

Atlantic. In short, for their Berlin pains the Soviets got NATO--a thorn they have been trying to remove from their hide ever since.

Then came Korea. Here the Kremlin succeeded in embroiling the entire United Nations--but most especially the United States--in defending against the first real surrogate operation. While the military effort failed, the fact of Communist persistence hardly needs elaboration when--a quarter century later--we still find the issue a major factor in American politics and security. But the ultimate confirmation that a new nuclear power had entered center stage came in 1957. Once again, the Soviets evidenced in that year an incredible facility for shooting themselves in the political foot...something they periodically seemed bound to do. On this occasion, Russian tanks and troops swept through Hungary and into the heart of Budapest to eradicate signs of "counter-revolution" within the Eastern Bloc. Predictably, world opinion turned almost universally against Moscow, and all the propaganda gains of the past decade seemed in imminent danger of being swept away. From the U.S. point of view, things couldn't have been better. But before the full returns could be collected, three nations--Great Britain, France, and Israel--reversed the tide: in concert, they invaded Egypt, ostensibly to safeguard the Suez Canal. In rapid succession, Hungary was forgotten, Egypt became the focus of world opinion, and Nikita Khrushchev--let off the Hungarian hook--for the first time rattled Soviet rockets. In one instant, Moscow

transformed its image from an aggressive, repressive predator to defender of right and justice in the Middle East. In the ensuing two decades, the West has been unable to dislodge the Kremlin from this position and, in large measure, peace has escaped this part of the world as a result. One is constrained to observe that international political ineptitude is not a monopoly held by the Soviet Union.

As an aside, it is also worth noting that Khrushchev's Hungarian adventure in 1957 can well be considered the genesis of the Brezhnev Doctrine, enunciated more than a decade later in explanation of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. That doctrine, incidently, applied as it was in Czechoslovakia, caught the Soviets directly on the horns of a dilemma of no small proportions. For, the carefully nurtured concept of detente, which had been adopted to replace the increasingly discredited "peaceful co-existence," had just begun to bear fruit in the capitals of NATO Europe. Moscow's swift and brutal suppression of the Czech deviationists thoroughly shocked those in NATO who had concluded that the millenium had just arrived on the wings of detente. They temporarily renewed some of the crumbling mortar between the bricks of NATO.

Prior to this time, however, an event occurred which went largely unremarked in the West, but one that would prove to have profound ramifications for the future. Enthralled with the power of nuclear-tipped rockets, Nikita Khrushchev decided that the Soviet Navy should comprise

little else than large numbers of submarines armed with "flying torpedoes." Presumably he wanted Sergei Gorshkov--whose "enthusiasm for missile technology...comparative youth...and ...record of political reliability" appealed to him--to undertake this transformation of the navy.* Thus, in January 1956, Khrushchev ousted Admiral Kuznetsov as the Soviet naval commander in favor of his own protege. But Gorshkov not only outmaneuvered his new boss, he outlasted him as well, and in the 22 years he has been Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy he has managed to forge a large, reasonably balanced, blue-water fleet whose surface ships are today as visible around the world as they are powerful. What would turn out to be a mistake from Khrushchev's point of view has in the long term redounded to Russian advantage. Moreover, it was the growing assertiveness of Moscow's foreign policy under Khrushchev's nuclear-rocket-backed belligerency which may well have given Gorshkov the very arguments he desperately needed to convince the land-oriented Kremlin leadership of sea power's indispensable value. Although the notion is hotly contested by some in the world of academe, I believe the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 constituted a watershed in the fortunes of the Soviet Navy. If Sergei Gorshkov didn't exploit the Russian humiliation--caused by Soviet impotence in the face of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet--with telling effect in Kremlin councils, I would be very much surprised. Whatever the actual circumstances, the results are crystal clear:

* Fairhall, David. Russian Sea Power, Gambit, Inc., Boston: 1971 pp. 183-184

the outreach of Soviet conventional military power--something so seriously lacking during Stalin and Khrushchev days--has now extended to the four corners of the globe...in direct relationship to the growth of the Red Navy. And that, of course, brings us to the question of where the U.S.S.R. stands today and how the Soviets are using this new capability.

If one peruses a world map today, one finds the Soviets engaged around the world, with their maritime prowess--naval, merchant, fishing, hydrographic--invariably in the vanguard. From operating bases and facilities in Cuba--Cienfuegos and Havana--Russian warships and naval aircraft sit astride the myriad Caribbean shipping routes which crisscross this vital region. In the Mediterranean Sea, the Soviet Navy can be found from one end to the other, and the capability of this fleet to contest American and Allied control of its waters was frighteningly demonstrated during the 1973 Middle East war. East of Suez, the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron, which came to that area to stay in 1968, outnumbers the U.S. Navy most of the time and is inferior in power only during periodic U.S. carrier task force deployments to the region. In the Pacific, the pattern of Soviet operations is similar. Of supreme importance is the fact that these deployments to seas far distant from the Russian homeland are all used to demonstrate Soviet military strength which can be used to support friendly and client states, as well as to intimidate those who might be currently opposing Moscow's policies. A case study is provided by present events in the South Atlantic

and on the African continent south of the Sahara.

To informed observers, this portion of the world is of critical significance to the West in general and to the United States in particular. If one takes only a brief look at American industry's dependence on raw materials imported from southern Africa, he will find the result to be sobering. We are heavily, and in some instances completely, dependent on this region for materials such as bauxite and alumina, chromium ore, manganese ore, nickel and its concentrates, tin, tungsten, and zinc...to name but a few.* Myriad other materials in lesser quantities flow continuously across the South Atlantic to the United States

Then, there is the matter of oil. With closure of the Suez Canal during the 1967 Middle East war, the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope suddenly assumed immense importance to Europe...and, incidently, increased consequence to the United States in light of our rapidly changing status as a nation no longer able to boast energy independence. Closure of the Canal spawned today's supertanker and, over the ensuing years, the waters south of the Cape became the windy corner of the oil trade, vying for prominence with the Strait of Malacca. The significance of these heavily traveled trade routes off the southern tip of Africa and throughout the South and Mid-Atlantic did not escape the notice of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Moscow's interest in the region

* For an excellent discussion of this point, see Hahn, Walter F. and Cottrell, Alvin J. Soviet Shadow Over Africa, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami: 1976

is not new...it didn't start with Angola.

A decade ago, Moscow's heavy hand descended on the Congo following the Belgian withdrawal. The results of this effort were something less than successful. Ghana proved not much more productive despite a heavy Russian investment in aid--military and economic. But persistence is one of the Kremlin's long suits and that attribute eventually paid off in Guinea. Today, ships and aircraft of the Soviet Navy operate routinely out of Conakry...this notwithstanding U.S. political pressure exerted on the regime of Marxist President Sekou Toure. And then came Angola. With introduction of Cuban combat troops --a first for Communist intervention in southern Africa-- the port of Luanda joined Pointe Noire and Conakry in providing support facilities to the Red Fleet. Now, if one draws lines between these ports and connects them with the island of Cuba, a rough triangle is described which crosses all the shipping lanes in a major portion of the South Atlantic. By manipulating a combination of arms and economic aid, diplomatic relations and friendship treaties, Moscow seeks to cement its presence and influence in this part of the world, as well as ensuring access to facilities which will permit the U.S.S.R. to threaten Western interests at will. The pattern is all too evident.

And, as I have already suggested, the Soviets have been assisted in their South Atlantic endeavors by the very nations they seek to victimize. The United States, for example, embroiled for the past two decades with Korea, Vietnam, and repeated

crises in the Mediterranean, has virtually ignored the South Atlantic as well as the littoral nations fronting on this crucial ocean. Aside from the annual UNITAS naval cruises around South America, and direct transits enroute the Gulf of Tonkin and the Indian Ocean during the Vietnam era--neither of which provided the political impact of a true naval presence--there has been essentially no U.S. naval activity in the area. And NATO, though critically dependent on Middle Eastern oil as well as most of the aforementioned raw materials from southern Africa, has stubbornly refused to move its Atlantic maritime boundary south of the Tropic of Cancer. Always concerned that any move to expand NATO boundaries would inevitably increase the risk that the Alliance would be drawn into one or more of the United States' world-wide commitments--a la Korea or Vietnam--its member states have consistently refused to acknowledge that there are NATO interests lying beyond the boundaries established decades ago. Moscow cannot help but applaud this refusal to countenance change.

A global move by the United States has also aided the Soviet Union in this region. No one, of course, can fault the moral and political power of the human rights posture assumed by President Carter, most especially its direct thrust at the U.S.S.R. But the scatter-gun application of its tenets around the world--against friend and foe alike--has clearly done serious harm to American interests in

several important instances. One of these impinges directly on defense of the South Atlantic against the on-going Russian incursion. Brazil and Argentina, historic friends and allies of the United States, are ideally located to field their own naval forces--and afford support facilities to those of the U.S.--when and if the need for combat operations should arise. Furthermore, these two nations are capable of contributing to the naval presence required throughout the region to counter that of the Soviet Union. But stung by the human rights violation charges broadcast to the world by the new American Administration, both nations took steps to sever the military support relationships they had maintained for many years with their neighbor to the north. Rumblings in Brazil, at the time of this initial retaliatory move, suggested to astute observers that this future colossus of the Southern Hemisphere might go even further. Shortly thereafter, the Atlantic Fleet sent a carrier task force south for training exercises with the Brazilian Navy and to make port calls at various places along the coast. The cruise turned out to be a highly successful one and, for a time, it appeared that this effort had gone a long way toward repairing some of the damage which the human rights charges had inflicted. One gesture by the United States Navy, however, proved not to be enough. On 19 September 1977, Brazil canceled all of the four remaining military agreements with the U.S.--two of them, including a naval agreement, going back to 1942 when the two nations undertook to cooperate

against the threat posed in the South Atlantic by Nazi Germany. Given the growing Soviet influence in this region, such a rupture benefits only Moscow...and we engineered it.

Taken in sum, one cannot help but wonder if control of the South Atlantic is not going to go to the Kremlin by default. And if that picture is not sufficiently grim, one has only to glance at what is happening throughout the southern portion of the African continent. With the former Portugese colony of Mozambique now in the clutches of a Marxist regime, armed and assisted to power by the Soviet Union--as it did in the case of Somalia; with the same situation obtaining directly across the continent in Angola; with the cauldron stirred by the explosive black-white struggle for power in Rhodesia and South Africa itself--not to mention Namibia--it is not difficult to postulate a future which would find all of the southern portion of Africa erupting in violence as a prelude to falling under control of Moscow-backed, Marxist governments, heavily influenced by the Soviets, and affording access to their ports and airfields to the Russians in exchange for arms and aid supplied during the struggles. Thus commanding the windy corner off the Cape and the maritime highways of the South Atlantic proper, the Kremlin would have a double handhold around the economic and industrial throat of Europe as well as that of the United States. And if one subjects those other regions of the world where the Soviets are currently active to this same sort of close

scrutiny, strikingly similar patterns emerge. Conditions in the South Atlantic and in southern Africa, in my judgment, are symptomatic.

So what should the United States do about the South Atlantic threat? The quickest response, of course, would be to establish a naval presence by means of reasonably frequent naval deployments. And these should be excursions designed specifically to highlight that presence amongst the littoral nations. Aircraft carriers and our most modern surface combatants should be sent to do the job. A publicized presence of naval forces with respectable muscle, calling at friendly ports on both sides of the ocean will assure those nations still on our side and impress those that are either in or leaning toward the Soviet camp.

In the longer term, we need to marshal political and economic force to promote our own interests and frustrate those of the Soviets. For example, we ought to be less reluctant to put heat on Guinea to deny access to Conakry from which Soviet ships and aircraft range north and south across the Atlantic today. At first blush it may seem inhuman to some to deny Public Law 480 food grants to any nation in order to stop it from doing that with which we take issue. Perhaps so. But on the other hand, is it fair to the American taxpayer or is it in the interests of this country to continue to supply such grants when they serve to keep a regime in power which is patently bent on aiding a nation--the U.S.S.R--

whose avowed purpose is to do us in? I think not. Moreover, we need to enlist the support of friendly countries around the littoral...not alienate them.

Specifically, we should be exerting every effort to help Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela to modernize their own naval forces. On the African side of the ocean we should judiciously combine diplomacy and economic aid in a carefully orchestrated program to move key nations to our side of the fence. Some military aid may be in order, despite the volatile nature of the region. Provision of a basic coastal defense navy to some of them could go far toward insulating them against the threat of subversive infiltration or unsophisticated, overt assaults from the sea by their neighbors. This action would leave control of the open ocean to those Western and Western-oriented nations possessing true blue-water fleets.

In brief, these are the sorts of initiatives the United States ought to be taking to blunt the current Soviet drive in this part of the world. Furthermore, since the pattern examined in the South Atlantic is similar to that obtaining in other parts of the world, I would submit that these same kinds of actions ought to apply elsewhere, as well. At the moment, however, we have a problem of major proportions: the present size of the United States Navy. At its lowest level in numbers of ships since the mid-1930's, the U.S. Navy is not today capable of countering the Soviet world-wide maritime offensive. And it will be even less capable of doing so in the next decade or two...unless its size and basic structure are substantially altered. More about that later.

As indicated at the outset of this discussion, I believe our approach to the very real threat posed by the Soviets must be one featuring utilization of total force. And its underlying philosophy will have to focus on full exploitation of those areas wherein the United States still enjoys superiority over the Soviet Union. With respect to technology, for instance, we must maintain a strong research and development effort--in civil as well as military fields. Most especially, we must choke off the current spate of virtually indiscriminate exports to the U.S.S.R. and Warsaw Pact countries. The recent Washington fight over sale of the Cyber-76 computer system to the Soviet Union is a direct case in point. It is clearly not in our own national interest to sell to our antagonist advanced technology that he does not have, thus permitting him to devote his resources--they are finite and limited, just as are ours--to other projects which may ultimately grant him the edge he needs to realize his fundamental objective: the demise of American power and the triumph of Soviet-led Communism.

Industrial know-how falls into the same category as technology. These and the incredible productivity of U.S. agriculture are parts of the total force we must apply to the Russian threat. To a degree, our actions will have to be reactionary inasmuch as Moscow has moved ahead of us in some areas and there we will have to play catch-up ball. But we should not let this fact limit our effort. We must be

innovative at the same time. As I noted earlier, this is not one of the Kremlin's strengths. While the Russian leaders are past-masters at the art of exploiting opportunities presented to them, they have demonstrated considerably less capability to create the conditions which they can then use to further their international aims. We must, therefore, expend more effort on peering into the future, in attempting to identify those brewing international situations which might provide Moscow new opportunities--and move to forestall prospective Soviet gains. Only by thus employing total force in an enlightened manner can we be assured that Lenin's prediction will come true...but that it will be the democratic protagonist who will triumph.

In summary, one must conclude that there is a global threat to the United States and the Western way of life. Ill-perceived by its prospective victims it may be, but it is nonetheless real. We can take hope, however, in the fact that on numerous occasions the Kremlin has revealed that it is something less than infallible. Confronted with a threat of this nature, innovative American policies will surely emerge victorious in the end. But unless we move promptly and positively, we may lose the contest by default. The course we must chart, it seems to me, is manifest.

Of supreme importance, of course, we must maintain strategic deterrence. To do so, it is essential that we redress the strategic nuclear imbalance at the earliest possible moment. For, under this umbrella, we can prevent coercion

of ourselves and our friends, while at the same time taking those conventional measures which will ensure our own successes while halting the onrush of Soviet-led Communism. The task, to be sure, will not be an easy one. Differing approaches to strategic nuclear war as elucidated by Richard Pipes, domestic spending pressures, refusal of American leadership to reveal the unpalatable to our citizens are all formidable hurdles. Nonetheless, these factors hold the key to our national survival.

Once strategic deterrence is assured...then what? I would reiterate that the growth in Soviet international outreach has paralleled the emergence of a comprehensive maritime capability. Our counter-action should, therefore, exploit the same arena. As an insular nation, which has for two centuries excelled in this environment, the United States should concentrate on sea power as one of its comparative strengths. We should not limit ourselves to such action, but employ it as a part of the total force concept with all of the flexibility we can manage. Conversely, we will ignore the maritime arena at our extreme peril. The final question to be answered, therefore, is what kind of navy does the U.S. need to do this portion of the job?

In my considered, professional judgment, it must be a fleet which is affordable...yet sufficiently numerous and powerful to confront--successfully--the Soviets' world-wide offensive. We must use our current carrier advantage to the maximum extent so long as these ships have sea-going

life remaining in them. Now, however--and the now is of critical importance--we must begin to construct the fleet of the future...we cannot risk waiting for a latter-day Pearl Harbor to demonstrate to us that a new naval age has dawned. We must, of course, disperse tactical aviation at sea...on an optimum number of platforms. After all, a nuclear-engined aircraft carrier--powerful though it unquestionably is--can be in but one place at a time. And, if the place doesn't happen to be where the vital action is taking place, that particular bird farm is something less than useful. Therefore, we must begin now to construct medium-size (40-60 thousand tons), conventionally-powered carriers to operate fixed-wing aircraft. These carriers (CVV) would fill the transition period until vertical/short take-off and landing (V/STOL) technology can be perfected. In the event it cannot, the CVV will provide a hedge against that possibility, permitting us to maintain tactical aviation at sea into the foreseeable future. If, on the other hand, we do solve the not inconsiderable problems of V/STOL technology, those aircraft can be sent to sea on existing CVV's and on smaller (20-35 thousand ton), cheaper, V/STOL carriers (VSS) in numbers adequate to meet our needs.

Further, we must press ahead with lower-cost--again, that means affordable in adequate numbers--missile-armed surface combatants capable of facing off with ships of the Soviet Navy...and winning. These and other new concept ships should be designed to carry V/STOL aircraft where feasible, thus

further dispersing our sea-borne tactical aviation. To do all this, we will have to capitalize on one of our nation's greatest strengths: America's technological superiority over the U.S.S.R. By these means we can develop and field new naval capabilities and employ new concepts which will allow us to negate the maritime gains made during the past twenty years by the Soviet Navy under the astute leadership of Sergei Gorshkov.

Finally, there is one ingredient without which the foregoing prescription will avail us little. We must have the national will and determination to run the course. Above all, this requires the understanding and backing of the American people. It has been my experience, as I have talked to Americans across the country, that if they are given the facts they will almost unanimously support whatever action may be necessary to solve the problem. As one looks back across the pages of history, it seems clear that it has not been the people who have been unwilling to face the facts but, rather, their leaders have been reluctant to reveal those facts to them. And, I might add, one can adduce that such reasoning usually stems primarily from political fears among the ruling elite.

Unless the American leadership--the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense--stand up and say to the American people, "Ugly as they may be, these are the facts," there is no way the sort

of determination which will be required is going to materialize. In short, our elected leaders have simply got to level with those who put them in office. If they do, we shall eventually triumph; if they do not, we shall surely perish.