

AMERICAN MEDICAL BUILDINGS

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ELMO R. ZUMWALT, JR.  
PRESIDENT


October 21, 1977

Mr. Paul Stillwell  
Managing Editor  
Proceedings  
United States Naval Institute  
Annapolis, Maryland 21402

Dear Paul:

Thank you for your letter of 1 October 1977. I attach herewith my proposed article. Please forgive the fact that it is not a smooth-typed product, but if I am going to meet your deadline I decided it better come in in its present form.

Sincerely,

  
E. R. ZUMWALT, JR.

ERZJr:bj

Enclosure



UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE  
ANNAPOLIS MARYLAND 21402

1 October 1977

Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret.)  
1500 Wilson Blvd. Suite 1700  
Arlington, Va. 22209

Dear Admiral Zumwalt:

As each year draws to a close, school children count the number of days until Christmas, and we count the number of days until our next deadline. **In this case, we** have a special reason for counting because we expect our surface warfare issue to be a special one. To make it a memorable issue, we're looking forward to your article and others. Thus, we hope you can find time during the next month to put the finishing touches on your manuscript. We would like to have the submissions for the issue in hand by 1 November so we will have time to evaluate them, get them to the board for voting, and then edit those that are selected for the special issue. Thirty days hath September, April, June and special issue authors...

Very respectfully,

Paul Stillwell  
Managing Editor  
Proceedings

## Total Force

by

Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN (Ret.)

The total force used by a nation in international power politics includes not only its strategic and conventional military and naval forces, but also the force flowing from the nation's society and resources. The Soviets are much better at combining their assets into a total force than we are. What I call total force is called the "correlation of forces" by the Soviets. They see and proclaim a change in this correlation of forces in favor of "socialism." The components of the "correlation of forces," or total force, as seen by the Soviets include strategic nuclear, conventional military, political, ideological, economic, technological, social and diplomatic force.<sup>1</sup>

The Soviets have in the past contrived, and stated their intention in the future to contrive, situations in which their total force combines to produce the likelihood of achieving success in the international arena without firing a shot. This intent is apparent in the words and actions of Soviet leaders, aiming toward the achievement of a military, political and psychological paralysis of the free world through peace propaganda, infiltration threats and diplomatic negotiations backed by military superiority.<sup>2</sup> It is my purpose here to examine the components of total force in the Soviet Union and the United States against the backdrop of the world strategic situation. I shall then look at seapower's contribution to total<sub>force</sub> and examine the logical strategy and forces for the U.S. Navy that ought to follow from such analyses.

I shall attempt to minimize repetition between my 1962 article, "A Course for Destroyers," and my 1976 article, "High-Low," though some parts will necessarily be restated. In my 1962 article, I pointed out that "it seems reasonable to conclude that in the absence of effective arms control agreements, the U.S.S.R. will arrive at that point in time at which she can wreak nearly total civil damage on her enemy by the 1970's or 1980's." We did not achieve effective <sup>arms</sup> control agreements. We reached the point of nuclear equivalency in the early 1970's. The Soviets today can wreak nearly total damage on us and have now moved to a condition of distinct nuclear superiority. Strategic nuclear weapons constitute the most important military component of total force, so I shall summarize the factors that brought about U.S. inferiority.

#### STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE

In discussing strategic nuclear weapons, it is important to comprehend their role not only in an actual war, not only their role as a deterrent to actual war, but also their role as a political coercive force. Nuclear superiority provides a superpower with more freedom to act unilaterally in the international arena without threat of interference. It provides a superpower with the ability to coerce a rival into inaction. This is particularly true of a nation such as the Soviet Union whose doctrine, unlike that of the United States, asserts that while an all-out nuclear war would be extremely destructive to both parties, its outcome would not be mutual suicide: The country better prepared could win and survive.<sup>3</sup>

During the 1960's, the U.S. completed a modern nuclear force with about 2000 delivery systems consisting of ICBMs, SLBMs, and B-52 bombers. The Soviets, lagging by about a decade, had about half that number by 1968. The Soviets, as evidenced by developments in the 1970's, were engaged in a drive toward nuclear superiority that was accelerated in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, as Mikoyan's parting shot to U.S. negotiators in that crisis suggested would be the case. In 1972, as a result of SALT I, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that prohibits either party from extensive deployment of ABM systems. We have not kept our one site ready. The Soviets have kept theirs active. Moreover, in my judgment, they have violated the treaty in at least three ways. There was also an Interim Agreement that limited for five years the numbers of ~~the USSR had the right to have 950 SLBMs to our 710 if they chose to give up th~~ ICBM/SLBM launchers at 1,054 for the U.S. and 1,618 for the Soviets. Many of the Soviet missiles are of the very large type such as the SS-9 (and its even larger replacement the SS18) which has three times the throw weight of the U.S. Minuteman missile. In 1974, the Vladivostok Accord established guidelines which would, if converted into a SALT II Treaty, limit the total number of delivery systems (ICBM/SLBM/Bombers) to 2,400, of which 1,320 could be MIRVed. Agreement has not been reached yet on any limit.

In March of 1975, the U.S. proposed two alternatives: 1) implement the Vladivostok agreement but <sup>defer</sup> for the future backfire bomber and cruise missile negotiations; 2) reduction of the Vladivostok limit of 2,400 offensive launch vehicles to 1,800 to 2,000; reduction of the Vladivostok limit of 1,320 MIRVed missile launchers to 1,100 to 1,200; a sublimit of 550 MIRVed ICBM launchers; inclusion of all SS17s, SS18s

Folder 210 of their 1618 ICBMs.

and SS-19s within the 550 subceiling; a limit of 150 on Soviet SS-9 and SS-18 modern large ballistic missiles (MLBMs) with <sup>in the</sup> 550 subceiling but with none permitted to the U.S.; a ban on testing or deployment of all new or mobile ICBMs and prohibition of modifications of existing ICBMs; a limitation of six-per-year in-flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs, and; a ban on cruise missiles with ranges greater than 2,500 kilometers.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>a</sup> This latter deal, if accepted by the Soviets, would have permitted the U.S. MIRVed ICBM throw weight of 1.25 million pounds while permitting the Soviets over four times as much -- 5.2 million pounds. Moreover, the number of Soviet MIRVed ICBM reentry vehicles would have been more than twice ours and the yield of each five times the yield of ours.

The best that can be said of the March comprehensive proposals is that, if accepted:

- 1) They would, with present U.S. programs, begin to reduce somewhat the immense Soviet strategic advantage after 1982,
- 2) They would not prevent the U.S. from developing new programs which would have reduced almost entirely the Soviet advantage.<sup>5</sup>

The Soviets greeted the March proposals with the strategy that worked so well in SALT I negotiations. They expressed fury and rejected them. The U.S. followed its normal pattern of promptly departing from one SALT position to the adoption of a weaker one.

The May 1977 proposal offered a new negotiating framework consisting of three tiers. The first tier would be an eight-year treaty, presumably similar to alternative 1 of the March proposals but with a longer time frame. The second tier was to be a three-year protocol to the treaty banning the testing or deployment of new ICBMs, intermediate-range ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles but not air-launched ones, permitting a larger number of SS-18s with no separate limit on SS-17s and SS-19s, limiting

production of BACKFIRE and heavy bombers equipped with intermediate-range cruise missiles. The third tier would be an agreed set of principles to guide the continuing negotiations to come into effect after the three-year protocol.<sup>6</sup>

The May proposal had the following effect:

1) With present U.S. <sup>strategic programs,</sup> they gave back the immense Soviet strategic nuclear supremacy that would have been somewhat reduced by the March proposals.

2) The U.S. gave up the right to reduce the supremacy until after 1986 at least.<sup>7</sup>

#### WHAT IS GOING ON AT SALT?

Over the years, the U.S. has emphasized accuracy of ICBMs while the Soviets have sought higher throw weight, yield and lethal radioactivity. Soviet accuracy lags the U.S., but their weapons approach the ability to neutralize U.S. strategic missiles (counterforce) by virtue of high throw weight and yield. The key to understanding Soviet nuclear superiority is in how this high weight and yield provides an increasing counterforce capability. As Soviet missile accuracy increases, the heavy, large yield warheads in the big Soviet missiles, such as the SS-9 and the newer SS-18, can be replaced with many, smaller MIRVed warheads. Thus, the throw weight <sup>very</sup> advantage enjoyed by the Soviets can be converted from <sup>large</sup> large yield weapons to a number of <sup>large</sup> MIRVed warheads that will produce a credible counterforce capability. The U.S. ICBM force is being neutralized. The aging B-52

force, with no B-1 replacement, cannot perform well the counterforce mission of neutralizing Soviet missile sites. The submarine SLBMs are basically anti-city (countervalue) weapons, not having, nor being permitted by the Congress to have, the accuracy of a fixed site ICBM. The cruise missile is also better as a countervalue weapon because of its long, subsonic flight time and vulnerability to defensive weapons, although its high accuracy and the numbers we can afford make it a useful counterforce weapon. The Soviets currently have more than 300 heavy ICBMs. A U.S. decision to build and deploy the mobile MX ICBM, to build cruise missiles of adequate range, and to increase submarine SLBM accuracy is the requirement for starting the march back to nuclear parity.<sup>8</sup>

Further SALT agreements are bogged down in issues over the large Soviet missiles, the MX, the cruise missile, and Backfire. The Human Rights issues of nuclear superiority, and were used as I have said as a ploy for public consumption to bring concessions from the U.S. during the 1977 SALT talks. There seems to be little doubt that the Soviets intend to maintain their current superiority in lethal radioactivity, numbers of missiles, types of missiles, megatonnage and throw weight, and to gain superiority in numbers of warheads as well as great superiority in civil defense.

There is a basic difference in attitude toward security between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The U.S. is a nation used to projecting power abroad as a means of defense in the post World War II period, while blessed with safe borders at home. There is a feeling of never again wanting to be surprised by a nation, such as Japan at Pearl Harbor, delivering a covert strike against the heart of the U.S. military deterrent force, as was the U.S. Fleet in 1941. Today, a significant part of that deterrent is the

ICBM force. Perversely, as a result of a desire to protect that deterrent, the U.S. is extremely wary of any steps to develop what is perceived by the Soviets as a counterforce capability lest it encourage a Soviet counterforce capability. The Soviets, on the other hand, have a country that has been invaded many times, and see themselves today ringed by the threatening forces of the U.S., NATO, and the Peoples Republic of China. The Soviets approach security from a viewpoint that, in order to avoid invasion, they must be capable of attacking first if warranted by the situation, and overwhelming the potential invaders through the early use of great destructive power and large standing armies. "Strike first as a last resort" is a basic tenet of Soviet military doctrine. U.S. efforts to present a passive pose with regard to our counterforce capabilities have not stopped the Soviets. The Soviet goal remains to seek a first strike, counterforce capability as a defensive measure as well as a means of obtaining an international coercent force.

There is a divergence of views between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on the credibility of nuclear war as a real option. The U.S. policy is to rely on deterrence, discrediting nuclear war as a viable option because of the great havoc it would wreak on each side. The Soviets consider nuclear war as a credible option.<sup>9</sup> This viewpoint is substantiated by Soviet writings and actions. They are spending more than one billion dollars annually (as opposed to our few million) on a civil defense program that could provide a strategic advantage potentially as destabilizing as the ABM.

In the U.S., there is a tendency to take a short-term view of overall strategy, a characteristic of western democracy and capitalism. The Soviet viewpoint, more sustainable under an authoritarian, militaristic dictatorship,

is more long term. The "arms control viewpoint" tends to adopt the short-term solution in order to obtain agreements, believing that the real long term achievement is the limitation of arms. The U.S. too often adopts the "arms control viewpoint" at the expense of its long range security. The Soviets, more than we, recognize that arms control negotiations are a necessary tactic in an overall strategy, but that the long range goal is strategic nuclear superiority to insure national survival and not some fair final limitation of arms. The Soviets perceive that though the use of nuclear weapons seems unthinkable, they have a coercent effect, and the day may come when such weapons become usable if one side has sufficient superiority and if the stakes warrant it. They intend to be that side.

#### Conventional Military Force

The existence of strategic nuclear force will always impact on the usability of conventional force, both in location and manner. In terms of location, there exist areas such as the European central front where the threat of escalation to nuclear war is so high that conventional forces are of value primarily as an added deterrent or nuclear "tripwire." There are also areas such as the Eastern Mediterranean, the Norwegian Sea and the developing countries of Africa and Asia where conventional force is more usable.

During the decade of the 1970's, we have witnessed a trend toward an increasing quantitative advantage in Soviet conventional force. The Soviet Army is now deployed in over 170 divisions. The U.S. operates with 16 Army divisions. Soviet tanks outnumber the U.S. 45,000 to 10,000. Soviet principal naval surface combatants outnumber the U.S. by about 220 to 180. Soviet general purpose submarines outnumber the U.S. by 250 to 73.<sup>10</sup>

Overall, U.S. conventional military forces have declined in comparison with those of the Soviet Union, and U.S. qualitative leads are less pronounced than in the past.<sup>11</sup> Though numbers do not tell the story, accurately, the overwhelming nature of the Soviet numbers tell a great deal.

In addition to Soviet nuclear superiority, they have also achieved conventional military superiority. An important step in achieving conventional military superiority has been the expansion of the Soviet Navy into a force capable of countering U.S. sea control forces, thus potentially splitting the Atlantic community allies. It is the sad duty of Chiefs of Naval Operations to draw this bottom line. Admiral Holloway's latest published views draw that bottom line in a way that ought to have received greater attention than they have.

Under the threat of escalation to nuclear war, we must consider two types of conventional conflict: a very short conflict and a more extended one. The desire of both sides to avoid escalation would tend to support the short conflict theory, and the "one-strike," short notice, war is practiced by Soviet forces in Europe and at sea.<sup>12</sup> This type of conflict is particularly applicable on the flanks of NATO, the Indian Ocean and Africa where conventional force is more usable. For example, the Soviets could engage the U.S. conventionally at sea with the least risk to their homeland or risk of triggering nuclear war. They would prefer to use their total force, but particularly seapower, to achieve their goals without conflict. However, if the U.S. Navy were interposed, the Soviets could decide to engage in conflict at sea rather than give up the minimum objective to which they believed their superior force entitled them. The advantage to be gained from such a conflict would be not only attainment

of the objective, but political leverage resulting from the demonstration of superior conventional force. If they can prevail in such short conventional conflicts, or coerce the U.S. to stand idly by while Soviet expansion takes place, then they do not need to <sup>call</sup> on their capability for an extended conventional war or a nuclear war to achieve their goals.

#### POLITICAL FORCE

Political force has to do with the leadership and stability of governments and their ability to carry out plans to successful conclusions, achieving political consensus and operating successfully in a bureaucratic environment. This is more difficult to do in the U.S. democratic system than in the Soviet authoritarian government. Yet, the Soviets do need bureaucratic and political consensus among their upper echelons. As for the people, communists impose their decisions on the people, directing gratitude for the implementation of the "correct policy of the communist party."<sup>13</sup>

The communists see our recent political difficulties as the "increasing political instability of bourgeois society." They see the discrediting and distrust of western institutions to be "intensifying."<sup>14</sup> Certainly the difficulties experienced during the Watergate Years gave that impression. The traumatic experience of losing the politically and militarily mismanaged Vietnam War added to the feeling of gloom that permeated the U.S. in recent years. The doomsayers of U.S. policy echo that gloom and would have us retreat from world leadership and refuse to confront blatant Soviet expansion, feeling that political consensus to react cannot be obtained among the American ~~People~~.

The Soviets have been politically successful in selling the facade of detente, or "relaxation of tensions" as they call it. In fact, there has been no such relaxation. On the Soviet side, the cold war has never stopped and the need for Soviet "containment" has never been stronger. The real purpose of detente from the Soviet points of view is to remove U.S. pressure such that political, economic and material might can be strengthened for the continuing struggle.<sup>15</sup>

In 1975, Kissinger delayed reporting the facts on the <sup>Angolan</sup> Situation until Soviet arms and Cuban troops had the war essentially won and then the U.S. Congress acted effectively to prevent the U.S. from aiding non-communist forces in the Angolan Revolution. This was a political failure of the U.S. system to recognize the long term threat of communist expansion, and resulted primarily from a desire to hide the failure of detente, the debilitating impact of Watergate, and the public's post Vietnam "never again" mood. The U.S. stood idly by while Cuban mercenaries were used to fight the Soviet Union's proxy war in Angola, providing them a foothold for further expansion in troubled and strategic southern Africa.<sup>16</sup>

The Soviets have their own political problems. Their means for choosing a successor to the President and Party Chairman are weak because they are unde<sup>mocratic</sup> and usually result in instability. Racism and unrest among the many nationalities of the Soviet Union are a source of dissension.<sup>17</sup> A perplexing problem for the Soviets is the increasing demand for consumer goods among the people, which can be only partially met if emphasis on military and industrial technology continues. Within the communist family, the increasingly independent attitude of the Warsaw Pact states, the restive

European Communists and the openly hostile Chinese prevent communist solidarity on many issues. But these are problems wrestling under a blanket. The Soviet government is capable of suppressing some of these problems and obtaining more political consensus and more rapidly than we.

The Soviet Union has political power that is strong, and it is capable of projecting that power (albeit sometimes with effects not anticipated) to such places as Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Vietnam, India (before the election) and Korea. The U.S. is currently in irons with regard to projecting political power, questioning its desire or ability to do so. In the political component of total force, two extremely important questions must be tested for political consensus. First, does the U.S. have sufficient will to devote enough resources to obtain a superior total force? Second, assuming enough total force, does the U.S. have the leadership, morale and will to use that correlation of force<sup>S</sup> to prevent Soviet expansion? These questions are sensitive to our four year political reelection process, and politicians are wary of raising them. It is my firm conviction that the American people will support a "yes" on both questions, and in fact must do so to ensure the survival of the United States in<sup>the</sup> face of the long term Soviet threat. But until these issues are firmly put forward to the people and thus tested and confirmed, the Soviet Union will hold political force superiority.

#### IDEOLOGICAL FORCE

From the Soviet viewpoint, the Communist Socialist ideology has "proved its vitality and invincibility," becoming a world system embracing Europe, Asia and now Africa.<sup>18</sup> The "great Soviet sacrifices and ultimate victory over Facism" in World War II are seen as the catalyst that caused

"victorious people's revolutions" that overturned capitalist systems in Eastern Europe. These victories were followed by Communist regimes in China, Korea, Cuba, Vietnam and Angola. Communist parties in Western Europe are perceived to have become stronger, and socialist policies such as the nationalization of industries to have been adopted. The "class battle" is seen as continuing with the Soviet Union as the ideological leader of the communist world, seeking to spread communist ideology and socialist systems into all countries of the world.

The communist socialist ideology is one that seeks a classless society in which "man's exploitation of man" is ended. It calls for a state controlled economy and unchallenged loyalty to all of the policies of the state. Soviet Communism has manipulated Russian nationalism to meet its needs, using the "Great Patriotic War" (World War II) as the vehicle to generate national pride and unity. Fear of the recurrence of the great tragedies of that war (twenty million dead) generates support for a strong military. With the exception of the heroic few, symbolized by Solzhenitsyn, the Soviet people have been willing to accept and support an oppressive ideology and political system, believing that without it their country could not compete in the modern world. (Solzhenitsyn holds that the Soviet people can be rallied to the call of individual freedom if the U.S. has the will and the toughness.)

This ideological unity is challenged by the People's Republic of China, which has developed its own brand of Communism and become an antagonist of the Soviet Union, accusing them of "Socialist Imperialism" in Asia and Africa. But, in facing the West and the emerging countries of Asia and Africa, communist ideological unity creates the appearance of strength when compared to the free, much debated policies emanating from the U.S. and Western Europe.

In countries facing chaotic economic conditions, and a vacuum of effective leadership, the communist ideology has appeal. From the government point of view it promises authoritarian control. From the view of the people, it promises that illusory goal, the equal distribution of goods. For these reasons, the Third World, where countries are trying to achieve twentieth century standards of living overnight, sees communist ideology as a strong competitor.

The ideological force of the U.S. is based primarily on the freedom and recognition of the rights of each individual person. The right to free enterprise is the basis of our capitalism. A government, supported by the political consensus of the people, is a basic right provided by the western ideology. This ideology has a great appeal to newly emerging nations, but great difficulty is encountered in implementing it because there is little democratic tradition and the temptation to the ruler to consolidate <sup>permanent</sup> power is irresistible. His justification is generally that the road to rapid industrializ<sup>ation</sup> requires authoritarian control of people and resources. Ideological force is therefore a toss-up between the two super powers. Each ideology has its strengths and weaknesses in the modern world. The one that is best supported by the other factors of total force will <sup>probably</sup> prevail.

#### ECONOMIC FORCE

Economic force is the factor that today permits the U.S. to exercise great power in the world. By any measure, the economic success of the U.S. outstrips that of any country. The most capital for investment and the most business know-how is available to the U.S. in using economic force to maintain a position of influence and world leadership. The Soviet

Union has, through its controlled economy, isolated itself from the world market and made the ruble of little <sup>value</sup> in international exchange. Its economic influence is thus limited primarily to bilateral material arrangements which are often unattractive because of the political linkages. It is the economic force of the U.S. that has often influenced the ideological choice in Third World countries in favor of the West.

Today, however, there are several factors that could change the posture of U.S. economic force. First and most important is the increasing dependence of the U.S., Western Europe and Japan on foreign petroleum sources. A cut-off of Mideast oil sources or their seaborne trade routes would quickly bring the industrial world to its knees. Japan would go under first, followed by Western Europe and eventually the United States. Today, the U.S. imports seven to eight million barrels of oil a day which is almost half of our daily consumption. Consumption trends, unless checked will increase by 50 percent by 1990. Petroleum imports will have to increase to meet this demand. The availability of these imports is sensitive to unpredictable world political, economic and military factors, such as the Arab-Israeli situation, the OPEC nations petroleum price control, and the increasing threat to seaborne oil routes by the Soviet Navy. The 1973 Arab oil embargo was a predictable event that only partially demonstrated the power of petroleum over the industrial world and the military superiority of the Soviet Union in the region. Efforts to become "embargo-proof" in the U.S. will be successful only when alternative energy sources are made economically feasible. This must occur by the year 2000 when it is predicted that world oil production will peak and begin to decline. In the meantime, the main-<sup>depend on</sup>tenance of U.S. economic force as a strong factor in the world will <sup>depend on</sup> whether our petroleum supply remains unimpeded, militarily, politically, and economically.

The U.S. economy is also dependent on the import of many mineral raw materials. Over seventy-five percent of our requirement for manganese, cobalt, titanium, chromium, aluminum and other essential strategic materials are imported.<sup>19</sup> These imports are also subject to political control and could be cut off, damaging the U.S. economy. The Soviet Union is today the most self-sufficient industrial nation in the world with respect to petroleum and mineral resources. The Soviet economic force is, though weak in business, management and technological structure, strong in the secure availability of resources.

U.S. resource imports are strongly dependent on shipping. Yet, U.S. merchant shipping has been decreasing in recent years. The capabilities of the active merchant marine are quickly exhaustible and specialized in ways that make them of minimum utility for use in a military emergency (such as container ships that are ill configured for carrying vehicles).<sup>20</sup> The U.S. merchant Marine Fleet is made up mostly of ships flying "flags of convenience" from Liberia, Panama and Honduras to avoid U.S. union wages and environmental control regulations. There are some 314 of these ships, and their availability and utility for a U.S. emergency is questionable. The Soviet Merchant Marine is controlled by the Soviet Navy and includes 1,650 modern ships whose design provides high utility for support of naval forces.<sup>21</sup> Like other Chiefs of Naval Operations, I attempted to obtain some unity of policy between the U.S. Navy and the Merchant Marine and supported a stronger, more reliable seapower posture for U.S. merchant ships. I am sorry to report that I too was frustrated in that attempt by government agencies--parochial and bureaucratic. Until a strong, seapower oriented merchant Marine is achieved in the U.S., it will continue as a weak link in U.S. economic force.

The Soviets have recognized finally that in order to be internationally competitive with U.S. economic force, they must develop a trading relationship with the industrialized world. In order to obtain the hard currency to buy the technological and consumer imports they need, the Soviets have begun to operate a series of banks and multi-national corporations in Western Europe, the Mideast and Asia.<sup>22</sup>

These companies include insurance, equipment leasing firms and maritime agencies. Of these, the most successful has been in shipping, exploiting the capabilities of the Soviet Merchant Fleet, and using it at a loss to gain business in carrying the goods of the world, including <sup>those of</sup> the U.S. From this effort, hard currency as well as strategic and political benefits accrue to the Soviets.

U.S. economic force in the world is therefore being challenged in an increasingly successful way. The immensity of U.S. economic force, however, still prevails. We should adopt policies that reinforce that strength rather than expedient ones that provide business know-how, technology and material goods to "bail-out" the Soviet economy. If carelessly-supervised U.S. "give away" policies continue, we will continue to contribute to increasing the strength of the Soviet economic <sup>and military</sup> force that will be used against us. With Soviet <sup>power</sup> military and political force superior to our own in the struggle for <sup>power</sup> ~~influencing~~ economic force remains the primary factor that prevents Soviet total force from prevailing.

#### TECHNOLOGICAL FORCE

Technological force, supporting military and economic force, is an important factor in the cold war. "Break <sup>throughs</sup>" in technology are the victories of the cold war, providing one side or the other with a real or perceived advantage that limits the initiative and influence of the other.