

The U.S. has been the world technological leader for several decades, and has used it to sustain a qualitative military advantage that offset Soviet numbers. Though still the leader in technology, the U.S. is being challenged by the Soviet Union which has developed the largest research and development manpower base in the world, numbering some 800,000 scientists and engineers.<sup>23</sup> Where the U.S. remains superior in such things as electronics, computers, space technology and submarine noise suppressants, the Soviet Union shows superiority in high pressure physics, rockets, air defense missiles and anti-ship missiles. The Soviets are closing the gap in ballistic missile accuracy, space sensor systems and tactical nuclear weapons.<sup>24</sup>

With an R&D budget in recent years 50 percent greater than ours the Soviets, when equally efficient, have been able to investigate three interesting programs for every two ~~of~~ ours.

The trend of continued technological growth in the Soviet Union in recent years indicates a high priority, and could seriously reduce the U.S. lead. In the U.S., there is more pressure to produce a research product that is usable in the economic world, and emphasis on military needs and pure research are increasingly criticized. It is not a question of our ability to have superior technological force, for that exists, but rather our will to adjust priorities and resources to retain it.

#### SOCIAL FORCE

Social force is the substance, morale and will of the people and the health and ability of their institutions to support and solve the problems of a modern society. It is exported and communicated daily through the mass media, tourism and economic as well as social contact. It is the "image" or "make-up" of a nation. The Soviets see in the U.S. a new series

of social crises and contradictions. They see evidence of social decay in the challenge of institutions such as the school and the church. They see capitalism decaying through monetary crisis and inflation, and they do their bit, as in the 1973 oil crisis, to <sup>hasten</sup> our decay. The Vietnam and civil rights riots, followed by Watergate, bolstered these observations. The Soviets perceive an increasing likelihood that the "working class people" of <sup>Western</sup> Societies are ready for a "class revolution." From their perspective, they cannot understand that what they have seen are the machinations of a free society adjusting to the realities of a changing world.

Today, it is my opinion that the social force of the <sup>post-Kissinger</sup> U.S., its will and capability to be <sup>heavy</sup> ~~strong~~ and viable in the modern world, is stronger than ever. However, the potential of this social force remains to be tapped and used.

The Soviets attempt to portray strong social force externally through such things as education and sports. Soviet educational institutions are plentiful and well equipped, but the education is politically controlled and narrowly oriented. A good example of this is the Soviet military where young, supposedly well educated officers lack initiative and perform jobs that are done by U.S. non-commissioned officers. In sports, the Soviet "amateur" teams are in reality professionals, and their victories, though impressive, convey the idea of authoritarian control rather than the existence of an enlightened social force.

#### DIPLOMATIC FORCE

Diplomatic force, or "interstate relations" as the Soviets term it, is the ability of a nation to effect a strategy in the world short of the actual use of military force. Examining the balance of this force is best done by looking at U.S. interests in the principle theaters of the world.

Western Europe has succeeded economically in becoming a third major element in world power relationships. However, the economics of Italy, France and Britain have become shaky, leaving West Germany as the economic power center. Militarily, West Europe still depends on the U.S., through NATO, for security. If the Soviets ~~respect~~ our will, the central front in Germany should remain secure from Soviet encroachment as long as a credible NATO conventional military force is there, backed by the threat of escalation to nuclear war. It is a "static" area under these conditions. The northern and southern flanks of NATO are more "dynamic" and subject to encroachment by Soviet military, political and ideological force. Along the Norwegian front, one Norwegian brigade faces two Army divisions and a naval infantry brigade backed by six divisions in the Leningrad area.<sup>25</sup> Soviet naval forces, including submarines and long range naval aircraft, exercise effective sea control of adjacent seas, and no U.S. commander has confidence that NATO forces could reinforce this area from the sea. Along NATO's southern flank, the Soviet Navy controls the Eastern Mediterranean, but Communist land forces face difficulty in penetrating the natural barriers to Italy and France. Politically, force is being exercised through Eurocommunism (which advertises itself as independent from Soviet control, but is not sufficiently so).

Western Europe remains extremely important strategically to the U.S., and its stability and security constitutes our first line of defense against Soviet total force. We should strive to maintain the central front as a "static" area and increase our total force on the northern and southern flanks to achieve the same. I believe that the Soviet threat to northern Norway is real, and that if we do not strengthen the region, they will

eventually take some of that territory in order to obtain better access to the sea, demonstrate the superiority of their total force and accelerate Finlandization of NATO. On the southern flank, the Soviets will, if military force trends continuing, attempt to exploit some crisis in order to engage or face down the Sixth Fleet, force its withdrawal, weaken NATO, and provide more leverage for its political and ideological force.

With the end of the Vietnam War, the balance of power around the Asian rimland has temporarily stabilized. The primary reason for this has been the continuing existence of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the rapprochement between the People's Republic of China and the U.S., and Vietnam's decision to follow a non-client role with both PRC and the U.S.S.R. China, sensing a Soviet threat to its ideology and separate existence, has for the time being chosen to seek the U.S. as a balance to Soviet power in Asia. The Sino-Soviet confrontation tends to preserve the status quo and permit Japan to balance itself between China and the U.S. and continue to exert great economic influence. During a recent visit to China, I had the opportunity to talk at length with top Chinese officials, including the Foreign Minister and <sup>the PRC</sup> Senior Vice Premier. In these discussions, it was apparent that the Chinese desire to manipulate the U.S. as a buffer to Soviet power. We share concern over the Soviet Union as a common interest.

The smaller rimland countries depend on the U.S. for security against a united Vietnam and a belligerent North Korea that leans toward the Soviet Union. A void of U.S. power in the Asian area would quickly be replaced by Soviet power, building on a naval expansion already begun in the Sea of Japan. Reduction of forces in South Korea or a <sup>still greater</sup> Soviet advantage in seapower could result in China seeking a Sino-Soviet rapprochement and a shifting of the entire balance of power in Asia to the Soviets. This would then permit the Soviets to use ideological and political force, or

proxy military forces (such as Vietnamese or North Korean) to hasten their version of social revolution. The U.S. should seek to maintain and strengthen its position in Asia and support the Chinese against the Soviets, not through appeasement (such as abandoning Taiwan), but through strength of total force and economic cooperation to assist their vitally needed modernization.

If Europe and Asia can be made reasonably stable, the threat of further Soviet "Socialist Imperialism" will be in Africa and the Indian Ocean area. The Chinese leaders I met with told me that the Soviets are "focusing their energies on Western Europe rather than Africa," and that developments in Africa are "going well." This is a natural Chinese viewpoint in that it is decidedly to their advantage to have a continuing U.S. Soviet confrontation in Western Europe, diverting Soviet power from their own borders. In Africa, not yet understanding the immediate vulnerability of free world oil SLOCs to Soviet forces there, they would prefer to compete with the Soviets without U.S. interference, adopting the role of "friend and leader of the Third World." I believe that the Soviets see control of Africa as a means of exercising total force and a key step toward winning global <sup>hegemony</sup> without having to fight in Europe or Asia.

The African area of newly emerging nations is strategically important to the U.S. because of its size and political impact, its geographic position along world trade routes and as an important source of raw materials.<sup>26</sup> The Soviets have selected Africa as an area for intense exploitation and have secured, <sup>albeit</sup> with some ebb and flow of influence, positions in Guinea and Angola on the west, and Somalia, Ethiopia and Mozambique on the east. They also exercise influence in North Africa on the Mediterranean littoral

through Libya. Political control of these areas will affect the U.S. interests in the Mediterranean, the Horn-of-Africa and Persian Gulf Area, the politically explosive southern Africa area (Rhodesia, South Africa, Namibia), and along the petroleum laden seaborne trade routes from the Persian Gulf, around the Cape of Good Hope to Europe and America.

The use of Cuban forces in Angola in 1975 in support of the Communist MPLA was the beginning of the use of proxy military force for the Soviets in Africa. The Cubans are also involved as military advisors in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Tanzania, Somalia and Ethiopia.<sup>27</sup> In the Persian Gulf area, Soviet support of Iraq with new military equipment and bases poses a threat to Iran, Saudi Arabia and the stability of the world's most oil rich area. The Soviet Navy operates out of its base at Berbera in nearby Somalia and obtains support from South Yemen, bordering on Saudi Arabia to the south. On the east side of the Indian Ocean, Soviet influence in India was strong and is not yet eliminated.

The Soviets see Africa and the Indian Ocean area as the most exploitable. With Europe and Asia tense but basically "static" at this time, and most of Latin America beyond their immediate reach both geographically and politically, Soviet objectives in Africa will probably be pursued <sup>first</sup> . . . These include expansion of influence to Third World countries, attainment of a base posture to support a forward deployed Navy, enhancement of the Soviet image as a great power, the flanking of China to the south, control of the oil routes and creation of an expanding base to influence world events. They correctly understand the threat that Soviet control of the African littoral poses to U.S. interests (and also to Europe and Japan).

There are three sparks today in the African-Indian Ocean area that could touch off raging fires. First, would be any renewal of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Second would be the extension of the Ethiopian-Somalian war which could affect U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. Third, the situation involving the revolution and invasion <sup>to achieve</sup> ~~for~~ black rule in Zimbabwe and later South Africa creates a volatile environment. The Soviets have position in Africa to affect the outcome in these latter two areas. We do not. In fact, the U.S. is in the process of negotiating a "disarmament of the Indian Ocean" area with the Soviets which could eliminate our small base on the island of Diego Garcia and restrict naval movements. The Soviets, under such an agreement, could still bring power to bear by using the always disavowed insurgency forces under their influence in Africa. They could also cover the Indian Ocean with long range naval aircraft from the Soviet Union, carrying anti-ship missiles. And, since the Soviets have never admitted having a naval base and airfield at Berbera in Somalia, they will no doubt attempt to maintain this strategic position <sup>e</sup> despite any negotiations.

Thus, in the "diplomatic force" component of total force, or "interstate relations," the Soviets are gaining leverage. In Europe, the northern and southern flanks of NATO are vulnerable. In Asia, the Soviets wait anxiously to see if the U.S. will in fact withdraw from South Korea as advertised. If it does, the opportunity exists to bring South Korea into the communist fold and replace U.S. power with Soviet power, completing the southern flanking movement against China, setting the stage for an end to the Sino-Soviet conflict and forcing Japan to

its agonizing reappraisal. In Africa, there is a void of U.S. power, and Soviet power is increasing unopposed. If pressured too far on the question of black majority rule, there is no doubt that South Africa will fight and will have nuclear weapons. Such a conflict would <sup>probably</sup> bring the Soviets into the picture <sup>actively</sup>. The U.S. would be faced with the choice of intervening with no base of power in Africa, or seeing the Soviets obtain control. I see the competition for a power base in Africa to be the factor that will tip the "diplomatic force" component of total force in favor of the Soviets unless the U.S. takes action to stop Soviet "Socialist Imperialism" there.

#### SEAPOWER

Seapower plays an important role in every component of total force. Submarine ballistic missiles are the most survivable of the strategic forces. The conventional forces of the Navy must ensure

sea control in order to project any other forces abroad. The Navy is used as a carrier of political, ideological and social ideas to other parts of the world in its "presence" or "show the flag" mission. Technologically, the Navy must be at the forefront in order to carry out its mission. The relevance of naval forces in influencing diplomatic crises has been demonstrated many times. Contrary to the Soviet Union, the industry and trade of the U.S. depend on ocean traffic in both directions, and the most important allies are overseas. The U.S. economy is dependent on seapower, merchant and naval. And, the political interests and commitments of the U.S. require the maintenance of the ability to project and support large military forces overseas. The exercise of U.S. total force is dependent on having superior seapower. What then is the capability of our Navy to function as a reliable contributor to U.S. total force in the face of Soviet total force?

In the area of strategic weapons, the surest way to neutralize a Soviet counterforce capability is to develop and deploy the mobile ICBM, the cruise missile, and most important to provide our most survivable platform, the nuclear submarine, with the missile accuracy required to hit a Soviet land based missile silo. This technology exists and should<sup>1</sup> be incorporated into the Trident missile. The Soviets could only match this by moving its missile forces to sea, which they are likely to do anyway. Only a major breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare could negate this strategy, and such a breakthrough against distant, deep diving submarines is unlikely.

In conventional naval warfare, the Soviet Navy has the most assured capability against the U.S. Navy in a short conventional conflict. The Soviet Navy has a powerful anti-ship capability in its air, surface, submarine and land-launched missile attacks, coordinated as exercise OKEAN 70 and 75 demonstrated they can do. The U.S. has yet to match that capability or develop a reliable defense against it. We also continue to operate our forces, particularly our large aircraft carriers, in ways

that are strategically and tactically antiquated. For example, for political reasons, we operate two large carriers in the restricted waters of the Mediterranean where they are "shadowed" by Soviet units and subject to massive anti-ship missile attack on short notice. We make the Soviet targeting problem simple by allowing the carrier freely to operate in the electronic spectrum with characteristic emissions easily identified. In a "short war" scenario where some objective ~~were~~ <sup>were</sup> contested, but the conflict was quickly terminated for fear of escalation to nuclear war, the Soviets could prevail by quickly neutralizing our aircraft carriers. This would negate our only current offensive capability, leave other surface ships vulnerable without air cover, and leave our submarines vulnerable to Soviet air and surface attack. A short conflict also tends to benefit the Soviets because it prevents their geographic disadvantage in having limited access to the sea from being exploited through blockade or the mining of narrow straits. 1

In a longer, sea control type of conventional conflict, we would still lose the use of our deployed large carriers early. Even if operated well into ocean waters, Soviet missile firing submarines and aircraft could mount an anti-ship missile attack that would overwhelm a target as large and so limited in numbers as our costly aircraft carrier.

We must quickly adapt our U.S. Naval Forces, strategy and tactics to meet the threat of the Soviet Navy if we are to have credible sea power support of total force. We have entered an era of weapons with extremely high accuracy and high explosive force, even in conventional explosives. Defense against such weapons has not caught up with the offense, and <sup>even allowing for such improved</sup> defense capability as CIWS, dispersal of forces is necessary. From a force structure point of view, this means building more, smaller ships. We must also disperse our sea based airpower onto more <sup>F</sup>platforms. We must also disperse our total offensive power into

other ships <sup>rather than limiting offensive power</sup> ~~in addition~~ to aircraft carriers.

During the years following World War II, the U.S. Navy was essentially unopposed at sea. In Korea and Vietnam, the Navy mission to project power ashore using strike aircraft was honed and emphasized. Establishing sea control prior to operating the power projection forces from carriers or amphibious ships, was not required. Today, that is no longer so. As I have testified before Congress since 1971, the odds are that the Soviet Navy can deny the U.S. Navy control of the sea. Because of the high accuracy of anti-ship missiles, the large carrier represents too many dollars per unit to be optimal as a combatant in a sea control war. The utility of the large carrier, as has been shown historically, is optimized in the many crises where airpower is required and sea control is not contested. Under these conditions, the large carrier is the most cost effective and politically acceptable method of projecting airpower. However, we must recognize that we cannot depend on the large carrier if a sea control conflict takes place because it is too expensive to permit the number we need. We must disperse our airpower.

In order to disperse our airpower, I proposed, as CNO, to build a 17,000 ton, 25 knot small carrier called a "Sea Control Ship." I would have preferred to put forward a somewhat larger ship, but I judged that this would have given the opponents of CVAN-70, which I also advocated, an alternative with which to kill the nuclear carrier. The Sea Control Ship was to, <sup>carry helicopters and Harrier VSTOL aircraft. My intent was to</sup> deploy the large carriers out of the reach of Soviet missiles during times of tension and replace them with dispersed, low mix, air capable ships. This was to be the first step in moving towards a credible sea control capability. The sea control ship did not survive the political and bureaucracy of Washington.

The Navy is now in the process of creating a "CVV" or "mid-range" carrier. (50,000 tons vice 90,000). This CVV will have a VSTOL capability, but will also have a catapult for conventional aircraft. This

will create a less expensive aircraft carrier, and the reduced size of its air wing will result in less cost and a larger total number of carriers in the force. Moreover, the CVV is the ideal transition carrier to get us from the present generation aircraft to the VSTOL era. It is a ship large enough to handle present generation aircraft, but cheap enough to permit more carriers and fewer "eggs in one basket." We should not build any more large, expensive nuclear carriers.

I personally worry that the existence of a VSTOL capability (Marria A and B versions) is being ignored in favor of the long range development of a "high performance" VSTOL culminating in the 1990's. Even this development has been slowed by the Defense Department, stating that before further funds are devoted to VSTOL it must be proven superior to conventional aircraft. In my judgment, a high performance VSTOL aircraft could be developed as early as 1984 if supported at this time. The Soviets are doing it.

This brings up the point of how one looks at the capabilities of aircraft. Some experts tend to look at such capabilities with the power projection strike mission or the air defense mission in mind. But, if the aircraft carrier is out of action, these missions become meaningless for high performance aircraft. Air defense then falls upon ship-board missile batteries, and power projection falls upon the power projection forces that have been held in reserve pending the outcome of sea control operations. We should measure carefully the capabilities required of a sea control aircraft, one that can be operated from dispersed, smaller ships.

A high performance strike aircraft can be operated in a power projection role from a large carrier after <sup>sea</sup> control is secured. But to supplement its numbers, a medium performance VSTOL can be operated from small sea control ships providing air defense, anti-ship strikes and ASW patrol, along with helicopters. Such a VSTOL further supports the goal of dispersing the total offensive power among all combatant

ships.

With the development of the HARPOON and TOMAHAWK anti-ship missiles, every combatant ship, submarine and aircraft has a potential offensive role previously available only to carrier based strike aircraft. These missiles can strike enemy surface and land targets well beyond the radar horizon. Thus, they need to have an over-the-horizon reconnaissance and targeting capability that is not dependent on aircraft based on the scarce large carrier. Satellite reconnaissance, intelligence, passive ECM and acoustic sensors all produce localization information that is valuable for targeting. Such information must be processed, correlated and transmitted to ships on a worldwide basis in a usable form. We must also have an aircraft, based on dispersed smaller ships, that can use this localizing information to pinpoint the target and transmit targeting information to SSM equipped ships. The LAMPS helicopter will provide some capability in this area. Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV), which are airborne drones with sensors built in need to be developed. The most capability would be obtained by building or modifying a ship in the 7000-10,000 ton range to carry 2-4 VSTOL aircraft of the AV-8B (Harrier) type. This aircraft could provide sufficient speed and self-defense characteristics to assume an improved level of survival in a hostile environment commensurate with the cost of its mother ship, and provide over-the-horizon targeting information to many ships and submarines armed with HARPOON and TOMAHAWK. The mating of the VSTOL with the shipborne cruise missile would permit the VSTOL to take off with only a light sensor load, maximize its fuel for reconnaissance and targeting time, and use the shipborne missile for striking targets. This aircraft does not have to be a high performance type. The technology exists today to build the ship (let's call it a Sea Control Cruiser) and the aircraft and have it ready in the early 1980's.

Tactically, surface forces must operate in dispersed formations to

(31)

confuse the enemy targeting and deny large areas to the enemy. This tactic is applicable to the air, sub and surface threat, recognizing that with the high accuracy of modern weapons, a surface unit once located and identified has a high probability of being damaged. We need to acquire force <sup>①</sup>levers as soon as possible that will permit the large carrier to be used in the less threatened areas until an acceptable degree of sea control is attained. A task group should be made up of several sea control ships which would operate with a dispersed escort providing air defense, ASW air and targeting information to anti-ship missile ships. Escorts would contribute to air defense with missile systems, and ASW with sonars, LAMPS helicopters and torpedoes. A further dispersal of airpower and offensive power would be obtained by also operating several Sea Control cruisers (with fewer numbers of VSTOL than a Sea Control Ship, but better missile and gun weaponry), also with a dispersed escort in the same fashion. Finally, we must recognize that the submarine is our most survivable platform, and better integrate its operations with the task group. The attack submarine should provide an outer anti-submarine screen around the task group, with anti-ship missiles available in a secondary role. In restricted waters such as the Mediterranean, we also must not ignore the contribution that can be made by shore based anti-ship missile batteries, fast patrol boats with anti-ship missiles (such as the PHM), and long range naval aircraft. With this type of strategy, a Sea Control Task Group could employ effective tactics to prepare the way for the large power projection carriers.

At present budget levels, the "Hi-Low Mix" philosophy must be followed in order to obtain enough ships to provide a dispersal of offensive power. We cannot afford to pour our scarce resources into the building of super ships at the expense of sufficient numbers of capable ships. In this connection, the 3000-5000 ton Surface Effects Ship (SES) is, next to VSTOL, the most important development for the

Surface Navy. If the sea control cruisers (with VSTOL) could be SES type platforms, the increased speed obtained would provide a quantum jump in ASW and the ability to operate aircraft.

Obviously, the "union issues" in the Navy are sensitive and important in achieving such a strategy. One cannot create a new strategy, a new way of thinking, without breaking some rice bowls. No longer do we have such clearly defined roles for air, surface and submarine forces as existed in the past. In order to develop a strategy to meet the Soviet seapower threat, we must not only operate as one Navy, but also find ways, as the Soviets have done, to build a total seapower force that includes coordination at sea with the Merchant Marine, the Coast Guard, the Air Force, and the Army in a way similar to our Navy-Marine Corps team concept.

The Surface Warfare Officer must play a unique role in achieving this unity of purpose and strategy. He is well qualified to do so, being the naval officer that most consistently deals with all of the dimensions of naval warfare in fulfilling his calling, including surface, air, subsurface and the electronic spectrum. He is most likely to avoid the trap of leaning so far toward purely technical matters that he is lacking in matters of tactics, strategy, and the "total force" picture. He must find ways to win over the traditionalists who cling to old large carrier platforms and strategies. An officer in high command must deal with all capabilities, evaluate the threat, and create an integrated team capability. The Sea Control Task Group which I have described will come about only if civilian and military authority get together now and create the forces that will support such a strategy. It will function well only if "union" interferences are overcome and modern naval strategies using modern technologies are thought out and employed. I am not so naive as to think as to think that "union" issues will ever totally disappear, and at lower echelons they even aid us through establishing unity of pride. However, the "union"

politics at the higher planning echelons are totally unacceptable if we are to build and operate a modern Navy equal to the threat.

### Total Force

The Soviet Union uses coordinated total force much better than we. They have achieved strategic nuclear and conventional weapon superiority. They can use nuclear superiority as a coercent to force the U.S. to "stand idly by." They have more control over seapower resources and can use their Navy today to either face down the U.S. Navy in a short conflict or deny ~~xx~~ U.S. sea control in an extended conflict. Until the U.S. finds the leadership to tap the political consensus of its people and find that they will support what is necessary to stand up to the Soviets, the Soviet Union will enjoy an advantage in political force. Ideological force, as applied to other countries, is a toss-up between western democracy and Communism. Western democracy has the most appeal, but Communism is better organized and equipped to deal with the short range goals of emerging nations. U.S. economic force is the primary factor in preventing Soviet total force from prevailing, but it is being challenged by the Soviets in an increasingly successful way. U.S. technological force is superior to the Soviets, but the lead is dwindling. U.S. social force is superior but lacks the strong leadership at all echelons in government to focus it on the necessity of standing up to the Soviets. Diplomatic force is a toss-up with Europe stable but vulnerable on the flanks, Asia stable while U.S. power remains, most of Latin America temporarily beyond Soviet reach, and Africa a void now being exploited by the Soviets. Soviet control of Africa could tip diplomatic and other parts of total force in their favor. Seapower is necessary in order for the United States to successfully exercise total force. Today, the U.S. does not exercise complete seapower, lacking the full contribution of the Merchant Marine and coordination with the Coast Guard, Army and Air Force. The U.S. Navy is the only service

capability to control the seas with current forces and strategies in the face of the Soviet Navy.

Of the eight components of total force, the Soviets have superiority in the top three of strategic military, conventional military and political. The U.S. has superiority in the economic, technological and social components with all three being seriously challenged. Ideological and diplomatic components are a toss-up and could go either way in any situation. Without some changes in national priorities and leadership in the U.S., the "correlation of forces" may indeed shift to favor the Soviets. As we face the menace of modern weapons of great destruction, it's not the suddenness of the war we might get in that is the ~~most~~ <sup>greatest</sup> threat, but rather the length of the war we are in now. That long war is being fought intelligently and increasingly successfully by the Soviets with "total force." The job of the Navy and of the surface ~~line~~ officer, in dealing with that Soviet challenge by optimizing the seapower component of U.S. total force, has never been more critical.

## FOOTNOTES

1. Ponomarev, Boris, Candidate Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, "The Role of Socialism in Modern World Development," PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, 6 December 1974, p. 4-13. The components of the "correlation of forces" are discussed in clear detail in this article, though not specifically itemized.
2. Possony, Stefan T., Professor at Georgetown University, "Analysis of Soviet 'Mein Kampf' reveals accelerated time table for world conquest by 1975" New York World Telegram and Sun, October 4, 1961.
3. Pipes, Richard, Professor at Harvard University, "The Soviet Strategy for Nuclear Victory," Washington Post, Sunday July 3, 1977, p. C-1.
4. Committee on the Present Danger, "Where Do We Stand on SALT?" July 1977.
5. Paul Nitze, "U.S. Strategic Security: SALT and U. S. Strategic Programs," 15 September 1977.
6. Committee on the Present Danger, "Where Do We Stand on SALT?" July 1977.
7. Paul Nitze, "U. S. Strategic Security: SALT and U. S. Strategic Programs, 15 September 1977.
8. *Ibid*, The conclusions are the author's based on analysis of the data herein
9. Pipes, p. C-1.
10. Brown, George S., General, USAF, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1978, 20 Jan., 1977, Government Printing Office, p. 60-75.
11. Bradsher, Henry S., Washington Star Staff Writer, "Was Gloomy Study of U. S. Might Hushed Up?" Washington Star, Wednesday, August 10, 1977, p. 1.
12. Powers, Robert C., CDR, USN, The Relevance of Superpower Navies in the Nuclear Age, Thesis, George Washington University, 23 July 1977, p. 18-32.
13. Ponomarev, p. 14.
14. Ibid., p. 8.
15. Ponomarev, p. 8-12.
16. Moss, Robert, "Moscow's Next Target in Africa -- Paying the Price for Angola," London Sunday Telegraph, February 20, 1977.

17. Vandys, V. S. "The Problem of Nationality," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXIV, September-October, 1975, pg. 32-48.
18. Ponomarev, p. 1.
19. Brown, op cit.
20. Collins, John M., "American and Soviet Armed Services, Strengths Compared, 1970-76," Congressional Record, No. 135, Part III, Friday, August 5, 1977, Vol. 123, p. S14092.
21. Ibid., p. S14093.
22. Meyer, Herbert E., "Russia Turns Capitalist in World Trade Game," Washington Post, Sunday, July 31, 1977, p. B-1.
23. Brown, p. 104.
24. Collins, p. S14068.
25. Ibid., p. S14101.
26. Brown, p. 44.
27. Moss, p. A-7.