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27 January 1978


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Dear Bud:

Enclosed is your edited manuscript, "Soviet Strategy and U.S. Counter-Strategy," for your review. Guidance from our editor on checking your manuscript is also enclosed. I regret the delay in getting back to you.

Please return your manuscript as soon as you get a chance to check it. Assuming that we have an agreed draft at that time, we will then send it to the printer.

Warm regards,


BRUCE PALMER, Jr.
General, USA-Retired

enclosure (1)

*Mailed to Palmer
2/7/78
by*

"Soviet Strategy and U.S. Counter-Strategy"

by Elmo Zumwalt

Editor's Notes to Author

Please check all editing and deal with notes in margins. Use colored pen or pencil for your corrections.

Please note that subheads have been inserted in conformity with AEI style. Propose alternatives for any you think could be improved.

Provide footnotes where requested (including full bibliographic reference and page number for direct quote) and number notes sequentially.

Your statement on p. 3 that the word détente comes from the Russians is surprising. Please expand.

I can document this
no five changes

SOVIET STRATEGY AND U.S. COUNTER-STRATEGY

Elmo Zumwalt

Introduction to Strategy

An intense--at times bitter--debate rages today with regard to U.S. national strategy; the course which American policies will pursue around the world in the years ahead. As the argumentation develops, it exposes deep divisions both within and ^{outside} without the Government itself. ^{People disagree about} These schisms ^{the extent} encompass everything from ~~not assessment~~ of the threat confronting our nation to the strategy ^{by which} ~~necessary to counter~~ that threat, ^{should be counted,} and the military force levels required to implement the chosen strategy. Within the U.S. Government ^{the debate was sparked} this effort--sired by Presidential Review Memorandum No. 10 ^{For OK?} "PRIM Ten," ^{known} as it is referred to in Washington's ^{which created} oral short-hand ^{a study group} is supposed to solve the new President's problems, ^{Or rather it} ~~centering on~~ national security, ^{But} professional military planners in the Armed Services were dismayed to learn that the study was to be undertaken simultaneously on two tracks: one group--headed by Professor Samuel P. Huntington ^{turned do a} ~~assayed a not assessment~~ ^{205132/1000000} of the threat to which the United States ^{was} is currently exposed and ^{prospects for} ~~what~~ the future might hold; concurrently, a second group--~~this one~~ headed by Dr. Lynn Davis, late of the Carter Transition Team and now ~~enseoned~~ ^{in defense} in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as ^{would} Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning ^{GA} set about devising national strategies and military force levels. When this modus operandi was revealed by the new team, the question immediately posed ⁱⁿ along the corridors ~~and around the rings~~ of the Pentagon ^{was} must be considered a fair one: How can proper

it is the most recent round of the debate

created two groups

was

strategies and supporting military force levels be determined

~~when~~ when the threat which must be overcome has not yet been

postulated? The answer, of course, is that they cannot. ~~Thus,~~ ^{Instead}

~~the inference which clearly follows:~~ ^{Not} some other determinant

~~must~~ govern the exercise; perhaps the budget. Those who have

spent most of their lives planning and executing the defense

of the United States, know a far better way to solve American

national security problems. ^{or study?}

First, one defines U.S. national aims and objectives.

Then an assessment is made of perceived threats which might

preclude achievement of these objectives. Once this ~~infor-~~ ^{assessment}

~~mation is at hand--and understood--it is then~~ possible to

devise a range of strategies, each designed to achieve the

defined goals in the face of the expected opposition. Finally,

one can ~~then~~ ^{the} determine military force levels necessary to

execute the selected strategy. And, if the determined level

of force proves not politically or fiscally supportable, if

some lesser capability is elected by the governmental leaders,

the planners can then estimate the national risk which must

be assumed. Only with this kind of logical analysis can the

nation's leaders--specifically, ~~the President~~ make a sound

decision ^{s about} ~~as to~~ the course the nation will follow. ~~In this~~

~~particular treatise, the latter--more rational--approach~~

~~will be employed.~~

Soviet Strategy. My ~~opening~~ ^{first} premise is that, ~~insofar as~~ the United States

~~is concerned,~~ the Soviet Union is clearly ~~our~~ ^{the} main antagonist, ^f

If the menace posed by the ~~U.S.S.R.~~ ^{Soviet Union} is adequately analyzed,

~~sound~~ ^{the} strategies ~~are~~ ^(are sound) devised to cope with that menace, and the requisite forces are ~~then~~ fielded, the nation will be fully prepared to meet any other conceivable contingency, which ~~might materialize.~~ ^{a Soviet challenge and some lesser crisis} Should ~~these two events~~ ^{united} occur simultaneously, however, we ~~will~~ ^{the size of} need additional forces to ~~cope with~~ ^{which would be determined by} the additive threat. Moreover, the severity of the second contingency, ~~will patently drive the sizing of the additional forces.~~

Since today ~~and~~ ^{to the} for the foreseeable future ~~the~~ principal obstacle ~~standing in the way of~~ achievement of American goals is the Soviet Union, one must begin by analyzing Moscow's ~~own~~ aims and objectives--specifically ~~those~~ ^{that} ~~in~~ conflict with our ~~s~~ ^{its ways of} --and how ~~the Kremlin~~ ^{is} intends to accomplish them. So, what, indeed, ~~are~~ ^{is} the Soviets ^{Union} about? Despite the euphoria which has periodically been generated in the West by Russian-originated terms such as "peaceful co-existence" and ~~detente~~ ^{is not really a detente}, the fundamental goal of the U.S.S.R. has remained unchanged since the days when Nikolai Lenin told the 8th Party Congress, (1919):

see ed. note

"We are living not merely in a state, but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end." ✓

complete reference including page 28

This basic theme has been reiterated over and over again by every Soviet leader who has succeeded Lenin, and never more bluntly than by Nikita Khrushchev when he threatened to "bury" us.

While relative military strength has been and still is a basic ingredient of the continuing ~~Russo-American~~ ^{Soviet}

1. See Chap
2. SOVIET word outline. Dept of State Publication 6836, 626.9 Primary Office, Wash DC, Release July 1953 p 48

confrontation, it would be a serious mistake to focus on this facet alone. For the Kremlin leaders obviously plan to use every method available to them in their campaign to reduce the power of any nation or coalition of nations that might be capable of frustrating what Moscow perceives as the ultimate destiny of the Red Revolution. *This is what they have done in the past* ~~As we shall see, the~~ U.S.S.R. has employed just such a wide variety of means over ~~the past half-century~~ and can be expected to do ~~so~~ in the future. Though ~~the rubric~~ *their slogan* may change, as the Soviet Communists shift tactics in order to manipulate world opinion at any given time, the underlying meaning as viewed from Red Square remains singularly constant.

This is not to say that the Russians are executing a detailed, long-range plan devised years ago; one which meticulously articulates a step-by-step program for ^{bringing about} the inevitable world dominion of Soviet-led Communism. This simply is not the case. As a matter of fact, on myriad occasions the Kremlin has demonstrated that its day-to-day policies are exploitive rather than creative. That is to say, Soviet leaders have always been quick to capitalize on any opportunity presenting itself, but by and large they have not been able to create conditions which could then be manipulated for gain. Still, it must be acknowledged that they have developed this exploitive capability to a rather high level, ^{and} all too often ~~not only counting on~~ ^{they have} ~~but~~ ^{ed and} receiving the unwitting help of their intended victims.

From the outset, however, the Soviets ^{Union has} ~~have~~ pursued ~~and~~

still do seek to achieve a series of short-term objectives, ^{This is still its policy.} each ~~one~~ designed to further the long-term campaign. Perhaps ^{short-term objective} the most notable of these ¹ has been the ~~drive to develop~~ ¹ a heavy industrial base. Lenin and Stalin realized early ~~on~~ that once the Communist Party had consolidated its hold on the country, they could squeeze the people as hard as necessary to turn the ^{Soviet Union} U.S.S.R. into a modern industrial state; ~~one capable of producing~~ ^{and only such a state could} the military prowess required to shift the "protracted conflict"--as Robert Strausz-Hupe so aptly termed it--to the battlefield when and where required.

source reference to Strausz-Hupe

Complementing this internal drive for total self-sufficiency, has been Moscow's campaign to establish, then cement, ties with those Western European countries which ^{was} it ~~found itself~~ unable to seize in the aftermath of the ~~Second~~ ^{II} World War. At the same time, the Kremlin seeks to ^{alienate these nations} sever ~~those same Western ties,~~ not only ^{from} with the United States, but ^{also from} with the so-called Third World. The objective is all too evident. By cutting the West off from ^{the} raw materials required to feed its industrial maw, the Communists hope to ^{precipitate} ~~perpetrate~~ the ^{final} capitalistic convulsion ^{of capitalism predicted by} Karl Marx and Nikolai Lenin, ~~predicted.~~

OK? meaning (nuclear)

In ~~pursuance of these objectives,~~ the Kremlin seeks everywhere to cut American connections with other nations around the world, ² thus reducing U.S. industrial and political power through a process of isolation. Viewing the international confrontation as a zero-sum game, the ^{Soviet leaders} ~~Kremlinites~~ calculate that every country subtracted from

3 Strausz-Hupe: Robert ~~and~~ ^{Ed} Protracted Conflict. Harper & Brothers, Publishers, New York: 1959, p 20

the U.S. orbit is automatically added to their own.

This strategy, employed ^{through} ~~across~~ the years by the ^{Soviet Union} ~~U.S.S.R.~~, is a broad one utilizing the full range of Russia's strengths and advantages. ^{A measure of} ~~Comprising~~ political pressure, ideological propaganda, economic manipulation, use of surrogate combat troops, and ^{In the last resort} ~~resorting to~~ Soviet military ^{might} ~~prowess only as a~~ ^{all of them} ~~last resort~~, that strategy is also supported by tactical moves which can shift swiftly and dramatically. Moscow has been extraordinarily flexible in the use of ~~these~~ tactics, depending on its international position at the moment. For instance, in the aftermath of World War II the Kremlin-- ^{well aware} ~~struck by the fact~~ of its geographic ^{be} ~~power~~ limitations-- ^{to its power} ~~mounted a comparatively~~ ^{modest} ~~limited~~ world ^I ~~wide~~ offensive, ~~one~~ essentially confined to ideological penetration. Acutely aware of the nuclear monopoly then enjoyed by the United States as well as recognizing the relatively limited reach of the Soviet military, ² ~~constrained~~ as it then was to crossing frontiers into countries contiguous to the Motherland itself, Moscow did little more than work ^{for the} ~~on~~ internal subversion of target nations and provide arms to prospective client states. Over the years, however, as a Russian nuclear capability evolved and, especially, as Russian military outreach lengthened, a far more aggressive Soviet policy emerged.

And just as quickly as the industrial base permitted, the leadership pressed ^{for the} ~~expansion~~ of most facets of Soviet military power. →

Quite understandably, Moscow assigned first priority to strategic nuclear forces. But close on the heels of this effort followed an across-the-board program to provide all conventional forces with tactical nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, the ~~latter~~ forces were expanded and modernized in other ways. Subsequently, a blue-water Soviet navy was pushed and ~~the beginnings of~~ a true sea- and air-borne power projection capability made an appearance. In general terms, this has been the thrust of Soviet policies up to the present, and there is abundant evidence that more of the same is in prospect. To support the ~~foregoing~~ ^{se} assertions, we will ~~shortly~~ take a detailed look at ~~that~~ ^{the} evidence. But for the moment, given the current posture of the ~~U.S.S.R.~~ ^{Soviet Union}, we must ask ourselves what sort of response the United

States should make.

The American Response.

To begin with, of course, we must recognize that there exists ~~a threat to our achievement of those aims and objectives we deem essential to the future security and well-being of this country.~~ ^{are threatened.} All too often, this has proved to be the largest part of the problem. In some instances, ~~it is simply a case of the American people and their leaders~~ ^{have simply been} ~~unable to detect an international development~~ ^{the danger arising from} ~~which carries the danger of damaging one or more U.S. interests.~~ ^{that might} In other instances, ~~it is a matter of deliberately ignoring the development~~ ^{they have} ~~because it is unpalatable.~~ ^{s. they found} The tragedy ~~herein~~ ^{we have sometimes missed that} is that ~~the latter reaction has occurred~~ ^{our enemies told us} even when an antagonist has ~~publicly articulated exactly what he planned to do.~~ ^{they} Three ^{that have been}

From the Foreign Ministry of Japan in 1937 - the
 Memoire submitted to the Emperor regarding
 a plan for war against the Chinese - under
 Ching Kai Shek - presents a picture of the
 Memoire are published then (a history of a
 highly secret version) There has been
 considerable debate over the content
 of the report. While it allows for war
 against the open to question; it is far more
 clear that it called for extermination of
 "inferior races" (I repeat "inferior" for
 no content the part of the Memoire. Because
 of the doubt about contents the content, I
 have restricted my interpretation to the more
 limited format. The following citations are
 pertinent:

Bergson, Louis. Japan's Foreign Policy
 Part II, Book 1, London, 1933, pp 358-9
 (the view that the members are a part of the
 class)
Collier's Encyclopedia. Vol 15. pp 644-5
Longwell, George. 1958, pp 411 (a more
 detailed analysis)

striking examples ^{of such blindness} ~~have transpired within~~ the past five decades.

Despite the voluminous writings of Nikolai Lenin, it was not until the closing days of World War II that we came to realize ^{that} he and his political descendents meant business; ^{by that} ~~nor, moreover, that the latter now~~ ^{time of course, Lenin's successors} had a sizable fraction of the national power required to make ^{the master's} ~~Lenin's~~ predictions come true. Then there was the case of Adolph Hitler, ^{When} ~~writing~~ ^{writing} Mein Kampf (My Battle), ^{which he wrote} ~~while sitting~~ in a German jail in 1924, ~~when it~~ was first published, few people paid any attention to the book. ~~It~~ didn't become a world-wide best-seller until the waning days of the 1930's, by which time the former Austrian house-painter had solidified his control of Germany, had rebuilt the Wehrmacht, and was about to unleash it to fulfill the grandiose plan he had put ^{on} ~~to~~ paper in 1924. An even less well known ~~but~~ altogether similar event took place halfway around the world in the late 1920's. In Japan, the ~~Foreign~~ Minister, ~~one~~ Baron Tanaka, ~~produced~~ a Memorial which outlined Japanese plans for the establishment of a "greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere," ^{zation} an endeavor which came painfully near to permanent reality ⁱⁿ the opening days of World War II.

Is this the title? Was it a treatise or an essay?

At first glance, it would appear that in ^{cases like these} ~~such circumstances~~ the citizenry ^{was carried by their preoccupation} ~~are too concerned~~ with the present, with their own personal problems and well-being; ~~that~~ their attitude ^{seems to have been} ~~is~~ ~~one of~~ "ignore that nasty problem and it will go away." I,

for one, lay the blame at a different doorstep. In my judgment, the failure of the public to perceive an international danger in the making can be ascribed to the national leadership's

The Tanaka Memorial is one of the most infamous documents in recent history because the document was the first time that Japan was written by Baron K. Delo-Tanaka

reluctance ~~or refusal~~ to level with the American people. If the facts are clearly laid out and the dangers fully explained, the American body politic will react with an unambiguous demand for whatever action might be necessary to put things right. More about this later.

Once ^{a)} ~~it is recognized that there is a problem,~~ ~~the~~ threat ^{has been} ~~is~~ acknowledged, ~~the~~ manner of dealing with it is fairly straightforward. We need first to devise a broad national strategy which will assure ^{the} achievement of essential U.S. aims and objectives despite the threat posed by Moscow. Then we must calculate the power which will be needed to make that strategy work. Like the Soviets, ^{Union, we} ~~it~~ must be a ~~comprehensive~~ ^{our} marshalling of the disparate strengths of the United States: political, economic, ideological, industrial, technological, and military. Above all, the posture we adopt must be backed with an evident national will which clearly signals to our antagonist that we will not hesitate to employ those means whenever and wherever necessary. ^{If} ~~Absent~~ this latter factor, ^{is absent} the others will ^{carry} ~~bear~~ little weight ~~in dealing with~~ a coldly pragmatic leadership such as that ~~installed~~ in the Kremlin.

I would characterize this ~~sort of an~~ approach to American security as the employment of total force; ^{It draws into} ~~not only the use~~ ^{not only} of the strategic and conventional military and naval prowess of a nation, but ^{also} the full ^{range} ~~power~~ of its societal and resource capabilities, ~~as well.~~ ~~Moreover,~~ the components of total force must be ^{used} ~~applied~~ in a coordinated, mutually reinforcing fashion. This is one area ^{where} ~~in which~~ we

can learn from ~~past actions~~ of the Soviets, ^{Union} for ~~they~~ ^{it has} have proved significantly more adept at manipulating total force than have we. I will expand on this theme as we undertake a detailed evaluation of the evidence before us with regard to Soviet international machinations, and what they portend for the future.

~~Inasmuch as~~ Moscow fully understands that we ~~all really~~ do live in a power-political world, ^{where} ~~and that~~ the bottom line of the international power scale comprises strategic nuclear weapons, ^{where} this is where any evaluation must begin. ~~And at~~ the outset, several things ought to be said about the strategic equation.

Beneath an umbrella of true strategic nuclear deterrence, the superpowers find themselves considerably constrained in their own freedom of ^{to initiate} ~~action with respect to~~ political as well as conventional military ^{action} ~~initiatives~~. Always in the background lurks the spectre of escalation to the ultimate "nuclear holocaust." ~~...as we insist on terming it.~~ Conversely, that umbrella provides significant freedom of maneuver to lesser nations. Charles de Gaulle decisively proved this thesis when he tossed NATO and ^{the} U.S. military headquarters out of France in 1966.* He was able to do so because he knew the United States could not retaliate by removing that segment of the American strategic umbrella which then covered France, protecting ^{it} ~~her~~ from Soviet attack or coercion. Our

* For a detailed discussion of this point, see Hanks, (Robert J.) Captain, USN, "The High Price of Success," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 94, No. 4, (April 1968), pp. 26-33

only option would have been to close the umbrella on that side of the Atlantic, thus exposing all of NATO. De Gaulle well knew we simply could not take that Draconian step. The danger ~~herein~~, of course, is that ^{the} actions of ~~such~~ lesser nations can precipitate unsought superpower confrontations. -- *like*

~~Witness~~ the U.S./^{Soviet} U.S.S.R. face-off at the height of the ~~1973~~ Arab-Israeli war. ^{in 1973} Finally, perceptions of the strategic balance--^{or} more accurately, of ~~an~~ imbalance--can influence the allegiance and actions of other nations, ~~in itself~~ creating significant shifts of political and military power in the world, ^{such as} ~~e.g.~~ Finlandization. Therefore, the positioning of the strategic nuclear scales--^{actual} real and ^{perceived} ~~apparent~~--affects all else that we do or ^{attempt} endeavor, and it is vital to the future of the United States that those scales be ~~balanced or~~ tilted in our favor, ^{arises} For a critical danger ~~materializes~~ when they become unbalanced in favor of ^{our} ~~one's~~ antagonist. Strategic nuclear superiority confers on the possessor the ability to coerce others ^{and} to achieve its purposes without firing a shot of any kind--nuclear or conventional.

From the American point of view, the history of ~~the~~ nuclear weapons ^{has been} ~~age is a~~ dreary ~~one~~. Starting with an unquestioned monopoly in 1945, we have--in my considered judgment--descended to the point ^{where} ~~that~~ today ^{our arsenal is} ~~we stand~~ manifestly inferior ^{that is} to the Soviet Union. Moreover, present trends suggest that the exceedingly dangerous posture in which we now find ourselves will ~~likely~~ worsen. How did the United States manage to get itself into such a fix?

After World War II

Following ^{the} collapse of the Baruch Plan to place international controls on the nuclear genie, ^{the} Soviets ^{stead-}fastly declined any sort of control, ^{as nuclear weapons} since ^{they} already had stolen most of the technology needed and ^{it} were well on their way to becoming nuclear capable. ^{the} United States embarked on a program designed to provide sufficient nuclear strength to ensure our safety and that of our allies. By the mid-1960's we had fashioned a force comprising some 2,000 delivery systems, ^{while} the Russians trailed us about ten years in technology and 50% in numbers. At this point, we committed a cardinal error. We stopped. According to the ^{Governmental} wisdom of the day, we had ^{enough strength} adequate prowess to devastate the ^{Soviet Union} U.S.S.R. should Moscow ever be stupid enough to cross the unthinkable threshold. ~~That wisdom anticipated~~ the Kremlin ^{it was believed,} would continue to build to levels something like ours, mutual deterrence would emerge, and the "holocaust" would be foreclosed. But the ^{Soviet leaders} ~~masters of the Kremlin~~ ^{did not think the same way} refused to reason as ~~did the then~~ occupants of the Pentagon's E-ring and the ~~White House's~~ Oval Office. The Russians continued to build. And, to them, the name of the game was "Bigger is Better," not only in numbers but ^{also} in size, which ultimately translates into range and throw-weight. Furthermore, with the advent of ^{the} POLARIS ballistic missile submarines in the United States, the Kremlin lost no time ⁱⁿ emulating the U.S. move and soon began sending some of its own strategic nuclear force to sea. Still, we held to the magic number of 1,054 land-based intercontinental

ballistic missiles ^{and} about 650 sea-launched ballistic missiles; ~~with~~ the balance of the nation's strategic deterrent force comprising ^{ed} the aging B-52 bombers. By 1972 when the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) produced the Interim Agreement, putting a lid on total strategic delivery vehicles, the U.S. still had its 1,054 land-based ICBM's, but Moscow boasted 1,618, ^{that the Americans ones} and these were significantly larger. For instance, the Soviet SS-9 missile--by then in silos and targeted against the United States--possessed three times the throw-weight of our own MINUTEMAN. ^{As} If this were ~~not~~ ^{not} enough, our SLBM advantage had gone down the drain as well. While the Interim Agreement permitted us 44 submarines and 710 launching tubes, the Soviet ^{Union} came away with 62 boats and a total of 950 tubes. Thus, convoluted reasoning and ~~an in~~ ^{the}

Inordinate Administration ^{of} desire for an agreement ~~any kind~~ cemented the ~~fact of~~ strategic nuclear inferiority insofar as America was concerned. ^{of the United States}

It is, ^{of the United States} ~~therefore,~~ all too clear that neither ^{our exemplars} through ~~example~~ self-restraint nor negotiations, ^{has} as exemplified by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, ~~have we~~ managed to slow or ~~to~~ inhibit in any way the Soviet drive for strategic superiority. When, ~~to~~ the ~~clear~~ evidence of the continuing Russian strategic build-up, ^{he is unambiguously} ~~one adds the~~ complementary efforts ^{the Soviet Union is} they are making in dispersal and hardening not only of industry but command, control, and communication facilities ~~as well;~~ and a huge civil defense

* SALT I also produced the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty which prohibits deployment of extensive ABM capability by either nation. The Soviets maintained their Moscow system, ^{while} we promptly dismantled the one we were building to protect our land-based ICBM's.

Subhead
over A

under way
 program, it should become ~~clear~~ ^{plain} to even the most casual observer that in the Kremlin, the leaders believe an all-out nuclear war is possible, and they ~~also~~ believe they can win one if it comes.

No less an expert on the Soviet Union than the former Director of Harvard University's Russian Research Center, Professor Richard Pipes, ~~recently~~ ^{has} explained in some detail why the Kremlin believes this to be the case. [✓] Noting at the outset ^{of a recent article} that "American and Soviet nuclear doctrines... are starkly at odds," he ~~continues~~ ^{ed} by charging the American strategic community with a predisposition "...to shrug off this fundamental doctrinal discrepancy." To ~~one bearing~~ ^{anyone who} considerable ^{had his eyes open during} ~~impressionistic scar tissue~~ from World War II, the Cold War, Korea, ~~etc.~~ ^{and the rest}, it sounds like Lenin/Hitler/Tanaka all over again. And it bears repeating that it is the American Governmental leadership ^{who} ~~which~~ holds these views and steadfastly refuses to present the blunt facts of the deteriorating U.S. strategic position to the American people.

If to this bleak ~~picture of the over-ridingly important~~ strategic situation, one adds the tactical nuclear advances being made by the Soviets, ^{Union} and then the massive ~~conventional~~ ^{in conventional military power} military effort—especially at sea—one finds it manifestly impossible to ~~justify or explain the over-all endeavor~~ ^{what the Soviet Union is doing} except in terms of a concerted drive for global domination. It is against this background evidence that one must attempt to assess Soviet intentions--present and, most especially, future.

*Pipes, Richard, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary, Vol. 64, No. 1, (July 1977).