

*On the basis of*

Based on my own experience and examination, I believe the Kremlin is continuing its historic, single-minded campaign to achieve world dominion for Soviet-led Communism, *and* that ~~Moscow is quite prepared~~ *it intends to be able* to use any and all means at its disposal to gain that end. Inasmuch as the ~~U.S.S.R.~~ *Soviet Union* has become a "have" nation since World War II, I further believe the Russians would like very much to achieve this fundamental goal without directly engaging the Soviet Union in a war ~~of~~ any kind; ~~that~~ Moscow harbors no great desire to put the Motherland at risk, ~~unless the end result~~ *goal* can be realized in no other way. Where ~~the~~ *has become* application of military force becomes necessary, the Communist leaders have employed, and will continue to use, surrogates to avoid ~~direct~~ *the* engagement of their own forces in ~~actual~~ combat. Should it ultimately prove necessary, however, they ~~are~~ *would be* prepared to do the job themselves. An empirical examination of Soviet moves around the world provides revealing and informative evidence in support of this assessment of Moscow's intentions.

A Pattern of Gradually Increasing Militancy.

Perhaps the best point of departure for such an evaluation is a brief review of Soviet actions from 1945 to the present. The ~~U.S.S.R.~~ *Soviet Union* emerged from the ~~Second World War~~ *II* ~~behind~~ *after* the United States as the next most powerful nation on earth. Though grievously hurt by that conflict, ~~she~~ *the Soviet Union was* nonetheless ~~came out of it~~ *emerge* with greatly expanded borders. ~~the~~ *the only major nation to do so* and she, unlike the other main Allied powers, made ~~no~~ *it* move to demobilize the enormous military machine ~~she~~ *it* had assembled prior to and during the

war years. Within the newly acquired borders of the Soviet Union as well as in Eastern Europe, Iran, and the Far East, nothing happened to match what Winston Churchill described as <sup>the</sup> a melting away of the armies of democracy. Nevertheless, Joseph Stalin <sup>stood</sup> had a serious problem ~~standing~~ between ~~him~~ and the goals he sought to achieve: the limited reach of his armed forces. In 1945, only nations ~~whose borders were contiguous to those of the Soviet Union~~ <sup>or those of nations</sup> occupied by the Red Army <sup>she</sup> lay within <sup>^</sup> range of the Russian Bear's power. Stalin, therefore, found himself forced to concentrate on such countries as he could reach. Over the next few years, he cemented Soviet control of European nations already under the heel of the Red Army. And only the declining, but still-to-be-reckoned-with, strength of the (U.S.) and Great Britain--backed (and this is crucial ~~to understanding~~) by the American nuclear monopoly--eventually forced him to withdraw from Austria and Iran. Elsewhere, despite Allied protests, Moscow proceeded to nail down its territorial gains stemming from <sup>of the</sup> the Axis defeat.

But although his armed forces ~~might~~ <sup>she might not</sup> could not reach into the rest of the world, the Russian dictator did not by any <sup>his international aims. Militarily</sup> means neglect ~~it~~. ~~From his position of international power~~ <sup>t</sup> ~~impotence, insofar as military muscle might be concerned,~~ Stalin mounted a world <sup>He</sup> wide ideological offensive. <sup>Resur-</sup> <sup>ed</sup> ~~recting~~ the international Communist infrastructure <sup>inherited from</sup> ~~spawned~~ in the mind of Lenin, <sup>which had lain dormant after</sup> ~~but allowed to hibernate subsequent to~~ the abrupt reversal of Russo-German relations ~~following~~

*Stalin*

Hitler's assault in 1942, the Soviet dictator put this organization back to work subverting regimes around the globe. The Red Army might not be able to reach the Western Hemisphere, ~~for example~~, but ideology certainly could. And so could Soviet-manufactured arms. Carried in Russian ships, they flowed in increasing <sup>numbers</sup> quantities to those states which seemed to be surrendering to the ideological offensive: China, Indonesia, Korea, and--to be sure--the nations of Eastern Europe.

But ~~beginning~~ in the late 1940's a ~~change~~ <sup>change</sup> in Russian foreign policy began to appear. It became noticeably more aggressive, ~~and~~ the timing of the shift ~~can~~ <sup>allows it to</sup> be traced directly to ~~an~~ <sup>the</sup> emerging Soviet nuclear capability. ~~The~~ <sup>gradually</sup> increasing militancy of Moscow's ~~thrusters~~ <sup>increased the militancy of its</sup> ultimately ~~into~~ <sup>penetrating</sup> areas separated from the ~~U.S.S.R.~~ <sup>Soviet Union</sup> by salt water which heretofore it had been unable to influence with military power. ~~gradually manifested itself.~~ First, however, came the confrontation over Berlin. And here one finds Moscow making ~~its~~ <sup>the</sup> first cardinal mistake in ~~its~~ <sup>its</sup> post-war foreign policy. By ~~throwing a blockade around Berlin, the Russians managed to~~ ~~transform~~ <sup>as</sup> the embryonic European Union ~~just~~ <sup>was</sup> beginning to recognize that it had helped to vanquish the legions of Adolph Hitler only to see them immediately supplanted by a far more powerful and implacable foe ~~into~~ <sup>the Russian blockade of Berlin transformed Europe</sup> the North Atlantic Alliance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). ~~More importantly, they had caused the United States to reverse~~ <sup>Above all, it brought</sup> ~~its departure from Western Europe, and voyage back across the~~ <sup>back to</sup>

~~Atlantic. In short, for their Berlin pains the Soviets got NATO--a thorn they have been trying to remove from their hide ever since.~~

Then came Korea. Here the Kremlin succeeded in embroiling the entire United Nations--but most especially the United States--in ~~defending against~~ the first real surrogate operation. While the <sup>Soviet</sup> military effort failed, the ~~fact~~ <sup>fact</sup> of the Communist <sup>S</sup> persistence hardly needs elaboration when, <sup>3</sup> a quarter <sup>ga</sup> century later, ~~we~~ <sup>is</sup> still find the issue a major factor in American politics and security. But the ultimate confirmation that a new nuclear power had entered center stage came in 1957. Once again, the Soviets <sup>Union Proved</sup> evidenced ~~in that year~~ its <sup>talent</sup> an incredible facility for shooting ~~themselves~~ <sup>itself</sup> in the political foot... ~~something they periodically seemed bound to do.~~ On this occasion, <sup>as it should</sup> Russian tanks and troops swept through Hungary ~~and~~ into the heart of Budapest to eradicate signs of "counter-~~revolution~~" ~~within~~ the Eastern Bloc. Predictably, world opinion turned almost universally against Moscow, and all the propaganda gains of the past decade seemed in imminent danger of being swept away. From the <sup>American</sup> U.S. point of view, things couldn't <sup>rattles</sup> have been better. But before the full returns could be collected, three nations--Great Britain, France, and Israel--reversed the tide: in concert, they invaded Egypt, ostensibly to safeguard the Suez Canal. <sup>quickly</sup> In ~~rapid succession,~~ Hungary was forgotten, Egypt became the focus of world opinion, and Nikita Khrushchev--~~let off the Hungarian hook--~~ for the first time rattled Soviet rockets. In one ~~instant,~~ Moscow,

*check year*

transformed its image from an aggressive, repressive predator <sup>the</sup> of Hungary, <sup>has been transformed into the</sup> to defender of right and justice in the Middle East. In the ensuing two decades, the West has been unable to dislodge the Kremlin from this position, and, ~~in large measure,~~ peace has <sup>largely</sup> ~~ensured~~ <sup>ended</sup> this part of the world as a result. One is constrained to observe that ~~international political ineptitude, is not a~~ monopoly held by the Soviet Union <sup>does not have a monopoly on</sup>

~~As an aside,~~ <sup>it</sup> is also worth noting that Khrushchev's Hungarian adventure in 1957 can well be considered the genesis of the Brezhnev Doctrine, enunciated more than a decade later in <sup>defense</sup> ~~explanation~~ of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia <sup>in 1968.</sup> That doctrine, incidently, applied as it was in Czechoslovakia, ~~caught the Soviets directly on the horns of a dilemma of no small proportions. For, the carefully nurtured concept of detente, which had been adopted to replace the increas-~~ <sup>Comony as it did when the new detente policy,</sup> ~~ingly discredited "peaceful co-existence,"~~ had just begun to bear fruit in the capitals of ~~NATO~~ Europe, Moscow's swift and brutal suppression of the Czech deviationists thoroughly shocked those <sup>into some horse cleaning,</sup> ~~in NATO who had concluded that the millenium had just arrived on the wings of detente. They temporarily renewed some of the crumbling mortar between the bricks of NATO.~~

<sup>The Growth of the Soviet Navy.</sup> <sup>In the mid 1950s</sup> Prior to this time, however, an event occurred which went largely unremarked in the West, but ~~one that~~ would prove to have profound ramifications, ~~for the future.~~ Enthralled with the power of nuclear-tipped rockets, Nikita Khrushchev decided that the Soviet Navy should <sup>comprise</sup> ~~comprise~~ <sup>mainly of</sup>

Level B  
Subhead ↑

~~little else than~~ large numbers of submarines armed with "fly-  
 ing torpedoes." Presumably he wanted Sergei Gorshkov, whose  
 "enthusiasm for missile technology...comparative youth...and  
 ...record of political reliability" appealed to him, to under-  
 take this transformation of the navy.\* Thus, in January 1956,  
 Khrushchev ousted Admiral Kuznetsov as the Soviet naval com-  
 mander in favor of his own protégé. But Gorshkov not only  
 outmaneuvered his new boss, he outlasted him as well, and in  
 the (22) years he has been ~~Commander-in-Chief~~ of the Soviet  
 Navy he has managed to forge a large, reasonably balanced,  
 blue-water fleet whose surface ships are today as visible  
 around the world as they are powerful. What would turn out  
 to be a mistake from Khrushchev's point of view has in the  
 long term redounded to Russian advantage. Moreover, it was  
 the growing assertiveness of <sup>Soviet</sup> Moscow's foreign policy under  
 Khrushchev's ~~nuclear-rocket-backed~~ belligerency which may  
 well have given Gorshkov the very arguments he desperately  
 needed to convince the land-oriented Kremlin leadership of  
 sea power's indispensable value. Although the notion is  
 hotly contested by some in the world of academe, I believe  
 the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 constituted a watershed in  
 the fortunes of the Soviet Navy. If Sergei Gorshkov <sup>must have</sup> didn't  
 exploit the Russian humiliation <sup>in his hands</sup> ~~caused by Soviet impotence~~  
~~in the face~~ of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet with telling effect  
 in Kremlin councils, ~~I would be very much surprised.~~ What-  
 ever the actual circumstances, the results are crystal clear:

\* Fairhall, David. Russian Sea Power, Gambit, Inc., (Boston:  
 1971) pp. 183-184.

the outreach of Soviet conventional military power, <sup>which was</sup> ~~something~~ so seriously lacking during <sup>the</sup> Stalin and Khrushchev days, <sup>I</sup> has now extended to the four corners of the globe, <sup>in direct</sup> ~~relationship~~ <sup>Proportion</sup> to the growth of the <sup>Soviet</sup> Red Navy. And that, of course, brings us to the question of where the <sup>Soviet Union</sup> U.S.S.R. stands today and how <sup>it is</sup> ~~the Soviets are~~ using this new capability.

If one peruses a world map today, one finds the <sup>Union</sup> Soviets engaged around the world, with <sup>its</sup> ~~their~~ maritime <sup>presence</sup> ~~pro~~gress--naval, merchant, fishing, hydrographic--invariably in the vanguard. From operating bases and facilities in Cuba--(Cienfuegos and Havana)--Russian warships and naval aircraft sit astride the myriad Caribbean shipping routes which crisscross this vital region. <sup>It</sup> ~~In~~ the Mediterranean Sea, the Soviet Navy can be found from one end to the other, <sup>its</sup> ~~the~~ capability <sup>of this</sup> ~~of this~~ fleet to contest American and Allied control of its waters was frighteningly demonstrated during the 1973 Middle East war. East of Suez, the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron, which came to that area to stay in 1968, outnumbered the U.S. Navy most of the time and is inferior in power only during periodic U.S. carrier task force deployments to the region. In the Pacific, the pattern of Soviet operations is similar. Of supreme importance is the fact that these deployments to seas far distant from the Russian homeland are all used to demonstrate Soviet military strength which can be used to support friendly and client states, as well as to intimidate those who might be currently opposing Moscow's policies. <sup>The</sup> ~~A~~ case study is provided by present events <sup>now unfolding</sup> in the South Atlantic

and on the African continent south of the Sahara. *Have a case in point.*

To informed observers, this portion of the world is of critical significance to the West in general and to the United States in particular. ~~If one takes only a brief look at~~ American industry's dependence on raw materials imported from southern Africa, ~~he will find the result to be~~ <sup>is</sup> sobering. We are heavily, and in some instances completely, dependent on this region for materials such as bauxite and alumina, chromium ore, manganese ore, nickel and its concentrates, tin, tungsten, and zinc, ~~to name but a few.~~ <sup>✓</sup> Myriad other materials in lesser quantities flow continuously across the South Atlantic to the United States

Then, there is the matter of oil. ~~With closure of~~ <sup>When</sup> the Suez Canal ~~during the 1967 Middle East war,~~ <sup>was shut down</sup> the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope suddenly assumed immense importance to Europe, ~~and, incidently, increased consequence~~ to the United States, ~~in light of our rapidly changing status~~ <sup>which had recently lost it,</sup> ~~as a nation no longer able to boast energy independence.~~

Closure of the Canal spawned today's supertanker and, over the ensuing years, the waters south of the Cape became the windy corner of the oil trade, vying for prominence with the Strait of Malacca. The significance of these heavily traveled trade routes off the southern tip of Africa and throughout the South and Mid-Atlantic did not escape the notice of the Soviet Union. Moreover, Moscow's interest in the region

\* For an excellent discussion of this point, see (Hahn, Walter F.) and (Cottrell, Alvin J. Soviet Shadow Over Africa, Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami: 1976).

*(Miami)*

is not new. <sup>not</sup> it didn't start with Angola.

A decade ago, Moscow's heavy hand descended on the Congo following the Belgian withdrawal. The results of this effort were something less than successful. Ghana proved not much more <sup>responsive</sup> ~~productive~~ despite a heavy Russian investment in aid, <sup>9</sup> military and economic. But persistence is one of the Kremlin's long suits and <sup>it</sup> ~~that attribute~~ eventually paid off in Guinea. Today, ships and aircraft of the Soviet Navy operate routinely out of Conakry, <sup>despite the</sup> ~~this notwithstanding U.S.~~ political pressure <sup>brought</sup> ~~exerted~~ <sup>to bear</sup> on the regime of Marxist President Sekou Toure, <sup>by the United States.</sup> And then came Angola. With introduction of Cuban combat troops -- <sup>the</sup> first ~~for~~ <sup>soldiers</sup> Communist ~~intervention~~ in southern Africa -- the port of Luanda joined Pointe Noire and Conakry in providing support facilities to the ~~Red~~ Fleet. Now, if one draws lines between these ports and connects them with the island of Cuba, a rough triangle is described which crosses all the shipping lanes in a major portion of the South Atlantic. By manipulating a combination of arms and economic aid, diplomatic relations and friendship treaties, Moscow seeks to cement its presence and influence in this part of the world, as well as ensuring access to facilities which will permit the <sup>Soviet Union</sup> ~~U.S.S.R.~~ to threaten Western interests at will. The pattern is all too evident.

<sup>A Compliant Victim.</sup> ~~as~~ <sup>Union has</sup> as I have already suggested, the Soviets ~~have~~ been assisted in <sup>its</sup> ~~their~~ South Atlantic endeavors by the very nations <sup>it</sup> ~~they~~ seek <sup>s</sup> to victimize. The United States, for example, embroiled for the past two decades with Korea, Vietnam, and repeated

crises in the Mediterranean, has virtually ignored the South Atlantic as well as the littoral nations fronting on this crucial ocean. Aside from the annual UNITAS naval cruises around South America, and direct transits enroute <sup>to</sup> the Gulf of Tonkin and the Indian Ocean during the Vietnam era ~~neither of which provided~~ <sup>had</sup> the political impact of a true naval presence) ~~there~~ there has been essentially no U.S. naval activity in the area. And NATO, though critically dependent on Middle Eastern oil as well as most of the aforementioned raw materials from southern Africa, has stubbornly refused to move its Atlantic maritime boundary south of the Tropic of Cancer. Always concerned that any move to expand NATO's boundaries would inevitably increase the risk that the Alliance would be drawn into one or more of the United States's world-wide commitments--~~a~~ <sup>the</sup> la Korea or Vietnam, ~~its~~ <sup>some</sup> member states have consistently refused to acknowledge that ~~there~~ <sup>lie</sup> are NATO interests ~~lying~~ beyond the boundaries established decades ago. Moscow cannot help but applaud this refusal to countenance change.

A <sup>general foreign policy initiative</sup> ~~global move~~ by the United States has also aided the Soviet Union in this region. No one, of course, can fault the moral and political power of the human rights posture assumed by President Carter, ~~most~~ especially its direct thrust at the <sup>Soviet Union</sup> U.S.S.R. But the scatter-gun application of its tenets around the world ~~against~~ against friend and foe alike has clearly done serious harm to American interests in

several important instances. One of these impinges directly on <sup>the</sup> defense of the South Atlantic against the ~~on-going~~ Russian incursion. Brazil and Argentina, historic friends and allies of the United States, are ideally located to field their own naval forces ~~and~~ <sup>to</sup> afford support facilities to those of the U.S. ~~when and~~ if the need for combat operations should arise. Furthermore, these two nations are capable of contributing to the naval presence required throughout the region to counter that of the Soviet Union. But stung by the human rights violation charges broadcast to the world by the new American Administration, both nations took steps to sever the military support relationships they had maintained for many years with their neighbor to the north. Rumbblings in Brazil, at the time of this initial retaliatory move, suggested to astute observers that ~~this~~ <sup>the</sup> future colossus of the Southern Hemisphere might go even further. Shortly thereafter, the Atlantic Fleet sent a carrier task force south for training exercises with the Brazilian Navy and ~~to make port~~ calls at various <sup>ports</sup> ~~places~~ along ~~the coast~~. The cruise turned out to be a highly successful ~~one~~ and, for a time, it appeared that this effort had gone a long way toward repairing ~~some of~~ the damage ~~which~~ the human rights charges, ~~had~~ inflicted. One gesture by the United States Navy, however, proved not to be enough. On 19 September, 1977, Brazil canceled all of <sup>its</sup> the four remaining military agreements with the U.S. ~~two of~~ <sup>them</sup>, including a naval agreement, ~~going~~ <sup>dated</sup> back to 1942 when the two nations undertook to cooperate

against the threat posed in the South Atlantic by Nazi Germany. Given the growing Soviet influence in this region, such a rupture benefits only Moscow. ~~and~~ we engineered it.

Taken in sum, one cannot help but wonder if control of the South Atlantic is ~~not~~ going to go to the Kremlin by default. And if that picture is not sufficiently grim, one has only to glance at what is happening throughout the southern portion of the African continent. With the former Portuguese colony of Mozambique now in the clutches of a Marxist regime, armed and assisted to power by the Soviet Union <sup>(as was the</sup> ~~as it did~~ <sup>regime in</sup> ~~in the case of~~ Somalia); with the same situation obtaining directly across the continent in Angola; with the cauldron stirred by the explosive black-white struggle for power in Rhodesia and South Africa ~~itself~~--not to mention Namibia--it is not difficult to postulate ~~a future which would find~~ all <sup>across</sup> ~~of the~~ southern portion of Africa erupting in violence as a prelude to ~~falling under control~~ <sup>The establishment of</sup> of Moscow-backed, Marxist governments, heavily influenced by the Soviets, <sup>Union</sup> and affording <sup>it</sup> access to their ports and airfields ~~to the Russians~~ in exchange for arms and aid supplied during the struggles. Thus, commanding the windy corner off the Cape and the maritime highways of the South Atlantic proper, the Kremlin would have a double handhold around the economic and industrial throat of Europe as well as that of the United States. And if one subjects those other regions of the world where the Soviets <sup>Union is</sup> ~~are~~ currently active to this ~~same~~ sort of ~~close~~

one discovers scrutiny, strikingly similar patterns emerge. <sup>the</sup> Conditions in the South Atlantic and in southern Africa, in my judgment, are symptomatic.

Total Force to meet a Global Threat  
 [ <sup>So</sup> what should the United States do about the South Atlantic threat? The quickest response, of course, would be to establish a naval presence by means of reasonably frequent naval deployments. And these should be excursions designed specifically to highlight that presence amongst the littoral nations. Aircraft carriers and our most modern surface combatants should be sent to do the job. A publicized presence of naval forces with respectable muscle, calling at friendly ports on both sides of the ocean will <sup>(2)</sup> assure those nations still on our side and impress those that are either in or leaning toward the Soviet camp.

In the longer term, we need to marshal political and economic force to promote our own interests and frustrate those of the Soviets. <sup>Union</sup> For example, we ought to be less reluctant to put heat on Guinea to deny <sup>the Soviet Union</sup> access to Conakry <sup>a port</sup> from which Soviet ships and aircraft range north and south across the Atlantic today. At first blush it may seem inhuman to some to deny Public Law 480 food grants to any nation in order to stop it from doing that with which we take issue. Perhaps so. But on the other hand, is it fair to the American taxpayer or is it in the interests of this country to continue to supply such grants when they serve to keep a regime in power which is patently bent on aiding <sup>the Soviet Union</sup> ~~a nation the U.S.S.R.~~

whose avowed purpose is to do us in? I think not. Moreover, we need to enlist the support of friendly countries around the littoral, ~~not~~ alienate them.

Specifically, we should be exerting every effort to help Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela to modernize their own naval forces. On the African side of the ocean we should judiciously combine diplomacy and economic aid in a carefully orchestrated program to move key nations to our side of the fence. Some military aid may be in order, despite the volatile nature of the region. ~~Provision of a~~ <sup>By providing</sup> basic coastal defense navy <sup>us</sup> to some of them <sup>so countries we</sup> could go far toward insulating them against ~~the~~ ~~threat of~~ subversive infiltration or ~~unsophisticated~~ overt assaults from the sea by their neighbors. ~~This action~~ <sup>Yet we</sup> would still leave control of the open ocean to those ~~Western~~ and ~~Western-~~ oriented nations possessing true blue-water fleets.

In brief, these are the ~~sorts of~~ initiatives the United States ought to be taking to blunt the current Soviet drive in this part of the world. Furthermore, since the pattern examined in the South Atlantic is similar to that obtaining in other parts of the world, I would submit that these same kinds of actions ought to apply elsewhere, as well. At the moment, however, ~~we have a problem~~ <sup>there is an obstacle</sup> of major proportions: the ~~present~~ size of the United States Navy. At its lowest level in numbers of ships since the mid-1930's, the U.S. Navy is not today capable of countering the Soviet world-wide maritime offensive. And it will be even less capable of doing so in the next decade or two, ~~unless~~ its size and basic structure are substantially altered. ~~More about that~~ later.

## Exploiting American Strengths.

As indicated at the outset of this discussion, I believe our approach to the very real threat posed by the Soviet~~s~~ <sup>Union</sup> must be ~~one featuring~~ <sup>e</sup> utilization of total force. And its underlying philosophy will have to focus on full exploitation of those areas wherein the United States still enjoys superiority over the Soviet Union. With respect to technology, for instance, we must maintain a strong research and development effort--in civil as well as military fields. Most especially, we must choke off the current spate of virtually indiscriminate exports to the ~~U.S.S.R.~~ <sup>Soviet Union</sup> and Warsaw Pact countries. The recent <sup>UN</sup> Washington <sup>the</sup> fight over sale of the Cyber-76 computer system to the Soviet Union is a ~~direct~~ case in point. It is clearly not in our own national interest to sell to our antagonist advanced technology that he does not have, thus permitting him to devote his resources--<sup>which</sup> they are finite and limited, just as are ours--to other projects which may ultimately grant him the edge he needs to realize his fundamental objective: the demise of American power and the triumph of Soviet-led Communism.

Industrial know-how falls into the same category as technology. These and the incredible productivity of U.S. agriculture are ~~parts~~ <sup>components</sup> of the total force we must apply to the Russian threat. To a degree, our actions will have to be reactionary inasmuch as Moscow has moved ahead of us in some areas; <sup>in those areas</sup> and there we will have to play catch-up ball. But we should not let this fact limit our effort. We must be

innovative at the same time. As I noted earlier, <sup>innovation</sup> ~~this~~ is not one of the Kremlin's strengths. While the Russian leaders are past-masters at the art of exploiting opportunities presented to them, they have demonstrated considerably less ~~capability~~ to create the conditions which they can then use to further their international aims. We must, therefore, expend more effort on ~~peering into the future, in attempting to identify~~ those brewing international situations <sup>which</sup> might provide Moscow <sup>with</sup> new opportunities--and <sup>we must</sup> move to forestall ~~prospective~~ Soviet gains. Only by ~~thus~~ employing total force in an enlightened manner can we <sup>ensure</sup> ~~be assured~~ that Lenin's prediction will come true <sup>but</sup> ~~that it will be~~ the democratic protagonist ~~who~~ will triumph.

In summary, one must conclude that there is a global threat to the United States and the ~~Western~~ way of life. Ill-perceived by its prospective victims ~~it may be~~, ~~but~~ it is nonetheless real. We can take hope, however, in the fact that on numerous occasions the Kremlin has revealed that it is something less than infallible. Confronted with a threat of this nature, innovative American policies will surely emerge victorious in the end. But unless we move promptly and positively, we may lose the contest by default. The course we must chart, it seems to me, is manifest.

Strategic Deterrence and a Strong Navy. Of supreme importance, <sup>as the</sup> ~~we must~~ maintain <sup>advance to</sup> strategic deterrence. <sup>For this</sup> ~~To do so~~, it is essential that we redress the strategic nuclear imbalance at the earliest possible moment. <sup>Protected by the strategic nuclear</sup> ~~For, under this umbrella~~, we can prevent coercion

*If we act*

of ourselves and our friends, while at the same time taking <sup>whatever</sup> those conventional measures ~~which~~ will ensure our own successes ~~while~~ <sup>and</sup> halting the onrush of Soviet-led Communism. The task, to be sure, will not be an easy one. Differing approaches to strategic nuclear war as elucidated by Richard Pipes, domestic spending pressures, <sup>and the</sup> refusal of American leadership to reveal ~~the~~ <sup>facts</sup> unpalatable to our citizens are all formidable hurdles. Nonetheless, these factors <sup>are intimately related</sup> ~~hold the key~~ to our national survival.

Once strategic deterrence is assured, <sup>then</sup> what? I would reiterate that the growth in Soviet international outreach has paralleled the emergence of a comprehensive  <sup>Soviet</sup> maritime capability. Our counter-action should, therefore, exploit the same arena. As an insular nation, which has for two centuries excelled in this environment, the United States should concentrate on sea power as one of its comparative strengths. We should not limit ourselves to such action, but employ it as a part of the total force concept with all of the flexibility we can manage. Conversely, we will ignore the maritime arena at our extreme peril. The final question to be answered, therefore, is what kind of navy does the U.S. need to do this portion of the job?

In my considered, professional judgment, it must be a fleet which is affordable, yet sufficiently <sup>large</sup> numerous and powerful to confront <sup>successfully</sup> the Soviets' <sup>Union's</sup> world-wide offensive. We must use our current <sup>in aircraft carriers</sup> carrier advantage to the maximum extent so long as these ships have sea-going

life remaining in them. Now, however--<sup>as a matter of immediate</sup> ~~and the now is of~~  
~~critical importance~~--we must begin to construct the fleet  
of the future, ~~we cannot risk waiting~~ for a latter-day  
Pearl Harbor to demonstrate to us that a new naval age has  
dawned. We must, of course, disperse tactical aviation at  
sea on an optimum number of platforms. After all, a nuc-  
lear-engined aircraft carrier, powerful though it unquestion-  
ably is, can be in but one place at a time. ~~And~~ if the  
~~place doesn't happen to be where the vital action is taking~~<sup>it does not happen there</sup>  
place, that particular bird farm is something less than use-  
ful. Therefore, we must begin now to construct medium-sized  
(40-60 thousand tons), conventionally-powered carriers to  
operate fixed-wing aircraft. These carriers (CVV) would fill ~~the~~<sup>cover</sup>  
the transition period until vertical/short take-off and land-  
ing (V/STOL) technology can be perfected. In the event it  
cannot, the CVV will provide a ~~hedge against that possibility,~~<sup>an alternative</sup>  
permitting us to maintain tactical aviation at sea into the  
foreseeable future. If, on the other hand, we do solve the  
not inconsiderable problems of V/STOL technology, ~~these~~<sup>the new</sup> air-  
craft ~~can~~<sup>could</sup> be sent to sea on existing CVV's and on smaller  
(20-35 thousand ton), cheaper, V/STOL carriers (VSS) in numbers  
adequate to meet our needs.

Further, we must press ahead with lower-cost ~~again, that~~<sup>again, that this</sup>  
means affordable in adequate numbers, ~~missile-armed surface~~  
combatants capable of facing off with ships of the Soviet  
Navy ~~and winning~~. These and other new ~~concept~~<sup>types of</sup> ships should  
be designed to carry V/STOL aircraft where feasible, thus

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further dispersing our sea-borne tactical aviation. To do all this, we will have to capitalize on one of our nation's greatest strengths: America's technological superiority over the <sup>Soviet Union</sup> ~~U.S.S.R.~~ By these means we can develop and field new naval capabilities and employ new concepts which will allow us to negate the maritime gains made during the past twenty years by the Soviet Navy under the astute leadership of Sergei Gorshkov.

*The Importance of Will and Leadership,*

Finally, there is one ingredient without which the foregoing prescription will avail us little. We must have the national will and determination to run the course. Above all, this requires the understanding and backing of the American people. It has been my experience, as I have talked to Americans across the country, that if they are given the facts they will almost unanimously support whatever action may be necessary to solve the problem. As one looks back across the pages of history, it seems clear that <sup>while</sup> ~~it has not~~ been the people <sup>usually</sup> ~~who~~ have been <sup>often</sup> ~~unwilling~~ to face the facts, but, rather, their leaders have been reluctant to reveal those facts to them. And, I might add, <sup>this reluctance</sup> ~~one can adduce that~~ ~~such reasoning~~ usually stems primarily from political fears among the ruling elite.

Unless the American leadership--the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense--stand up and say to the American people, "Ugly as <sup>though</sup> they may be, these are the facts," ~~there is no way~~ the sort

<sup>that</sup> of determination <sup>can</sup> which will be required is ~~going to~~ material-  
 ize. In short, our elected leaders have simply got to level  
 with those who put them in office. If they do, we shall  
 eventually triumph; if they do not, we shall surely ~~perish~~.

*more self fulfilling the prophecy of Holy Kings  
 that the ~~United States~~ the U.S. has passed its historic  
 hypocrisies like so many other nations*