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C: Yea, he uses a lot of analytical work just to keep bureaucracy occupied so they can't really give serious thought to these problems. But at the same time he does use it in a serious way to explore alternatives that he is quite sincerely interested ~~in~~ in. And also to ^{re-}smoke out the action from the other agencies to some of these ideas. So he knows in advance what the counter arguments are going to be and what the magnitude of opposition ~~is~~ is going to be.

R: So it doesn't mean he is committed to any of these ideas it just means he's mulling around about them?

C: That's right.

R: Now at that point was it necessary to take defensive measures as it were? You know he's trying to trade off Trident or something or he's thinking about maybe it would be an idea to trade off Trident or something. Is that the point at which Zumwalt or somebody steps in and tries to nip this idea in the bud?

C: Well, that gets a little farther down the line. I'll discuss that in just a minute. Let me talk about MIRVs a little bit. Because after we were after six ~~or~~ or eight months into SALT II, Kissinger started to get this fascination with the MIRV business and perceived that as the number one problem he saw to the SALT area. And more important, in fact, than getting a formal and comprehensive agreement to supercede the old agreement. And the reason he felt this way, at least this is the way he explained it, was that the Soviets were coming along more rapidly than we had anticipated ~~and they were~~ in their testing area. We were ~~not~~ facing an opportunity to limit their MIRV deployments which, unless it proceeds now, would be lost to us permanently. And ~~the~~ the reason for that was that the Soviets had not yet reached the point of

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deploying their operational MIRV systems. They were in the test phase and while they were in the test phase, you could monitor what they were doing with reasonable accuracy. And we knew until the systems were perfected and they had a goodly number of flight tests on them, and from past history we knew roughly--from our own experiences--roughly what that number of tests was, and we're able to evaluate the tests that went along with regards to success or failure. In ~~working~~ ^{working} at the point where they perfected the systems, his argument was if we can get them right now to stop their flight testing, then they can't deploy the MIRV system. And, therefore, the strategic balance ^{will} ~~will~~ not be effected to our disadvantage by Soviet MIRV deployments. So, his argument was we should go to them with a proposal right now with both sides to stop all their flight testing, recognizing the fact this ~~is~~ act would effect the Soviets much more than us because we already had Minuteman III perfected and in the process of deployment was Posiden. It would of course preclude the development of newer systems ~~on~~ on our part including the Trident system. When the JCS opposed this proposal on the grounds that in the ~~American~~ ^{verification panel}, in the VPWG and subsequently the verification battle, on the grounds that on the whole provided arguments, what it that boiled down to was this: that first of all, we didn't have enough confidence in our intelligence about how far along the Soviets were, to be sure that we could detect covert deployments ~~by~~ of them of MIRV systems. They were far enough along that they were willing to take a little risk, indeed, they might be farther along than we perceived. But even not crediting them with too much ~~capability~~ capability. But

they're willing to take a risk and go ahead and deploy the systems covertly now without further protesting, they might wind up with a very real MIRV capability that we wouldn't even be aware of. The second point was that Kissinger proposed limiting only ICBM MIRV flight testing on the Soviet side because he didn't think they would agree to a complete foreclosure on MIRV testing. And if the Soviets were allowed to go ahead test SLBMs and MIRVs, why they could subsequently transfer that technology from the submarine missile force to the ICBM force. Or even just deploy SLBMs in ICBM silos and maintain their capability that way.

R: Is this all indisputable fact or is this an interpretation?

C: Is what?

R: The capacity to deploy SLBMs and ICBMs and that kind of stuff.

C: I would put that ~~down as~~ ^{in the} category ^{of} fact.

R: You really can do that. You can transfer your MIRV from one thing to another?

C: Yea.

R: No serious technological arguments to refute that?

C: No. And there were some uninformed arguments by non-technical people that this wasn't the case but there was ^{in fact a big agreement} a consensus among the technical people that this ^{sort} type of technology transfer was quite feasible. And, essentially, untechnical, assuming the Russians took precautions to keep it from our observation. And on top of that, this was the weakest and least important of the JCS arguments. The JCS said we don't perceive this urgency ~~in~~ about the need for a MIRV agreement that Kissinger does. And beyond that, we ^{just} don't philosophically believe ~~that~~ the qualitative limitations on strategic forces is a good idea because they prevent force modernization over a period of time. And

historical record tends to show force modernization is a good thing in the sense that it allows you to ~~do~~ reduce the cost of maintaining your strategic forces and it also tends to result in more stability in the strategic balance. Now that's an academic argument. It's not a military argument. That comes from people like Wholstedder. The JCS endorse the argument and they believe that this is the case.

R: There is grounds for legitimate difference of opinion on that?

C: Yea, on certain aspects of it there ~~is~~ is. On other aspects of it the evidence ^{I think} is pretty clear.

R: Did Zumwalt take the lead in this particular JCS position or was he fighting the battle of the Hicks Committee at that point?

C: No, Zumwalt took the lead in the sense ~~that~~ of arguing ~~the~~ most vigorously, and I would think, bore a strong expression of JCS views on this particular subject. Now often JCS positions, ~~and particularly~~ ^{particularly} if they are reactive in the sense of responding to some specific initiative that's come from Kissinger through the VP apparatus, they positions get generated ~~very rapidly~~ automatically, and the system just produces a draft position. Then the JCS look at it and decide whether that, in fact, reflects their views. And quite often the product that they get is in performing as far as a lot of working by the Chiefs themselves sitting down at the table. And Zumwalt ~~was~~ the most articulate of the Chiefs and the best informed on this particular subject was able to dominate the discussion and exert a lot of leadership, with regard to the JCS position.

R: Had this group here provided him with stuff at that point?

C: Yea, they provided him with this including detailed books with the purpose of education ~~and~~ ^{plus} his own education with the purpose of focusing

his thinking toward specific positions.

R: Am I correct in assuming then when some issue would surface over there in the VPWG or VP or something that this would provoke a certain amount of activity in the sub-panel here? That is indeed what happened?

C: Yes, that's right. Anyway, despite the views of the JCS, Kissinger...

R: So you were kind of a competitive working group?

C: Yea, Kissinger promulgated what's called a ~~NSDA~~ NSDM, a National Security ^{Dec 15/001} Memorandum. He said these are highly classified, Their distribution is very limited.

R: Presumably signed by the President himself right?

C: Well, it presumably represents a Presidential decision, often signed by Kissinger for the President. And ~~it was~~ ^{why it is} never quite clear whose decision it was.

R: Obviously it wasn't put out without the President knowing it though?

C: I wouldn't say obviously. I would say that's an open question. I have no evidence one way or the other. But as time went on one got the impression that the President had turned the SALT area over almost completely to Kissinger and was not following it in any detail at all and the main evidence on this was on those rare occasions where there were NSC meetings, and there were many more VP meetings than ~~NSC~~ NSC meetings--NSC meetings ^{in SALT} were extremely rare, when they occurred the people who attended them got the distinct impression that the President was very poorly informed on the issues in discussion.

R: This was something that developed over time then because at the beginning he was quite ~~in~~ in the middle of it, wasn't he? At least Newhouse gets that impression.

C: Well, again I have no authority other than Newhouse to fall back on.

R: Newhouse does give that impression.

C: Yes. He does give that impression. But remember that Newhouse is drawing on one source primarily and that's a semi-official history of what went on during that period.

R: He did check around in other places. He did talk to a lot of other people. There's internal evidence he did.

C: I don't know. I suppose he did. Yea. The argument that the Kalb Brothers got into last night, I don't know if you saw them on Channel 26. They were being attacked by Peter Lissinger and what's his name, Agronsky, about that book on Kissinger.

R: That seems to ~~be~~ be more than semi-official.

C: Well, that was the argument that it really was not a good journalistic job because they relied too heavily on a single source. Anyway, ^{NSDM} ~~Lieber~~ came out. ^{NSDM} ~~Lieber~~ can address anything ~~in the~~ ^{in the} national security area. But one thing that ^{NSDM} ~~Lieber~~s are used for is to provide definitive guidance to the SALT delegation on what the US position is. So a ^{NSDM} ~~Lieber~~ came out saying to offer this test ban proposal to the Russians. It was offered and the Russians evidenced absolutely no interest in it whatsoever.

R: It must be very frustrating just in a human way to agonize for 3 months over what what you're going to say to the Russians and then they yawn and walk out the door. Negotiating itself must be a terribly strenuous thing to do and I guess Kissinger is good at that. You know he has the physical and emotional stamina to sit through an awful lot of garbage.

C: Well, there are people that would disagree with that.

R: But people will disagree with anything.

C: But people who disagree with characterization of him as a good negotiator in the sense that if you judge him by the results of his negotiations, he's also not good. And if he were a good negotiator he would get better results than the results that he gets. So the Russians evidenced no interest in the offer. We then, back in early 1973, with a detailed draft treaty ...

R: A MIRV ban? A testing ban?

C: No. We proposed that. The Russians rejected that. That was kind of the end of that. We dropped it. We then went in with a rather detailed draft treaty with the thought that that would serve as the vehicle for his serious discussions with the Russians.

R: This would be JCS concurred?

C: No it wasn't. We were confronted with a fait accompli. Nobody knew that it was coming or knew what the terms were going to be.

R: This one hadn't served through the verification panel?

C: No. There was this message to the delegation saying that here's what we want you to propose to the Russians.

R: And it really was detailed. I mean a lot of work had gone into it?

C: No, I wouldn't say a lot of work had gone into it because a detailed treaty ~~that~~ only runs on an issue like this for five or six single spaced pages and so you could sit down at a typewriter and knock ^{it} out in two hours if you weren't too conservative about ~~it~~ ^{sound} how it was going to be. And I think critics would say that this draft earmarked/ of something that was going to be.

R: But it did come as a complete surprise to everybody?

C: Yes, it did come as a complete surprise; something that was hastily put together by people over there on the NSC staff.

R: Your "spy system", if you'll pardon the expression, didn't uncover this?

C: It wasn't working very well in that period. So, we presented this to the Russians. We presented a detailed...supporting rationale. It was worked up by the delegation pertaining to each one of the articles. It left the Russians cold. So back to ~~the~~ the drawing board. So then the focus shifted back...

R: Were the provisions of that treaty highly secret? thing at this point?

C: I wouldn't call them highly secret. After all the Russians know what we proposed and so what are we revealing if we publish ~~it~~ it? It provided for equal aggregates. It had a MIRV provision which was probably pretty well balanced. It had a lot of other provisions which were sort of fill-in-the-blanks or multiple choice provisions. That's a generalized language ^{then with} but ~~the~~ specifics being negotiated subsequently with the Russians agreeing in principle to this particular portion.

R: It didn't address itself to the FBS though.

C: No, it didn't. We finally developed for FBS what's called a non-circumvention formula, which means ^{that} we will agree any proposals to the Russians, and they have I understand an interest of them, which means ^{that} we will agree that we will not in the future circumvent central and strategic balance by deploying any additional F Base Systems and will maintain the status quo of the FBS.

R: Was this checked without NATO?

C: After the fact it was. We told them afterwards what we had done

and they agreed to it. They said that's fine. That's a perfectly sensible ~~the~~ approach to the problem.

R: Well, if your account is accurate, if your whole theory is accurate more than your account--I'm sure your account is, the time that the Russians will stop yawning and everything we say will be precisely the time at which they have MIRV deployed?

C: Well, it would be that point or it would be at the point at which we come in with an agreement which the terms they find attractive.

R: But actually they're not going to find any terms attractive but a total give away at this point until they have MLRV deployed.

C: Well, I think there is a range, we can identify a range within which the Russians would agree to any one of several possible formulations of a deal. There's a maximum that they would like very much to have the agreement reflect and there is a minimum beyond which they will not go. And quite clearly that minimum is one which would let them go ahead and carry out all the MIRV deployment plans. Essentially MIRV their whole ICBM force and keep a significant quantitative margins in terms of missiles.

R: You think that's the minimum they would take?

C: Well, more or less.

R: What about MIRVing the whole SLBM too or is that not as important to them?

C: ~~If~~ I don't think that's as important to them. At least they have not given the indication that it is as important to them. And with their throw weight advantage which resides in their ICBM force, if they could MIRV that whole force, then even though we had our SLBMs MIRVed they would still have a warhead advantage over us .

R: But they would not have a first strike capability? We would still have the assured destruction strike with our ?

C: Yea.

R: So presumably there would still be a balance of sorts?

C: Yea, but when you use the word "balance" it becomes sort of tricky. Now you talked about assured destruction. ? Well...

R: Well that's Newhouse's thing.

C: Sure. That was our announced strategy up until quite recently. That was the McNamara buzz word that was carried over into the Nixon administration until just about two years ago, when we evolved a new strategy--something that has been called the Schlesinger strategy--on the flexible option for nuclear delivery systems with the idea of a response for use of nuclear forces less than an all out strategic exchange. That sort of thing. He has argued for which he has presented the rationale to Congress and in some of his public announcements and actually although it's been attributed to Schlesinger because we went public with it at about the time he became Secretary of Defense, it was worked out before he ever came into the Pentagon. A study group had been working it up for about a year before that.

R: Was that study group one of yours?

C: Oh no. This was DOD working with JCS participation and NSC staff participation. It was a Kissinger commission as a matter of fact. And John Foster, who was the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, was the head of this group. And the charter of that

group said in essence "ensure destruction is no longer an adequate strategy" because ~~it~~ it doesn't give the President options. He only has one button on his desk which says push this button ~~and~~ and we launch everything ^{we got} to try and kill as many Russians and destroy as many of their cities as possible. And this situation may not evolve unless we get into a showdown with the Russians. It may not evolve in such a way that we want to push that button. And we ~~can't~~ ^{can't} have gradations of that ~~policy~~ possibility, some options short of that that we can resort to. So our forces should be structured, our command and performance systems should be structured, our strategy should be structured to support a whole ray of options.

R: I can see that but all the same the "bottom line", in the new jargon, is still the ability to respond to a massive first strike with a very destructive second strike. Right? ~~Nobody~~ In spite of what else might be a superstructure, you've got to have that, don't you? You can't do anything unless you have that. Right? I mean you're really in no position to do anything. You can't feel safe without it.

C: That's the maximum capability. All these are portions of that capability.

R: And although it's true you should be able to ^{other} do things short of that, you still have to be able to do that.

C: That's right. Nobody is saying that is a capability ^{which} ~~that~~ we don't want to possess any longer. There are rather subtle shifts of emphasis that say "assured destruction", if you still want to use that term, doesn't necessarily mean killing the maximum number of Russians possible. Maybe ~~that~~ isn't the best way to deter the Russians because the Russian value system is different. Human life has less value to the

let's see if we can't get agreement on MIRVs alone. In recognizing at this point Soviet testing had gone past the point where a test ban would have accomplished anything useful, so let's see if we can't get them ^{to agree} to put a limit on their MIRV deployments in exchange for something. We got to figure out what we can give them to make this an attractive deal to them. Well, the JCS and OSD went back and said why is there such a terribly urgent problem that we have to abandon the target of a comprehensive agreement and devote all energies to the MIRV. (Pause). Let me just ask you something about your approach to this subject. Are you, do you contemplate that after you have a feel for Zumwalt's role in this whole thing and discuss it with him that you will be coming back to get more specific detail about some aspects of this because I'm sort of avoiding getting into a lot of detail at this point.

R: I suppose that's right. Yea. After all he's the source of everything and one or the other of us will be coming back for chapters and verses. Yes. Because one thing is very clear, the more that dates and and places and people can be specified, the more credibility...

C: Yea, but what I'm asking is do you want that kind of detail today?

R: What I'm looking for today is aid in composing an outline for the board. A chapter on this, a chapter on this. Where are the chapters and what is the sequence of the narrative and what comes first and what comes second and what is important and what is trivial from the point of view of his particular role and participation. I'm very interested in hearing the substantive thing as it went on but what I'm most interested in hearing is what he was doing during the course of all this. How much of this was stuff that he actively concerned himself with and did things about and how much of it was stuff that just

went by him or that he didn't think was worth jumping into. I just have an editorial bias about it, an editorial point of view. Is SALT going to be one chapter or ~~or~~ six chapters?

C: Well, with regard to SALT II, up to the point that we had reached in detail, his principle was as a member of the JCS, sitting down there in the Tank, arguing with the other Chiefs, exhorting them to take sound positions and to think through the problem carefully.

R: He was keeping himself as informed as he could?

C: Oh yes. And using his own knowledge to educate the other Chiefs...

R: Have you any idea how they reacted to this? Is there anything for the book at this point about the relationship in the JCS on this subject or any subject? Or is that just something you just don't know about?

C: Well, I've got a lot of specifics that ~~1/11/61~~ on given issues how each of the Chiefs reacted to the problem and how they reacted to what they were hearing from Zumwalt. I'm sure he can recollect a lot of specifics also. Zumwalt's method was to start out each ~~working~~ day with a meeting at 7'o'clock in the morning with his Vice Chief, with his director of program planning who is sort of a chief of staff for the staff, with his executive assistant and...

R: Wasn't that Tidd? His program planner?

C: No. His program planner was Worth Bagley until a year and a half ago and then it was a fellow named Tom Heyward who has the job currently. And his executive assistant who was Capt Burt Sheperd and was succeeded by Capt Don Pringle, and myself. And the day would start with a very detailed debrief by Zumwalt of his activities during the preceding 24 hours, since last we had met with him. He was very meticulous. He kept good notes, anything of significance of a conversation

or a decision he had made, guidance he had given, meetings he had gone to he would run them down. This would take anywhere from 15 minutes to an hour and fifteen minutes depending on how busy his day had been. He was the most careful guy I had ever seen in this regard and was very anxious that his subordinates know in detail exactly what he had been involved in and that they have the same data base from which to operate in supporting him...

R: Was this a monologue or did he solicit comment?

C: It was usually a monologue. But anyway, if there had been a meeting with the Chiefs or the ~~himself~~ himself, it would all come out in these meetings and he's got pretty detailed notes on them and I've got pretty detailed notes on ~~them~~ ~~them~~ on particular areas I was interested in or active in. And this was where ^{these} recollections of about reactions of certain people would come from. Sometimes as he would go along he would ask questions, direct specific observations to members of the group, and relate something that had been told to him and ask if that were correct (incredible) some length and then he would go around the room and each guy there would have a chance to comment on anything he had heard from Zumwalt or to bring Zumwalt's attention to things that were going to happen that day or issues going on or decisions Zumwalt should be aware of. That would take another 15, 20, or 25 minutes.

R: Was there any constraint on telling him exactly what you thought?

C: No, on the contrary. It was expected and encouraged, for the benefit of the group. Normally, when that was over, ~~he would have~~ about another half dozen people would come in, other staff assistants, a legislative liaison guy and his press man, and some of his personal aids, and they would all give a little brief, 30 second to one minute brief, about things he ought to know as he started that day.

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His press staff usually spoke the longest, and then he'd give them five minutes worth on what was in the morning newspapers, that was ipertinent to Zumwalt, or the Navy, or DOD. So by 8:30 in the ~~mx~~ morning he was allpumped up and ready to go ~~mout~~ and do battle R: Sounds like its about time to go to bed! You'd be exhausted by that time.

C: So, but it was terribly helpful to me personally in trying to serve the guy effectively, to have the benefit of all that information flowing back. And I think it was a good management technique ~~mx~~ on his part. I often went inthere at 7:00 a.m. kind of glad that he was going to do the talking for the first half-hour. On this Zumwalt question, how did Zumwalt influence what was going on in SALT I. In addition to his discussions down at the tank, he would talk to other people out of town and express his concern about the way things were going in SALT I, and express his philosophy of how he thought we should be handling it.

R: Did he have, did he try to maintain a constituency ~~xxxx~~ in Congress with his views on SALT? Was he talking to people like Jackson all the time?

C: Sure. And it wasn't so much a ~~q~~ question of cultivating a constituency, because ~~the~~ constituency already existed, and its leader was Jackson, who is one of the best informed guys in the country on SALT.

R: He had ~~x~~ his own sources of information.

C: Yes. Jackson by virtue of his Chairmanship in the Criminal Investigations Committee of the government operations sub-committee, and then the ^{Government} Operations Committee, has got certain responsibilities

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of relaying to intelligence agencies, and as a result he's got carte blanche with CIA for example, to call for any intelligence they have in any area that interests him. And he uses that as a mean to ~~insure~~ insure that he stays fully informed on what the Soviets are doing in the strategic race. Now. . .

R: Well Kissinger really wants to cut Jackson out, he wants to black him out about information. Can he do it?

C: No he couldn't do it, because Jackson would just rescind and go right to the President. And say, your national security ~~assistant~~ ^{assistant} is acting in a way which is offensive to one of ~~your~~ the most influential democrats in Congress. He wouldn't put it in those blunt terms, but that would be the message. Which he probably wouldn't have to make explicit at all, I mean President Nixon. ~~Nixon~~

R: Nobody would try to do anything to Jackson.

C: He could just make ~~his~~ life too difficult for the President, the President's programs. . .

R: Well you said Jackson knew about those back-channel negotiations.

C: Well, that gets into a whole ~~is~~ different subject area, and let me just summarize it by saying, there were two problems, that existed throughout BALT II, and which exist today, with regard to the flow of information to appropriate people in the government. On the executive branch side, the Congress set up the National Security Council system, in the National Security Act of 1948, and its amendments. It said that there were certain orderly procedures ~~that~~ which we want followed in order to insure that all the elements of the government which have something to contribute in this area, participate in the decision-making process. And that the President has the benefit

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of balanced advice, and as a part of that process, the JCS are given certain very clear statutory obligations relating to conditional military advice . Under Kissinger, that system I think by design, did not function the way it apparently was intended to function, and the way it had functioned in previous administrations. In the sense that the use of the NSC and its subsidiary ~~panels~~ ~~panels~~ panels, as a vehicle for working out some sort of ~~consensus~~ consensus in agency use, was discouraged and frustrated by Kissinger's style of ~~operation~~ operation. The NSC meetings became what I can only characterize as a complete farce.

R: Of course Kennedy and Johnson didn't call many NSC meetings, did they? The whole apparatus went down hill after Eisenhower then?

C: I don't think it's so much a question of the number of or the frequency of the meetings but the spirit in which they were conducted. And the use of the council as a median to reconcile the divergent viewpoints. But first of all to ensure the presentatoin of divergent viewpoints to the President and then some attempt to get a reconciliation to make decisions. I think when you look at the way Kennedy operated, for example, during some of his greatest crises such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, he made a deliberate effort to solicit a wide variety of viewpoints. He encouraged differences of opinion. And then having aired all the ~~different~~ possibilities he listened to from different people, he made up his mind what he was going to do. The NSC under Nixon became the platform for announcing pre-formed Presidential decisions rather than a vehicle for airing differences of opinion. The verification panel, as time went on, increasingly became that kind of a median also.

R: How do you reconcile what you are saying with what Newhouse says very persuasively which is what Nixon/Kissinger objected to about the Johnson style was that Johnson always insisted that he be presented with a consensus. And as a result many things fell out in the cracks, many points of view that would have been important for him to hear never got up to his level because of this mad effort to make a consensus. And that what Nixon/Kissinger wanted was not a consensus but a bunch of options. That's Newhouse's account.

C: I would say that I disagree with that description of the situation, as applies to SALT.

R: And that the object of the whole verification panel and working group was to work up on options which could then be presented to the President. You can do A, B, C, D, and E and then Newhouse does go with the beginnings of SALT I in which there was A, B, C, D, and E and 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

C: I just can't really speak with firsthand knowledge about how things were in SALT I. I think your best source on that is Zumwalt. But I think that what you will hear from him is that there really wasn't much significant difference between the way the system operated ~~with~~ SALT I and SALT II.

R: Obviously the Kissinger-Nixon style was not to reach a consensus. It was to ...

C: Well, I wouldn't call it the Nixon-Kissinger style. I'd call it the Kissinger style because I think Nixon was getting his input from a single source and that source was Kissinger. And because of the characteristic isolation with which Nixon operated, he didn't know and, from all indications, didn't care particularly whether what he was getting was a consensus or not.

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R: He was at the mercy of "whatever" Kissinger...

C: Well whatever guy had access to him and responsibility for that particular area. Kissinger's whole philosophy about SALT was that SALT, the real issue was not SALT but detente. And that SALT should not be allowed to interfere with or spoil the atmosphere of detente.

R: Zumwalt has said that but it's something I haven't fixed firmly enough in my head yet.

C: The great event in the last several years was ...

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C: If this means accommodating ourselves to the Soviet views, not in terms of just total sellout but settling for less than what we feel would be an ideal position, if that will give momentum to the whole process of detente then it's worth doing. It seems he just couldn't contemplate, and as time wore on and as people began to become more skeptical of detente in this country and the press began raising all sorts of questions of Congress, Kissinger became ~~more~~ ^{much} more defensive about it because he thought as though his own personal reputation was associated with the process or concept of detente.

R: God knows the whole idea of started out in an atmosphere basically favorable to him. It's something everybody wanted. It wasn't that he had to overcome a lot of hostility for detente. He was going with the current.

C: Yea. Well it's a concept no reasonable man could argue with. It's just when it got translated into some specifics like the wheat deal and the question of technology transfer, the whole basis for which our trade with Russia was going to be conducted, the question of whether we should extend large credits to the Russians to finance our trade, the question of whether we should get involved in these large resource exploitation deals ~~with~~ where we made a very heavy investment at the outset that would payoff in future years as the resources were extracted. You know, building a big pipeline ~~across~~ at a cost of two billion dollars that will give you natural gas or oil ten years from now. That sort of thing. And then there was the Jewish immigration issue which Jackson and others brought out which complicated the whole cycle.

R: Finally, and I think maybe in the long run most persuasively, they appaling picture of what Soviet ^{society} ~~life~~ is like comes from Solzhenitsyn.

C: Yea. The reminder that the basic charater of the society is one

that we find pretty reprehensible.

R: One that makes it very questionable whether detente is possible, whether detente is something they have in their system to engage in.

C: Whether they were ever sincere about it from the very beginning, there is an argument about whether they viewed it as a tactical maneuver in order to ^{over the} short run gain some advantages and put the ^{themselves} Soviets in a better position for a real leaps forward a decade from now in a speech Brezhnev is suppose to have made in Czechoslovakia. Anyway, on the Congressional side there was very little information flowing from Kissinger or any other source about ^{specific} US positions in the negotiations or the conduct of the negotiations themselves. Congress knew basically what they read in the newspapers and not much more.

R: And that includes Jackson?

C: That includes Jackson as well. This is really why, before the last summit when there was all this speculation in the press about a sellout for political reasons to salvage Nixon, that Jackson who had been kept so much in the dark felt it necessary to call everybody up to the Hill and ask them what had been going on.

R: Everybody. You mean the negotiators?

C: He called Schlesinger. He called the Joint Chiefs. He called Kissinger in. He called Paul Nitze in. And asked them what had been going on since SALT I agreements ~~had been~~ signed. The Congressional committees had received no reports at all. Tell me what has been happening for the last two years.

R: These were formal hearings?

C: Yea. These were formal hearings, by the Arms Control Subcommittee and the Senate Armed Services Committee on which Jackson is the chairman. He called them up there and said we would like to know what has

been happening for the last two years. We read the newspapers but we would like some communication between the executive branch and this committee on this very important issue. We would like to know the history of what has transpired, where we stand now, what the current US ^{SOVIET} position is, what we view the Soviet position to be, and what the government proposes to anyone who goes to Moscow. I don't think any reasonable person can argue that the Congress is not entitled, not the whole Congress but those charged with ^{the responsibility of} overseeing this area, are entitled to this ^{kind of} information. It was just unavailable.

R: These were closed hearings?

C: Yes. These were executive sessions because of the classification of material being presented to them. Kissinger was invited to be lead off witness. He couldn't make it. I forget what the story was. He was out of town I think. So Schlesinger went up first and ~~if~~ the Chief came on. Witnesses were put under oath. And this was done primarily because the Chiefs felt a little more comfortable under oath. So as not to ~~make~~ it too pointed they put all witnesses under oath including Kissinger. Kissinger was absolutely furious when they asked him to take the oath. He said I'm Secretary of State. I can't recall having been asked to take the oath before. Jackson ^{to him} explained that all the witnesses have been sworn. And so Kissinger accepted the oath. Anyway, Jackson felt, I think with some justification, that those hearings and the publicity that surrounded them, including this great controversy between Jackson and Kissinger on the so-called secret agreement, which I think is worth a whole chapter in the book because Zumwalt is right in the center of that from start to finish and the story still has not been told publicly. Jackson feels that that series of hearings may be the principle reason ~~is~~ that we did not get a bad agreement in the summit.

R: Did they ever publish a longer version of those hearings?

C: No they haven't. But my understanding is they will. Jackson asked for a lot of documentation.

R: Zumwalt testified?

C: Zumwalt testified. Every time a pertinent document was mentioned, a NSDM or JCS Memorandum, something like that, Jackson asked to write it into the record. And this gave great problems to Kissinger.

R: The NSDMs in particular, I guess.

C: Yea. Because when the whole record of documentation is put together, it doesn't paint a picture which reflects a great deal of credit upon the administration.

R: I don't agree with those. Having Newhouse fresh in my mind, I've been reading on yesterday and the day before, Kissinger may have given him most of the stuff. But it by no means an apologia for Kissinger because there are times when the whole thing seems like a damn fool whirlygig you know. Notoriously ~~was~~ the time when national command authority was offered and then everybody said "Oops, we shouldn't have done that." That story is told rather fully and it reflects little credit on any of the people in charge.

C: Yea, but what's the total impact of the story.

R: The total impact of the story is that no agreement would have been gotten without Kissinger and that time will tell whether it was a good agreement or not. I think that is the impact.

C: And I think that is probably the best result that Kissinger could have hoped for and basically what he anticipated when he chartered a book like that to be written and if the book would ~~not~~ have any credibility at all and if you ~~could~~^{would} get anyone responsible to do it and obviously could not...

R: Do you say he chartered it on the basis of knowing that he got a hold of Newhouse and said "hey, write a book about SALT".

C: I don't know. I don't know who made the first approach. But if you go to the record of Kissinger's confirmation hearings as Secretary of State, he was quizzed very carefully about that book. It was in executive session but they have subsequently declassified the whole thing. And he was asked if this was an official history of the SALT I negotiations. And what role did you play. What sort of access was Mr Newhouse given to classified documents. Who reviewed the manuscript. Who commented on the manuscript. What came out was you never got a clear idea of whose initiative it [was]. Did Kissinger ask him to do it or did he ask Kissinger to do it. Or did he start on it and get involved with Kissinger and Kissinger then open all the records to him? But it's quite clear the thing was written with the fullest co-operation of Kissinger and with access to all of the classified records of the NSC staff, that pertained to the subject except for limited distribution by channel message traffic. And when Newhouse was finished that the book was reviewed, I forgot who did it, it was a member of Kissinger's NSC staff who was directed by Kissinger to review and comment on the thing with the object of correcting any factual [errors].

R: Was the object correcting factual errors or just security stuff?

C: Oh no. It wasn't correcting security, it was correcting factual errors. Kissinger was quite clear on that point in his testimony.

R: I wonder what Newhouse said about that because people say different things about things like that. I have some journalism experience and I know that correcting factual errors is legitimate, however, as long as it isn't changing opinions, points of view, conclusions, or eliminating true things that reflect poorly on them. It's quite clear that in the

internal evidence of the book, you would ^{not} need the testimony to know that Kissinger had given Newhouse access to numerous things. How else would he get them?

C: Paul Nitze, who read the book with great interest--it's a well written book and it's a good book, made the observation that the book as far as it went is generally accurate but that it was only a partial telling of the story. And because it was only a partial telling of the story, it comes through in a distorted way. And that specifically the position and some actions taken by the JCS, and by OSD, and by the JCS and OSD members of the negotiating team, are not referred to in critical points in the telling of the story. Where there omission ~~unconsciously~~ really results in ~~some~~ serious imbalance in the ~~ex~~ reading. The ~~only~~ other criticism which I would make, and you know, I, and Paul Nitze is first of all in as good a position to know in detail what was going on in SALT I as anybody, and secondly he's just a terribly honest guy, he wouldn't say something like that unless it were true. And Nitze doesn't come through badly in the book himself. So, you know, he has no personal reasons.

R: Nor does Wolfstedter. He comes through real fine. You know, there aren't any physical bad derogations people whose positions might have been differently been ~~in~~ dealt.

C: The other, the criticism that I would make of the book, is the disregard to ~~a~~ strategic philosophy, an understanding of some of the technical aspects of strategic forces, and SALT issues. On which there are disagreements in the government. The approach which Newhouse takes, ~~and~~ ^{when} he's not presenting, say, this is the argument of so and so, where he's just explaining certain things for the benefit of the lay reader. The way they come out almost uniformly, is the way that

Kissinger would explain them, rather than the way that ~~the~~ military guy would explain, or Paul Nitze would explain them, or Jim Schlesinger would explain them. Or rather Walstedter.

R: I think it's indisputable, as the book also shows, not an excessive amount, but a certain amount of heated bias against the military, or just the assumption that the military ~~is~~ is always acting parochially, ~~and~~ in defense of its own budgets and own interests. But I think that's ~~fair~~ fair.

G: The interesting thing that just made me muddled to that whole philosophy which I recognize we're not saying we share that philosophy. . .

R: Well, but I would tend to believe it though, till it was proved otherwise.

C: One of the little ironies in the whole line-up of SALT positions and in the last couple of years has been that while Kissinger had ~~always~~ opposed our going forward to the Russians with any proposals which call for mutual reductions on both sides in strategic systems, the Secretary of Defense, and the JCS have ~~en-~~ dorsed specific negotiating positions which call for . . .

R: For mutual reductions. . .

C: Yes. Now the other problem guy around town who's ~~done it~~ done it, of course is Jackson. He's made several speeches in the last year, hammering very hard on this reductions theme. That is to say, we want not only arms control, we want disarmament, then when everybody gets disarmament in the strategic area, let's shoot on the path of reduction phase by phase. But if you were to go to. . .

R: This is reduction in the strategic field, you're talking about?

C: Yes, if you were to go to the average well-informed guy, and say,

you know, this issue on reductions, who do you think in the government is for it, and who's against it, and you'd get exactly opposite positions and opinions.

R: Yes. I should think the strategic thing, you know, just thinking about it superficially, I should think the strategic thing would make everybody uncomfortable. The less of that they had to have, the better off everybody would be. Such a volatile bunch of stuff, and it's so irrevocable once you use it, I wouldn't think that any sane person would like to be in charge of a thousand nuclear warheads, You know, who wants that kind of thing on your back, I should think.

C: I've told you how Zumwalt feels about having robbed the money that is available for. . . Yes sure, it makes a dangerous ~~world~~ world to live in.

R: It's also a personal ~~responsibility~~ responsibility, more than any person should have to bear, I should think. Maybe generals and admirals don't think that way but they ought to, if they don't.

C: Kissinger's reason for being against them, is he doesn't think they're negotiable

R: Well I would have thought that's the reason, you'll get no where with them. Of course it's getting no where with anything right now. ~~Is~~ Is SALT II still just a big yawn for the Russians, or have any negotiations ~~take~~ taken place in SALT II?

C: No, no serious negotiations. And for the last year now the whole focus has been on the MIRV issue with the idea of getting a separate agreement which does nothing but control MIRV's. And this is where Kissinger has really been pitted against the Pentagon on this issue ~~for~~ of a separate MIRV agreement.

R: The Pentagon just doesn't want a separate MIRV right?

C: They don't want a separate MIRV agreement and they ~~will~~ reject. . .

R: Civilians and military are as one. . .

C: ~~The ~~entire ~~difference~~~~~~ Alike, that's right. No difference between Schlesinger and the Chiefs on that ~~was~~ issue.

R9: Schlesinger is fighting Kissinger?

C: Well, yes with some qualifications. Well, anyway, Kissinger a year ago, started saying, on this MIRV thing we've really got to get going. Technology is really wild, the arms race is just getting completely out of control, the Russians ~~are going to have~~ ^{are going to have} literally just thousands of warheads. Some people using unclassified data, have estimated the Russians, if they MIRV, an ~~old~~ ^{old} missile ~~can~~ ^{old missile} throw weight can have as many as 25 thousand warheads.

R: You can get 14 at least out of ^{one of} those things.

C: Out of the SSR and the SS-18 which is the MIRV version ~~is~~ of the follower of the SS-9. Anyway, Kissinger became totally preoccupied with the MIRV's. He said, we've got to go after that cause the Russians ~~are~~, / , we've got to catch them before they have their whole force MIRV'd. The Pentagon said in reply to that, give up, you know, it's 1973, 1974 now and the Russians are not going to have their force MIRV'd until the end of this decade. It's not going to happen tomorrow or a year from now. So let's stay on the track ~~is~~ ^{toward a} comprehensive permanent agreement, and not go down this side road that you want to take us down. They said, beyond that ~~is~~. . .

R: Why is it a side road?

C: It's a side road for this reason that we had had great difficulty getting the Russians interested in negotiating. This led people to the conclusion that the leverage we were using to try to induce

them to negotiate a comprehensive agreement seriously, was not very great, and that ~~may~~ ^{may} have been for a number of reasons, Zumwalt's argument was that we were simply not using all the leverage we had available to us. We were keeping the ~~is~~ SALT negotiations within the very narrow confines of arms control negotiations, and were not using Kissinger's famous theory of linkage, to connect them with better bilateral issues. And Zumwalt's argument was we should go ~~is~~ to the Russians, and make it clear to them, that what is really at stake here is detente. And that detente cannot survive over the long run in a situation of serious imbalance in the strategic capabilities in the two sides. And that if the Russians are serious about wanting a relaxation of tensions, it will have some prudence to it. We've got to recognize that that has to rest on a foundation of military balance between the two countries.

R: Didn't he, Newhouse, imply, though ~~he~~ doesn't actually say, that one factor in suddenly loosening up the Russians, was Kissinger's sudden, unheralded appearance in Peking. That Kissinger indeed used "linkage" in getting the Russians to sit down and talk in the first place.

C: Yes, I see; Zumwalt pressed that point anyway.

R: Was this also a Nitze point? ^{Did} this point get worked on in your sub-panel?

C: Yes. This is the point at which. . .

R: When ~~is~~ did he start pressing this one, and where did he press it?

C: Zumwalt? Well he started it ~~with~~ ⁱⁿ discussions with the other Chiefs, he followed it up in memoranda he sent to the Chairman, and subsequently in some memoranda he sent to the Secretary of ~~the~~ Defense.

During the last year he was CNO, he was more active than any other time, in the SALT area. And in addition to sending memoranda expressing viewpoints ~~on~~ ^{of} all variety of SALT related issues, and suggesting what the general thrust of our negotiating position should be. He submitted a whole series of what are called CNOM's, which stands for, CNO Memoranda, to the JCS. A CNOM, and their counterparts with different acronyms for the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, and the Air Force, CSAM's and CSAF's, are a vehicle for initiating an expression of JCS viewpoint on a particular. JCS can take a ~~fair~~ formal recorded position, either as a result of their giving directions to the Joint Staff to prepare a position for them. The Joint Staff responding to stimulus that comes from outside the services, or by Service Chiefs sending down a CNOM which is a draft of a proposed JCS position. Where it gets circulated to the other services, they comment on it, the ~~ex~~ -officers meet, they revise language. It goes through all the drafting procedures that any JCS paper goes through. Finally comes up through the Operational Deputies, then the three-star Deputies, and the Chiefs, and they work it a little more, and then eventually moves up to the Chiefs themselves. And they revise as necessary, and then it becomes a JCS position. Well, Zumwalt submitted a large number of CNOM's, on SALT issues, which eventually, sometimes in unrecognizable form, other times in almost the same language in which they were ~~submitted~~ ^{originally} became JCS positions. And Zumwalt thought, ~~what~~

R: Were those a basically drafted forms originally over here?

C: Zumwalt, you know usually with some fairly specific indications from him of what he wanted ^{them} to say.

R: Yes I know, it's a drafting process. You just don't go draft

~~him~~ something mostly for somebody, and say here sign this, obviously you have to have some indication he wants something to sign, right?

C: Right. So Zumwalt felt that one of the problems in SALT I had been that the Chiefs never really thought through their positions very carefully, and they did not build a record by getting their positions reflected in formal, reported memoranda. . .

R: In terms of rigor of analysis, and doing good homework, and all that kind of stuff, how does the military compare to the civilian establishment?

C: In the SALT area?

R: Anywhere. Well I suppose the military's better at some things than others. . .

C: Yes, I think they do quite well now-a-days. Primarily as a result of the ~~in~~ impetus and sort of thing provided by McNamara where the services were told, you know, ~~x~~ we don't give a damn about military judgement off the top of your head. You've ~~g~~ been wearing your uniform for thirty years, but so what you've got to ~~■~~ be able to articulate it and defend it in terms that make sense to us. So the services took that to heart, they trained a bunch of officers who had the capability, and their doing quite well. McNamara was good for the services. It had a spillover. It wasn't limited to the systems analysis area in the narrow sense of that term, but it made the services much more aware generally that they had to be able to articulate and defend their positions on any issue in very sound, logical terms, .

R: So at this point the JCS paper on something will compare evenly with a State Department paper.

C: No. Because now when you apply the label, JCS, to it, you talk about service paper, army paper, navy paper, or Air force paper 8-B-12

that's one thing. If you say JCS, then it gets back into the, . . . this business again, compromises and language, and it results sometimes in absolutely incomprehensible style.

R: So JCS doesn't carry the weight it should in the General Security Councils. In other words it's not as good.

C: I'm just wondering whether I should agree completely, or whether I should qualify it. I think, if I would agree with it, but at the same time I will say that the, what comes out of the NSC staff, and what comes out of the, what's now called the PANE, Program Analysis and Evaluation, which is the new name for the systems analysis group at OSD, is not all that good either from the point of view of quality, it's declined in the last years. So, I think on a comparative basis JCS would not be all that bad. At any rate, the CNOM's forced the JCS to address in formal recorded fashion a lot of these SALT issues, with the objective on Zumwalt's part, of building a written record which will have two results: 1.) it would force Kissinger to take penalty for JCS views; by confronting him with these papers, here's what we think about these issues. And Kissinger would not then later be able to present, retrospectively answer. . .

R: This in effect answers what I was asking before which was didn't, wasn't the ease with which Kissinger at first ~~attempted~~ ^{was able} to brush off the military views here partly because the military itself ~~it~~ did not do the work of the very best qualified.

C: No, it wasn't a question of quality, it was a question of the military acting in an aggressive way to assure that ~~their~~ their views were presented at all. And given the fact that the committee mechanism ^{of} ~~that~~ the NSC system had really ceased to function as a medium for 8-B-15
presentation of adversary views, and ~~was~~ working ~~it~~ out a consensus.

this presentation of JCS memoranda that recorded their views, for historical record, and for such influence as they might have ~~had~~ on Kissinger as he went down the road toward an agreement became particularly important. And Zumwalt felt that at the time of SALT I the Chiefs were in a weakened position because they could not demonstrate clearly what ~~was~~ their positions and arguments had been leading up to the agreements. And therefore, Kissinger was able to portray the situation as one in which the rest of the government, he carried the rest of the government along with him up to the point to negotiate the agreements. Well, as a matter of fact this really wasn't the case, but it ~~wasn't obvious~~ couldn't be documented as not having been the case.

R: Of course the fact that you had a Secretary at that point who was as you say fairly disinterested in the details, ~~and contributed~~ ~~was~~ to that.

Q: But anyway, the Chiefs in SALT II, thanks mainly to the pressure Zumwalt kept on them, built a very aggressive record of positions. Just how impressive that was didn't ~~in~~ strike me fully, I don't think it even struck Zumwalt fully, until we went up to the Hill to testify before the ~~the~~ Jackson Committee. And ~~the~~ Jackson ~~at~~ asked Moorer to outline the history of the SALT II negotiations up to that point, and to indicate what the JCS position had been as the negotiations progressed, on all the key issues. And Moorer had in front of ~~at~~ him a notebook, with 14 key JCS memoranda in it. Which he was able to use to summarize the whole SALT II process, and to indicate with great clarity what the JCS position had been on each one of these issues as time went on. No other agency or government has clearly recorded the history of their views on SALT II as the JCS did. ^{9-B-14}

R: ~~That~~ That kind of fouls up the back-channel a little bit too doesn't it?

C: Yes it does.

R: It's not quite as easy to go waltzing off by yourself when there's that kind. . . Kissinger must be pretty annoyed with Zumwalt and company at this point.

C: He didn't realize until further date what a formidable adversary Zumwalt was in the SALT area. I don't think he realized since a lot of what Zumwalt was doing was within the confines of executive sessions of JCS particularly ~~initial~~ ^{during the} initial ^{months of SALT II}. There weren't too many people who knew what kind of influence he was ~~exerting~~ ^{wielding} on them.

R: Well, if Kissinger had realized it early, I think it's safe to assume, he would have spent some time buttering him up.

C: Yea, I think so.

R: Or else made sure he got fired.

C: It would have been difficult though, the Chiefs have four year statutory terms. It's never come up that I can recall, when the Chiefs were quartered for two year terms, and then Adm. Anderson was fired by McNamara, and this was one of the reasons why Congress enacted the mandatory four year term for service chiefs, without possibility of reappointment. Let me just mention one more thing that will be of interest to you. Right toward the end, in his last month ^{of} ~~his~~ tenure as CNO, Zumwalt, was really very concerned about the direction SALT was going. I'm leaping over a lot of history now but Kissinger seemed absolutely determined to get a MIRV agreement. I didn't tell you why the Chiefs, & Sec. Def, thought a separate MIRV agreement was a bad idea, but they did. Kissinger didn't seem responsive to this criticism or recommendation at all.

And Kissinger, in a couple of VP meetings, as we got closer to a settlement, made quite clear the fact that ^{he} earlier advanced a lot of fairly technical rationales, for a separate MIRV agreement, but as the, Schlesinger and the Chiefs one by one shot down his arguments, ^{because} they really didn't hold water, Kissinger would abandon them. Although interestingly ~~was~~ enough he still uses a lot of them ~~is~~ publicly, but within the bureaucracy he dropped these things and it finally came down to one argument,, that detente was in very serious trouble, as a result of the mid-East war, as a result of the administrations inability to deliver on the trade/^{bill} because Jackson was blocking the most favored nation for the Jewish emmigation issue. And as a consequence, the advocates of detente who were in the Soviet Union were in serious trouble with their "adversaries." And what they needed to keep detente alive, in both this country and the Soviet Union, and to convince people of both countries that there was something good in detente for everybody, was to show that ~~they~~ ^{it} could produce follow-on agreement on the SALT area, which was kind of the centerpiece in the whole detente relationship. And for the benefit of Breszhnev, ~~was~~ ~~w~~ show that that agreement would be one which he could represent as, if not advantageous to the Soviet Union, ~~was~~ at least not disadvantageous to the Soviet Union, in the terms that the Soviets saw the situation, which were quite different from the terms in which we saw the situation. And it was very clear toward the end there, that that was the principle justification that we saw for SALT, and that he, for the MIRV agreement, he was prepared to pay a rather large price in terms of accomodating to Soviet viewpoints. Now he went to Moscow, as I recall in March, a couple of months before the summit, & They talked the MIRV agreement at that time. They talked

specific numbers. And the Russians initial position was that we should have an equal number of MIRV missiles on each side. 1,000 MIRV missiles for us, and 1,000 MIRV missiles for them. And ICBM's, with no limit on either side for ICBM's/ Well, even Kissinger recognized that this was such a bad deal, we couldn't accept it. Because 1,000 MIRV missiles on each side, meant that their superiority in throw weight that would translate into many more warheads for them. On top of that, there was great feeling here that if the Russians got that ~~kind~~ kind of a MIRV deal, they would consider the whole subject of strategic arms control as finished. You know, we've taken care of numbers issue now in the interim agreement, we've taken care of the MIRV issue in this agreement, what more is there to negotiate. They would insist on just maintaining that status quo ~~in~~ perpetuity and even though the ~~interim~~ interim agreement would expire in 1977, when 77 came we would be in a very weak position to negotiate any adjustment of those numbers from the Russians.

R: As a Sovietologist, do you have the impression that the effrontery of that proposal might have partly been due to their sense that Nixon was so shakey, he might settle for almost anything.

C: Yes, I think so. I think the Russians looked at it this way, they didn't much care that they an ~~agreement~~ agreement with us or not, they were interested for the next several years in going ahead with their planned . Well, anyway, Nixon was in a weak position, we were the proposers in this case, we're the ones who are anxious to get an agreement, so why not try out something absolutely preposterous. If we accepted, nothing lost for the Russian they come out a little better than they would have otherwise.

R: But they probably wouldn't have made such a proposal to a

President they saw in a strong position.

C: Anyway Kissinger told. . .

R: Watergate did have a very pronounced effect on everything. I think it also, if I may venture a speculation which I would be glad to hear your comments on, I think it also had a pronounced effect on the relationship between the military and the White House, just simply because on the whole, Generals and Admirals at the top ~~are~~^{generally} tend to be straight arrows, and get to be pretty appalled by such goings on. Is that and accurate. . .

E: Yes that's pretty accurate. There was in me a lot of feeling. . . just general disgust for the whole shabby mess.

R: It does seem to me, particularly since McNamara was wielding the whip, the military has tended to be fool's deferential to the civilians and keep a low profile and so forth. But evidently in the last ½ year, they've emerged from their shells, or is that wrong.

C: I don't know whether that's. . . you mean as a result of Watergate?

R: I mean partly as a result of Watergate. I think Kissinger, just as a newspaper reader, had the military intimidated, and swaggled for a long time, and he doesn't any more.

C: That's very true. Of course this is in part a function of the fact that Kissinger's prestige and authority, generally has been diminished in the last 6 months. Watergate, the wire-tap episode that he got involved in. . .

R: And the charge, based or baseless, that he was going to make a bad deal with the Russians to save the administration

C: The whole thing he got tangled up with Jackson, the secret agreement, where the two men were exchanging charges publicly, and Jackson essentially saying Kissinger was lying.

R: then the threat to resign. . .

C: we saw a very marked change in the attitude of the press toward Kissinger about 8 months, when for the first time critical articles about him began to appear with some in them. Then you had Lt. Schultz, about how he negotiated the Vietnam settlement, which raised some serious questions about what he had done there. A lot of the Jewish community turned against him by their perception that he was really willing to sell Israel down the river in order to ~~make~~^{make} the Arabs happy, and in order to avoid tensions in that part of the world. The accumulated effect of all these things. . . Anyway he. . .(end side B).

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