

SUBJ: ADMIRAL RAUCH'S INTERVIEW

Keep

TO BEGIN WITH, IT WILL BE HELPFUL IF YOU'LL GIVE ME YOUR NOTIONS ABOUT HIS PRINCIPAL CHARACTERISTICS, SO I'LL KNOW WHAT TO GO AFTER WITH HIM.

R - WELL, I'M SURE HE'S LIKE THE ORPHAN THAT TRYING TO BE DESCRIBED BY THE BLIND MAN, DIFFERENT THINGS TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE.

WHAT WAS HE TO YOU. THAT'S ALL I COULD ASK.

R - HE'S A MAN THAT, OF COURSE, IS THE GREATEST PERSON TO WORK FOR, THAT YOU COULD EVER COME ACROSS, AND I THINK NO MATTER WHOM YOU WOULD TALK TO WHO WORKED CLOSELY WITH HIM, WOULD PROBABLY MAKE THAT SAME STATEMENT; AND I WILL TRY TO DESCRIBE WHY.

HE HAS A CHARISMA, A PERSONAL WAY THAT IS REALLY GREAT. I SAY ALL THIS BECAUSE SO LONG AS HE WAS WORKING FACE TO FACE WITH PEOPLE, AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF A SHIP, WHEN HE WAS A COMMANDER OF A FLOTILLA OF SEVERAL SHIPS, WHEN EVEN IN VIETNAM WHERE HE WAS COMMANDER OF ALL THE NAVAL FORCES OUT THERE WHICH REPRESENTED IN THE ORDER OF 38,000 PEOPLE, HE GOT AROUND ENOUGH -- HE ALMOST MET EVERYBODY THERE FACE TO FACE, THEY THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE PART OF HIS FORCE. WHEN HE WAS CNO AND HAD 600,000 PEOPLE TO DEAL WITH AND COULD NOT GET THAT PERSONAL CONFRONTATION--NOT CONFRONTATION BUT PERSONAL RAPPORT--THAT IS WHERE I THINK--MAYBE THE FIRST TIME IN HIS LIFE HE REALLY GOT ANY TYPE OF RESISTANCE FROM HIS SUBORDINATES. NOW, THERE ARE ALWAYS PEOPLE WHO ARE IN COMPETITION WITH HIM AND PEOPLE ABOVE HIM WHO WERE SUPPORTIVE AND PEOPLE WHO WERE NOT, BECAUSE HE WAS A TYPE OF AN INDIVIDUAL AND MADE THINGS THAT HE DID, AND HE WAS DAMMED SHOCKED. BUT, GENERALLY ALL OF HIS SUBORDINATES WERE SOLIDLY

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BEHIND HIM. AS CNO, THERE YOU'LL FIND A PERCENTAGE WHO WERE NOT, NOT A VERY LARGE PERCENTAGE, FORTUNATELY, BUT ENOUGH THAT MADE ENOUGH NOISES.

DID THAT COME AS A SURPRISE TO HIM AND FRUSTRATE HIM ANY?  
R - I DON'T KNOW THAT IT DID OR NOT. I THINK IT MAY HAVE BEEN A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF FRUSTRATION. YOU KNOW, I CAME TO WORK WITH HIM AS SPECIAL ASSISTANT WHEN HE CAME TO THE JOB AS CNO.

IMMEDIATELY?

R - YES SIR. AND CERTAINLY, I DID NOT EXPECT TO SEE SOME OF THE RESISTANCE THAT OCCURRED THEN, BECAUSE I WAS USED TO SEEING HIM IN THE AREAS WHERE ALMOST ALL OF HIS SUBORDINATES --

WHAT HAD BEEN YOUR OFFICIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM IN VIETNAM?  
ADM - WELL, I'M GOING TO KIND OF START BACK ABOUT THE WHOLE RELATIONSHIP, THE THING IS HE'S JUST A WONDERFUL GUY TO WORK FOR. THE REASON IS BECAUSE HE IS A VERY POSITIVE INDIVIDUAL AND HE LIKES TO TRY THINGS THAT HE THINKS ARE WORTH RISKING FOR THE BENEFIT YOU ARE GOING TO GET OUT OF IT. WHICH IS FAIRLY A TYPICAL OF MOST OF THE TRADITIONAL PEOPLE IN THE NAVY.

OR CAREER MILITARY PEOPLE?

ADM - OR ANYWHERE ELSE. I DIDN'T MEAN TO SINGLE OUT THE NAVY. I THINK THAT THE BEST WAY TO DESCRIBE THAT IS THAT THE-- FOR MOST PEOPLE WHEN YOU COME TO THEM WITH A NEW IDEA THE IMMEDIATE ANSWER IS NO. THEN YOU KEEP THEM ASIDE, YOU KEEP COMING BACK AND PERSEVERING AND JUSTIFYING IT, PRETTY SOON YOU COULD GET THEM TO SAY OKAY, MAYBE OR OKAY, LET'S BUY, SOMETHING LIKE THAT.

ADMIRAL ZUMWALT GENERALLY SURROUNDS HIMSELF WITH PEOPLE THAT HE THINKS UNDERSTANDS HIS POLICIES AND HIS PHILOSOPHY AND HAVING

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SO, WHEN YOU COME TO HIM--WHENEVER ANY OF THOSE PEOPLE COME TO HIM WITH AN IDEA, GENERALLY THE FIRST ANSWER IS YES. THEN HE'LL QUALIFY IT BY, DO WE NEED TO TRY IT OUT SOMEWHERE FIRST OR YOU'VE GOT TO CHECK WITH SOMEBODY ELSE TO SEE HOW IT IMPACTS ON THEM. IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS NOT A FRIVOLOUS YES TO EVERYBODY, BUT IT'S GENERALLY AN IMMEDIATE INSIGHT INTO THE ADVANTAGES OF , DOING SOMETHING NEW THAT- HE GENERALLY SEES THAT AND WANTS TO TRY, THEN THE IS ON YOU TO FIGURE OUT WHAT IS THE BEST WAY TO DO THAT SO IT ENDS UP BEING A MEANINGFUL THING YOU ARE DOING INSTEAD OF SOMETHING THAT'S NOT.

WHAT WAS HIS TRIP OF SURVIVING IN THE NAVY, BEING LIKE THAT. IT WOULD SEEM TO ME HE HAD A PRETTY GOOD CHANCE OF BEING SQUASHED RIGHT AT THE BEGINNING IF YOU ARE THAT KIND OF A GUY.

ADM - I NEVER KNEW HIM UNTIL HE WAS A REAR ADMIRAL, SO I DON'T KNOW. HE HAD A LOT OF IDEAS, AND I'M SURE HE TRIED A LOT OF THINGS. WHEN HE GOT COMMAND OF SHIPS, I KNOW THAT HE DID A LOT OF THINGS ON HIS OWN. I KNOW SOMETIMES THAT THE BOSSES AND OTHERS QUESTIONED IT BUT NOBODY CAN ARGUE WITH SUCCESS, AND HE WAS ALWAYS IMMINENTLY SUCCESSFUL.

HE MUST HAVE HAD A MEASURE OF TACT AND ---

ADM - HE IS A VERY TACTFUL INDIVIDUAL, AND WHEN HE HIMSELF NOW GOES FORWARD WITH SOMETHING, AND I THINK HE HAS DONE THAT ALL HIS LIFE, ONCE HE DECIDES TO GO IN A PARTICULAR DIRECTION, HE DOES AN EXHAUSTING AMOUNT OF HOMEWORK AND IS ABLE TO SHOW JUST CAUSE FOR WHY HE OUGHT TO GO IN THIS DIRECTION. GENERALLY IT PAYS OFF. SOMETIMES, IN DOING THE SAME WORK, HE FINDS THAT MAYBE HE

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SHOULDN'T DO THAT. BUT, GENERALLY WHEN HE STARTS LOOKING INTO IT, THAT WITH BRINGING HIMSELF UP TO SPEED ON EXACTLY WHAT IT IS HE WANTS TO DO. HE'S DEVELOPED A VERY GOOD SERIES OF SOME OF THE STRENGTHS THAT CAME ABOUT IN HIS BACKGROUND TO MAKE HIM THE MAN THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN THE HEAD OF THE NAVY FOR FOUR YEARS AND A MAN WHO IN THAT JOB DID PROBABLY FOR THE NAVY THAN HAS BEEN DONE IN ANY FOUR YEAR JOB FOR A LONG TIME OR FOR A FOUR YEAR PERIOD. WHAT IS IS THAT HE IS A NATURAL BORN DEBATER AND HE IS A PERSON WHO LOVES A FIGHT, AND I DON'T MEAN THAT IN A VIOLENT SENSE, BUT IN A COMPETITIVE SENSE. HE THRIVES ON COMPETITION AND VERBAL COMPETITION. I BELIEVE THAT, IF YOU HAVEN'T ALREADY, YOU'LL FIND OUT, THAT HE WAS HEAD OF THE DEBATING TEAM IN HIGH SCHOOL AND AT THE NAVAL ACADEMY, AND HE JUST NEVER STOPS DEBATING. HE'S STILL GOING TODAY. THE OTHER THINGS IN HIS BACKGROUND, I THINK THE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS JOB, OF COURSE, I COULD EVEN BACK UP BEFORE THAT, IN FACT I SHOULD. YOU KNOW THE STORY, I THINK, ABOUT HOW MR. NITZE KNEW OF HIM. I'VE HEARD THIS STORY THIRD OR FOURTH HAND. IT'S A THING YOU'LL WANT TO GET FROM HIM FIRST HAND. WHEN HE WAS AT THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE HERE AT FORT MCNAIR, I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE PROGRAM WAS IN DETAIL, BUT I KNOW THAT THE STUDENTS WERE DELIVERING PAPERS, AND YOU KNOW ALSO AT THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE THROUGHOUT THE YEAR, VIPS FROM THE GOVERNMENT TO COME OVER TO GIVE LECTURES. THE STORY GOES THAT THEN CAPTAIN OR COMMANDER, I THINK CAPTAIN ZUMWALT HAD DELIVERED A PAPER, I THINK STRATEGIC PAPER, AND IT

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WAS JUST VERY, VERY WELL RECEIVED. AND MR. NITZE CAME OVER, EITHER THE NEXT DAY OR THE DAY AFTER ( AT THAT TIME HE WAS DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS) HE CAME OVER TO TALK AND THE COMMANDANT AT THE WAR COLLEGE AND OTHER PEOPLE THAT MR. NITZE TALKED TO WHEN HE ARRIVED OVER THERE, KEPT TELLING HIM ABOUT THIS FANTASTIC TALK WHICH EVERYBODY HAD HEARD THE DAY, OR A COUPLE OF DAYS BEFORE, GIVEN BY THIS YOUNG CAPTAIN ZUMWALT. TO A POINT TO ALL OF US THAT MR. NITZE FELT HE HAD GOTTEN A BETTER RECEPTION OF HIS PAPER, THAN MR. NITZE HAD ON HIS TALK. SO HE SOUGHT THIS MAN, THE CAPTAIN WORKED FOR HIM IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, OF COURSE, HE WAS THERE THEN WITH MR. NITZE AT A VERY KEY TIME, MAINLY DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS IN 1962. HE LEARNED A LOT DURING THAT PERIOD. THEN HE WENT WITH MR. NITZE, OF COURSE, TO BE HIS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT WHEN MR. NITZE BECAME SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

HE ALWAYS HAD THE REPUTATION FOR YEARS OF BEING ONE OF THE NAVY'S EGGHEADS OF THE PENTAGON, ONE OF THE BRIGHT GUYS. ADM - YES, I THINK SO. AND, OF COURSE, YOU KNOW MANY PEOPLE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING THOUGHT THAT HE WOULD BE CNO SOMEDAY. HE WAS JUST HEAD AND SHOULDERS ABOVE EVERYBODY ELSE. BUT, PARTLY BECAUSE OF HIS INTELLECTUAL CAPABILITY, PARTLY BECAUSE OF PERSEVERENCE AND HE IS A NATURAL SAILOR. HE WAS A GOOD NAVAL OFFICER, FROM THE PROFESSIONAL STANDPOINT OF GOING TO SEA ON A FIGHTING SHIP. AND, PART BECAUSE, I SAY, OF PERSEVERENCE

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IN THIS ADDRESS OF SPIRIT OF COMPETITION, BUT ALWAYS DONE WITH THE GREATEST AMOUNT OF DIPLOMACY. I HAVE NEVER SEEN HIM VISIBLY LOSE HIS COOL OR LOSE HIS TEMPER, AND YET I HAVE KNOWN, BECAUSE OF WHAT IS GOING ON AT A PARTICULAR MEETING AND KNOWING HIM, THAT HE MUST BE ABSOLUTELY BOILING INSIDE, BUT IT IS ABSOLUTELY UNDECERNABLE. AT ANY RATE, I THINK THAT THE FEELING THAT HE HAS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE IS . I JUST DON'T WANT TO DRAW ON YOUNG PEOPLE, BUT FOR ANYBODY RIGHT TO SOME OF HIS CULTURAL BELIEFS, WHETHER IT IS A RACIAL CULTURE OR AGE CULTURE OR VALUE CULTURE, I THINK IT PROBABLY CAME EARLY ON, BUT I THINK IT SORT OF GOT FINED THUNED, WHICH IS THE WORD HE USES ALL THE TIME, IN VIETNAM.

WHAT WERE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HIS GOING TO VIETNAM?

ADM - I THINK THAT'S A QUESTION YOU OUGHT TO ASK HIM. OF WHY HE WENT TO VIETNAM, I DON'T KNOW. I HAVE HEARD HIM MAKE THE STATEMENT THAT THEY MOVED HIM OUT OF THE PENTAGON OUT WHERE HE COULDN'D DO ANY HARM, BECAUSE HE WAS A READ ADVERSARY WHEN HE WAS DIRECTOR OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS.

ADVERSARY OF WHOM?

ADM - WELL, SOME OF THE PEOPLE WHO WERN'T PUSHING FOR SOME OF THE PROGRAMS AS HARD AS HE WAS.

WHO WAS HIS ADVERSARY, MOORER?

ADM - I DON'T KNOW. CERTAINLY TO A DEGREE, ADM MARTLE WHO WAS THEN DIRECTOR OF ASW SYSTEMS PROGRAM. HE WAS TRYING TO GET MORE SUBMARINES, MORE DESTROYERS AND HE WAS DOING A LOT OF STUDIES IN THE ASW AREA, WHICH HE FELT VERY STRONGLY ABOUT.

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I THINK THAT HE JUST CAME ON AWFULLY STRONG AND TRIED TO RUN PROGRAMS HIMSELF. I'M NOT SURE THAT ANYBODY DISAGREED REALLY IN PRINCIPLE WITH THE WAY HE WAS GOING, BUT HE WAS KIND OF TAKING OVER AND HE WAS DOING A LOT OF STUDIES AND GAINING A LOT OF VISIBILITY AND MAYBE THREADING IN SOME AREAS THAT WERE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOME OTHER PEOPLE.

HE WAS A REAR ADMIRAL THEN?

ADM - RIGHT. BUT HE DID IT SO DIPLOMATICALLY AND HE ALWAYS CUT IN HIS OWN BOSS AND WORKED THROUGH HIS OWN BOSS. AT THAT TIME IT STARTED OUT TO BE, I THINK THE FIRST ONE WAS VADM HOLMES AND THEN HE LATER WENT TO CINCLANTFLT AS A FOUR STAR ADMIRAL AND THEN I BELIEVE ADMIRAL CLAREY, WHO LATER BECAME VCNO AND A CLOSE FRIEND OF ADM ZUMWALT, CAME IN AND SOMEWHERE IN THERE IT WAS ADM FRED BENNET, WHO WAS A REAR ADMIRAL IN THE WASHINGTON AREA AND FLEETED UP TO DIRECTOR OF NAVY PROGRAMS AND PLANS. HE ALWAYS DID IT VERY DIPLOMATICALLY. HE CUT EVERYBODY IN, BUT HE WAS VERY AGGRESSIVE IN THE WAY HE RAN STUDIES AND IN THE WAY HE GOT STEERING COMMITTEES TOGETHER FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FROM THE CIVILIAN SIDE OF THE SECRETARY'S OFFICE, AND GOT THEIR BLESSINGS

WAS HE THERE -- WHEN MOORER, NIXON WENT TO THE WHITE HOUSE. HE WAS THERE UNDER JOHNSON? HE WAS THERE UNDER CLARK CLIFFORD?

ADM - YES. HE WAS THERE UNDER MR. MACNAMARA. GOING BACK TO

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OTHER STRENGTHS, THERE WAS ONE--

WERE THOSE GUYS AWARE OF HIM, ESPECIALLY AS OR WAS HE JUST FAIRLY ANONYMOUS?

ADM - OH NO. THEY WERE ALL VERY WELL AWARE OF HIM. WHEN HE WAS WORKING WITH INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS WITH MR. NITZE, OF COURSE, HE GOT TO KNOW THE PEOPLE IN THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S OTHER OFFICES THERE. THEN WHEN HE WENT TO WORK WITH MR. NITZE AS HIS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT WHILE MR. NITZE WAS SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, THERE WAS ALWAYS A CLOSE ASSOCIATION WITH THE PEOPLE IN SHOP, WHICH WAS ASSISTANT ANALYSIS GROUP UNDER MR. MACNAMARA AND THEY GOT TO RESPECT HIM QUITE A BIT AND HE GOT TO KNOW AND RESPECT THEM QUITE A BIT. SO THAT WHEN HE BECAME DIRECTOR OF SYSTEM ANALYSIS, ONE OF HIS METHODOLOGIES WAS THAT HE WOULD PUT TOGETHER A STUDY--AND LET ME GIVE YOU A LITTLE EXAMPLE OF HIS SUCCESS--FOR SEVERAL YEARS 5 OR 6 UNDER MR. MACNAMARA WITH THE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS APPROACH THAT MR. MACNAMARA USED, WE HAVE NO DESTROYERS OR ESCORTS IN OUR NEW CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. HE AND MR. NITZE FELT THAT THERE SHOULD BE. NOW, THE WAY HE WOULD PUT A STUDY TOGETHER WAS THAT THEY WOULD MAKE SURE THAT THERE WAS A STEERING COMMITTEE OF MANY SENIOR PEOPLE INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES FROM DR. SHOP OR MAYBE HE, HIMSELF, AS WELL AS KEY PEOPLE IN DEFENSE DDR&E, AND OUR OWN NAVY SECRETAR'S SIDE.

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AND SO BY HAVING THOSE PEOPLE THERE, FIRST THING HE WOULD DO IS SAY OKAY, HERE ARE ALL THE ASSUMPTIONS WE ARE GOING TO MAKE AS WE GO INTO THIS STUDY, AND HE WOULD AGREE ON THEM. THEN THEY WOULD GO AND THEY WOULD WORK ON IT AND THEN THEY WOULD DECIDE THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL THAT THEY WERE GOING TO UTILIZE AND SO THEN THEY WOULD HAVE ANOTHER STEERING COMMITTEE MEETING AND THEY WOULD GET AROUND THE TABLE AGREEMENT ON WHAT THE MATHEMATICAL WAS. WELL, IF YOU HAVE GOT AN AGREEMENT ON THE ASSUMPTIONS AND AGREEMENT ON THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL, THERE IS NO WAY YOU CAN DISAGREE WITH THE CONCLUSIONS. SO THAT WAY YOU GOT EVERYBODY ABOARD AND THE CONCLUSIONS THEY WOULD COME TO IS THAT WE NEED X NUMBER OF ESCORTS AND SO WE BETTER START BUILDING.

DO YOU SUPPOSE THAT HE KNEW THAT IT WAS GOING TO COME OUT THAT WAY WHEN HE DRAFTED THOSE ASSUMPTIONS AND ADM - I DON'T KNOW. THAT IS A HARD QUESTION TO ANSWER.

IF HE WAS FLIM-FLAMING ANYBODY, IT WAS A PRETTY HIGH POWERED GROUP OF PEOPLE.

ADM - NO, I DON'T THINK IT WAS FLIM FLAMING.

MAYBE FLIM-FLAMING IS THE WRONG EXPRESSION. PRESUMEDLY I CAN'T REALLY CONVINCED--START THE STORY BY SAYING THAT THE PREVIOUS SYSTEMS ANALYSIS STUDIES UNDER MACNAMARA HAD COME UP WITH NO DESTROYERS.

ADM - WELL, NO. THE NAVY NEVER HAD ANY SYSTEMS ANALYSIS PEOPLE THAT WERE SENDING ANYTHING DOWN. WHAT I AM SAYING IS

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IS THE WAY THEY LOOKED AT THE BUDGET AND THE NAVY WOULD SAY WE OUGHT TO BUILD SOME OF THESE, THEY'LL SAY, WHAT'S THE JUSTIFICATION, AND THE NAVY WOULDN'T HAVE REASON ON WHY WE REALLY OUGHT TO HAVE SOME. SO HE WENT AHEAD AT IT VERY SYSTEMATICALLY AND PRODUCED MORE REASONABLE JUSTIFICATION. ANOTHER THING HE DID WAS, MR. MACNAMARA'S PEOPLE YOU WILL RECALL -- CHARLIE DIBONA WILL GIVE YOU A LOT MORE DETAIL ON THIS THAN I CAN BECAUSE HE WAS RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF ALL OF IT. NEXT THING OF COURSE WAS TRYING TO FORCE THE TFX DOWN ALL THE SERVICES THROAT SO THAT WE WOULD ALL HAVE OUR OWN . AND, HE DID ANOTHER STUDY, CHARLIE KNOWS ALL THE DETAILS, THAT SHOWED AND USING THE SAME PROCEDURE THAT GOT US OUT OF INVOLVEMENT OF THAT AND ANOTHER A TACTICAL AIR STUDY THAT GOT US INTO WHAT IS NOW THE F-14. SO, I DON'T KNOW THE REAL REASONS, BUT FOR SOME REASON OR ANOTHER---

WASN'T HE DUE FOR A TOUR OFF STAFF AT THIS POINT? HE HAD BEEN ON STAFF A LONG TIME HASN'T HE? WASN'T HE DUE FOR A FIELD COMMAND OF SOME KIND?

ADM - HE HAD ONLY BEEN THERE FROM -- HE GOT THERE AUGUST 1966 AND HE WENT TO VIETNAM IN SEPTEMBER OF 68. FROM MR. NITZE'S OFFICE WHERE HE MADE ADMIRAL, HE WENT OUT AND HAD A SEA TOUR AS HEAD OF A CRUISER/DESTROYER FLOTILLA IN SAN DIEGO. THEN HE CAME BACK TO THAT SYSTEMS ANALYSIS JOB, AFTER LESS THAN ABOUT A YEAR, SOMETHING IN THE ORDER OF A YEAR IN THE FLOTILLA JOB.

SO BASICALLY HE HAD BEEN ON STAFF FOR MOST OF THE PREVIOUS

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YEARS? I'LL GET THE WHOLE DOSSIER, THAT IS ONE THING I'VE GOT TO DO. ANYWAY, DID HE TAKE YOU OUT TO VIETNAM THEN?

ADM - I'LL GET TO THAT IN JUST A MINUTE, BUT LET ME GO BACK AND COMPLETE ONE OTHER QUESTION AND THAT IS I WAS KIND OF TELLING YOU ALL THE THINGS THAT MADE HIM SUCH A STRONG CNO. I MENTIONED HIS DEBATING ABILITY, THE SECOND THING IS, HE 'S ALWAYS BEEN A STUDENT OF HISTORY BUT THE WORK IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS GAVE HIM A POLITICAL/MILITARY BACKGROUND OR ENHANCED HIS POLITICAL/MILITARY BACKGROUND, AND WHEN YOU GET UP TO BE CNO, THESE TWO THINGS ARE REALLY VITAL, AND THE THIRD THING IS WAS HIS BACKGROUND FOR TWO YEARS WORKING IN THE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AREA; BECAUSE HE REMEMBERED MOST ALL OF THOSE STUDIES AND HE KNEW AS A CNO, WHICH ONES TO UPDATE AND DRAW ON SO HE HAD GOOD COACHING, AND WHILE JUSTIFIED REASONS FOR ALL THINGS THAT HE WAS TRYING TO GET IN THE CONGRESS AND GET IN THE JOINT STAFF, AND SO FORTH AS FAR AS FORCE LEVELS --

IS HE HIMSELF A MATHEMATICIAN?

ADM - WELL, HE WAS VALEDICTORIAN IN HIGH SCHOOL, BUT HE HAS NOT HAD ANY POST GRADUATE WORK IN THE MATH AREA.

BUT YOU DO SOME MATH AT THE ACADEMY, DON'T YOU?

ADM - YES, AND I FORGET WHERE HE STOOD AT THE NAVAL ACADEMY. SO YOU HAD A MAN THAT HAD A COLLEGE AND HIGH SCHOOL BACKGROUND HE WAS GOOD AT ANYTHING ACADEMICALLY, BUT HE'S NOT HAD A WHOLE LOT OF POSTGRADUATE WORK IN ANYTHING SINCE THEN.

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BUT HE'S GOT A VERY LOGICAL MIND, AND THIS IS A GREAT HELP. GOOD DEBATER, STRENGTH IN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND LOGIC AND DEVELOPMENT OF JUSTIFICATION; AND A STRONG BACKGROUN IN POLITICAL/MILITARY, AND YOU CAN'T BEAT THAT. TO HAVE THAT KIND OF COMBINATION AROUND IN YOUR ORGANIZATION.

SO SPEAKS MOSTLY IN GRAMMATICAL SENTENCES?

ADM - YES.

DO YOU KNOW WHETHER HE HAD ANY PRIVATE OPINIONS ABOUT THE ADVISABILITY WORTH OF VIETNAM ENTERPRISE, OR ARE PRIVATE OPINIONS DIFFERENT FROM THE OFFICIAL ONES?

ADM - THAT IS ANOTHER QUESTIONS YOU ARE GOING TO HAVE TO ASK HIM BECAUSE HE IS VERY GOOD IN ANSWERING THAT.

IS IT THE KIND OF THING THAT NAVAL OFFICERS WILL TALK ABOUT PRIVATELY AMONG THEMSELVES OR IS THERE KIND OF A TACIT AGREEMENT NOT TO DISCUSS SUCH THINGS?

ADM - NO. EVERYBODY HAS THEIR OWN OPINION. IF YOU ARE ORDERED TO GO OUT THERE AND DO YOUR JOB, YOU GO OUT THERE AND DO YOUR JOB, BUT--AND I DON'T THINK THAT ANYBODY WHO HAS EVER BEEN IN VIETNAM FAILS TO SEE A REASON FOR HELPING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. THE QUESTION IS, IS WHEHTER THIS IS SOMETHING THAT'S SUCH A RESPONSIBILITY OF THIS COUNTRY THAT YOU WANT TO SINK THAT MUCH RESOURCES INTO IT. ONCE YOU ARE OVER THERE, YOU KNOW THAT THE RESOURCES SUNK INTO IT IT'S REALLY OBVIOUS THAT YOU ARE HELPING SOME PEOPLE IN A BAD SITUATION.

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BUT WHETHER OR NOT IT'S THE POLICY OF THE COUNTRY TO UTILIZE THAT MUCH RESOURCE OVER THERE, THAT'S PRETTY MUCH UP TO THE ADMINISTRATION, BUT YOU HAVE YOUR OWN IDEAS AS TO WHETHER IT'S GOOD OR BAD. I THINK YOU'LL GET THIS BEST FROM ADMIRAL ZUMWALT. I THINK THAT THE POSITION THAT HE TOOK WAS MAYBE IT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED AND MAYBE WE SHOULD NOT HAVE GOTTEN INTO A SITUATION WHERE WE WERE EXPENDING THAT MUCH RESOURCE, BUT HAVING GOTTEN INTO IT, THERE WAS NO WAY THAT YOU COULD JUST PRECIPITOUSLY PULL OUT. AND IT HAD TO BE SETTLED IN SUCH A WAY THAT SOUTH VIETNAM WAS STRONG. SO, HE WAS VERY MUCH DEDICATED TO HOLDING THE LINE AND PUSHING THE ENEMY BACK WHILE STRENGTHENING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. THIS WAS KIND OF TWO PRONG PORTION OF THE MISSION THAT HE SET UP FOR HIMSELF WHEN HE WENT OVER THERE. THIS GETS ME NOW TO THE VIETNAM STORY AS I SEE IT. HE ASKED ME TO COME OVER BECAUSE HE WANTED SOME OFFICER TO, A CAPTAIN, MAYBE BUILD UP A LITTLE BIT THE OPERATIONS ANALYSIS GROUP THAT WAS OVER THERE. THERE WAS A SMALL GROUP OF 4 OR 5 OFFICERS WORKING DIRECTLY FOR THE COMMANDER OF THE NAVAL FORCES, WHICH WE WILL ABBREVIATE AS COMNAVFORV. HE ASKED ME THIS JUST BEFORE HE WENT OVER IF I'D GO OVER THERE AS SOMEBODY WITH A LITTLE BIT OF EXPERIENCE IN OPERATIONS AND ANALYSIS BECAUSE HE WANTED TO EXPAND THAT OPERATIONS OVER THERE, BASED ON WHAT HE HAS LEARNED WITH HIS

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INVOLVEMENT WITH SYSTEMS ANALYSIS FOR OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS.

YOU WOULD HAVE BEEN IN CHARGE OF THE OUTFIT?

ADM - OF OPERATIONS ANALYSIS GROUP, YES. HE GOT THERE ABOUT 10 DAYS BEFORE I DID, AND TOURED THE COUNTRY, A RELIEVING TYPE OF INSPECTION OR FAMILIARIZATION .

TO WHOM WAS HE DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE THERE?

ADM - TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE PACIFIC FLEET, NOW WAIT A MINUTE, THAT IS NOT EXACTLY TRUE. HE WAS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE THERE TO GENERAL ABRAMS, WHO WAS U.S. COMMANDER OF MILITARY SYSTEMS. BUT HE WAS RESPONSIBLE ON THE NAVY SIDE TO THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

BUT OPERATIONALLY IN TERMS OF DAILY OPERATIONS TO ABRAMS.

ADM - HE WAS A SUBORDINATE COMMANDER UNDER GENERAL ABRAMS.

AND IT WAS DIRECT. NOBODY IN BETWEEN?

ADM - DIRECT. GENERAL BROWN WAS THE OTHER SUBORDINATE COMMANDER. HE IS NOW CHAIRMAN OF THE CHIEFS. THOSE WERE THE TWO SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS OVER THERE. NOW, GENERAL ABRAMS HIMSELF WAS DOUBLE HATTED WAS HEAD OF THE U.S. ARMY FORCES OVER THERE, BUT HE HAD A GENERAL WHO WAS DEPUTY UNDER HIM FOR THAT OPERATION. ADMIRAL ZUMWALT WENT ON TO TOUR THE COUNTRY AND OF COURSE, HE DID A LOT OF STUDYING BEFORE HE WENT OVER THERE. I ARRIVED THE NIGHT BEFORE HE RELIEVED AS COMNAVFORV. HE KIND OF OUTLINED THE THREE THINGS THAT HE THOUGHT WERE HIS MISSION DURING HIS TIME IN VIETNAM. ONE WAS AN OPERATIONAL ONE, HE WANTED TO GET INTO THE DELTA A LOT MORE.

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AND TO UTILIZE OUR RESOURCES AND THE VIETNAMESE NAVY RESOURCES TO GET BACK CONTROL OF A LOT OF THE CANALS AND LITTLE TRIBUTARIES THAT THE VIET CONGS STILL HAD CONTROL OF SINCE THE THET OF 68. THE SECOND MAJOR AREA WAS ALSO OPERATIONAL. THERE WAS ONE MILITARY TERRITORY THAT CAME UNDER THE VIETNAMESE NAVY AND IT WAS CALLED THE SPOT ZONE, WHICH IS KIND OF MANGROVE SWAMP AREA JUST SOUTH AND EAST OF SAIGON. THE IMPORTANCE OF THAT -- THE REASON THAT IT BELONGED TO THE NAVY IS BECAUSE IT IS MOSTLY WATER -- IS THAT THE MAIN SHIPPING CHANNEL FOR SHIPPING UP TO SAIGON GOES RIGHT THROUGH THAT SWAMP. TRADITIONALLY, I GUESS, IS -- BEEN A LOT OF PIRATING, LOT OF ACTIVITY AGAINST SHIPPING THROUGH THE CENTURIES CARRIED ON IN THIS SWAMPY AREA. HE WANTED TO DO A BETTER JOB OF KEEPING CONTROL OF HELPING THE VIETNAMESE NAVY KEEP CONTROL OF THAT AREA TO AVOID ANY ATTACK ON SHIPPING GOING UP TO SAIGON. THE THIRD THING THAT HE WANTED TO DO WAS TO FIGURE OUT A WAY, AS FAST AS HE COULD POSSIBLY COULD, OF TURNING OVER OUR ASSETS TO THE VIETNAMESE, BECAUSE HE SAW THE UNITED STATES NAVY HAVING A LOT OF THEIR MONEY DIVERTED TO THE VIETNAM MORE, AND WE WERE NOT IN THE BUSINESS OF A LOT OF THE NEW CONSTRUCTION THAT WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN THE BUSINESS OF TO KEEP UP WITH, WHICH WAS ALREADY, A GROWING SOVIET FLEET. NOW, WE HAVE TALKED A LOT OF WHAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DONE IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, BUT IT HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR THE LAST 15 OR 20.

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RICE - AND WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE BACKGROUND?

ADM - AND HE WAS VERY MUCH CONCERNED ABOUT THAT. HE SAW THAT BUILDING AND HE SAW US WITH ALMOST A ZERO WITH A COUPLE EXCEPTIONS OF BUILDING PROGRAMS OF NEW CONSTRUCTION AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAM BECAUSE OF OUR MONEY BEING DIVERTED TO VIETNAM. AND HE THOUGHT ONE WAY TO GET OUT OF THAT IS TO GET THE VIETNAMESE TO PICK UP THE LOAD SO THAT THEY COULD HANDLE THE THING THEMSELVES AT LEAST ON THE THING HE HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR, NAMELY THE INSHORE AND RIVERINE FORCES, THAT WE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO TURN THAT OPERATION ENTIRELY OVER TO THE VIETNAMESE NAVY.

RICE - NOW, WHEN YOU SAY HE HAD THREE BIG MISSIONS WHEN HE TOOK OVER, OR OBJECTIVES, IN VIETNAM, HOW DOES THIS WORK IN THE MILITARY? WERE THESE ALSO ABRAMS' OBJECTIVES? WERE THEY ALSO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY'S OBJECTIVES? HAD HE CHECKED THEM AROUND BEFORE -- WERE THEY HIS PREDECESSOR'S OBJECTIVES OR DID THEY DIFFER FROM HIS PREDECESSOR'S OBJECTIVES? IN OTHER WORDS, HOW DOES INOVATION HAPPEN IF THERE WAS INOVATION IN THIS, HOW DOES IT OCCUR?

ADM - I THINK AN INOVATIVE OFFICER IN THE NAVY, WHEN HE COMES TO A NEW JOB, KIND OF EVALUATES THE NEW JOB AND THEN MAKE THE DETERMINATION, WHAT ARE THE KEY AREAS THAT I COULD MAKE THE MOST IMPACT ON THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THIS JOB BY PURSUING. NOW THE OTHER KIND OF OFFICER IS ONE WHO COMES ABOARD AND SAYS WHAT HAVE YOU DONE BEFORE AND WHAT DO I DO EACH MONTH AND CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO. BUT A PERSON LIKE

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ADMIRAL ZUMWALT, FORTUNATELY WE HAVE SOME LIKE THAT, WHEN THEY GET A NEW JOB, THEY TAKE A LOOK TO SEE WHAT ARE THE AREAS THAT I OUGHT TO REALLY PUT MY EMPHASIS ON.

RICE - NOW THESE THREE THINGS, WERE THEY SOMETHING NEW?

ADM - AND THESE WERE THE THINGS HE DECIDED ON. IN THE MANNER OF EMPHASIS USUALLY.

RICE - WAS THE VIETNAMIZATION PART OF IT NEW ALTOGETHER OR WAS THAT JUST EMPHASIS TOO?

ADM - IT WAS A HUGH EMPHASIS. LET ME TELL YOU ABOUT THAT, BECAUSE THAT WHERE WE WILL SPEND MUCH OF MY TIME. THAT IS WHAT I KNOW THE MOST OF. THERE WAS IN EXISTANCE A FIVE YEAR PROGRAM FOR MODERNIZATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES, AND THE NAVY PROTION OF THAT WAS A MODEST TURN-OVER OF SOME OF THE FACILITIES THAT WE HAD OVER A FIVE YEAR PERIOD.

RICE - FACILITIES BEING BASES AND BOATS?

ADM- FIRST BOATS, NOT MUCH TALK ABOUT BASES, MOSTLY BOATS. HE, RIGHT AFTER HE GOT THERE, SOMETIME AROUND THE 20TH OF OCTOBER, IT TURNED OUT THAT THERE WAS A ROUTINE PRESENTATION TO GENERAL ABRAMS THAT HAD BEEN CALLED FOR, OF THE PROGRAMS THAT VARIOUS SERVICES HAD FOR COMPLYING WITH THIS FIVE-YEAR TURN OVER PROGRAM. ADMIRAL ZUMWALT ASKED US TO PUT TOGETHER SOMETHING FAR MORE AMBITIOUS THAN THIS THING THAT WE WOULD HAVE DONE AS ROUTINE MEASURE, BECAUSE EVERYBODY HAD ITS PROGRAM, IT WAS A FIVE-YEAR PLAN, AND THE PEOPLE WHO WERE PUTTING IT TOGETHER WERE PUTTING TOGETHER THE SLIDES AND FORMAL PRESENTATION TO SUPPORT THIS THING THAT WAS A VERY ROUTINE, WELL DONE THING. HE WASN'T SATISFIED WITH IT. HE SAID IT WAS NOWHERE

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NEAR FAST ENOUGH, I REALLY WANT THIS THING ACCELERATED, REALLY PULL UP THE STOPS AND MAKE SOMETHING WHICH IS JUST AS FAST AS WE CAN GO. AND HE ASKED ME TO GET INVOLVED IN THIS. SO, OVER ONE WEEKEND, I GOT ALL MY PEOPLE TOGETHER IN SYSTEMS ANALYSIS GROUP THERE, AND I SAT DOWN AND WROTE SOME SKELETONS OUT. I HAD NEVER BEEN ON ANY OF THOSE LITTLE CRAFT OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT.

RICE - YOU HADN'T TOURED THE COUNTRY?

ADM - I DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THE NAVY IN VIETNAM. MY EXPERIENCE WAS WITH SUBMARINES, AND ONE TOUR IN WASHINGTON WITH HIM AND I WAS IN THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ANALYSIS BUSINESS. SO ALL I WAS DOING WAS DEALING WITH FIGURES THAT SOMEBODY WAS GIVING ME. I HAD MET A COUPLE OF VIETNAMESE OFFICERS AND I REALIZED THAT THERE WERE A REAL TALENTED, PROFESSIONAL GROUP, SO I SAID THAT THEY HAD THE NUCLEUS OF A REAL FINE GROUP OF PEOPLE THAT COULD PULL SOMETHING OFF. AND I MET THE CNO, ADM CHON, THEN COMMODORE CHON, AND THAT WAS ABOUT IT. SO I MADE UP SORT OF A SKELETON OF AN OUTLINE THEN GOT ALL MY PEOPLE IN AND I GOT THE FACTS FROM THE OTHER PARTS OF THE STAFF THAT KNEW WHAT THE RELATIVE SIZE OF THE TWO NAVIES IN COUNTRY WERE AND SO FORTH. AND OUR PEOPLE WORKED JUST ABOUT ALL NIGHT LONG FOR ABOUT 48 HOURS AND WE CAME UP WITH SOME SORT OF PROGRAM THAT WE PUT TOGETHER IN SLIDE FASHION, NEVER DID WRITE ANY SCRIPT OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT. SO THIS IS ABOUT

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MONDAY AND WE SAW THE BOSS, AND THAT WAS THE KIND OF THING THAT HE WAS AFTER. SO HE DID A LOT OF, ADD THIS TO IT, PUT ANOTHER SLIDE IN HERE ON THIS, YOU HAVE GOT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS HERE, CUT THAT WAY DOWN. WE KEPT MASSAGING THE THING UNTIL THURSDAY, ABOUT THE 31ST OF OCTOBER AND THAT WAS WHEN WE WERE TO MAKE THE PRESENTATION TO GENERAL ABRAMS. I AM SPENDING A LOT OF DETAIL ON THIS BECAUSE IT IS VERY SIGNIFICANT. IN THE MEANTIME, ON ABOUT MONDAY OR TUESDAY OF THAT WEEK, GENERAL ABRAMS WAS CALLED BACK BY PRESIDENT LYDON JOHNSON TO TALK TO HIM. PRESIDENT JOHNSON TOLD GENERAL ABRAMS, THE ONLY WAY OUT OF THIS IS TO TURN IT OVER TO THE VIETNAMESE, AND THE PROGRAM YOU GOT LAID OUT NOW IS NOT FAST ENOUGH. I'M PROUD OF YOU, I THINK HE WROTE HIM A LETTER AND GAVE IT TO HIM--ADM ZUMWALT CAN GIVE YOU ALL OF THIS. BUT WITH SUCH WORDS IN IT AS, LINCOLN HAD HIS MAN AND I HAVE MY ABRAMS, THIS KIND OF THING, BUT I WANT YOU TO GET THAT THING TURNED OVER TO THE VIETNAMESE. SO THURSDAY, WE WENT OVER TO THE PRESENTATION AND ADM ZUMWALT WAS GOING TO GIVE IT. ALL HE HAD WAS COPIES OF THE SLIDES THAT WE HAD WITH HIS OWN NOTES MADE ON EACH SLIDE, JUST STRICTLY NOTES. WE'VE PRACTICED A COUPLE OF TIMES, AND WE WENT OVER TO MACV HEADQUARTERS TO THE ROOMS WHERE WE MADE ALL OF THE BRIEFINGS AND PRESENTATIONS TO GENERAL ABRAMS AND TO HIS STAFF, AND WE PRACTICED IT ONCE MORE THERE. THEN IT WAS TIME FOR THE AIR FORCE'S PRESENTATION OF THEIR PROGRAM. ADM ZUMWALT STAYED THERE TO LISTEN TO THE AIR FORCE'S PRESENTATION.

THE COMMANDER WHO WORKED FOR ME, HE'S THE GUY WHO REALLY MADE SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND HE WAS KIND OF THE RIGHT HAND MAN TO ME, HE WAS THE GUY WHO WAS HELPING ME. WE ALSO DECIDED TO STAY THERE AND LISTEN TO THE AIR FORCE'S PRESENTATION. SO WHAT I AM TELLING YOU IS HEARD FROM BEHIND THE SCREEN. THE AIR FORCE GUY COULDN'T GET TWO SENTENCES OUT BEFORE HE GOT INTERRUPTED. I REALLY FELT SORRY FOR THIS PRESENTER, TO THE POINT THAT FINALLY YOU KNOW, FIST COMES DOWN ON THE TABLE, YOU HEAR ICE TRAYS BOUNCE, YOU HEAR QUIET OUT THERE BEFORE GENERAL ABRAMS STARTED TALKING AND HE REALLY CHEWED OUT THE AIR FORCE FOR NO IMAGINATION, WHAT WE WANT IS A GREATLY ACCELERATED PROGRAM, YOU HAVE GOT TO PULL OUT THE STOPS, USE SOME IMAGINATION AND ALL THESE OTHER THINGS, AND COME BACK IN TWO WEEKS WITH A PROGRAM LIKE I'M TALKING ABOUT RIGHT NOW. ADM ZUMWALT TOLD US LATER THAT WHEN EVERYBODY GOT UP FROM THE TABLE AND GENERAL ABRAMS DROPPED OUT, THE CHIEF OF STAFF CAME UP TO HIM AND SAID, BUD, IN VIEW OF WHAT HAPPENED, DO YOU WANT TO DELAY YOURS AND COME BACK IN TWO WEEKS? ADM ZUMWALT, KNOWING HIM, I KNOW HE WAS SMILING, SAID, OH NO, WE'LL GO AHEAD AND GO ON. WELL, HE CAME BACK TO US--NOW I'VE HEARD HIM TELL THE STORY RECENTLY, HE TELLS A DIFFERENT VERSION THAN I DO. HE SAID THAT WE HAD TWO DIFFERENT PRESENTATIONS, A SLOW PACE AND A FAST PACE. I DON'T REMEMBER PUTTING TOGETHER A SLOW PACE-- WHAT I DO REMEMBER IS THAT WE HAD ABOUT A THIRD OR A HALF OF THE PRESENTATION SHOW A LOT OF HISTORY AND ON WHAT HAD BEEN DONE AND WHAT WAS GOING TO BE DONE, THEN WE HAD THE LAST HALF OF IT THAT SHOWED OUR PROPOSED PROGRAM. HE CAME BACK AND SAID, OKAY, WE ARE GOING

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TO MOVE REAL FAST FROM HERE TO HERE. WE ARE JUST GOING TO PUT THEM ON, TAKE THEM OFF AND I'LL JUST SAY A FEW WORDS AND THEN WHEN WE GET INTO ALL OUR PROPOSALS, WE'LL KIND OF RELAX AND DWELL ON THAT. AND THAT IS PRECISELY WHAT HE DID. AND HE STARTED OFF, HE WAS GOING SO FAST THAT RAY AND I COULD HARDLY KEEP UP WITH THE SLIDES. ALL OF A SUDDEN HE GOT INTO THE NEW PROGRAM AND HE REALLY STARTED DWELLING IN ON THIS. HE TALKED FOR 30 MINUTES WITHOUT A SINGLE INTERRUPTION, AND WHEN HE GOT DONE, THERE WAS COMPLETE SILENCE. THEN, ONE BY ONE, THE STAFF, GENERAL ABRAMS WOULD SAY, WELL, YES BUT. AND AFTER ABOUT THE SECOND YES, BUT, DOWN CAME THE FIST AGAIN, I LIKE IT WE ARE GOING TO TRY AND SUPPORT YOU ON THAT. THAT IS WHAT I WANT. ADMIRAL ZUMWALT'S RESPONSE TO THAT WAS, GENERAL BY MONDAY MORNING, WE'LL HAVE A COMPLETELY STAFFED PLAN ON YOUR DESK. SO ALL OF OUR PEOPLE WORKED OVER NIGHT FOR FOUR MORE DAYS. WHAT WE PUT TOGETHER, AND UNFORTUNATELY I DO NOT HAVE THIS DOCUMENTED, WAS A LETTER WITH SOMETHING LIKE 12 ENCLOSURES THAT DESCRIBED THE PLAN THAT WE HAD PRESENTED, THAT CONTAINED THE SERIES OF LETTERS AND MESSAGES TO NOTIFY HIGHER AUTHORITY, TO SEEK A FEW RESOURCES FOR SOME OF THE THINGS THAT WE NEED TO DO. SO AN IMPLEMENTING DOCUMENT THAT REALLY AND TRULY IN SUCH A FORM THAT ALL GENERAL ABRAMS WOULD HAVE TO DO WAS SIGN HIS NAME ABOUT 8 OR 9 TIMES AND LET THEM GO AND IT WOULD BE ON THE ROAD. AS IT TURNED OUT, HE GAVE IT TO HIS STAFF TO STAFF, EVEN THOUGH HE WANTED TO SUPPORT IT. OBVIOUSLY HE GAVE IT TO HIS STAFF TO WORK WITH.

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AND IT WAS THE 18TH OF NOVEMBER THAT THE MESSAGE FINALLY WENT OUT. AND BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR, WE HAD IN OPERATIONS A SCHOOL THAT WOULD TAKE SOMETHING LIKE 300 YOUNG VIETNAMESE AT A TIME, RECRUITS RIGHT OUT OF RECRUIT TRAINING, AND IT WAS A COMBINATION OF TEACHING THEM ENGLISH, IT WAS A THREE-MONTH SCHOOL, AND A LITTLE BIT OF KNOWLEDGE ON HOW TO OPERATE IN ONE OF OUR SMALL FIBERGLASS BOATS CALLED PBR'S. THIS SCHOOL WE CALLED THE BOAT SCHOOL. WHAT WE WRE GOING TO HAVE TO DO TO GET THEM TO TAKE OVER OUR CRAFT, WE WERE TALKING OF TURNING OVER UPWARDS OF 500 CRAFT. AS IT TURNED OUT WHEN YOU COUNTED ALL THE BOSTON WHALERS AND ALL THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT CRAFT AND EVERYTHING, INCLUDING OUR COMBAT CRAFT, WE TURNED OVER ROUGHLY SPEAKING, A 1000 CRAFT FOR THEM TO OPERATE MOST OF WHICH THEY HAD NO EXPERIENCE WITH WHATSOEVER. NOW WITH THEIR NAVY HAVING TO GROW AT THE RATE AT WHICH IT WOULD HAVE TO GROW TO DO THIS, THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT CAPACITY TO GET THEM THROUGH ALL THE BASIC TRAINING SCHOOLS AND GET THEM INTO SOME SORT OF SYSTEM WHERE THEY, ON THEIR ON, WOULD TRAIN THE PEOPLE TO OPERATE SOME OF THESE CRAFT. FOR EXAMPLE WE'RE TURNING OVER EVENTUALLY 250 OF THESE PBR'S. SO WE FIGURED THAT THE BEST WAY TO DO THIS--THIS WAS PART OF THE PLAN THAT WE PUT TOGETHER THAT NOBODY THOUGHT WAS GOING TO WORK--WE DECIDED WHAT WE WOULD DO IS TRAIN THEM IN OUR CREWS, AND THE WAY WE WOULD DO THAT IS WE BRING A VIETNAMESE YOUNG MAN INTO THE CREW--ONLY FOUR MAN CREW--BRING THE VIETNAMESE MAN IN, MAKE IT 5 FOR AWHILE AND HE WOULD STAY THERE AND PICK UP HIS

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KNOWLEDGE AND CAPABILITY IN RELIEVING THE JUNIOR MAN ON THERE AND WE WOULD KICK THE U.S. GUY OFF, AND WE WOULD HAVE ONE VIETNAMESE AND THREE U.S. AND THEN WE WOULD BRING ANOTHER VIETNAMESE ABOARD AND HE WOULD LEARN AND WE WOULD GET RID OF ANOTHER U.S. AND SO FORTH UNTIL THE VIETNAMESE HAD THE WHOLE BOAT.

RICE - EASIER TO TEACH ONE VIETNAMESE ANY LESS THAN FOUR AMERICAN VIETNAMESE?

ADM - AND THAT TURNS OUT TO BE THE CASE. I STARTED IN THE OTHER DIRECTION. BEFORE WE PUT THIS THING TOGETHER. IN THAT TWO OR THREE WEEK PERIOD I HAD BEFORE WE SPENT THE WEEKEND PUTTING THE PLAN TOGETHER, I KNEW THAT WE WERE GOING TO HAVE A PROGRAM TO TEACH VIETNAMESE HOW TO OPERATE OUR CRAFT IN SOME WAY. ADM ZUMWALT HAD DECIDED THAT HE WANTED TO DO IN ON KIND OF ON THE JOB TRAINING AND I ORIGINALLY PURSUED THE IDEA OF TEACHING OF WHOLESALE TEACHING. IT TURNED OUT TO BE EASIER TO DO A WHOLESALE TEACHING OF THE VIETNAMESE. ON THE OTHER HAND, COMMODORE CHON, THE HEAD OF THEIR NAVY, WAS OF THE OPINION THAT OF ALL THE SERVICES, THE NAVY IN THE COUNTRY IS THE INTERNATIONAL SERVICE, AND ONE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE IS ENGLISH SO THAT THE MORE PEOPLE IN MY NAVY THAT COULD SPEAK ENGLISH THE BETTER OFF THEY ARE. SO HE WAS INTERESTED IN HIS PEOPLE LEARNING ENGLISH AND THE THIRD REASON WAS THAT WE DREW ABOUT 75% OF THE RECRUITS INTO THE NAVY OUT OF THE LARGE CITIES. THIS WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE MARINES AND THE ARMY, BUT AS FAR

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AS THE NAVY WAS CONCERNED IT WAS KIND OF LIKE THE AIR FORCE PRESTIGE ARMED FORCE. WHAT THAT MEANS IS THAT MOST OF THE YOUNG RECRUITS HAD HAD ENGLISH IN HIGH SCHOOL, SO IF YOU WERE TO ASK THEM TO WRITE AND READ, MANY OF THEM HAD A FACILITY TO THINK, BUT WHAT IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE VIETNAMESE IS TO UNDERSTAND AND PRONOUNCE, IN OTHER WORDS TO COMMUNICATE. SO WHAT WE WERE DOING PRIMARILY DURING THAT THREE MONTH PERIOD WAS INVOLVED IN THE COMMUNICATIONS COURSE. NOW WE KNEW THAT WE DIDN'T HAVE TIME TO TEACH TEACH THEM THE WHOLE LANGUAGE, AND SO WE DWELLED ON JUST THOSE WORDS THAT WERE NECESSARY TO GET ALONG ABOARD SHIP. BUT, AT THE SAME TIME TO MAKE IT INTERESTING AND TO GIVE THEM SOMETHING ELSE THAT WOULD BE USEFUL, WE ALSO TAUGHT THEM VARIOUS FACETS OF THE OPERATION ON A PBR AND IN FACT, WE HAD THERE KIND OF A MOCK UP OF A PBR SO THEY COULD UTILIZE THAT. WHILE THAT SCHOOL WAS IN BEING IN A HOTEL THAT WE RENTED, THERE WAS ANOTHER THING THAT WAS DONE, ADM ZUMWALT CALLED IN THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF CONSTRUCTION OUT THERE, AND TOLD HIM THAT HE WANTED A NEW SET OF BARRACKS AND A NEW SET OF CLASS ROOMS AT WHAT USED TO BE RECRUIT TRAINING CENTER AT CAM RAN BAY. THIS WAS PART OF OUR PLAN TOO. THAT WE WOULD TAKE THE RECRUITS, AND NOT TRAIN THEM BY THE NAVY, BUT WE WOULD HAVE THE ARMY DO ALL OF THE RECRUIT TRAINING, THEN WE WOULD TAKE THE PEOPLE UP AT THE NAVAL TRAINING CENTER AT CAM RAN BAY AND GIVE THEM A BASIC TRAINING UP THERE. I MEAN BASIC SKILL TRAINING. AND AT THE SAME TIME WE WOULD

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DOUBLE THE CAPACITY OF THAT SCHOOL. IN A REAL UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT THE CONSTRUCTION PUT TOGETHER A DOUBLING OF THAT CAPACITY AT CAM RAN BAY IN SOMETHING LIKE 36 DAYS. BUT THIS DID TWO OR THREE THINGS. BY THE BOAT SCHOOL IN SAIGON AND BY THIS FAST CONSTRUCTION PERIOD UP THERE IN CAM RAN BAY, IT SERVED NOTICE THAT IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS TO EVERYBODY THAT SAW IT, THAT THE UNITED STATES NAVY REALLY MEANT BUSINESS WHEN THEY WERE GOING TO TRY TO HELP THE VIETNAMESE NAVY ACTUALLY MORE THAN DOUBLE ITS SIZE AND TAKE OVER THE OPERATION OF A LOT OF UNITS.

RICE - LET ME ASK A QUESTION THAT BOTHERS ME A LITTLE. WHEN ZUMWALT GOES THERE ON PRACTICALLY NO NOTICE AT ALL, WITH A KIND OF A NEW PRESENTATION WHICH INVOLVE GIVING AWAY A LOT OF NAVY PROPERTY TO SOMEBODY ELSE AND ALL THAT KIND OF STUFF, DOESN'T HE HAVE TO CLEAR THAT SOMEWHERE IN THE NAVY BEFORE HE CAN TELL ABRAMS THAT IS WHAT WE PROPOSE TO DO?

ADM - THE ANSWER IS YES. AND SOME OF OF THIS DOCUMENTATION CAME BACK TO THE NAVY, THAT WERE THINGS BACK TO THE NAVY SAYING THIS IS WHAT WE --

RICE - WELL, DID YOU HAVE TIME BEFORE YOU EVER GOT TO ABRAMS TO, DID HE HAVE TIME TO TALK TO SOMEBODY AND SAY IS IT ALRIGHT IF I PROPOSE THIS TO ABRAMS?

ADM - SOME OF THE THINGS WERE IN THE FIVE YEAR PROGRAM AND WE WERE CUTTING THE FIVE YEARS TO ONE YEAR.

RICE - SOME OF THEM WERE WITHIN HIS PREROGATIVE AS COMMANDER?

ADM - THAT IS RIGHT. WE DID VERY LITTLE WITH AUTHORITIES OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS.

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RICE - THERE WERE NO KICK BACKS ABOUT THAT?

ADM - NO, NOT REALLY. WE GOT A COUPLE OF MESSAGES SAYING, WE ARE NOT QUITE SURE WHAT ALL THIS MEANS, BUT WE WANT TO SUPPORT YOU. AND FINALLY, HE FELT THE BEST WAY TO EXPLAIN IT WAS TO SEND A BRIEFING TEAM BACK HERE TO GIVE ADMIRAL MOORER AND TO GIVE CINCPACFLT THE SAME BRIEFING THAT HE HAD GIVEN TO GENERAL ABRAMS, IT WAS JUST THE EASIEST THING TO DO. SO HE SENT THAT COMMANDER WHO WORKED FOR ME, AND ANOTHER COMMANDER OUT OF THE MILITARY SYSTEMS OFFICE THAT WE HAD OVER THERE WHO KNEW THE FIVE YEAR PROGRAM. HE SENT THEM BACK AND THEY BRIEFED CINCPACFLT AND--

RICE - WHO WAS CINCPACFLT THEN, GRAHAM?

ADM - NO, AT THAT TIME IT WAS ADM HYLAND. CINCPAC, A JOINT COMMAND AT THAT TIME WAS ADM MACAIN.

RICE - THERE WASN'T ANY STATIC AS A RESULT, WAS THERE?

ADM - THERE WAS A LITTLE BIT, BECAUSE IN OUR PLAN, I HAD, INADVERTENTLY, GIVEN AWAY MORE THAN WE REALLY OWNED. SO IT WOULD HAVE CAUSED THE BUILDING PROGRAM TO BE QUITE AS AMBITIOUS AS WHAT WE PUT IN THERE, ADMIRAL ZUMWALT HAS A COPY OF THIS, I GOT TO TAKE THE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT. SO ONE OF THE WAYS THAT WE MADE THAT UP, WHAT THAT WAS IN WAS IN THE ARMORED RIVERINE FORCES. NOW, WHAT WE WERE GOING TO DO IS REPLACE SOME OF THE OLD FORCES THAT THE VIETNAMESE NAVY HAD WITH MODERNIZED CRAFT OF THE TYPE THAT WE WERE USING. WHAT WE ENDED UP DOING, SINCE I HAD SHOWN THE FIGURES THAT WERE MORE THAN WE HAD IN OUR INVENTORY, WAS TURNING OVER A REASONABLE AMOUNT WHICH WAS MOST

OF WHAT WE HAD IN OUR INVENTORY AND INSTEAD OF REPLACING, THE VIETNAMESE NAVY KEPT THEIR OLD FORCES THAT WERE SOMEWHAT IN THE SAME NATURE. SO THEY HAD ROUGHLY ABOUT 500 CRAFT AND OUR PROGRAM WHICH WAS TO COMPLETE AND DESIGNED THIS WAY OVER THAT WEEKEND, IT WAS TO COMPLETE BY THE END OF FISCAL YEAR 72. TO COMPLETE BY JULY 72.

RICE - IT'S ABOUT 3 1/2 YEAR PROGRAM.

ADM - NO SIR. WE WERE TALKING, THIS WAS THE END OF 68. YES, THREE AND A HALF YEARS. BUT MOST OF THE STUFF TO BE TURNED OVER BEFORE THAT, AND THE LAST YEAR WAS A LOGISTIC CATCH-UP TURN OVER THE BASES AND THAT SORT OF THING.

RICE- ONE OF THE LARGER IMPLICATIONS OF THIS WHOLE STORY IS WHAT HAS BECOME KNOWN AS VIETNAMIZATION WAS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE JOHNSON PROGRAM NOT A NIXON/LAIRD PROGRAM.

ADM - THAT'S A FACT AND VERY FEW PEOPLE KNOW THAT. IT WAS BEFORE NIXON WAS EVEN ELECTED. ADMIRAL ZUMWALT CAME OVER THERE WITH THE IDEA THAT'S THE WAY TO GO. THEN MR. JOHNSON GAVE DIRECTIONS TO GENERAL ABRAMS, THEN YOU HEARD HOW WE FIT INTO THAT. SO WHAT IT TURNED OUT WAS THAT WE GAVE ABOUT 1,000 CRAFT AWAY AND THAT MEANT THEY WENT FROM A 500 CRAFT NAVY TO A 1500 CRAFT NAVY AND THE LARGEST BEING SEVERAL DESTROYER ESCORT SIZE SHIPS. AND THEY WENT IN STRENGTH FROM ABOUT 17,000, AND THEY HAVE JUST RECENTLY DOUBLED OVER THE PREVIOUS THREE YEARS FROM ABOUT 8,000 WHEN ADMIRAL ZUMWALT GOT THERE, THERE WERE SOMETHING AROUND 17,000 AND THEY FINALLY PEAKED OUT AROUND 42,000. AT 42,000

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AS F\_R AS NUMBERS OF PEOPLE ARE CONCERNED, THEY WERE SOMETHING LIKE THE NINTH LARGEST NAVY IN THE WORLD. YOU KNOW THERE ARE NAVIES WITH A LOT MORE TONNAGE, BUT THEY DON'T HAVE THAT MANY PEOPLE.

RICE - TELL ME WHAT IS SOMETHING THAT NEEDS TO BE PUT IN PERSPECTIVE, IT SEEMS TO ME, REALISTICALLY WHAT PART OF THE TOTAL AMERICAN EFFORT IN VIETNAM DID THE NAVY REPRESENT? NOT JUST NECESSARILY IN TERMS OF NUMBERS WHICH WAS A SMALL PART IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OBVIOUSLY, BUT YOU KNOW, IN TERMS OF IMPORTANCE OF WEIGHED IN ANY WAY, HOW IMPORTANT TO THE WHOLE EFFORT WAS THE NAVY EFFORT. WAS IT A MINOR PART OF THE WHOLE ENTERPRISE OR WAS IT A VITAL PART OR SIGNIFICANT PART OR WHAT? THIS IS JUST YOUR OPINION.

ADM - IT IS HARD TO TELL YOU PERCENTAGE WISE. THE NAVY OR A NAVY WAS KNOWN FOR SUCCESS, FOR COMPLETION FOR ANY TYPE OF OPERATION IN VIETNAM FOR A COUPLE OF REASONS. FOR ONE THING, THEY HAVE SOMETHING LIKE 1250 MILES OF COASTLINE, AND UP TO ABOUT 1965 MOST ALL OF THE RESUPPLY OF ANY NORTH VIETNAMESE FORCES, AND ANY RESUPPLY OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE VIET CONG WAS BY SEA AROUND THE COASTLINE. IT MEANT TRAWLERS FROM HAIPHONG, THEY WOULD COME DOWN TO THE DELTA AND OTHER PLACES ALL ALONG THE COAST THEY WERE RESUPPLYING THE VIET CONG. AS A MATTER OF FACT, YOU GET DOWN INTO THE DELTA, THEY HAVE AN INTERESTING OPERATIONS DOWN THERE, THERE'S WHAT AMOUNTS TO A PENINSULA THAT IS COMPLETELY CUT BY WATERWAYS, THE WHOLE SOUTHERN TIP OF THE MEKONG DELTA THERE IS MANGROVE, SWAMP AND QUITE A HEAVY COVERAGE THERE, AND THEY WOULD USE THAT AS KIND OF A SURGE TANK AND THEY WOULD

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OFFLOAD DOWN THERE AND THEN THEY COULD RESUPPLY UP NORTH TO THE WHOLE DELTA AND WITH ANY PROBLEMS, THEY COULD WITHDRAW INTO THIS PLACE. SO THERE IS A FAIRLY WELL SANCTUARY. I'LL TELL YOU, FIGHTING THAT WAR IS LIKE SUBMARINE WARFARE. TWO-THIRDS OF THE BATTLE IS FINDING OUT WHERE THE GUY IS. SO THEY RESUPPLIED QUITE INSISTENTLY. AROUND 65, WE STARTED AN OPERATION AROUND THE COAST CALLED "MARKET TIME" AND CONSISTED OF SEVERAL BARRIERS. AN AIR BARRIER THAT FLEW AROUND 100-150 MILE OFF THE SHORE.

RICE - NAVY AIR?

ADM - YES SIR. THEN THERE WAS AN OUTER SURFACE BARRIER WHICH WAS DESTROYER ESCORTS, LST'S, MINESWEEPERS, COAST GUARD AND THESE SORTS OF THINGS. THERE WAS ALWAYS ABOUT 8 OF THEM ON STATION AROUND THE COAST. NOW, THIS IS OVER AND ABOVE THE GUN LINE, IN OTHER WORDS THE SHIPS THAT WERE TO SUPPLY GUN FIRE SUPPORT TO TROOPS IN VIETNAM. THE GUN FIRE SUPPORT SHIPS DID NOT COME UNDER ADM ZUMWALT, THEY CAME UNDER THE SEVENTH FLEET. BUT THE OUTER BARRIER, SURFACE BARRIER, DID. THESE PEOPLE ACTUALLY CHANGED OPERATIONAL CONTROL TO ADM ZUMWALT WHEN THEY GOT ON STATION.

RICE- I SEE, THEY WERE FROM THE SEVENTH FLEET-- THE AIR WAS SEVENTH FLEET.

ADM - THE AIR WAS SEVENTH FLEET BUT WE CONTROLLED ONCE THEY GOT TO THE PATROL POSITION, FOR THE MARKET TIME CONTROL, THEN IT WAS CONTROLLED, WE DID IT ESSENTIALLY FROM CAM RAHN BAY. THEN THERE WAS IN INSHORE BARRIER, WHICH WAS MADE UP OF ABOUT 100 OF THESE LITTLE 50 FOOT ALUMINUM BOATS CALLED SWIFT BOATS, PCF'S. THEY HAD GOOD ARMAMENT ON THEM, A COUPLE OF 50 CALIBERS AND THEY HAD

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GRANADE LAUNCHERS AND MORTARS AND A LOT OF GUNFIRE FROM THIS LITTLE BOAT, AND IT WAS FAIRLY SEAWORTHY UP TO A FAIRLY GOOD SEA. IN A REAL HEAVY SES THEY WOULD HAVE TO COME IN. SO YOU HAVE THE THREE BARRIERS, THE AIR BARRIER, THE OUTER SURFACE BARRIER, AND THE INSHORE BARRIER, AND THEN ADM ZUMWALT, IN HIS DESCRIPTION OF THIS ALWAYS LIKE TO DESCRIBE IT AS "PORT BARRIER" WHICH IS THE STRETCHES OF FRIENDLY CONTROLLED AREA ON THE COAST. THESE ARE ALL BARRIERS TO INFILTRATION. ONCE THAT WAS SET UP, THE AMOUNT OF INFILTRATION BY SEA REALLY CUT DOWN AND I GUESS THERE WERE AS MANY AS 8 OR SO TRAWLERS OVER A SEVERAL YEAR PERIOD THAT DID TRY AND GOT TURNED BACK, COUPLE OF THEM GOT SUNK. IT SERIOUSLY CURTAILED THE INFILTRATION BY SEA. THIS CAUSED THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TO HAVE TO RESUPPLY DOWN THROUGH THE HO CHI MEN TRAIL, DOWN THROUGH LAOS, THROUGH CAMBODIA AND THEN COME THROUGH VARIOUS PLACES IN CAMBODIA. THEY USED CAMBODIA AS A SANCTUARY. SO THEN WHAT YOU HAD WAS THE NECESSITY FOR THE VIET CONG TO BE RESUPPLIED ACROSS THE CAMBODIAN BORDER. SO WHAT THEY WERE DOING WAS THEY WERE COMING DOWN THROUGH LAOS AND THROUGH CAMBODIA, BUT THE BIG RESUPPLY WAS DOWN THE MAIN BRANCH OF THE MEKONG. SO THEN WE STARTED AN OPERATION -- THIS ALL HAPPENED BEFORE ADMIRAL ZUMWALT GOT OVER THERE, I'M JUST TRYING TO TELL YOU THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NAVY MISSION OVER THERE. SO WHAT THEY STARTED TO DO IS COMING DOWN THE MAIN BRANCHES OF THE MEKONG. THEN WE STARTED AN OPERATION THERE, CODE NAME WAS "GAME WARDEN". THIS WAS PRIMARILY

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ON THE MAIN BRANCHES THEMSELVES. THESE WERE ALL DONE BY PBR'S WHICH IS THE LITTLE 28 FOOT BOAT THAT HAD GRANADE LAUNCHERS, AND 50 CALIBERS ON THEM AND THE GUYS ALL HAD M-16's.

RICE - THESE HAD MORE FIRE POWER THAN OTHER BOATS MOSTLY HAD DIDN'T IT?

ADM - THE OTHER BOATS HAD ROCKETS, MACHINE GUNS AND RAPID FIRE. DEPENDS. SO GAME WARDEN WAS TO STOP INFILTRATION ON THE MAIN RIVERS THERE. THEN THE OTHER OPERATIONS THAT WAS GOING ON THAT THE NAVY WAS ENGAGED IN -- THIS WHOLE AREA SOUTH OF SAIGON IS JUST ONE BIG CHECKER BOARD OF CANALS-- SO THE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION WHICH WAS DOWN HERE JUST AROUND THE CAN THO AREA, I'M SORRY, AROUND THIS AREA RIGHT HERE, THIS IS THE HOME OF THE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION WHICH I AM GOING TO TALK ABOUT IN A MINUTE. THEY WERE EMBARKED IN ARMORED CRAFT THAT WE HAD OVER THERE WHICH WAS THE 12TH RIVERINE FORCES, THIS WAS ANOTHER TASK FORCE THAT WE HAD. THIS CONSISTED OF ABOUT 4 OR 5 DIFFERENT KINDS OF CRAFT. YOU KNOW THOSE OLD LCM'S, THOSE WELL TYPE BUILT SMALL CRAFT THAT WAS USED FOR LIBERTY PARTIES? WE HAD A LOT OF THOSE THINGS, WITH MACHINE GUNS LINED UP ON THE SIDE AND WE CARRIED 50-80 TROOPS IN THOSE THINGS DEPENDING WHETHER THEY WERE U.S. OR VIETNAMESE. ABOUT EVERY 1 OUT OF 5 OF THOSE HAD A LITTLE FLAT TOP BUILT ON TOP OF IT THAT WOULD TAKE A HELO AND THAT WAS PRIMARILY FOR MEDEVACING PEOPLE THAT GOT HURT. THEN THERE WERE ALSO SOME OF THOSE THAT WERE QUITE CONSIDERABLY MODIFIED--INCIDENTLY, THEY ALL HAD ARMOR ON THE SIDE OF THEM--TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY PUT A WHOLE FLAT FRONT ON THE THING AND PUT A HUGH GUN, EITHER A 40MM MACHINE GUN OR

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LIKE WE CARRY ABOARD SOME SHIPS OR A 105MM HOWITZER, ONE OR THE TWO AND OF COURSE, THAT WAS DONE TO MONITOR. THEN WE HAD ANOTHER MODIFICATION THAT ALSO HAD A BIG GUN UP IN FRONT, BUT IT ALSO HAD A WHOLE LOT OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. SO YOU HAD YOURSELF A WHOLE ARMORED ARMADA THAT COULD WIND ITSELF THROUGH THE CANAL SYSTEM AND TRIBUTARIES CARRYING A LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS. IF YOU HAD MAYBE 8 OR 10 OF THESE SMALL CRAFT YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO CARRY ALTOGETHER 500 OR SO TROOPS.

RICE- IT DREW VERY LITTLE WATER?

ADM - YES SIR, IT DREW VERY SHALLOW. PBR'S, INCIDENTLY, WERE PUMP BOATS, JET PUMPS BUT THE OTHERES WERE CONVENTIONALS WITH SCREWS. SO THEY CARRIED MEMBERS OF THE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION AND THEY WOULD TAKE OVER AN AREA BY JUST PROCEEDING UP THE RIVER AND EJECTING THE TROOPS INTO AN AREA AND THEY'LL FIGHT, TAKE OVER AN AREA OR IF THEY GOT IN TROUBLE THEY'LL GET BACK IN THE BOATS AND THE BOATS WOULD ALSO HAVE FIRE POWER TO PROTECT THEM. SO THIS WAS A FORMIDABLE FORCE. THAT KIND OF KEPT THE VIET CONG OFF GUARD IN THE DELTA AND ENABLE TO SLOWLY BUT SURELY START TRYING TO TAKE OVER AGAIN SOME OF THE WATERWAYS. THOSE WERE THE MAIN THINGS THAT WERE GOING ON WHEN ADMIRAL ZUMWALT GOT OVER THERE AND IT SHOWS THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NAVY TO THE OVERALL OPERATIONS, MAINLY ON THE COAST AND ON THE MAIN BRANCHES TO STOP INFILTRATION AND SOME OF THE TROOP PUSH, IF YOU WILL, IN THE RIVERINE FORCE DOWN THERE. THEN WHAT ADM ZUMWALT SAW, WHAT THEY THEN STARTED TO DO WAS COMING ACROSS THE BORDER, BY HAND, AND THEY CAME DOWN THIS AREA CALLED

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

THE PARROT'S BEAK, WHICH IS CLEAR ENOUGH, AND THEY'LL COME ACROSS THE BORDER INTO HERE AND INTO HERE. SO THE INFILTRATION STILL CONTINUED BY LAND, HOWEVER, IT TURNS OUT THAT THERE IS A RIVER THAT GOES IN RIGHT HERE AND CONNECTS TO A CANAL THAT GOES ALL THE WAY OVER TO THE -- THERE IS A CROSS-OVER UP HERE. THERE IS ANOTHER SERIES OF RIVERS THAT GO ON THIS SIDE OF THE PARROT'S BEAK AND IT MAKES A Y, AND ANOTHER ONE THAT GOES ON THIS SIDE ALL THE WAY UP HERE TO -- AND THEN THERE IS A CANAL SYSTEM THAT CONNECTS THIS PART OF THE BASSAC TO THIS RIVER. SO IN EFFECT THERE IS A WATERWAY THAT COVERS 250 MORE MILES OF THE BORDER FROM THE GULF OF SIAM, ALL THE WAY AROUND THE PARROT'S BEAK AND ALMOST TO THE BORDER RIGHT UP IN HERE. THE BULK OF THE INFILTRATION THAT HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE SAIGON OR THE AREA WAS COMING THROUGH HERE. SO WE PUT BOATS ON THIS THING AND THIS IS THE THING THAT ADM ZUMWALT DID. I THINK HE STARTED OUT OVER HERE WITH TRYING TO GET SOME OF THESE SMALL 50 FOOT ALUMINUM CRAFT MAKING EXCURSIONS INTO THESE RIVERS. HE CAME ACROSS HERE AND THEY JUST KEPT PROBING INTO THESE RIVERS AND THEY KEPT PROBING INTO HERE AND IT TURNED OUT VERY SUCCESSFUL. THEN WHAT HE STARTED DOING IS MIXING UP HIS FORCES AND HE WOULD USE THE HEAVY ARMORED CRAFT ALMOST LIKE THE BATTLESHIP OF THE RIVER, HE WOULD USE THE SMALL FIBERGLASS BOATS ALMOST LIKE THE DESTROYERS AND HE FORMED ONE OPERATION AT A TIME, I THINK IF I RECALL FIRST THIS ONE, THEN THIS ONE WHICH HE CALLED GIANT SLINGSHOT, THEN FINALLY THIS CONNECTED ONE RIGHT HERE SO THAT HE HAD A WIDE VARIANCE OF INFILTRATION

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

I MEAN INTERDICTION OF THE INFILTRATION OF THIS 250 MILE AREA. HE STARTED DOING THIS, HE OPENED THESE TWO RIVERS THAT WERE NOT OPEN BEFORE HE STARTED THAT. THE ARMY TELLING YOU HE'S CRAZY THEN THEY WOULD DENY IT BECAUSE THEY WERE STARTING TO BE ABLE TO MOVE--YOU KNOW THE ARMY ALWAYS HAD A LOT OF BOATS TOO FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT, AND THEY WERE ABLE TO GET THEIR BOATS GOING AGAIN FOR SUPPLYING RURAL OUTPOST UP IN THIS AREA.

RICE - THERE ISN'T A AWFUL LOT OF THEORY ABOUT THAT KIND OF WATER FIGHTING IS THERE?

ADM - NONE AT ALL. HE GOT THQT GIANT SLINGSHOT OPERATIONS GOING AROUND DECEMBER 1968 THEN THE OTHERS FOLLOWED SHORTLY THEREAFTER. ONE OF THE THINGS THAT STARTED HAPPENING AFTER WE DID THE INITIAL BIG THRUST TOWARDS OUR TURNING OUR PROGRAM OR OUR ASSETS OVER TO THE VIETNAMESE. WE CALLED THAT ACTOV WHICH WAS ACCELERATED TURN-OVER OF OUR FORCES TO THE VIETNAMESE. HE USED ACTOV BECAUSE IT SOUNDS LIKE ACTIVE. SO WE USED THAT IN ALL THE MESSAGES THAT WENT BACK AND FORTH SO EVERYBODY KNEW WHAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT. BUT WHEN WE FIRST BRIEFED THE FIRST SITUATION REPORT ON THAT TO GENERAL ABRAMS, WHICH WAS SOMETHING LIKE 30 OR 45 DAYS AFTER THAT INITIAL BRIEFING, WE GAVE HIM A BRIEFING ON HOW WE WERE DOING. WE SENT HIM A PICTURE OF THE HOTEL WE HAD TAKEN OVER FOR THE BOAT SCHOOL AND EXPLAINED TO HIM HOW WE WERE OPERATING THE BOAT SCHOOL AND HOW IT WAS GOING. FOR SOME TIME, IT TURNS OUT, HE HAD BEEN TRYING TO GET THE ARMY TO EXPAND THEIR ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACHING CAPABILITY FOR THE VIETNAMESE ARMY AND THE EXCUSE WAS THEY DIDN'T HAVE ANY FACILITIES TO DO IT. THEY DID HAVE THEIR ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROGRAM IN AN OLD BROKEN DOWN AREA OUT NEAR THE

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

VIETNAMESE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, THERE WERE A LOT OF OLD BARRACKS OUT THERE, CLASSROOMS, THAT HAD GOTTEN PRETTY WELL BEAT UP IN AN ATTACK OF 68. ANYWAY, AS SOON AS GENERAL ABRAMS SAW OUR HOTEL, HE IMMEDIATELY GOT HIS STAFF AND SAID TO THEM, NAVY CAN DO IT, WHY CAN'T YOU. SO THEY GOT A COUPLE OF HOTELS AND GOT SOME ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING GOING ON A LARGE SCALE SOMEWHAT MORE FORMALLY THAT WE WERE. THEY WERE USING THE DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE BUT THE IDEA WAS STILL THE SAME. AS A MATTER OF FACT, WE ALSO GOT ANOTHER HOTEL AND TAUGHT PURE ENGLISH TO THE PEOPLE THAT WERE GOING INTO OFFICER PROGRAM AND WERE GOING TO COME BACK TO OUR COUNTRY TO GO TO SCHOOLS BACK HERE. VERY SIMILIAR TO WHAT THE ARMY DID ALSO UNDER THE AID OF CIVIL DEFENSE LANGUAGE INSTITUTE. BUT THIS WAS ONE OF SEVERAL THINGS THAT ADMIRAL ZUMWALT HAD STARTED AND IT GAVE GENERAL ABRAMS AN IDEA. IN FEBRUARY OF 69, MR. NIXON TOOK OVER IN JANUARY AND MR. LAIRD CAME WITH THE PRESIDENT AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MR. LAIRD CAME OVER AND MADE A TOUR OF VIETNAM AND THE MACV STAFF OVER THERE LAID OUT HIS WHOLE SCHEDULE, BRIEFING SCHEDULE, AND NOWHERE ANYWHERE ON THERE AN INDICATION FOR THE NAVY TO MAKE ANY PRESENTATION TO MR. LAIRD. SO ADMIRAL ZUMWALT CALLED UP HIS FRIEND, I THING IT WAS A MAJOR GENERAL JULIEN YULE, AND SAID, MIND IF I CAME DOWN AND USED 5 MINUTES OF YOUR TIME, BECAUSE JULIEN HAD 30 MINUTES. IT WAS AT THE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION HEADQUARTERS DOWN AT DONG TAM, I TOLD YOU THAT THE 9TH INFANTRY DIVISION WAS THE OUTFIT THAT WE TRANSPORTED IN OUR ARMORED CRAFT, THAT'S ONE OF THE REASONS THAT THEY WERE

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

VERY CLOSE, ALSO JULIEN WAS LIKE ADMIRAL ZUMWALT IN MANY WAYS. HE IS ONE OF THE BEST ARMY GENERALS I HAVE EVER RAN INTO. HE WAS PATTERNED AFTER THE ABRAMS MODEL AND HE'S A REAL FIGHTER, AND THE ASSOCIATION WAS VERY CLOSE. SO WE WENT DOWN THERE WITH A PRESENTATION THAT WE PUT TOGETHER FOR MR. LAIRD. AS IT TURNED OUT DURING THE HALF HOUR PERIOD, AND WE WENT FIRST, I THINK WE USED 20 MINUTES OR EVEN 25 MINUTES, I KNOW THAT GENERAL YULE HAD TO CUT HIS WAY DOWN AND HE KIND OF AD LIBBED IT. THE REASON I MENTION THE OTHER THING ABOUT GENERAL ABRAMS SEEING OUR SCHOOL AND SEEING SOME OF THE OTHER THINGS THAT ADMIRAL ZUMWALT HAD DONE IS THAT, I KNOW FOR A FACT, THAT GENERAL ABRAMS MENTIONED THIS MAN ZUMWALT, HIS AGGRESSIVENESS AND HOW FAST HE WAS WORKING, TO MOST VISITORS WHO CAME OVER. ADM MCCAIN TOLD US OF THINGS THAT HE HAD LEARNED FROM GENERAL ABRAMS ON HOW WELL THE NAVY WAS DOING. GENERAL ABRAMS AND ADMIRAL ZUMWALT BECAME QUITE CLOSE AND, I THINK, THE VERY HIGHEST RESPECT FOR EACH OTHER. SO, I THINK, THAT A LOT OF THE REPUTATION THAT ADMIRAL ZUMWALT WAS GETTING BACK IN WASHINGTON WAS COMING THROUGH GENERAL ABRAMS, SOME THROUGH ADM MCCAIN. BUT AT ANY RATE, HE GAVE THAT PRESENTATION DOWN THERE. WHAT HE COVERED, AS I RECALL, WAS SOMETHING LIKE MAYBE 60% ON THE OPERATION THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN, AND MAYBE 40% ON HOW HE WAS PURSUING THIS TURN-OVER PROGRAM. IN THE OPERATIONAL SIDE, THAT WAS VERY MUCH LIKE I'VE ALREADY DESCRIBED TO YOU, HE TALKED ABOUT PRETTY MUCH ABOUT THE 1965 SITUATION, INFILTRATION, HOW THE MARKET TIME ALONG THE COAST KIND OF STOPPED THAT FORCING THEM TO USE THE MAIN BRANCHES OF THE MEKONG, HOW THE GAME WARDEN OPERATIONS STOPPED THAT, THEN HE TALKED ABOUT THE

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

RIVERINE FORCES, AND THEN HE SHOWED WHAT THE SITUATION WAS NOW AND WHERE THE MAJOR INFILTRATION WAS COMING IN. INCIDENTALLY, IN THOSE DAYS THERE WAS NOT ONLY JUST THE HO CHI MINH TRAIL, IN THOSE DAYS SIHANOUKVILLE IN CAMBODIA WAS A PLACE WHERE THERE WAS SEA SUPPLY AND THEN THEY WOULD TAKE IT FROM SIHANOUKVILLE AND BRING IT DOWN THROUGH THOSE OTHER LAND SPOTS THAT I MENTIONED. AND HE POINTED OUT HOW HE NOW HAD THIS INTERDICTION LINE FOR ABOUT THIS 250 MILES AND SO FORTH, BECAUSE HE PRETTY WELL JUST ABOUT COMPLETED THE WHOLE THING BY THE TIME MR. LAIRD GOT OVER THERE. AND THEN HE TALKED TO HIM VERY BRIEFLY ABOUT OUR OPERATION. WE HAD PICTURES OF EVERYTHING. WE SHOWED PICTURES OF THE BOAT SCHOOL AND SHOWED PICTURES OF THE CONSTRUCTION UP AT CAM RAN BAY OF THE NEW FACILITIES AND ACTUALLY SHOWED PICTURES OF GUYS IN CLASSROOMS STUDYING AND SO FORTH. AS A RESULT, MR. CHAFEE TOLD ME LATER, AND I DON'T KNOW, I ASSUMED IT WAS TRUE BUT I NEVER GOT IT FROM ANY OTHER SOURCE, WHEN I WAS DEBRIEFING THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY WHEN I CAME BACK ON SOME OCCASION I FORGOT WHICH ONE IT WAS, HE WAS TALKING TO ME AND HE SAID, DID YOU KNOW THAT IT WAS AFTER MR. LAIRD SAW THAT PRESENTATION OF ADM ZUMWALT'S DOWN THERE IN DONG TAM THAT HE FORMULATED THE TERM VIETNAMIZATION. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THAT'S TRUE OR NOT, THAT IS WHAT THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TOLD ME. SO I THINK IT DID IN FACT HAVE A BIG IMPACT ON MR. LAIRD AND SPURRED HIM ON. THAT WAS A THING THAT PROBABLY WAS PASSED ALONG TO PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT THAT I THINK THAT THIS MAY HAVE BEEN THE THING THAT TOLD MR. LAIRD TO - YOU KNOW WE REALLY OUGHT

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

TO MAKE A BIG EFFORT IN THIS THING. I'M SURMISING.

RICE - I GATHERED THAT AMONG ZUMWALT'S SPECIFIC TALENTS, HE'S A REAL GOOD BRIEFER.

ADM - HE'S AN EXCELLENT, OUTSTANDING BRIEFER.

RICE - THAT DOES<sup>N</sup> HURT, I SUPPOSE, THE WAY THINGS GO, I MEAN THE WAY THE DRILL GOES OF GETTING PROGRAMS ACROSS. I GUESS THAT'S A BIG HELP THERE.

ADM - IT IS, AS COMMANDER OF NAVAL FORCES VIETNAM, AND IT IS AS THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; BECAUSE YOU HAVE GOT TO PREPARE A GOOD STORY AND A GOOD JUSTIFICATION TO CONVINCING SOMEBODY THE IMPORTANCE OF YOUR PROGRAM. NOW, AS YOU KNOW WHEN HE BECAME CNO, HE PUT TOGETHER A BRIEFING ON FORCE LEVELS AND YOUR NEED FOR FORCE LEVELS AND NEEDS FOR A NAVY BUDGET AND SO FORTH. WITHIN THE FIRST COUPLE OF MONTHS--

RICE - PROJECT 60-900?

ADM - THAT'S RIGHT. AFTER PROJECT 60, THEN HE PUT TOGETHER SOME BRIEFING MATERIAL AND HE USED TO HAVE BREAKFAST WITH A SENATOR OR CONGRESSMAN AS HOST FOR ANOTHER 10 OR 15 CONGRESSMEN OR SENATORS AND HE WOULD GIVE THIS PRESENTATION, AND HE DID THIS OVER AND OVER AGAIN, AND HE'LL BE ABLE TO TELL YOU WHAT PERCENTAGE HE GOT TO, I THINK THAT AFTER A PERIOD OF TIME, THAT HE FELT THAT HE HAD GOTTEN TO VIRTUALLY TO ALL OF THE SENATE ON A SMALL GROUP BASIS AND SOMETHING WELL OVER 50% OF THE HOUSE.

RICE - ISN'T THAT WHAT EVERY CHIEF TRY'S TO DO NOW OR IS THIS--

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

ADM - TO MY KNOWLEDGE, NOBODY HAS EVER DONE THAT SMALL GROUP BRIEFING . ' IF YOU KNOW---

RICE - I DON'T KNOW. I MEAN I JUST DON'T KNOW. I WOULD HAVE-- I ASSUMED THAT EVERY SERVICE SHIEF REGARDED IT AS ONE OF HIS PRIMARY DUTIES TO PUT THE MESSAGE ACROSS TO CONGRESS.

ADM - THAT'S RIGHT, BUT THEY DEAL PRIMARILY WITH THE HEADS OF THE FOUR COMMITTEES. THE TWO ARMED FORCES COMMITTEES AND THE TWO APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES. BUT ADMIRAL ZUMWALT PLUS OTHER WELL-KNOW PEOPLE, BUT ADMIRAL ZUMWALT TRIED TO REALLY IN A SMALL PERSONALIZED GROUP, GIVE HIS PRESENTATION TO VIRTUALLY ALL OF CONGRESS. BUT HERE AGAIN, I'D PICK UP ON THAT WITH HIM WHEN YOU MENTION HIS BRIEFING CAPABILITY.

RICE- THAT WAS SOMETHING I DIDN'T KNOW. THAT'S A GOOD NEW THING. DO YOU KNOW ANYTHING OF THE OTHER PART OF THE BUSINESS OF HIS GETTING APPOINTED -- WHAT HE SAID, CHAFEE IN THE INTERVIEW -- THAT'S PART OF IT YOU DON'T KNOW.

ADM - I KNEW ALWAYS WHEN HE WAS COMING BACK BUT IT WAS KEPT VERY CLOSE HOLD. WELL, THEY ALWAYS DO THAT WHEN THEY BRING 4 OR 5 PEOPLE IN TO THE CITY TO INTERVIEW THEM FOR THAT JOB. IT'S DONE AS SURREPTITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE. AND HE CAME BACK FOR SOME OTHER TRUMPED UP REASON AND SOMETHIME AROUND IN APRIL, MAYBE MARCH OR APRIL, BUT HE'LL KNOW THE FACTS ON THAT, AND WHICH JUST TRILLED ME BECAUSE THERE ARE A LOT OF THINGS THAT WE HAD SEEN IN VIETNAM THAT WERN'T A BAD IDEA TO TRY OUT ON THE U.S. NAVY.

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

RICE- DID HE MAKE ANY MARKED MOVES IN THE PERSONNEL FIELD WHILE HE WAS COMMANDING IN VIETNAM?

ADM - WELL, THERE IS ONE AREA I'D LIKE TO DWELL ON. THE BIG THING WAS HIS CONSTANT CONCERN FOR EACH PERSON. I THINK HE FELT LIKE A FATHER EVERYTIME SOMEBODY GOT KILLED, I REALLY DO. IT WAS REALLY HARD ON HIM. OF COURSE, TO ADD TO THE DIFFICULTY, HE WAS A FATHER OF A PERSON OVER THERE, FOR MOST OF THE TIME.

RICE - WAS HIS MARINE SON OVER THERE?

ADM - NO, BUT HIS OLDEST SON WAS IN THE NAVY A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME AFTER HE GRADUATED FROM NORTH CAROLINA. HE WENT THROUGH THE NROTC PROGRAM IN NORTH CAROLINA AND HE BECAME AN ENSIGN, AND HE CAME OVER THERE AND HAD ONE OF THOSE LITTLE 50 FOOT SWIFT BOATS THAT I MENTIONED ON THE INSHORE PATROL. BUT HE DIDN'T DO ANY OF THAT PATROLLING. HE WAS ALWAYS IN THE THICK OF IT, AND HE WAS ALWAYS MAKING THOSE <sup>IN</sup> EXCURSIONS INTO THE RIVERS AND GOING PLACES WHERE IT WAS AND THIS SORT OF THING. WHICH, I KNOW, WAS A BIG CONCERN TO THE ADMIRAL BUT HE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT EVERY PERSON THAT WAS THERE. HE REALLY WAS.

RICE- THE THE NAVY HAVE AS HIGH A PERCENTAGE OF CASUALTIES AS THE OTHER SERVIEWES?

ADM - NO, I CAN GET THOSE FIGURES, BUT IT WAS HIGH WHEN WE STARTED A COUPLE OF OPERATIONS, THAT GIANT SLINGSHOT. WE GOT ALL KINDS OF INTELLIGENCE TO INDICATE THAT THAT REALLY HURT US.

RICE - YOU DID SAY YOU PAID A PRICE FOR THAT ONE.

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

ADM - YES. I FORGET THE FIGURES.

RICE- I SUPPOSE THAT OFF-SHORE PATROL WAS FAIRLY SAFE?

ADM - YES, UNLESS YOU MADE THOSE INCURSIONS, BUT GENERALLY JUST THE PATROLLING WAS RELATIVELY SAFE.

RICE - HOW COME IN A COMBAT ZONE YOU DON'T HAVE TO ISSUE TO MANY ORDERS ABOUT UNIFORMS AND HAIRCUTS AND STUFF LIKE THAT, I WOULDN'T GATHER.

ADM - THE ISSUE NEVER CAME UP. BUT WHAT I MENTIONING IS JUST TO IT REALLY WAS THE BEST WAY TO DESCRIBE IT I KNOW, FOR THE DEDICATION AND SACRIFICE OF ALL THOSE YOUNG GUYS WERE MAKING, JUST THE ANTHESISSES OF WHAT THE IMAGE WAS OF A YOUNG PERSON OF THIS COUNTRY.

RICE - WHAT WAS THE DUTY LIKE THERE. HOW MANY DAYS ON AND HOW MUCH OFF AND WHERE DO YOU GO WHEN YOU ARE OFF, LIKE THE GUYS ON THE RIVER PATROL.

ADM - FOR THE YOUNG PEOPLE? OH, THEY ALL HANDLED IT DIFFERENTLY. THE WAR, OF COURSE, WAS A SEVEN DAY A WEEK SORT OF THING. IT WAS MOSTLY AT NIGHT, THERE WERE DAY PATROLS AND ABOUT ONE OUT OF EVERY 5 OR 6 OR 7, I GUESS, FIRE FIGHTS THAT WOULD OCCUR, IT WOULD OCCUR DURING THE DAY TOO, IT WAS MOSTLY A NIGHT TIME THING SO THAT--

RICE - SO WERE YOU ON DUTY FOR A MONTH AND OFF FOR A FEW DAYS OR WHAT WERE THE WORKING CONDITIONS?

ADM - IT WAS MORE OUT ON PATROL ONE NIGHT AND THEN MAYBE SOMEBODY ELSE TOOK THE SECOND NIGHT, SOMETHING LIKE THAT AND THEY'D SLEEP DURING THE DAY.

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR RICE

RICE- YOU'D GET BACK TO R & R HOW OFTEN?

ADM - JUST ONCE WHILE YOU WERE THERE FOR ONE WEEK. IT WAS A ONE YEAR TOUR AND DURING ONE WEEK YOU GOT R & R SOMEWHERE WHICH MOST EVERYBODY TOOK. GENERALLY YOU'D SPEND YOUR ENTIRE TIME IN WHATEVER LITTLE BASE THAT YOU WENT TO. THE BASES COULD BE ANYWHERE FROM AN LST ANCHORED IN A RIVER SOMEWHERE, TO A LARGER BARRACKS SHIP THAT WAS ANCHORED IN A RIVER, TO A LITTLE TOWN OR A BASE BESIDE A TOWN WHERE THERE WOULD BE SOME SMALL BARRACKS, SMALL OFFICE BUILDINGS, SMALL REPAIR SHOPS.

RICE - BUT THE TOWNS WOULD HAVE WOMEN AND BARS ---

ADM - YES. NOW, OCCASIONALLY A GUY COULD GET OFF FOR A COUPLE OF DAYS AND COME UP TO SAIGON, BUT MOST OF THEM STAY IN THE FIELD. WE SUPPLIED OUR PEOPLE WELL, YOU KNOW. WE HAD AIR CONDITIONING AND WE HAD A LOT OF LITTLE BARRACKS PLACES, A LOT DID NOT, BUT MOST EVERYONE OF THE LITTLE BASES HAD A CLUB OF SOME SORT WHERE YOU COULD BUY BEER AND LISTEN TO SOME MUSIC

RICE - HOT MEALS, DRY BEDS, AND LINENS AND ALL THIS KIND OF STUFF--

ADM - WELL, IT WAS A LITTLE BIT MORE LIKE THE ARMY'S THAN IT WAS THE NAVY'S BECAUSE A LOT OF THOSE OUTPOSTS WERE REALLY JUST A LITTLE FENCED IN AREA RIGHT ON THE BANK OF A RIVER SOMEWHERE, AND IN SOME CASES ONLY CARRY OUT SOME OF PONTOONS AND BUILD SOMETHING ON A PONTOON OR JUST TIE A PONTOON TO A BANK SOMEWHERE AND PUT UP A COUPLE OF LITTLE CRUDE BARRACKS. SO, NOT ONLY DID OUR GUYS HAVE TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THEIR OPERATION ON THE RIVER, BUT THEY ALSO, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THEIR LIVES, HAVE TO WORRY

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. PRICE

ABOUT LAND SECURITY, SO WE HAD PEOPLE STANDING WATCHES IN OUTPOSTS AND GUARDING THE FENCE BECAUSE WE DIDN'T WANT TO TAKE THE CHANCE OF GETTING THE BASE OVERRUN. SOMETIMES YOU WOULD GET A BIG MORTOR ATTACK AND, OF COURSE, THE BEST DEFENSE IS GETTING INTO THE BOATS AND USING THE FIRE POWER ON THE BOATS BECAUSE THEY HAD A LOT OF IFRE POWER. BUT, IT WAS QUITE AN OPERATIONS. BUT IN ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION ABOUT HIS EFFORTS IN THE PERSONNEL AREA, HE JUST FELT VERY CLOSE TO THOSE GUYS AND TRIED REAL HARD TO MAKE IT AS PLEASANT FOR THEM AS HE COULD. YOU KNOW, IN THAT GIANT SLINGSHOT OPERATION, IT THINK THAT THE VERY FIRST TIME THAT HE VISITED EACH ONE OF THESE LITTLE OUTPOST THAT WE JUST SET UP ON THE BANKS OF THOSE TWO RIVERS, THEY HAD REFRIGERATORS AND MANY CASES OF BEER AND COKE COLA AND THAT SORT OF THINGS, THOSE THINGS ALWAYS WENT OUT EARLY AS SOON AS WE'VE SET SOMETHING UP. RICE - HOW DO THEY GET SUPPLIES, BY HELICOPTER?

ADM - BOTH BY HELICOPTER AND BOAT. THERE IS ONE OTHER THING THAT YOU WANT TO TALK ABOUT BECAUSE THIS HAS A BEARING AND THAT IS THERE WAS A CONCERN FOR WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WHEN WE PUT THE VIETNAMESE AND THE U.S. YOUNG PEOPLE IN THE SAME BOAT AND THE SAME CREW SINCE THEIR CULTURES WERE SO MUCH DIFFERENT. WE GOT A BRIEFING EARLY ON OUT THERE BY A MAN THAT HAD HAD SOME EXPERIENCE IN WORKING WITH THIS INTER-CULTURAL PROBLEM IN TURKEY AND IN KOREA, AND HE WAS AT THE MOMENT WORKING UNDER A CONTRACT WITH THE ARMY IN TIAWAN. AND WE FOUND OUT ABOUT HIM AND ASKED HIM TO COME OVER AND TALK TO US. FROM LISTENING TO HIM, ADMIRAL ZUMWALT

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

HAD US PUT TOGETHER WHAT WE CALLED PERSONAL RESPOND PROGRAM. WE HAD A NAVY CHAPLAIN, WHO WAS OVER THERE, WHO HAD JUST COMPLETED A YEAR'S GRADUATE WORK IN THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AREA, AND SO BETWEEN THE CHAPLAIN AND THIS MAN WE TALKED TO IN THILAND THAT WAS WORKING FOR THE ARMY, WE DEvised SOME SORT OF SYSTEM WHEREBY WE COULD TALK TO OUR PEOPLE ABOUT THE PROBLEMS OF DEALING WITH SOMEBODY FROM A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT CULTURE. THE MECHANISM THAT WE USED WAS WE WOULD GO INTO AN AREA AND WE'D DO A 10% SAMPLE SURVEY OF NAVY PEOPLE AND OF ANY BUSINESS PEOPLE WHO HAD ANY ASSOCIATION WITH THE NAVY. AND WE WOULD TRY TO FIND OUT FROM EACH SIDE-- ARE YOU ANTI-VIETNAMESE OR ARE YOU ANTI-AMERICAN, ARE YOU PRO-AMERICAN, PRO-VIETNAMESE AND HOW ABOUT THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE YOU ASSOCIATE WITH ARE THEY ANTI-VIETNAMESE OR ARE THEY PRO-VIETNAMESE. WHEN YOU GET THESE STATISTICS, YOU'D FIND OUT THAT THERE WAS USUALLY A VOTE FOR MINORITY BUT THERE WAS USUALLY FEWER PEOPLE AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE THAN EVERYBODY THOUGHT WAS AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE.

RICE - WELL, MUCH DO PEOPLE LIE, I MEAN, EVERYBODY KNOWS WHAT THE PURPOSES OF SUCH A QUESTIONS ASKED ARE, AND SOME OF THEM LIE LIKE HELL WHEN THEY ANSWER THOSE QUESTIONS, I'M SURE.

ADM - SURE. I COULDN'T AGREE MORE. BUT IT GIVES YOU SOMETHING TO GO BACK IN AND SIT DOWN WITH GROUPS OF PEOPLE AND GIVES YOU A DEPARTING PLACE ----

RICE - WOULDN'T PEOPLE WHO LIE, ARE PEOPLE THAT YOU CAN MOVE.

ADM - WELL, IT WOULDN'T MATTER ANYWAY. WE'D ALSO ASK QUESTIONS WELL, WHAT ARE THE THINGS YOU--WHAT ARE THE FIVE THINGS YOU LIKE LEAST ABOUT THE VIETNAMESE OR WHAT ARE THE FIVE THINGS YOU LIKE

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

ABOUT THEM. WE'D ASK THE VIETNAMESE ABOUT US. WHAT YOU'D ALWAYS GET WHEN YOU ASKED THE VIETNAMESE OR THE TURKS OR ANYBODY ELSE IN THE WHOLE WORLD WHAT THEY DON'T LIKE ABOUT US IS OUR SUPERIOR AIR. BUT EVERYBODY, NO MATTER WHO YOU TALKED TO THINKS THAT ABOUT THE AMERICAN, SO YOU CAN TALK TO GUYS ABOUT THAT. NOW, WHAT IS IT YOU DON'T LIKE ABOUT THE VIETNAMESE? WELL, THE BIGGEST THING IS THEY'RE ALWAYS TRYING TO TAKE YOU. OH, WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THAT? HOW MANY VIETNAMESE DO YOU KNOW? WELL, I KNOW SOME GIRL AT SUCH AND SUCH A BAR, I KNOW LAST TIME I WAS THERE, I GOT ROLLED AND ALL THIS SORT OF THING. WELL, HOW ABOUT NORFOLK? WERE YOU EVER ROLLED IN NORFOLK? WELL, YES, BUT THAT'S DIFFERENT THERE. WERE YOU EVER --- AND THEN ANOTHER THING THAT THEY DON'T LIKE IS THE FILTH, THE SANITARY CONDITIONS. WELL, THEN YOU START TALKING ABOUT IF YOUR COUNTRY HAD BEEN ENGAGED IN WAR FOR 25 YEARS, WHERE WOULD YOUR PRIORITIES LIE. ESSENTIALLY WHAT WE TRIED TO DO WAS KIND OF LAY THINGS OUT AND GET PEOPLE TO BE OBJECTIVE ABOUT THEM, TO TIE THEM TO A REALITY THAT THEY WERE FAMILIAR WITH AND TRY TO UNDERSTAND WHY THE PEOPLE OF THIS CULTURE WERE DOING WHAT THEY WERE DOING. BUT THEY WOULD HAVE A 10 PERSON FAMILY LIVING WITH THEM ---

RICE - SO THEY COULD BRING THEIR FAMILIES WITH THEM?

ADM - RIGHT AND THAT WAY THEY WOULDN'T HAVE TO GO BACK AND CHECK ON THE FAMILY. THEY GREW THEIR OWN FOOD, WE GOT THEM STARTED IN AGRICULTURE PROJECTS, PLANTS OF VARIOUS KINDS AND THEN WE GOT THEM--BELIEVE IT OR NOT THERE WAS NOT MUCH UTILIZATION OF THE WEALTH OF SEAFOOD ON THAT SHELF RIGHT OFF VIETNAM. IT IS ONE

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

OF THE RICHES IN THE WORLD. WE GOT SOME SMALL BOATS EQUIPPED SO THAT THEY COULD FISH---

RICE - I THOUGHT THE VIETNAMESE ATE A LOT OF FISH.

ADM - THEY DID EAT A LOT OF FISH, BUT THE NAVY WASN'T. THEY HAD TO BUY IT ELSEWHERE. THEY STARTED GOING OUT AND DOING THEIR OWN FISHING AND AT A MUCH REDUCED RATE, THEY WERE ABLE TO SUPPLY SEAFOOD TO THE PEOPLE ON THE BASE.

RICE - DID ANY OF THE OTHER ARMED SERVICES DO ANYTHING LIKE THAT?

ADM - YES, THE MARINES DID PROBABLY THE SAME EFFORT. THEY HAD IT PRETTY MUCH IN ONE AREA. THEY HAD A BIG, HUGH PIG FARM AND THEY ALSO HAD A BIG POOL THAT SEWAGE FROM THE PIG PENS DRAINED INTO AND THEY HAD DUCKS ON THAT POOL AND THEY HAD A VARIETY OF FISH THAT COULD SURVIVE ON THE EXCREMENT FROM THE PIGS. IT WAS ONE OF THE GREATEST ECOLOGICAL EXPERIMENT YOU HAVE EVER SEEN. WELL, THEN THE VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES FINALLY TOOK THAT

OF BUILDING AND THIS SORT OF THING AND THE ARMY DID SOMETHING LIKE THAT TOO. BUT, I THINK, THAT ADMIRAL ZUMWALT 'S WERE THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT, WAS A LITTLE INOVATIVE IN THE IDEA OF TRYING TO GET THEM SELF SUSTAINED IN THEIR OWN PROGRAM. AND THERE IS ONE OTHER THING THAT HE DID, I THINK GENERAL ABRAMS PUT THIS PROGRAM IN GEAR, GENERAL ABRAMS HAD SEEN A FERRET CEMENT BOAT IN THE PHILIPPINES ONE DAY AND SO ADM ZUMWALT STARTED LOOKING AROUND AND HE FOUND AN ARMY FIRST LIEUTENANT WHO HAD ARCHITECTURAL ENGINEERING BACKGROUND OF SOME SORT, WHO WAS PLAYING AROUND WITH MAKING SOME

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

DOMES OF FERRO CEMENT, WHICH IS A FANCY NAME FOR 4 OR 5 LAYERS OF CHICAMEYER ----

RICE - AND HIS SON WAS INVOLVED BUILDING A CEMENT BOAT OVER IN AMSTERDAM AND STILL INVOLVED.

ADM - SO WE GOT THE VIETNAMESE SHIPYARD OVER THERE INTERESTED IN MAKING DRY CEMENT BOATS. THE FIRST THING THEY DID WAS MADE A CARBON COPY OF ONE OF THEIR WORK JUNKS THAT THEY WERE USING. AND IT WAS REALLY KIND OF FUNNY BECAUSE THEY MADE A REAL CARBON COPY OF IT. NOW THE WAY YOU BUILD A JUNK IS YOU TAKE ONE BIG CENTRAL KEEL PIECE ABOUT THAT WIDE AND ABOUT THAT THICK AND THAT IS THE MAIN MEMBER, AND THEN ALL WE WOULD HAVE TO DO WAS COME UP FROM THAT. SO THEY BUILD TO THAT SAME SIZE, THEY BUILT A FORM AND Poured CONCRETE AND MADE A KEEL THEN THEY WOULD BRING UP THE CHICAMEYER UP FROM THE KEEL AND IT WAS FERRO CEMENT LIKE ANY OTHER FERRO CEMENT WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THAT HUGH KEEL. SO IT HAD ABOUT 1 FOOT LESS FREE BOARD THAN MOST JUNKS DO. IT WORKED OUT FINE. THEN THE NEXT THING THEY DID WAS THEY BUILD A FERRET CEMENT MODEL OF ONE OF THESE ALUMINUM 50 FOOT PIECE CF'S. THEN AFTER THAT THEY SAT DOWN IN THEIR SHIPYARD AND THEY DESIGNED THEIR OWN A THING THEY CALLED A "COASTAL RAIDER" WHICH EVENTUALLY WOULD REPLACE ALL THEIR JUNKS. THE WOODEN JUNKS HAVE A LIFE OF ABOUT 5 YEARS, THE SEA WORMS GET TO THEM AND NO MATTER WHAT KIND OF PAINT YOU WOULD USE, AT THE END OF 5 YEARS YOU WOULD HAVE ROTTEN WOOD.

RICE - THAT'S THE WATER THERE?

ADM - YES SIR. SO THE BEAUTY OF FERRO CEMENT IS IT DOESN'T REQUIRE THE ARTIFICER TO PUT OVER THE WAY OF THIS NICE KEEL

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

IN THE LONG RUN, BELIEVE IT OR NOT, CHEAPER. IT IS MADE OF FAIRLY EASILY GOTTEN MATERIALS. IT DOES REQUIRE A LITTLE BIT OF SKILL TO ONLY YOU HAVE GOT TO PRACTICE A COUPLE OF TIMES BEFORE YOU GET A GOOD ONE. IT IS EASILY REPAIRABLE AND IT WOULD GET BETTER WITH AGE INSTEAD OF DETERIORATE. SO THEY STARTED BUILDING THESE THINGS, AND I GUESS THEY HAVE SOMETHING LIKE A HUNDRED, THEY GOT VERY INTERESTED IN TURNING THEM OUT.

RICE - THEY'LL STAND UP TO THE VIBRATION OF AN ENGINE GOING?

ADM - YES SIR. WE DID GET SOME CRACKS FOR AWHILE BUT THAT'S NO PROBLEM BECAUSE IT IS VERY EASY TO REPAIR.

RICE - THAT'S WHAT I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE PROBLEM, THE VIBRATION AND CRACKING UP.

ADM - IT WAS THE ONLY PROBLEM, BUT IT TURNED OUT NOT TO BE A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THEY BUILT THAT PCF IN 1969 AND LAST YEAR 73 , IN MY PRESENT JOB I HAD TO MAKE A TOUR OF SOME OF MY THINGS GOING ON IN THE PACIFIC AND I HAD TO BE IN SUBIC BAY AND I HAD TO BE IN YOKOSUKA AND SO ON THE WAY I STOPPED OFF AND SPENT 10 DAYS LEAVE WITH ADM CHON IN VIETNAM AND WE DROVE DOWN TO ONE OF THE SMALL PLACES, WHICH IS ABOUT 20 MILES SOUTH OF SAIGON, HAD DINNER DOWN THERE AND THEN BOARDED THAT FERRO-CEMENT PCF AND DROVE IT BACK UP TO SAIGON. IT'S IN GOOD SHAPE, THAT'S FOUR YEARS. THERE ARE A LOT OF ADVANTAGES AND IT'S HARD TO COME UP WITH DISADVANTAGES.

RICE - AND THIS IS THE ONE I'M TALKING ABOUT IT'S HALF DOZEN KIDS PUT TOGETHER THEMSELVES, I GUESS THE ONLY THING THEY NEEDED SKILL HELP FROM WAS WITH RIGGING FOR ONE THING.

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

ADM - I'VE GOT PICTURES OF ALL THESE THINGS I'M TALKING ABOUT, THAT IS WHY I WAS GOING TO ASK YOU IF YOU'D BE INTERESTED IN LOOKING AT THE SLIDES.

RICE - THEN WE COULD GET AN ILLUSTRATED BOOK AND PUT SOME OF THOSE PICTURES IN THEM.

ADM - I'M JUST TRYING TO GIVE YOU SOME IDEA . BUT OF GREAT INTEREST IN THE FAMILY . HE WAS ALSO INTERESTED ALWAYS IN TRYING TO FIGURE IF THERE WASN'T A WAY TO EMPLOY THE FAMILY. AND, OF COURSE, THAT DID HAPPEN AT THESE BASES SOME OF THE PARENTS WOULD BE SCHOOL TEACHERS, AND THEY HAD DONE THEIR OWN SCHOOLS AT THESE BASES.

RICE - WHERE WAS HIS FAMILY WHILE HE WAS IN VIETNAM?

ADM - AT CLARKE AIR FORCE BASE IN THE PHILIPPINES. BUT SHE SAW ABOUT ONCE A MONTH. HE'LL GO OVER THERE FOR A WEEKEND ABOUT ONCE A MONTH. THIS WAS FEASIBLE FOR ANYBODY WHO WAS CAPTAIN OR ABOVE WHOSE TOUR WAS GOING TO BE EXTENDED. I SUSPECT THAT THAT WAS OSTENSIBLY A TWO-YEAR TOUR THAT HE WENT ON, WHICH WOULD HAVE MEANT THEY PROBABLY SHOULD HAVE TRIED TO GET HIM OUT AROUND SEPTEMBER.

RICE- SO HE COULDN'T FORETELL AT ALL AHEAD OF TIME?

ADM - I'M JUST GUESSING IF THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN A NORMAL TIME TO LEAVE, ABOUT TWO YEARS. IT WAS ABOUT THE 15TH OF MAY WHEN HE LEFT.

RICE - WHO WAS IN THE PHILIPPINES, THE WIFE AND TWO GIRLS?

ADM - YES. OCCASIONALLY JIMMEY, THE MARINE, HE WAS NOT IN THE MARINES THEN HE WAS STILL IN NORTH CAROLINA, HE CAME OVER FOR ONE SUMMER.

ADM RAUCH'S INTERVIEW WITH MR. RICE

BUT THIS, I KNOW YOU WANT TO GET OFF VIETNAM, BUT I THINK ALL THAT IS IMPORTANT, ALL THAT FOR THE CONCERN FOR THE WELFARE OF THE VIETNAMESE FAMILY.

RICE - I KNOW SO LITTLE ABOUT THE MILITARY AND WHAT THE JOB OF A HIGH RANKING OFFICER IS. HOW DOES A GUY LIKE THAT SPEND HIS DAYS. WHAT DO YOU DEVOTE YOUR TIME? HOW MUCH TIME DO YOU SPEND ON WHAT? HOW MUCH IN THE OFFICE AND HOW MUCH IS HE OUT IN THE FIELD?

ADM - IN VIETNAM? GENERALLY HE WOULD BE IN THE FIELD ANYWHERE BETWEEN TWO HOURS TO A WHOLE DAY.

RICE HE WAS OUT OF THE OFFICE A LOT THEN?

ADM - HE WAS OUT OF THE OFFICE PROBABLY BETWEEN A THIRD AND A HALF OF THE TIME.

RICE - THIS JUST INSPECTING, VISITING AND WATCHING AND LOOKING?

ADM - AND WHAT COULD HE DO TO HELP? WHAT RESOURCES DO YOU NEED?

RICE - THAT IMPLIES THAT HE IS A MAN WHO WAS QUITE WILLING TO DELEGATE ROUTINE TO OTHER PEOPLE WORKING FOR HIM.

ADM - OH YES AND IN SOME AREAS THAT HE SEES GOING WELL, A COMPLETE DELEGATION. HE HARDLY WOULD EVER BOTHER YOU IF YOU HAD SOMETHING REALLY ON TRACK. YOU WOULD JUST TELL HIM PERIODICALLY. HE SET UP A MANAGEMENT INFORMATION CENTER, HAD ADM TIDD, WHO CAME OVER AS CHIEF OF STAFF, SET UP A MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM, SO THAT EVERY MAN, DON'T KNOW WHETHER IT WAS TWELVE O'CLOCK EVERYDAY, THEY WOULD MET AND HE GAVE A PRESENTATION ON WHAT THE KEY PROBLEM WAS AT THE MOMENT, HOW WE WERE GOING PLUS ALSO AN UPDATE ON THE PIGS AND CHICKENS PROGRAM.

RICE - THIS WAS A DAILY STAFF MEETING?

ADM - YES SIR. IT WAS AN INFORMATION MEETING AND HE WOULD FIND