

ADMIRAL ZUMWALT'S ADDRESS TO  
THE BANKER'S CLUB ON 27 AUGUST 1973  
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO DO TODAY IN 20-25 MINUTES IS TALK TO YOU ABOUT THE WORLD SITUATION, BUT BACKING AWAY FROM IT SUFFICIENTLY TO PUT A LITTLE PERSPECTIVE INTO IT, CONCENTRATING PRIMARILY ON THE MILITARY ASPECTS; BUT ALSO RELATING IT TO WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE ABOUT WITH REGARD TO THEIR FOREIGN POLICY AND TO SOME EXTENT WHAT WE ARE ABOUT.

THE FIRST AREA IN WHICH I WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK IS THE STRATEGIC FIELD. YOU WILL RECALL THAT AT THE END OF WWII, WE ENDED THE WAR BY DROPPING TWO ATOMIC WEAPONS ON JAPAN AND WE WERE IN THE SOLE POSSESSION, ALONG WITH OUR BRITISH COUSINS, OF THE ONLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EXISTENCE. AND THAT WE WERE IN AN ERA OF DETENTE, AS WE HAVE BEEN EVERY DECADE SINCE THE COMMUNIST CAME TO POWER, FOR AT LEAST A PORTION OF THE DECADE. AND THE BARUCH PLAN WAS PUT FORWARD TO GIVE THE RUSSIANS THE OPPORTUNITY TO RECOGNIZE THAT WE WERE READY TO SHARE CONTROL OF THESE WEAPONS UNDER AN INTERNATIONAL CONTROL, AND THIS WAS REJECTED. WE WENT ON INTO THE FUSION AGE, THE SOVIETS FOLLOWED FRIGHTENINGLY RAPIDLY BEHIND US FIRST WITH FISSION AND THEN WITH FUSION. OTHER NATIONS BEGAN TO ACQUIRE THE WEAPONS AND A MAJOR ARMS RACE ENSUED.

THE NEXT SIGNIFICANT POINT IN THE STRATEGIC RACE OCCURED AT THE TIME OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. AT THIS POINT, THE SOVIETS HAD WATCHED FOR MANY YEARS THE IMPACT OF OUR SUPERIORITY IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD, AND THEY DECIDED BY THIS MOVE TO DOUBLE THE MEGATON AGENT, CUT IN HALF THE WARNING TIME BY INSTALLING MISSILES ON THE SNEAK IN CUBA.

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AND WHEN AS MR. RUSK SUGGESTED WE STOOD EYE BALLS TO EYE BALLS UNTIL THEY BLINKED, YOU CAN BE VERY SURE THAT IT WAS BECAUSE THEY HAD MADE THE RATIONAL CALCULATION, AS HAD WE, THAT WE HAD THEM OUTPOINTED SOMETHING BETWEEN 4 AND 10 TO 1, DEPENDING ON HOW ONE DOES THE CALCULATIONS IN THE STRATEGIC FIELD, AND THAT THEY ALSO HAD RUN THROUGH THE CONSEQUENCES OF TRYING TO BULL THEIR WAY THROUGH WITH THEIR NAVY, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN DISASTROUS FOR THEM. AND SO THEY DID THE ONLY RATIONAL THING THAT THEY COULD DO, THEY MADE THE BEST DEAL THAT THEY COULD MAKE AND WE GAVE THEM A FACE SAVING WAY TO BACK DOWN. THE SOVIETS MADE IT CLEAR TO US, AT THE TIME, THAT THEY WOULD NEVER AGAIN BE CAUGHT WITH THEIR MISSILES DOWN, AND THEY BEGAN TO CONSTRUCT THE MOST MASSIVE STRATEGIC PROGRAM IN HISTORY IMMEDIATELY AFTER THAT

ISIS, AND THEY LAUNCHED UPON THE SECOND LARGEST MARITIME CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM IN HISTORY, EXCEEDED ONLY BY OUR OWN WWII PROGRAM; AND THEY DID A THIRD THING, A TACTICAL GIMMICK, THEY GRAPPLED US INTO A TEST-BAN TREATY. I WAS DIRECTOR OF ARMS CONTROL AT THE TIME IN THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, WE HAD BEEN TRYING TO NEGOTIATE THAT TREATY FOR MONTHS, SUDDENLY AFTER THE CRISIS, IT BECAME CLEAR THROUGH INTERESTING LITTLE SIGNALS WE WERE GETTING FROM SOVIET EMBASSIES AROUND THE WORLD THAT THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO CLOSE THE DEAL AND WITHIN A MATTER OF MONTHS, WE DID. NOW, THEY VISUALIZED IT AS A TACTIC. WE HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE A CONTRACT BETWEEN OURSELVES AND SOMEONE WE DIDN'T TRUST VERY MUCH TO GIVE US A CHANCE TO SEE WHETHER WE COULD BUILD A BASE FOR SUFFICIENT UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE COULD BE OTHER DEALS DOWN THE ROAD.

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AND EVEN AT THAT TIME WE WERE TALKING ABOUT A NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY WHICH CAME TO PASS; ABOUT THE HOT-LINE WHICH IS NOW IN EFFECT; ABOUT THE BAN ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN SPACE WHICH IS NOW IN EFFECT; AND WE TALKED IN THOSE YEARS ABOUT SOMEDAY GETTING TO WHAT WE CALLED A SEPARABLE FIRST STAGE DISARMAMENT AND WHICH HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BECOME CALLED SALT.

NOW, THE NEXT SIGNIFICANT STEP IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD AFTER THOSE AGREEMENTS THAT I HAVE JUST RECITED, BEGAN WHEN IN THE LATTER PART <sup>OF</sup> LYNDON JOHNSON'S ADMINISTRATION, THE EFFORTS WERE MADE TO CRANK UP THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. AFTER RE-EVALUATION AND A HIATUS AGAIN INITIATED UNDER THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, AND AFTER A LONG AND DETAILED /PERIOD OF DISCUSSIONS, WE CAME TO THE BOTTOM LINE ON MAY 1972 WHEN A TREATY AND AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT WERE INTRODUCED. THE TREATY PROVIDED THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE TWO SITES EACH IN THE DEFENSIVE AREA, ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SITES, AND THAT IN THE OFFENSIVE SIDE, THERE WOULD BE AN INTERIM FIVE-YEAR AGREEMENT. THE RUSSIANS WERE DELIGHTED TO GET THE TREATY SPECIFYING PERMANENT PARITY IN THE DEFENSIVE SIDE BECAUSE WE WERE WELL AHEAD OF THEM WITH REGARD TO ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY, AND THEY KNEW IT. ON THE OFFENSIVE SIDE, THEY WERE UNWILLING TO GIVE PARITY, BECAUSE THEY WERE BUILDING AND WE HAD NOT BEEN BUILDING. AND THE BEST WE COULD DO WAS TO GIVE THEM 60% SUPERIORITY IN LAND BASED MISSILES WITH THE PROVISIO THAT THEY COULD BRING THAT DOWN TO ONLY A 40% SUPERIORITY IN ORDER TO BUILD UP TO AN AUTHORIZED 33% SUPERIORITY IN SEA BASED MISSILES AND AN AUTHORIZED 40% SUPERIORITY IN SUBMARINES AND A DEFACTO OF 300% SUPERIORITY IN THROW WEIGHT AND MEGATONNAGE.

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WE HAD NOT, UNDER THE TREATY, A MODEST ADVANTAGE IN THE BOMBERS AND WE HAD ABOUT A 100% ADVANTAGE WITH REGARD TO MIRVS, THE MULTIPLE INDEPENDENT RETARGETABLE VEHICLES OR WARHEADS. THEY WERE NOT SPECIFIED EITHER. AND THEREFORE, IT WAS A TRANSITORY THING. PRESIDENT NIXON, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS MADE IT CLEAR TO THE PEOPLE AND TO THE CONGRESS IN OUR TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF THIS DEAL, <sup>THAT</sup> IT WAS <sup>JUST</sup> THE BEST WE COULD GET AND WE HAD TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WAS ASYMMETRICAL PARITY AT BEST; BUT FOR A FLEETING MOMENT IN TIME AND THAT UNLESS WE WERE BRISK ABOUT FUNDING STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, THE B-1 STRATEGIC BOMBER, THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE FIELD, UNLESS WE HAD THOSE PROGRAMS COMING ALONG VIGOROUSLY, WE WOULD HAVE TO EXPECT AN UNSATISFACTORILY AGREEMENT WITH REGARD TO THE NEXT ROUND OR SALT II. THE CONGRESS DID NOT FUND THOSE PROGRAMS ADEQUATELY. THEY CUT THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET EACH YEAR NOT WITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE JACKSON RESOLUTION HAD BEEN PASSED BY BOTH BODIES OF THE CONGRESS WHICH SPECIFIED DON'T COME BACK TO US WITHOUT ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE THE NEXT TIME. THE TOOLS WITH WHICH TO DO THAT WERE NOT GIVEN. AND, AT THE TIME OF PRESIDENT NIXON'S LAST SUMMIT MEETING WHEN HE WENT TO MOSCOW, IT WAS A VERY NEAR THING TO WHICH OF TWO ALTERNATIVES HE WOULD CHOSE. WHETHER TO NEGOTIATE PERMANENT INFERIORITY, WHICH WAS WHAT THE RUSSIANS WERE INSISTING UPON, OR WHETHER TO SMEAR OVER THE NATURE OF THE DEAL WITH SOME PAPERWORK AGREEMENTS AND THE LATTER, THE LESS WORRISOME ALTERNATIVE WAS SELECTED AND ANOTHER ROUND MUST BEGIN SHORTLY. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL

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NOT GET PARITY IN THAT NEXT ROUND WITH THE KINDS OF DEFENSE BUDGETS NOW BEING ENACTED BY THE CONGRESS.

LET ME SHIFT NEXT TO THE FIELD OF NON-STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND POWER. HERE AGAIN, IN THAT EARLIER AGE OF DETENTE AT THE END OF WWII, YOU WILL RECALL THAT OUR COUNTRY ENDED UP IN A POSITION OF OVERWHELMING SUPERIORITY. THE EFFORT WAS MADE TO GET ALONG WITH THE SOVIETS AS PART OF OUR BONAFIDE IN ADDITION TO THAT BARUCH PLAN IN THE STRATEGIC FIELD. WE STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE UNITED NATIONS. WE SIDED AGAINST OUR ALLIES WHO HAD COLONIES AND INSISTED THAT THEY DISAFFILIATE WITH THEM IN ORDER TO BRING ALL THESE NATIONS INTO THE UNITED NATIONS AND WE SOUGHT TO WORK OUT A HOST OF AGREEMENTS WITH THE RUSSIANS. WE ALSO AS A BONAFIDE IN PART AND BECAUSE OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURE IN PART, RAPIDLY DEMOBILIZED AND ALMOST OVER NIGHT ACHIEVED A POSITION OF THE SECOND MOST CAPABLE MILITARY POWER. STALIN DID NOT DEMOBILIZE, AND WHEN WE WERE WEAKER, HE BEGAN TO MANEUVER THROUGH POWER AND POLICY INTO ONE NATION AFTER ANOTHER IN EASTERN EUROPE UNTIL AS MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL SUGGESTED THAT IRON CURTAIN DESCENDED ACROSS EUROPE. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO BEGIN THE LONG CLIMB BACK. THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE WAS INITIATED. THE MARSHALL PLAN, WHICH YOU WILL RECALL EVEN THAT LATE DATE INITIALLY PROPOSED TO ENCOMPASS ALSO THE COMMUNIST NATIONS BUT WHICH WAS REJECTED BY THEM WHICH LED TO THE RECONSTITUTING OF THE WAR-TORN ECONOMIES IN EUROPE, FOLLOWED BY THE NATO ALLIANCE WHICH MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THESE ECONOMIES TO BEGIN TO NURTURE ARMIES AND AIR FORCES SO THAT THEY COULD BEGIN TO HELP TO TAKE CARE OF THEMSELVES. THIS WAS FOLLOWED AS STRENGTH WAS REGAINED IN THAT AREA BY A SIMILIAR SERIES OF ARRANGEMENTS IN THE PACIFIC, THE BI-LATERAL

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ARRANGEMENTS WITH JAPAN, WITH TAIWAN WITH THE PHILIPPINES, WITH THE ANZUS PACT. THE STRUCTURE OF POWER, THIS POLICY OF CONTAINMENT, SO WELL ARTICULATED BY MR. GEORGE CANNON IN THOSE DAYS, WAS FIRST GIVEN ITS MAJOR TEST DURING THE KOREAN WAR WHEN STALIN ELECTED TO HAVE THE NORTH KOREANS INVADE SOUTH KOREA AFTER AN UNFORTUNATELY WORDED SPEECH BY MR. ATCHESON WHICH DIDN'T SAY WHAT THEY THOUGHT IT SAID, BUT NEVERTHELESS WAS SO CONSTRUED. AND, WE HAD TO FIGHT UNDER THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES, WHILE FOR THE FIRST TIME IN OUR HISTORY, A LIMITED WAR FOR A LIMITED OBJECTIVE DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR ESCALATION, WE WOULD WITHSTAND CONVENTIONAL AGGRESSION WHEN IT TOOK PLACE. AND IT NOT ONLY HAD TO BE PROVEN TO THE NORTH KOREANS, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY TO THE CHINESE WHEN THEY CAME IN. AFTER THE TRUCE WAS WORKED OUT THERE, THE LESSONS LEARNED FROM THAT CRISIS MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE UNITED STATES FOR AN ENSUING PERIOD OF TIME TO MAINTAIN A GREATER MEASURE OF CONVENTIONAL POWER; AND ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE LESSONS LEARNED LED TO THE ARTICULATION OF A NEW DOCTRINE. NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV DESCRIBED IT BEST WHEN HE SAID, WARS OF NUCLEAR EXCHANGE ARE BAD, CONVENTIONAL WAR\$ARE BAD, BUT WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION ARE GOOD. BY THAT HE MEANT WHEREVER WE CAN FIND AN INSIPIENT REBELLION, WE'LL FEED IT WITH MAN, MONEY AND COMMUNIST AGENTS AND WE'LL TAKE TERRITORY AWAY FROM THE FREE WORLD USING THEIR RULE AND BRING IT UNDER THE IRON CURTAIN. AND THE LATE UNLAMENTED DEFENSE OF CHINA <sup>MINISTER</sup> LIN PAO SAID THE SAME THING IN A DIFFERENT FASHION WHEN HE SAID, JUST AS WE TOOK OVER THE CITIES OF CHINA BY CAPTURING THE RURAL

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AREAS, WE WILL TAKE OVER THE CITY CONTINENTS OF THE WORLD, EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, BY CAPTURING THE RURAL CONTINENTS OF THE WORLD, LATIN AMERICA, ASIA, AFRICA. THE MAJOR TEST OF THIS DOCTRINE TOOK PLACE IN A VERY UNFORTUNATE PLACE IN SOUTH VIETNAM WHERE THERE WAS A HERITAGE OF COLONIALISM. A PLACE WHERE, IN MY JUDGMENT, THE TEST SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE WAY IT WAS, THE CHALLENGE SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN PICKED UP; BUT THAT WAS THE ERA OF THE UNCERTAIN TRUMPET. THE DESIRE TO DEVELOP AN COUNTER-INSURGENCY DOCTRINE OF OUR OWN WITH WHICH TO DEAL WITH THIS KIND OF THREAT, AND AS A RESULT, MAJOR EXPENDITURES OF MEN, LIVES, AND RESOURCES FOR NEARLY A DECADE WENT INTO THAT WAR. NOW, AT THIS VERY TIME, THE SOVIET PROGRAMS IN THE STRATEGIC FIELD AND IN THE MARITIME FIELD WERE MAKING TREMENDOUS PROGRESS. AND, OUR PROGRAMS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER-TAKEN AT SOME POINT IN THE LATE SEVENTIES. BUT BY VIRTUE OF GETTING US BOGGED DOWN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WITH THE EXPENDITURE OF A BILLION OR TWO PER YEAR ON THEIR PART, THEY FORCED US TO EXPEND 25 TO 30 BILLION DOLLARS A YEAR FOR NEARLY A DECADE; AND THIS ACCELERATED THE RATE AT WHICH THEIR CURVES OVERTOOK OURS. AND AS A RESULT, WE HAVE TODAY A SITUATION IN WHICH IN THE STRATEGIC FIELD, THE SOVIETS ARE IN THE PROCESS OF GAINING SUPERIORITY, AND IN THE MARITIME FIELD, HAVE ALREADY GAINED SUPERIORITY. I NEED TO EXPLAIN WHAT I MEAN BY THAT LATTER IN THE FOLLOWING WAY. IF THE SOVIET NAVY WOULD AGREE TO COME OUT AND FIGHT OUR NAVY IN A FAIR FIGHT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE OCEAN OR OFF THE VIRGINIA CAPES, WE COULD WHIP THEM. BUT, IF ONE REALIZES THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS A LAND POWER WHICH DOES NOT NEED THE OCEANS AND

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WHICH CAN DEFEAT ITS TWO PRINCIPAL ENEMIES THE NATO PACT NATIONS AND COMMUNIST CHINA OVER LAND LINES, AND CAN SUPPORT ITS PRINCIPAL ALLIES, THE WARSAW PACT NATIONS OVER LAND LINES, IT NEEDS LESS POWER TO THAT JOB AT SEA THAN WE DO; A MARITIME POWER, A WORLD ISLAND TIED THROUGH ALLIANCES TO THE REST OF THE FREE WORLD, NEEDING TO REINFORCE OUR FORCES OVERSEAS AND OUR ALLIES' FORCES, NEEDING THE OCEAN TO BRING IN THE 15% OF THE OIL THAT COMES IN TODAY OR THE 50% THAT WILL COME IN BY 1980, NEEDING THE SEAS TO IMPORT THE 69 OF THE 72 CRITICAL RESOURCES FOR WHICH WE ARE ALREADY DEPENDENT UPON THE SURFACE OF THE SEAS. AND SO, VIEWED IN THAT LIGHT, IT TAKES MORE NAVAL POWER TO DO OUR MISSION THAN IT DOES TO DO THEIRS. AND, IN THAT COMPARISON, I BELIEVE WITH HIGH CONFIDENCE, THAT WE HAVE TO MAKE THIS STATEMENT TODAY THAT THE ODDS ARE THAT THE SOVIET NAVY CAN DO ITS JOB CUTTING OUR SEA LINES, AND THE ODDS ARE THAT WE CANNOT DO OUR JOB, KEEPING THOSE SEA LINES OPEN IN A CONVENTIONAL WAR. NOW, WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF ALL THIS. DOES IT MEAN THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WAR? I THINK THE FACT IS RATHER UNLIKELY TO COME TO PASS. WE DIDN'T HAVE IT DURING THAT QUARTER OF A CENTURY WHEN WE HAD SUPERIORITY. DOES IT MEAN THAT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE A CONVENTIONAL WAR WITH THE SOVIET UNION? THERE AGAIN I THINK IT IS UNLIKELY TO COME TO PASS. BOTH SIDES ARE TOO RATIONAL. THERE MAY BE A RISK OF MISCALCULATION DURING THAT DANGEROUS PERIOD WHEN BOTH SIDES ARE NOT SURE THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE THE SAME PERCEPTION AS TO WHO IS SUPERIOR; BUT IT IS VERY UNLIKELY AS SOON AS BOTH SIDES

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ARE AGAIN CLEAR AS TO WHO HAS THE SUPERIORITY JUST AS THEY HAVE BEEN FOR THE PAST 25 YEARS WHEN IT WAS CLEAR THAT WE HAD IT. NOW LET ME PROCEED TO EXAMINE FOR YOU THE WAY IN WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE USED, DURING THE CRISIS OF MY FOUR-YEAR WATCH, THE POWER THAT THEY WERE ACQUIRING IN INCREASING QUANTUM AMOUNTS. FIRST WAS THE JORDAN CRISIS OF SEPTEMBER 1970. HERE YOU WILL RECALL THAT THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN IN THE PROCESS OF PROVIDING EQUIPMENT TO THE SYRIAN AND EGYPTIAN ARMIES FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME. THE SYRIAN TANKS INVADED JORDAN, ENCOURAGED TO DO SO BY THE SOVIETS. THREE FACTORS OPERATED TO BRING THAT THING OUT RIGHT FOR US. THE FIRST WAS THE FACT THAT THE JORDIAN ARMY FOUGHT BETTER THAN PEOPLE HAD CALCULATED. THE SECOND WAS THAT THE ISRAELIS MOVED THEIR FORCES NORTHWARD. AND THE THIRD WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES SENT POWER TO THE AREA. WE LOOKED FIRST AT WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO BRING IT IN FROM EUROPE AND FOUND THAT WE WERE NOT ABLE TO GET OVER-FLIGHT RIGHTS FROM OUR OWN NATO ALLIES. AND, THEREFORE, ARMY FORCES WOULD HAVE HAD TO BE BROUGHT IN BY FLYING OUT OF EUROPE INTO THE NORTH SEA, THROUGH THE BRITISH CHANNEL, AROUND THROUGH THE STRAITS OF GIBRALTAR AND 2200 MILES ACROSS THE MEDITERRANEAN AND YOU COULDN'T GET THERE WITH THE AIR TANKER WE HAD. SO WE HAD TO REENFORCE THE SIXTH FLEET WITH A THIRD AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND REMEMBER THAT WHEN PEOPLE TALK ABOUT UTILITY OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND WITH MARINES EMBARKED ON AMPHIBIOUS LIFT. AND THAT COMBINATION OF FACTORS LET THE SYRIANS TO BE PERSUADED BY THE RUSSIANS TO WITHDRAW THEIR TANKS TOGETHER WITH A COMMITMENT THAT THEY WOULD REPLACE THEIR LOSSES.

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THE NEXT CRISIS WAS THAT OF THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT WHEN AN ALLY OF THE SOVIET UNION, THE INDIANS, ATTACKED AN ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES, PAKISTAN. BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES SENT THEIR POWER INTO THE INDIAN OCEAN. THE SOVIET UNION IN ADDITION TO ITS NAVAL POWER THERE WAS ABLE TO REACH THE AREA BY BOMBERS OVERFLYING THE NATIONS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN LITERAL. THEY DO NOT FEEL CONSTRAINED BY LACK OF OVER FLIGHT RIGHTS. AND FACED WITH THAT IMBALANCE, THE UNITED STATES WAS LIMITED IN WHAT IT COULD DO. AND WE HAD TO SIT AND WATCH WHILE THE INDIANS PROCEEDED TO DISMEMBER HALF OF PAKISTAN. ONE CAN MAKE THE CASE THAT THE INDIANS MAY HAVE FELT RESTRAINED BY THE PRESENCE OF OUR NUCLEAR CARRIER TASK FORCE FROM DOING THE REST OF THE JOB AT THAT TIME. BUT, YOU CERTAINLY CANNOT MAKE THE CASE THAT WE DID A CREDITABLE JOB OF SUPPORTING OUR ALLY IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE.

SOVIET POWER CONTINUED TO ACCUMULATE AND THE NEXT MAJOR CRISIS OF A BILATERAL TYPE OCCURRED IN THE YOM KIPPUR WAR OF OCTOBER 1973. HERE THEY HAD CONTINUED THE TRAINING OF THE EGYPTIANS AND THE SYRIANS. THEY TAUGHT THEM TO MASTER STRATEGIC SURPRISE. THEY BROUGHT OFF THIS SURPRISE SO BRILLIANTLY THAT NOT ONLY THE ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE, BUT OUR OWN WAS MISLEAD. THEY VERY NEARLY UNDOED THE ISRAELIS IN THE EARLY DAYS AND ONLY THE EXISTENCE OF ONE AIRFIELD TO WHICH WE HAD ACCESS, THE AIRFIELD IN THE AZORES, MADE IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO GET THE EQUIPMENT THERE TO TURN THE SITUATION AROUND. AGAIN WE HAD NO SUPPORT FROM THE AIRFIELDS OF OUR ALLIES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. THE SOVIETS SENT 98 SHIPS TO FACE OUR 65, A 50% ADVANTAGE. IT'S TRUE THAT WE HAD THREE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS THERE AGAIN, BUT THE SOVIETS AGAIN HAD

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AIRFIELDS IN SYRIA AND IN EGYPT AND IN CRIMEA, AND THEY WERE IN SUCH A POSITION THAT HAD IT COME TO WAR, IN MY JUDGMENT, THE ODDS WERE THAT WE WOULD HAVE LOST IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. AS A RESULT, WHEN THE ISRAELIS HAD THE EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY READY TO BE CUT OFF AND DESTROYED AND WHEN THE SOVIETS SAID TO US WE ARE COMING IN IF YOU DON'T STOP THEM, IN MY JUDGMENT. QUITE APART FROM THE POLITICAL FACTORS INVOLVED, WE HAD NO MILITARY ALTERNATIVE THAN TO STOP THE ISRAELI. NOW, IF ONE EXTRAPOLATES AHEAD THE NATURE OF THE GAME AS THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO ACCRETE EXTRA POWER IN THE YEARS AHEAD AND AS WE CONTINUE TO LET OURS DETERIORATE (AND BE AWARE THAT WE ARE SPENDING THE SMALLEST FRACTION OF OUR BUDGET FOR DEFENSE, SINCE 1950, THE SMALLEST FRACTION OF OUR GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT SINCE 1950, WE CUT OUR NAVY IN HALF IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, AND WE HAVE THE SMALLEST NUMBER OF SHIPS SINCE 1939) IF THESE FACTORS CONTINUE, THE SOVIET UNION IS GOING TO BE ABLE TO CONTINUE THE KIND OF POLICY THAT THEY HAVE EXERCISED IN THESE LAST THREE CRISIS. THERE WAS A CONVENTIONAL WISDOM IN WASHINGTON THAT WE WON A GREAT TACTICAL VICTORY IN THE YOM KIPPUR WAR BECAUSE THE RUSSIANS ARE OUT OF EGYPT AND SYRIA IS TILTING TOWARD US. MY OWN VIEW IS THAT WE TOOK A GREAT STRATEGIC LOSS AND THAT THE SOVIETS OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN DELIGHTED TO HAVE SETTLED FOR WHAT THEY DID. FIRST, THEY SETTLED BEFORE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE GOT CONCERNED ENOUGH TO ASK <sup>VERY</sup> SERIOUS QUESTIONS. SECOND THEY GOT THE OIL PRICES TROUBLE WHICH MEANS A BILLION PEOPLE IN 30 COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD TODAY ARE IN THE PROCESS OF GETTING READY TO STARVE AND WHICH MEAN AS MANY OF YOU KNOW, THAT THE FREE WORLD ECONOMY HAS BEEN BADLY BUGGERED UP. IT WAS A TREMENDOUS STEP FORWARD FOR THE

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SOVIETS AS THEY VIEW PROGRESS. THEIR OBJECTIVES, I THINK, CLEARLY IN THE YEARS AHEAD IS TO CONTINUE THEIR CONCEPT OF DETENTE. IT IS ONE THAT I CALL DIFFERENTIATED DETENTE. THEY'LL BEHAVE IN THE AREAS WHERE THEY MUST BEHAVE BECAUSE IT IS TOO DANGEROUS NOT TO, SUCH AS ON THE PLAINS OF GERMANY WHERE THE WHOLE THING IS LINKED SO CLEARLY TO OUR NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND THEY'LL MISBEHAVE WHEREVER THEY THINK THEY CAN GET AWAY WITH IT IN WAYS DESIGNED NOT TO LEAD TO WAR, BUT TO CONTINUE TO SO DAMAGE OUR ECONOMY AND THOSE OF OTHER NATIONS OF THE WORLD. THAT THERE WILL BE A TENDENCY TO RADICALIZE REGIMES AND TO DRIVE THEM TOWARD THE SOVIET CONCEPT OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTROL.