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Tape 15 - Side A-1

Halderman - continued from Tape 14 - Side B

I said that it seemed to me that in that event he could be objective based on fact rather than objective without fact. Halderman said that he recognized that I had a point but that he preferred to keep himself cut off from getting to know anyone with whom he didn't have to deal routinely in order that he could make decisions more impartially. I sought to put across to him the great concern I had about the rate of reversal of the maritime balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. He indicated that he would do what he could from that end. I never saw him again nor observed any evidence that he had been helpful in the defense field. It is my belief that he walked a fairly wide circle around Henry. Friends on the White House staff told me that there was very great jealousy between Henry on the one hand and Erlichman //Halderman on the other and that Erlichman and Halderman had begun the process of cutting Henry down at the time that they were overtaken by the Watergate. These friends believed that had Watergate not been brought to light the President would have let Henry go, since he was also beginning to have a great jealousy toward Henry's popularity and was hopeful that he could secure his own position in History as a great foreign policy success better by demonstrating good work in the field after Henry left. The only other experience to relate concerning Halderman took place during the famous six weeks, I believe that I believed that

Page 15 - Sub A-1 Halderman

Based on what friends on the White House Staff have told me that Halderman's

recommendations to the President during the period of the Constellation - Kitty-

Hawk difficulty was that I be fired, but that Erlichman took the opposite view

as I have suggested in another dictation.

Helmut Sonnefeldt

Helmut Sonnefeldt is probably best described as a poor man's Henry Kissinger, that is he has Henry's great knowledge in the field of foreign affairs, has served as a grey eminence in the field of European policy particularly European Economic Policy has served the role in the Salt negotiations and been sort of a general backer upper to Henry . He is less devious than Henry and less able to seduce as Henry. Since he comes across as a man who is some what egotistical but as Henry is better able to disguise his egotism .**AS reported elsewhere he was a member of my CEP, that

I have
as the CNO Executive Panel and a gradual change in the degree of his openness and candor was in that group and he became more and more of a time to fear Henry and as he had observed Henry cutting away from him those who resisted him or who were reported to Henry as having expressed views opposite to Henry's. At one point Helmut Sonnefeldt was nominated to according to H&A Henry's report to be Under Secretary of Treasury this was held up for a long period of time by Senator Russell Long, the Chairman of the Committee which had to confirm him because Senator Long (Sen. had reported to me privately) had been told that Sonnefeldt was guilty of having leaked sensitive information to the Israel Government

I interceded with Russell Long on Sonnefeldt's behalf at that time because I

believed him to be and still do a dedicated public servant. I told Senator Long

that I had never ~~heard~~ observed Sonnefeldt ~~go~~^{involved} off or be associated with any activity or the kind that had come to his attention. There was nothing in my committee

The Senator assured me that seemed to have leaked. He ~~should~~^{would} move forward with confirmation, ~~I felt~~ on

Sonnefeldt, ~~I felt~~ It is my understanding however that the deal was finally

negotiated between Kissinger and Senator Long that immediately after Sonnefeldt's confirmation (as a face saving gesture) he would be nominated to be to the position he now holds in the Department of State , thus resolving the doubts of the committee

that had to worry about Treasury and voted him back into the State Department,

where he would be in a position to leak far more sensitive information if he were

in fact doing so. Sonnefeldt Ad. Z. has nothing further to say about him.

Wayne Smith

Wayne Smith was an assistant analysis who worked for Doctor Allan Unthoven(?) back in the MacNamara era. He subsequently co-authored with Allan Unthoven(?) a book on system analysis . He was brought to the NSC staff by Henry Kissinger early in the Nixon Administration and served as a kind of a general expediter on the Staff. He is very bright , very decisive and filled a useful function in moving for Henry those kinds of issues in analytical field that were beyond the competence of Al Haig and he nearly developed a stomach ulcer while working for Henry and the constant pressure from his wife , finally departed in what I believe to be fairly amicable terms to work for Mr. Justin Dart of Dart Industries in California. I remained on good terms with Wayne Smith through out his tenure in the White House and have been in contact with him on some of his subsequent visits to Washington. He had been used as a consultant from time to time by Henry although this appears to be Henry's way of just kind of keeping people on the string who have worked for him out of concern to maintain their loyalty. It's kind of an inverse of phone-tapping Martin Halprin(??).

JOHN MITCHELL

Continuing my efforts to assure that all those who had access to the President were informed of the state of the Naval balance and what we were trying to do about it with an inadequate budget, I contacted John Mitchell after I had met him two or three times and invited him to come to lunch. I had a long lunch with him and we had a very good exchange of views. He seemed to me to be extremely bright, intelligent, completely loyal to the President, convinced (this was long before Watergate) that the President was the best thing that had happened to this country for many years and a proper expression of the current conservative mood of the American people. He came across as patient, careful, thoughtful, painstaking. There was none of the bombast or sense of egotism that one experiences in so many closely associated with the President. He seemed to be a rather self-effacing person insofar as his personal objectives were concerned and only interested in doing what he could to support the President. At the conclusion of our lunch, he urged me to meet ~~****~~ to talk to him any time I felt ^{that} I had problems which were of such import that they ought to get to the President. I had one occasion subsequently to try to do so. Paul Nitze came to see me after SALT I Treaty and Agreement were signed expressing considerable concern about the fact that John Newhouse had come to see Paul Nitze about a book he was writing. Paul Nitze

Tape 15 - Side A - part 3

JOHN MITCHELL - continued

had discovered that John Newhouse had been given by Henry Kissinger a very large number of the most sensitive cables and inter-office memoranda relating to SALT. Indeed some of these memoranda had never been seen by Paul Nitze and others in the Government. Paul was quite concerned of the disclosure of information in these memoranda quite apart from the fact that it was a violation of the law, would sever important personal relationships that had grown up between himself and ~~the~~ Psuchkin(?), the Soviet intellectual who was Paul Nitze's opposite number and between each of the other US -USSR pairings on the two delegations. ~~THE~~ ~~DISCUSSIONS~~ Obviously, these people knew that their discussions were being reported to the U. S. Government but to have their disclosures reported in the press or in a book with all the frankness with which they spoke about the Soviet system and their superiors could have caused a marked ~~???~~ in the relationships and have hazarded the getting forward of our business. Paul Nitze and I discussed how best to get this matter to the attention of the President. By this time, it was quite clear that the relationships between Mel Laird and the President, while on the wane, as a result the things that Henry Kissinger was saying to the President about Mel Laird and because of Mel Laird's opposition to some of the Presidential initiatives in South Vietnam, Mel Laird having taken a less hard line

attitude and we did not believe that Mel Laird would be able to get to the President on this matter and, if he did, it would be considered as merely an effort to unhorse Henry. Neither of us had confidence that Halderman understood the problems, knowing that he could be gotten to. I felt I could probably get to Erhlichman but didn't know whether Erhlichman could feel he could go directly to the President, whether the information would be screened out by Halderman. We finally concluded that John Mitchell would be the best bet on this very sensitive matter and I recalled ^{the} ~~my~~ invitation that he had given me to let him know when we needed help. Paul Nitze therefore called John Mitchell (who, I believe) was no longer in the Cabinet but was working on the re-election committee (by the way, papers that Newhouse had been given had been carefully screened to put forward only the things that made Henry look good and not those that made him look bad). Paul Nitze called John Mitchell who agreed to see him in New York. Paul Nitze flew up, gave him the full story and asked John Mitchell whether there was anything more that he, Paul Nitze, should do. John Mitchell said "No, there was not". That's the last that either of us heard of it. My supposition is that John Mitchell was so preoccupied by this time in ?? re-election and the insipient Watergate matters that he never got around to dealing with it.

JOHN CONNALLY

I knew Governor Connally first when he was Secretary of the Navy. He served only a brief period - slightly less than a year - he was decisive and effective in the job but, obviously, more interested in making a quick record for himself as the launching platform for the governorship of Texas and in the long term???

?????? on the Navy. After he was elected Governor, I saw him a time or two when I was executive assistant to Paul Nitze, who was then Sec. of the Navy.

On one occasion he came in with his arms still in a sling, after, a long period of time after the assassination. I said to him, "Gov. Connally, when are you going to get the arm out of the sling". He promptly shot back with style of Texas Humor "The day after the election". When Gov. Connally came into the cabinet I visited him on several occasions and he came ^{to} by my office ~~once or twice~~ for lunch once or twice. Again having learned the objective of making sure that he had gone over access to the President, and was fully familiar with the details of the maritime balance. He became quite concerned about the deterioration in our position and spoke to the President about it more than once. He was also helpful later on in a number of the PFIAB, President's Foreign Advisory Board, as they were tasked by the President

Page 17 side A part 2 JOHN CONNALLY

to look into the maritime balance. The PFIAB had been put to work on this problem, I suspect as a way of really in a way of getting the problem out of the Presidents immediate hair and I had been told by a friend on the C staff that the President would never listen to the final report by the PFIAB about the maritime balance, therefore when the report was done I alerted Gov. Connally to this fact. He was tremendous in getting the President to listen to their report. I considered Gov. Connally as based on When my wife and I visited Houston, Gov. Connally and his wife very graciously insisted on acting as co-hosts along with Paul Howell for lunch and dinner while we were there. I like the man, I have always found him direct and honest and decisive. I would have thought he would not make a good President before his political career came to an end under the indictment from the grand jury. As of this writing I believe him to be innocent and that Jacobson is lying. I hope I am right and that the court will agree with my judgement. He has a lovely extroverted wife who together with him would make a very gracious couple in the White House. I meet John Connally shortly after he left the office of

TAPE 15 SIDE A PART 5 John Connally

Special Assistant or Counselor to the President , the last service he gave to the Nixon Administration. I asked him why he left so soon after coming aboard, he gave me his usual direct answer , he said "I was asked by the President to come in and advise him . I gave him the advice , he didn't take it and I left". That is he didn't take it and didn't seem to want any more, therefor I left.

Tape 15 Side A Part 6

George Schultz

I had contact with George Schultz in three different incarnations I believe while he was still Sec. of Labor . I had several meetings with him while he was director of OMB and another couple when he was Sec. of the Treasury. He was one of the very few who came through the White House morass unscathed in any personal way. I found him to be direct, straight forward , highly intelligent thoughtful and ~~analytical~~ analytical. He understood our points I was making and he asked very good questions , he expressed considerable concern about what was happening to the U.S. Navy capabilities and was, I believe, in the main helpful to us in beginning to reverse the fraction of the budget allocated to the Navy as a result of which we were able to increase our proportion of the defense pie by approximately 1% a year , each of the four years I was in the job. George impressed me as being less action oriented than any of his colleagues and inclined give advice unscolded..... than to press hard to get his programs through. This may be in part why he survived so long and also explains why he was able to forswear the Byzantine plotting which went on among so many of the others.

ROGERS MORTON

Although one would suppose that a man in his job would wouldn't have much occasion to be speaking to the President about defense views. I knew him to be a highly respected former member of Congress, close to Mel Laird and didn't want to miss the opportunity to include him among the group that knew how we were fairing visa the Soviets. I had two lunches with him, one in my office and one in his. I found him somewhat in the mould of Gov. Connally to be a big man in the literal and figurative sense, straightforward, honest in his advice and quick to grasp the import of what he was being told and in an area that was not very familiar to him and he seemed willing to help to what extent he could. I feel confident that he used all opportunities during Cabinet Meetings to support the mood for greater defense budget. In the latter part of the President's Administration he was in poor health as the result of a malignancy of the kidney, he seems to have gotten on top of that problem in recent months.

MEL LAIRD

One could do a book on Mel Laird and in my book he has to be a good guy.

His reputation is that of a devious politician has been some sort of a character. He is a master politician, he is a master at getting things done and is a master at pulling the levers of power behind the scenes. Very few could have survived as Sec. of Defense while taking on Kissinger and the President. And Mel Laird did in that the period of the winding down of the South Vietnam war, when his basic instincts were to go faster with regard to the withdrawal and to react less vigorously in such exigencies as the incursion into Cambodia and Laos and in regard to the final mining and bombing at Hanoi. As a result of the fact that he fought the President so hard that at least on one occasion Adm. Morrer reported to me and I believe there were two that the President arbitrarily ordered him fired within ~~23~~ 24 hours. However, the President was never able to give the orders direct himself and I am sure that after reflection on the great popularity that Mel Laird had on the hill, he was not able to deliver the black got. Mel Laird was able to win the defeat of all amendments designed to

Tape 15 Side A ~~Part 8~~ Mel Laird

cut the budget through out the tenure as Sec. of Defense. He did so by using all of his influence skillfully and by his own great prestige on the Hill. He seemed to me to have forged a very effective team within the Defense Dept. He was skillfull at using each of us for our strong points and minimizing the use of those who had weak points where they were weak. On

END OF TAPE 15 Side A Part 8 Mel Laird

Continued on Tape 15 Side B