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Continuing on with Schlesinger, ~~Impending~~ my press relations advisor, and I felt that Schlesinger was at times a little hypocritical or at least ambivalent, in that there were several occasions when publicly he disagreed with those of us who were expressing great pessimism about the maritime balance, and in a few background briefings to the press, he also did this. All of us believe that this was the result of great pressure put upon him by Haig and Kissinger, who by this time were quite concerned lest the President be tagged in addition to all the other accusations being made against him, for having let us fall behind the Soviets in the strategic field both by budgets and by negotiations, and for having let us fall behind the Soviets in the maritime field due to inadequate budgets. Kissinger of course was personally paranoid on this because he wasn't so much interested in what the facts were, as he was concerned at any indication to the Soviets ~~xxxxx~~ that we thought we were behind would toughen their position in both their foreign policy initiatives and their negotiations. In any event, Schlesinger did take these views out of my presence, but in my presence on several different occasions, admitted to me that he thought I was probably right with regard to the critical nature of the maritime balance, and with regard to my pessimism concerning war outcome, and probability of success. He further stated that he had no analytical basis for disagreeing with me since he had not himself gone into the details of the calculations that we had done, and did recognize, that the calculations we had made were rational and properly done.

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get his extension. Soon after Clements came on board, I contacted him since I had not been able to get John Warner to do so, about the two critical management problems that we had. The first of these had to do with the need to renegotiate a contract with Grummond aircraft corporation, timed at such a point where we would have squeezed Grummond down to almost the last of their financial reserves, under the original for F-14 aircraft. The problem was as follows: Grummond had signed a contract under the old McNamara "wound to tune" concept, which required them to use DOD's inflation estimates, and which required them to make a procurement contract before they had ever built the first F-14 aircraft. It has never been substantiated to my satisfaction, but there was talk passed on to me that Grummond was also assured by some Navy people, that if they would make a low bid they could well by subsequent revisions of the contract. In any event, as a result of either faulty building, or miscalculation with regard to procurement costs, or because of the much higher rate of inflation which occurred, the Grummond corporation lost money on each of its first five lots of aircraft. I was insisting that they continue to lose money, and wanted them to continue to do so, until it was clear that they could no longer survive, and at that point to renegotiate a contract which would let them make enough money to survive, because we badly needed the aircraft. I couldn't get John Warner to dig into this one, nor could I get him to talk to a higher authority about the problem. And so I contacted Bill Clements, and told him that I consider it a matter of high priority that he dig into this soon after he came aboard. I also seized him with the problem of Litton, that is our shipyard down at Pascagoula, Mississippi.

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Here again, we had a similar type management problem. Pascagoula had originally been an old-fashioned type shipyard. Then before I came into the top job Senator Stennis, had gotten the state of Mississippi to fund under a state bond issue, a new ship-yard across the river from the old one. To do the so-called mass-production of ships similar to what was being done to merchant ships in Japan, Germany and Sweden and similar to what was being done for war ships in Russia. The concept in my judgement was a good one, but gross underestimates as to how much it would cost to get the shipyard operating and up to speed, and the personnel trained <sup>WERE</sup> made. In any event, Litton had bid first on nine amphibious ships called, LHA's, and second on 30 destroyer called, Spruenc's Class Destroyers. By the time I came into the job, Litton was already in big trouble in regard to the LHA's and it was clear that they were going to go over their contract for reasons somewhat similar to those that I have outlined for Grummond. Also as we looked at the problem of how to try to get as much done, and in as many fields as we could with the inadequate budgets we were facing, I concluded we had to cut the number of LHA's contracted for from nine down to five. Under the terms of the contract, this gave Litton the right to renegotiate, and that was another element to complicate the equation with regard to Litton. Here again I was of the view that we had to force Litton, not only Pascagoula division, but the corporate company which under the contract was required assume any losses from the division, to lose as much of their reserves would stand. However, unlike Grummond, which was prepared to be quite open with us with regard to their true financial situation,

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we never were able to get Litton level with us completely. I always thought that it was the reason Litton probably misled its stockholders with regard to ~~x~~ its financial situation, and didn't want to have the details of their financial situation understood, although this was a supposition that I could not prove. Bill Clements did agree to go visit both companies, and do some work on the contracting, management problems, and we made visits to both places and some follow-on meetings in the buildings. Meanwhile, however, John Warner got to Bill Clements and convinced him that he had made a mistake in dealing with me and that he ought to deal with John Warner, and this made it very difficult to operate since I never had any confidence in John Warner's word and found many occasions in which he had ~~xx~~ actually lied to me when I would check what he alleged had happened in meetings between him (Warner), and attended by others. Whereas, Dave Packard had always been able to see the need to work directly, not only with me, but indeed with my subordinates on the details, Bill Clements never was willing to use this direct access in a way that would solve the dilemma of John Warner who, ~~which~~ I have said, was a ~~stink~~ dilettante and not capable of really understanding the details of the management problems. I report another episode involving Bill Clements to get it into the record as raw material, and because it reveals something of the character of the man. This has to do with Admiral Jim Calvert.

Jim Calvert is a classmate of ~~xxxx~~ mine, a very able fellow who had command of the second nuclear submarine to go under the ice-cap across the North Pole. He was one of ~~xx~~ three classmates, the other

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two being Admiral Ray Pete, and Admiral Bill Anderson, who were selected first from our class from Commander to be Captains, two years ahead of the rest of the class, and a year ahead of me. Then when it came time for selection to Rear Admiral, Jim Calvert and I were the first two members of the class to be selected for Rear Admiral. I made three stars before Jim, and soon after I did so was able to upgrade the job in which Jim was serving, Superintendent of the U. S. Naval Academy from two stars to three stars, so that Jim was able to be promoted. That was soon after I became Chief of Naval Operations. Later on I was able to nominate and win approval for Jim to become Commander of the First Fleet. And the original plan, as Jim knew about, had been when we consolidated the First Fleet on the West Coast with the anti-submarine warfare command in Hawaii into a single two three-stars into a single three-star job and two staffs into a single staff, that Jim would inherit the combined Command. However, Jim did not do well with his then boss Commander and Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Clary, at that time, and Admiral Clary preferred the other man. Jim, therefore, lost out on this job and this, together with the subsequent promotion of Admiral Worth Bagley, to four stars, Admiral Bagley having been considerably junior to Jim, apparently led Jim to decide that he should retire from the Navy. I considered Jim to be so able that when I received his letter telling me that he intended to do this, which incidentally was a very thoughtful and supportive letter, I called him and urged him to reconsider. He declined to do so, and subsequently, a week before he retired, I persuaded the Secretary of the Navy to join me in a call to Jim in

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which we pointed out to him that Admiral Dick Colbert, a four-star officer in command of the NATO forces in the Mediterranean, was dying of a malignancy and that ~~xxx~~ within a few months there would be a vacancy for ~~x~~him there. Jim asked for a day ~~f~~ to think it over, and then telephoned the Secretary of the Navy to state that ~~x~~ he would not take that job. Jim retired from the Navy. Some two or three weeks later, I received a call from John Warner in the morning saying that he'd like to have me meet him at 8:00 in the morning in Bill Clements office. I walked in not ~~x~~ knowing the subject which is always a little unusual. Bill Clements, opened the conversation by saying to me that Jim Calvert had contacted him two days ~~z~~ earlier, to say that he realized he had ~~x~~ made a terrible mistake. And that he wanted to return to active duty. Bill said that he had given the problem to John Warner, and ~~xxx~~ asked him to solve it. John instead of ~~xx~~ consulting with his service chief as almost any service Secretary would have done, had not discussed it with me, and instead had had a series of private ~~mf~~ meetings with Jim Calvert in which he talked over all of the likely jobs. Had gone back to Bill Clements and had told him that Jim should be brought back to active duty as Chief ~~x~~ of Naval Personnel. John Warner knew that this would ~~xxxx~~<sup>cause</sup> real heart-burn with me, because Chief of Naval Personnel was Admiral David Bagley, brother of Worth, a man who had not only been my lifelong friend, ~~z~~ from prep-school days but a man in whom he knew I had the highest confidence to be doing a superb job in support of my personnel policies. John sought to sweeten the pot by stating that he would propose to promote Dave Bagley to four-stars, and to make him the NATO Commander in the Mediterranean. At this point, Bill Clements

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resumed the offensive and stated, as he knew I had many enemies on the hill, and he thought Jim Calvert would be very helpful to me, in carrying on the work of the Navy in this regard, without any pause for my views. I don't feel that I very often take my eye off the ball, but I did in this case for two reasons: 1.) I welcomed an opportunity to see a promotion for Admiral Bagley, and 2.) at that time I did not know that Jim Calvert had not vigorously supported my personnel policies. But I said to Bill Clements and John Warner, was that I recognized that I had some enemies on the hill but I also felt that I had a large number of friends, and I wasn't particularly concerned about the situation on ~~the~~ the hill, second, notwithstanding that, the proposition they had made sounded reasonable to me, but that first I would want to ~~xxx~~ talk it over with Admiral Mickey Weisner, my Vice-Chief of Naval Operations and Admiral David Bagley, and subject to their concurrence which I thought I would get, I would support this. Bill Clements said fine, I've got Jim Calvert across the hall waiting to talk to you, why don't you go over and work it all out with him, which I also considered to be very poor ball. I went across to see Jim, expressed some surprise that he hadn't come to me first instead of Bill Clements since as a military man he knew he should have started with the Service Chief, Jim rather weakly said ~~that~~ that he recognized this, and probably thought it through carefully. He pledged himself to give me a full support, and I told him what I had said to Clements and Warner, and indicated that I would be in touch with him. Incidentally, I had also made the point to Clements and Warner that it would take, legislation through the Congress to bring Jim Calvert back

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to active duty, since once a Naval officer, or military officer has retired, he cannot be put back into any command position without an act of Congress. I then went back to my office and sent for Dave Bagley and Mickey Weisner. ~~xxxxx~~ Both of these two great Naval officers were furious with me. They both pointed out that Jim Calver had worked somewhat in tandem with George Anderson in trying to slow down the integration of black midshipmen into the Naval Academy, and in trying to avoid having to implement the personnel changes that I had made. They did not feel that he had done a vigorous job of supporting my personnel policies when ~~he~~<sup>he</sup> went to San Diego as Commander of the First Fleet. Even stronger, they felt that it would be a significant set-back to many other distinguished Naval Officers who had continued to work hard, who had stayed on active duty, who had not expressed their sour grapes by requesting retirement to have Jim brought back and put into a position where he was clearly being groomed as one of theirs apparent at the end of my tenure. To top it all off Admiral David Bagley flatly refused to accept promotion to four-stars, stating that he would be quite content ~~xxxxxx~~ to finish his career as Chief of Naval Personnel in order to get accomplished the many things that he and I were trying to accomplish. Feeling somewhat sheepish for having misread the situation, I went back to John Warner and told him that in my view the deal was off. John Warner at this point, refused to accept the veto, and said that it was out of his hands since Bill Clements had said, get it done. I then told Bill Clements that the deal was off as far as I was concerned. Bill Clements stated that he had interpreted that what I had said in

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his office to be a firm commitment, and that he expected it to be carried out. I suggested to him that that was not the interpretation he should have drawn, but that in any event, we had an interim step, and that it was to find out whether or not it was going to be possible to get Congressional support for the recall of Jim Calvert to the active rolls. In other words, could we get legislation through both bodies of Congress. He agreed to this and sent John Warner off with me to take soundings among key members of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee. We found that the reactions were indeed very lukewarm. As is always the case in something as controversial as this, by the time we got there it was apparent that some of them had already been alerted by advocates on both sides, and they recognized this as a very controversial issue. A number of members of both committees, told me privately that they thought that Bill Clements and John Warner were out of their minds to be trying such a thing. These reports began to get back to Jim Calvert, and after two days he withdrew his request to be restored to the active rolls, and this ended the problem. The way in which this had been carried out by both John Warner and Bill Clements I considered to be reprehensible, that is to call me in and present me with a *Fait d'accompli* with Jim Calvert across the hall waiting to see me, as soon as my arm had been twisted. And my greatest regret is that I didn't at the time know sufficient about Jim Calvert's attitudes on the personnel support to have rejected the deal at the very outset. The only plus I can give myself, is that I was misled, is that I took my eye off the ball out of excitement of the opportunity to see David Bagley win a promotion. (End side A.)

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Whereas David ~~xxxxxxx~~ Packard, however much of a bull in a china shop he might have been, had a high degree of respect on the hill as an expert witness who could be decisive and accurate in what he was saying, Bill Clements was a very poor witness. And on at least two occasions was highly criticized for inaccurate testimony. On one occasion Senator Milton Young left the Hearings he was so furious with the ~~xxxx~~ testimony that Bill Clements had given on a specific occasion, and Senator Young told me that Bill Clements would have a hell of a time ever getting anything out of him. Bill Clements came to the job having been given a great amount of briefing by the old guard on the need to reverse the Navy's personnel policies. He apparently kept after John Warner to try to do so. As I have indicated elsewhere, I declined to be pressured, and Bill Clements didn't have the strength or force of character to insist. He took pride in announcing in speeches in Texas that the first thing he had done upon assuming office was to have Admiral Zumwalt get a ~~xxxx~~ hair cut. (Not True). Bill Clements was militantly opposed to bringing women into the service academies, and looked askance at my assignment of women to the ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ hospital ship Sanctuary. He, seemed to me to never get beyond the first level of understanding of the issues. And to have a kind of a ~~xxxx~~ knee-jerk reaction as to what to do on issues that were so complex that they required much analysis, discussion and thought. I think partly because he was so superficial and knee-jerk as opposed to Paul Nitze's very deep analytical approach to problems and partly because Bill Clements was so closely in touch with people like Barry Goldwater and Harry Byrd who had always

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been strong enemies of Paul Nitze, Bill Clements was viciously anti-Nixon. He spoke against him behind his back on numerous occasions, and Jim Schlesinger spoke to me two or three times about his concern about Bill Clements' attitude toward Paul Nitze whom Jim Schlesinger highly respected. Bill Clements brought this same attitude to others in the building who had analytical and intellectual capabilities. I modestly put myself in that category, but include such people as Charlie DeBona, Pat Parker, who also made his list as being the kind that caused him concern. All in all if I can twist Winston Churchill's description of Clement Atley a bit, I would describe Bill Clements as a very "immodest man who nevertheless had much to be modest about."

The next profile is <sup>on</sup> John Chaffey. John Chaffey had been governor of Rhode Island and had lost a bid for re-election. He had been a strong supporter of Rockefeller, and soon after Mr. Nixon, the Rockefeller camp as part of the political binding up of the wounds, arranged to have John Chaffey appointed as Secretary of the Navy. He is a clean cut, modest man of above average intelligence, but no genius. He has very humanitarian instincts, and is ~~is~~ very strongly people oriented. He had, while Admiral Moorer was Chief of Naval Operations, developed the concept of building motels on Naval bases to make it possible for Naval personnel who were in a transient status with their families to live more cheaply than they were able to do prior thereto. And each year he had insisted on about 20 million taken out of other military construction projects, in order to build more housing for the underprivileged military personnel. As I have indicated elsewhere, I believe his decision to select me among the various alternatives that

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he had, as Chief of Naval Operations, to the extent that it was not dictated by Mel Laird, was made by John Chaffey more because of my interest in the personnel than it was because of my views on modernization in the strategic area or foreign policy. My relationships with John Chaffey, were cordial throughout the period of his tenure as Secretary of the Navy. We sometimes disagreed very strongly on the issues, and he sometimes overruled me, on the other hand, I always felt that I got a fair hearing, and I never hesitated to come again if I had additional information upon which to base a and he sometimes reversed himself and would support me having overruled me. He strongly supported all the changes I had made in the Z-grams, and I believe left the Navy convinced that together we had been a good team. After I had completed my tenure I received a very fine letter from him indicating his strong support for what I had accomplished. He was not interested in the details of modernization of or weapons systems planning and had very little interest in the foreign policy field although he did have a very strong view that we withdraw from Vietnam faster, so much so that soon after he left the Navy to go run against Senator Pell to be Senator from Rhode Island, he announced that he disagreed with the President's policy on South Vietnam and stated publicly that he had not been consulted with regard to the bombing decisions. And that he would have opposed them. I think in part for this reason, Mr Nixon did not give him good support in his election race, and he lost by a good margin to Senator Pell even though Mr. Nixon carried Rhode Island. John Chaffey is a very attractive political animal, and I would not write him off from a very bright political future.

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The next vinette, is John Warner. I believe I have said enough about this miserable human being through reference to him in discussing other personalities but can enlarge, if you, Bob, desire me too.

The next ~~xxxxxx~~ personality is Mr. William Mittendorf. I first met Bill Mittendorf when he was ambassador to Holland, and I went to the retirement for Admiral Went in London. He asked to meet with me as a man who had been a Naval officer and had followed the Navy with great interest. When we met, he expressed some concern about the direction of our Z-gram ~~xxxxx~~ initiative. I explained to him the philosophy of what we were trying to accomplish, and he expressed himself as satisfied. Later, e when John Chaffey left the Navy and John Warner moved up to become Secretary, Bill Miteendorf was nominated to be Under-Secretary of the Navy with the firm committment by the White House that he would then become the Secretary of the Navy. He became a very vigorous supporter of both my personnel programs and my modernization programs. He s worked prodigiously on the Hill with me ~~us~~ to try to insure that as many representatives and S<sub>e</sub>nators as possible were exposed to our views, were briefed on the deteriorating nature of the Naval balance, and on the need for the various programs in the Naval budget. During ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> period when John Warner was announced to be moving over to take the relatively meaningless job as head of the Bicentennial Organization, John Warner then decided, for reasons unknown to me, that he was not going to support Bill M<sub>i</sub>ttendorf as his successor, although he had previously indicated he would do so. I believe it is because John Warner is such a ~~xxxxxxxx~~ chameleon that he was reluctant to advocate Bill M<sub>i</sub>ttendorf with Jim Schlesinger having

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Taken a position against Bill Mittendorf. Jim indicated to me that he did not believe that Bill Mittendorf had the intellectual equipment to be Secretary of the Navy. And Jim Schlesinger apparently felt no sense of personal commitment to support him since he had not been Secretary of Defense at the time that the commitment had been made. He looked at a number of other candidates. Bill Mittendorf asked me for my support, I gave it to him, and spoke to a number of my friends on the Hill including - Scoop Jackson, Barry Goldwater, John Tyler (Check this - last name - typist), John Stennis, Eddie Abair - all of whom expressed support for Bill Mittendorf. Jim Schlesinger finally came down in favor of a man who had been a Naval Academy graduate in the class of '44, (I believe his name was Norman, but that needs to be checked), and this individual was sent over to the Hill without adequate massaging of the committees, by either the legislative people in Defense or the White House, as a result of which - lack of preparation and because he had not been adequately briefed on how to deal with the people on the Hill - he was shot down. This then, after a long delay, cleared the way for Bill Mittendorf, and after additional pressure was put on the White House by the Hill, he was finally nominated to be Secretary of the Navy. It is too early to judge how good he will be, he will give it all he's got. He's long on energy and drive. I think Jim Schlesinger is probably right that he is less good than others might have been with regard to his intellectual equipment, but he's got the heart and love of the Navy to go a long way to make up for this deficiency. Soon after he became Secretary of the Navy, he was apparently instructed by Jim Schlesinger, under

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White House pressure to defuse some of what I was saying publicly about the critical nature of the maritime balance. That is, the odds were that we would lose, and ~~it~~ did so. However, he called my office to assure me, that he still believed what we both had been saying.

Next vinette is on Admiral Moorer. I think we may have in our get-acquainted tapes some discussion of this. You'll recall that I said that I was not Moorer's choice, he would have preferred either Admiral Chick Clary, his first ~~me~~ choice, a man who is most senior among the possible candidates, and who had been his deputy when Admiral Moorer had commanded the Pacific Fleet, and who had been one of his two numbered Fleet Commanders when Admiral Moorer commanded the Atlantic Fleet, and who was finally Admiral Moore's Vice-Chief of ~~OPERATIONS~~ Naval Operations. SEcondly, Admiral Moorer would have preferred then Vice-Admiral Bush Bringle, who was the senior aviation candidate, Admiral Clary being a submariner. Anothr individual to whom Admiral Moorer had been close. Admiral Moorer considered me too young and inexperienced, and I think Admiral Moorer also had probably reservations about me because I had worked so closely with Paul Nitze, and was therefore somewhat painted with the "civilian brush." Admiral Moorer had volunteered to me, on our first meeting, that he had not ~~it~~ felt I should have the job until four years later, but made it clear that he intended to work with me. My dramatic series of personnel changes clearly caused Admiral Moorer personal trauma. He had appropriate cause in one regard and that is, there is an old Navy tradition that one doesn't change the sails for the first w quarter of the new watch, and I on the other hand began to make changes im-

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mediately. My reasons for this were that I recognized what a brief period of time four years was. I recognized that I had only two or three years before the draft expired, and we had such a long way to go to overhaul the personnel system. But nevertheless, it could accurately have been judged by Admiral Moorer that this was a reflection on him. I think in general he supported ~~xxxxx~~ my ship modernization programs, and we thought almost exactly alike with regard to our strategic views, and our views concerning foreign policy and the nature of the maritime balance. There was one exception to this, and that is that Admiral Moorer did not believe in putting percentages on the probabilities of war outcomes. He felt, and he told me on numerous occasions that he felt that it was too likely to get the Congress inclined to further cut our budgets, if they knew that we were pessimistic about war outcomes they might have a tendency to say, well so what? and cut us still more. Nevertheless, he did admit to me in ~~xxxx~~ the Jordan crisis that it would have been very difficult to prevail in the Eastern Mediterranean, and during the Yom Kippur crisis that if we had had to fight the Russians we would have "gotten our asses whipped." And I reported him as having said this in the testimony I gave for, before the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee on a subsequent occasion. After the heartburn of the initial changes in the personnel administration had eroded and as Admiral Moorer began to see that I would be a vigorous supporter of ~~XXXXXXXX~~ his strategic and foreign policy views, we developed a high degree of understanding, and I think became increasingly close during the four year period. I supported Admiral Moorer strongly during the period of the so-called spy ring, of the so-called "JCS spy-ring" and

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I think he appreciated that. Admiral Moorer's problem was that he was an impossible point in the triangular relationships between the President and Kissinger on the one hand, Mel Laird on the other and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the third. On numerous occasions the President or Kissinger and sometimes ordered him to get military planning done in a certain field, and ordered him not to tell Mel Laird about it. On these occasions Admiral Moorer was meticulous in making the JCS aware of his orders as he should have under the law, and he was also meticulous about insisting to the President and Kissinger that he had to have Mel Laird's initials on any directives that went out. So that there was never, to the best of my knowledge and belief, any order transmitted to the field, from the White House unless it had gone through the Secretary of Defense, by way of the ~~102~~ Chairman of the JCS, but there were many occasions when this circuitous route was followed instead of the normal route of White House to Secretary of Defense to ~~Chairman~~ Chairman of the JCS. Admiral Moorer had been told that he would be re-appointed to a third two-year term as Chairman of the JCS, at the time that the stories on the spy-ring broke. This then not only killed his chances to become Chairman, but caused him a great deal of personal trauma, since it is I understand the first time he ever came personally under attack in his long career of public service. During the period of the racial unrest in the Navy, Admiral George Anderson contacted Admiral Moorer, seeking his support in efforts to un-horse me. Admiral Moorer reported to me that he as said to George Anderson at that time what he had said to me many times about George Anderson, namely, "you can't have a dead hand on a teller George, stays out of it." I wish that George Anderson

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had taken his advice. The ~~xxxxxxx~~ whole story of the Moorer-Zumwalt dealings during the spy-ring period and my discussions with Secretary Schlesinger are probably a matter for separate dictation, if you Bob feel its newsworthy.

The next vinette is on General Westmoreland. I did not know General Westmoreland until I became a member of the JCS, at which time he had been Chief of Staff of the Army for a couple of years. I was not impressed with his intellectual capabilities, and found myself continually amazed that Mr. McNamara who put great emphasis on intellectual prowess, could ever have made the decision to make ~~him~~ him commander of U. S. Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, at the time when that was the most important military job in the country. He was ~~an~~ man who seemed to me to be vain, and superficial. A man who was totally captive to staff positions, and very ill-equipped to carry on any kind of meaningful debate in the tank. I found the meetings in the tank when General Westmoreland was there, to be extremely galling. We spent many many hours debating commas, and semi-colons, and slight nuances instead of getting on to the substantive issues. I am reassured that ~~my~~ my judgement in this regard is accurate because immediately after his departure, and the arrival of General Abrams, the quality of debate in the tank ~~xxxxxx~~ improved, ~~and~~ <sup>the</sup> the order of magnitude, the length of meetings reduced dramatically, and we found ourselves increasingly focusing on important issues rather than trivia. On the occasion of my first appearance as a member of the JCS in the White House, for the budget meeting with the President in December of 1970, each of us had been told to take "about twelve minutes" in briefing the President. I had done considerable work pre-

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paring for this briefing; I had briefed Mel Laird and Admiral Moorer privately, ahead of time on what I was going to say, and had their concurrence in what I was going to say. When we went before the President, I apparently took about 16 minutes. Mr. Agnew and Mr. Kissinger were both reportedly impressed at that time with what I had had to say, (This is before Henry developed his paranoia toward me), afterwards, my friends in the White House told me that Al Haig was sent for by General Westmoreland and roundly criticized for his failure to alert General Westmoreland adequately as to what kind of issues would be covered, because he was dissatisfied with the way he had come across in comparison with me. Admiral Moorer reported to me that General Westmoreland came to him after that briefing, and complained that I had taken too much time. Mel Laird reported to me the same thing. Mel Laird told me that he had said to Westy, "Look, Westy, Bud is the only member of the Chiefs who came in ahead of time and told me what he was going to say, I knew what he was going to say and approved it."

The next personality is General Abrams. I first met General Abrams when he was the Army representative of a Department of Defense Task Force to engage in Cuban contingency planning. This was the Task Force which I mentioned under the Haig vinette, had been set up under Mr. Cyrus Vance who was then Secretary of the Army, with Joe Califano (check spelling of last name - typist), special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army, and acting as the full-time chairman of the Task Force. I was the representative from the Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA's office, and Abe, a Major-General then was the Army representative. At that time I found

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him somewhat of a . He had very little to say and on a very few occasions when he did have something to say, it was rather negative yet expressed vigorously. He would then subside into non-communication again. My next experience with him was when I was ordered to Vietnam to be his Naval Component Commander, he at the time being Commander U. S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, or the ~~Theater~~ Theater Commander. On arrival, General Abrams spent about four hours with me, personally listening in while his intelligence and operations and logistics chiefs all rang true for Navy

of the war and the general concept they had toward fighting. I was impressed with the fact that this busy Commander would sit through the whole briefing of a prospective Component Commander, and that he would not give me any specific guidance with regard to what he wanted me to accomplish as the Naval Component Commander, he seemed rather completely willing to let me figure out how to support him once I understood what his problems were. Several months later, General Abrams communicated to me that he had had a high degree of confidence in me, even prior to my arrival, because he had received a letter from the then Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Paul Ignatius, who was a good friend of his from the days when Mr. Ignatius was an Army Assistant Secretary, or Under Secretary, in which Mr. Ignatius had outlined my capabilities. General Abrams also reported the fact that he had also been considerably chagrined that the first he had heard about my assignment was when the orders were issued. Apparently the Navy had failed to consult as is protocol. However, he did not hold this against me personally. At the end of my first day's briefing, General Abrams then told me that the real decision making point in the week for him

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him was the Saturday morning called the "Wieu", pronounced yoq. The acrostic stands for "Weekly Intelligence Estimate Up-date." In fact it z was used as a meeting of the Board of Directors. General Abrams had there all of the principal members of his own staff, and the Air Force, Navy and Army Component Commanders. Nearly monthly he would also have the Corps Commanders in and on those monthly meetings the U. S. Ambassador was usually invited. General Abrams used these meetings first for an intelligence up-date of everything that had happend during the week, and what the forecast might be, second for a report of operations of a significant nature. . .(end side B.)