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Continuing with Abrams. He would frequently interrupt during these briefings to ask questions, carry on a discussion with key Commanders or members of his staff, initiate a request for a new project or a new operation, and so forth. The most dramatic example of which the staff performed under his maestro-like touch, was the day at the end of the week, he asked the question, as to whether in view of the increased threat in the ~~XXXX~~<sup>III</sup> corps, and the diminished threat in the I corps we shouldn't suddenly move a division from the northernmost part of the country back to the vicinity of Saigon. This was the only time consideration of the whole division movement was, between corps was made, during the 20 months I was there. We discussed it from the standpoint of sea-lift, air-lift, logistics support, strategy, tactics, intelligence, it was a beautiful example of making a corporate commander's estimate. At the end of the meeting General Abrams said that he had tentatively concluded that he should make the decisions to go the next day, but he wanted to meet again later that afternoon, to see if anybody had developed any additional insights or reservations. We all dashed out. I established a special communications net with the Commander Seventh Fleet, and after a personal teletype communication, confirmed that the amphibious lift could be made available, others did their part, we re-assembled that afternoon, the decision was made and the division movement began that day. General Abrams upon superficial examination is sometimes compared with General Grant. He enjoys his whiskey, he smokes and chomps on a cigar, he has a kind of a blunt and earthy way of expressing himself upon occasion, and he is by nature taciturn. For example,

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I sometimes found when we were together, drinking a martini, that I would ask him a question, and after sufficient time had elapsed that I assumed he wasn't going to answer it, I would then move on to make another intervention in the conversation, and by that time found that he was ready to deliver himself of his answer. However, on occasion when it demanded, that he could be absolutely lyrical and intellectual in his expression of views. I observed him on one occasion when the Time-Life-Fortune organization had sent its annual tour of top executives to South Vietnam, watching a briefing go very badly. It was clear that the executives were beginning to be turned off, that the information was too detailed, and that the job was not getting done of communicating to this group. General Abrams suddenly leaped to his feet, and in a most brilliant, and eloquent 15 minute dissertation absolutely electrified these individuals, and left them walking 8 feet tall. General Abrams could be very tough. On one occasion when I made a decision to authorize the award of a medal to a Vietnamese officer because I felt time was running and we did not have a decision from his staff, he was quite blunt and explicit in making it clear to me that there would be no repetition. On the other hand, he was absolutely loyal and willing to stick his neck in support of all of us when we made decisions of a controversial nature with regard to the war itself. That is he was totally willing to back, until he fired him for incompetence, any Commander who was doing his best job for, in support of the war. I might give an example, the Chief of the Vietnamese Navy, Admiral Chon (check spelling-typist), and I became convinced that two of the most important

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sanctuaries. Of the three very important strategic sanctuaries being used by the Communists in the IV Corps, or Delta ~~xx~~ of South Vietnam- the seven mountains area, the Yu Minh forest, and the southern tip of the Ka Ma Peninsula, that the latter ~~of~~ these could be completely taken away from the Viet Cong, and restored to the control of the government of Vietnam, ~~xxxx~~ using largely Naval Forces. We went to the IV Corps, Commander, and suggested to ~~h~~ him that we would go to the ~~Santa Rosa River~~ Cua Dua River, and begin vigorous patrols in this area and put down resistance from the banks, and then at that point, that we should land a landing force of troops provided by the IV Corps Commander to re-establish a base in the area <sup>to</sup> which we were convinced the local populous would flock. They were reportedly, increasingly disenchanted with Viet Cong in that area. It was a very lucrative area, rich fishing, wood resources, shrimp, and it would be a distinct asset to the economy of the government of Vietnam, but more ~~an~~ importantly a major setback to the Viet Cong if they lost it. The IV Corps Commander ~~x~~ considered that it was a dangerous operation to put troops ashore in that area, and he could not support taking troops from other areas. I therefore went to General Abrams, and explained to him that there was an alternative, that we could put a base anchored on barges in the middle of the river, which was fairly wide, and defend it from the barges, ~~xxxxxxx~~ heavily loaded with machine guns and ~~m~~ mortars, and that, plus the boat power we would have there would make it impossible for the Viet Cong to overrun it. General Abrams said that the ~~xxxxxx~~ concept made sense to him, and we proceeded with our planning ~~getting reluctant concurrence from the IV Corps Commander.~~

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The operation was initially approved by the Major General whose name I will have to get, who was the IV Corps' Commander. But by the time it was ~~launched~~ launched, he was replaced by Major General Weatherill who had deep reservations about the operation. We went in and established the base, in what was probably the most exciting of the riverine operations of the war, and this could be a whole story in itself. Soon thereafter, General Weatherill sent one of his Colonels down to examine the operation. The Colonel came back and reported to him, that it was a disaster waiting to happen, that it was manned by clerks and bottle-washers who had not been adequately trained, and ~~that~~ if the Viet Cong attacked it, it would sink beneath the waves. General Weatherill expressed vigorous concern to General Abrams. I suggested to General Abrams that he send his deputy, General Bill Rossen down with me to look at the operation. General Abrams concurred, we went down. The local Navy commander called us "operation Seafloat," gave a briefing, the Army expressed its concerns, General Rossen gave a Solomon-like judgement at the end, <sup>in</sup> which he had to conclude that the operation's results had been very modest to date. But that he also had to conclude that the reasons about survival had been grossly overstated, and he authorized the operation to continue for another two months. By the end of that time, several thousand people had eluded the Viet Cong and come in and settled along the banks, and we had won support for our concept which ultimately led to the complete liberation of this area. General Abrams was kept far too long in command of the forces in Vietnam. At great

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sacrifice to his personal life, and to his family, and to his health. I have never ~~fx~~ felt, since he came to the job of Chief of Staff of the Army, he was in good health, and his recent malignancy and subsequent bloodclot come as a great personal tragedy to me.

The next vinette is General Ryan. General Ryan was Chief of Staff of the Air Force when I came to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was down to earth, brusque, business-like. He was by nature an operator rather than a conceptual thinker or planner. I always considered that he was one-level above his appropriate assignment in the job of Chief of Staff of the Air Force. His reputation as an operational commander was superb and I believe he would have been much better off as a Theater or unified commander, rather than as a Service Chief. He was honest and straightforward. After I had bitten the bullet, the first year in my briefing to the President, and ~~had~~ ~~fx~~ had told him that in my view the odds were by the end of fiscal year 1971, going to be less than 50% that we ~~x~~ ~~xmm~~ could prevail in a war at sea against the Soviets. General Ryan made the same statement with regard to Air Force capability, the following years. I believe his views were accurate.

The next vinette is about General George Brown. I first knew General George Brown when he was special assistant to, or rather Military Executive Assistant to Secretary McNamara when Secretary McNamara was the Secretary of Defense. He is a low-pressure, outwardly easy-going individual who carries the air of country-boy perhaps a little further than it needs to be carried, but a man of wisdom and depth. After that I watched him as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs under General Wheeler, and really got to

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know him when ~~xxx~~ he commanded the Seventh Air Force which was the Air Force, Air Force Component under General Abrams in Vietnam, at the same time I commanded the Naval Forces there. He and I became friends and worked well together, and each I think made compromises in order to enhance the other's business wherever there were interface problems. He was highly thought of by General Abrams, and was a good team player. I saw little of him when he was Chief of the Air Force R and D Command but again~~st~~ saw him regularly for my last year ~~xx~~ when he was Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Here I came to see that he was stronger on the operational and technical side than he was with regard to ~~xx~~ the conceptual issues. I did not feel that he ever, fully, got on top of the Strategic Arms Limitations discussions and he tended always to~~x~~ leave that to Admiral Moorer and to me. I do not believe that he has the intellectual capability to keep up with Secretary Schlesinger in this field, nor is he an expert in the foreign policy field. These ~~xxx~~ will be weaknesses in his administration as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, but he should be superb when it comes to giving advice about the operational use of the Armed Forces. He will of course do his best to help the Chief of Staff of the Air Force increase the Air Force fraction of the budget, just as Admiral Moorer did his best to help me increase the Navy fraction of the budget, during the last four years.

The next vinette is about General Leonard Chapman. When I came to the tank, General Chapman was Commandant of the Marine Corps, and therefore a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "for those matters of interest to the Marine Corps." I had first met General

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Chapman when he was a Brigadier General stationed at Le Jeune and I was a Commander in the Navy, working as Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Personnel. I was immediately taken to him as a thoughtful, somewhat introverted, very intelligent man who had command presence and who, somewhat like Gary Cooper, managed while saying very little to have an appeal to his subordinates. I next came to deal with him when he was Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps, under General Greene, and I was the Rear Admiral, Director of Systems Analysis, in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. There were several occasions on which I had to insure the analysis that we were doing was either acceptable to the Marine Corps, or if not acceptable that they at least understood what we were up to and why, and on these occasions, I found General Chapman always willing to come half-way to meet the Navy position; and a very shrewd negotiator. When General Chapman became Commandant, he visited Vietnam, and I had the opportunity to brief him, since in Vietnam the Marine ~~Advisory~~ Advisory Force was under my Command. They being located along with the Vietnamese Marines in the III and IV Corps. Whereas the senior U. S. Marine was in Command of U. S. Marine Forces in I Corps. And so for that part of his visit that had to do with the equipping of Vietnamese Marines, or of talking with U. S. Marines who were advising the Vietnamese Marines, I was the one with whom General Chapman should deal. I further had the problem of doing the planning concerning the withdrawal of U. S. Naval Forces in I Corps who were there in a support role to the U. S. Marines. When General Chapman came to visit me, he indicated to me that he felt that the way in which we were supporting the Vietnamese Marines left nothing to be desired. He was

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extremely willing to provide any additional support to <sup>them</sup> ~~him~~ that I thought was needed. In other words he treated me as though the war-time commander for the Navy and Marine elements in the southern part of the country; he had complete confidence in me. I asked him at that time how he felt about the early or late withdrawal of U. S. Marines from the I Corps, the question being whether the Army should come ~~up~~ out first or the Marines should come out first. It was a matter of importance, to me ~~as~~ since I had to know how to plan the withdrawal of the U. S. Naval forces, and they would go early if the Marines left. General Chapman indicated his non-parochialism by indicating he wanted to do exactly what General Abrams preferred to do. This was the general attitude that I saw in General Chapman in almost every capacity. When I became the Chief of Naval Operations ~~immediately~~ Admiral Moorer told me that his relations with General Chapman had been quite cordial and he felt it had been a good partnership. I called on General Chapman and told him that I would like to dedicate myself to continuing that partnership and suggested that whenever we had problems between the Navy and the Marines, we ought to try to solve them between ourselves and not kick it up to civilian ~~an~~ authority. General Chapman ~~stated~~ <sup>said</sup> that he agreed 100% and that was the way it was. I recall no occasion during the period of General Chapman's tenure as Commandant which lasted for the first half of my four years, that he and I had to go to the Secretary of the Navy in an adversary relationship. And I recall many occasions when we supported each other not only within the JCS arena, but also with the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of Defense. He is the kind of man whom I would cheerfully follow into hell, as is General Abrams. Incidental-

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the story of General Chapman having become Commandant is interesting. The name that was sent over when General Greene was ready to retire, was that of General "Brute" Krulak who was a 5'4" cocky little fellow who was very popular with Mr. McNamara; somewhat of a martinet, but a very able man. However, President Johnson had learned ~~that~~ a few weeks earlier that General Krulak, who did not expect to be named Commandant, was ~~in touch~~ in touch with the Copley Press, who were offering him a job. The Copley Press had been quite unfriendly to President Johnson, and Lyndon Johnson, as was his want, therefore disapproved General Krulak's nomination. The other man who had been prominently mentioned for the job, and who was reputedly General Greene's candidate, was General Lew Walt, who had become the hero of the Marine in the field while he was in command of the ~~Third~~ Third Fleet Marine Force in the I Corps of South Vietnam. He was always helicoptering into the heat of action wherever it might be and therefore became dubbed by the Marine footsoldier as "Big Squad Leader in the Sky." With Mr. McNamara's advocacy of General Krulak and General Greene's advocacy of General Walt, General Chapman became rather a compromised candidate. Thus are decisions made, and in my view it was the best thing that could have happened to the Marine Corps and to the Navy-Marine Corps Team.

The next vinette has to do with General Cushman. General Cushman was General Chapman's successor. He was selected personally by President Nixon because he had been a very close to President Nixon when Mr. Nixon was Vice-President, he was his Marine aide at that time. General Chapman had wanted to retire General Cushman at the end of his tour in command of the Third Fleet Marine Force in Vietnam.

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General Cushman had gotten to the President who made Cushman the Deputy Director CIA, which kept him on active duty. When it came time for General Chapman to retire, General Chapman submitted ~~W~~ as his first choice, Lieutenant General Chaisson, I believe, who was the most widely recognized as the most able of the Generals in the Marine Corps after General Chapman. There were two other Generals one of whom was a Congressional Medal of Honor winner, General Ray Davis on General Chapman's list. General Cushman was not one. After the list went forward Mel Laird called General Chapman, and asked him to put General Cushman on the list as number 4. These names went over to the White House and the President picked General Cushman. Whereas General Chapman had been a very sound administrator who had gotten right into the details of the Marine Corps, and could do so because they are a small organization without a wide range of problems, General Cushman did not do so, and tended by default to let his deputy General Anderson run the Marine Corps. In my view, the new team of Cushman and Anderson has badly hurt the Marine Corps by promoting people who are personal proteges rather than people on their merit to the top slots, and by retireing some very able people. However, I don't think I should use this in the book because I sound a little bit too much like George Anderson, when I say it. This is a view that is ~~W~~ shared by others.

The next personality is Admiral Rickover. About Admiral Rickover one has to start off by saying that "when he is good he is very, very good, and when he is bad, he is horrid." I have arranged to send you, Bob, a copy of the interview that was done when I was a Commander, and

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Was interviewed by him for the Nuclear Propulsion Program, and wonder whether we might not use it as part of a flash-back when I am discussing Admiral Rickover. He really is worth a whole chapter in the book ~~xxxx~~ probably, in which event we've got to do a lot more than I'm ~~g~~ going to do in this tape. He's a man who believes to the point of fanaticism, in the importance of nuclear ~~g~~ propulsion. He is a member of the Jewish faith. Reportedly was ~~g~~ given a very hard time while he was at the Naval Academy. Was not well-treated nor beloved as he came along throughout the Navy. Youk know the story that apparently Naval leadership at the time the Naval reactors were first being developed, did not see the significance of them to the same extent Admiral Rickover did. Admiral Rickover was passed over for Rear Admiral, and had nothing to lose, and began to court assiduously those within the Congress who believed in nuclear power, and has over time, working in a very brilliant fashion, changed himself from the status of a passed-over Captain in the Navy, to a four-star Admiral still serving on active duty in a retired status, who is no longer fully subject to the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, or the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of Defense, or ~~xxxx~~ indeed the President. Because he has a hat as head of the Nuclear Reactors Division of the Atomic ~~g~~ Energy Commission which puts him under that agency, which in turn has joint responsibilities to both the Congress and the Executive Branch. He's able to play this ~~xxx~~ position in such a way that he can get Congressional ~~x~~ support for things that sometimes border on the outrageous. As he has gotten more powerful and more independent, and more fanatical, he has carried the programs for Nuclear Propulsion to a point where they probably have

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begun to do the Navy more harm than they have done good. Let me qualify as follows, there can be no doubt that nuclear propulsion is always more effective than fossil fuel propulsion. . 1 (end Side A)

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The only real doubt about nuclear propulsion has always been whether the additional effectiveness of nuclear power was worth the additional cost. In the case of the Russian Navy for example, although they are building more nuclear propelled submarines than we are, they maintain  $2\frac{1}{2}$  times as many attack submarines altogether by building a large number of diesel submarines as well. And in the case of the Russian Navy, they have never built a nuclear propelled surface ship. Apparently feeling that the additional cost of nuclear power, in their ~~own~~ case, is not worth the additional effectiveness. In the case of the U. S. Navy, I think there can be very little doubt that the additional cost of nuclear power in the case of the submarines, is well worth it for the effectiveness it brings. It changes the whole nature of the animal. It divorces the submarine from any need to come to the surface, to the limit of human endurance. The question is a much closer question when one looks at putting nuclear propulsion into aircraft carriers. It costs 50% more to make an aircraft carrier nuclear propelled, so that we could have 3 conventionally powered carriers for the price of 2 nuclear carriers, and at a time when adequate numbers of mobile airfields are on the world are important, this is a very moot point. Nevertheless on balance, I still conclude that its worth it with regard to aircraft carriers which are so very often needed to react quickly to some new strategic situation around the world in cold war. Or at least some generous fraction of our 15 or 12 aircraft carriers should be nuclear propelled. Then when one begins to get below the level of aircraft carriers, I think the analyses proved quite conclusively that additional ships, such as

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escorts for carriers, and other kinds of surface ships, do not give you sufficient additional effectiveness as to be worth the cost. It's quite clear from the calculations that the Navy has done, that numbers of platforms in numbers of different parts of the ocean at any one time are likelier to make it possible for us to survive, than more effectively propelled smaller numbers of platforms. In other words we need to have as many ~~mis~~ missile systems, and as many anti-submarine systems in as many parts of the world as we can get them, and for the kinds of budget levels that we're able to talk about, we probably have more maritime capabilities at sea if we buy the larger numbers of ships that we can get, (excluding submarines and carriers), by sticking to conventional power. Nevertheless Admiral Rickover, through long years of association with key members on the Congress, through a brilliant program of cajolery, threat, offers of good jobs, and so forth, has been able to move far beyond the level of a program manager, building hardware to meet the Navy's requirements. And is creating artificial requirements for ships which are so costly in individual unit prices, that the Navy is less capable today than it would be if Admiral Rickover were no longer commanding the program. There is a whole separate story about Admiral Rickover's dictatorial and ~~fx~~ fascist-like activity with regard to the way in which he handles, not only those people working for him but the way in which he spies on, blackmails and threatens skippers of ships, and skippers of ~~shp~~ shipyards which is embodied in the Swanson case, about which one could do some very special discussion I guess. My relations with Admiral Rickover were as follows: whenever he judged that we would be together on an issue, he always came to me, whenever he judged that

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we would not I always heard about it first, either from one of the Senators who were close to him on the Hill, or from the Secretary of the Navy after John Warner became Secretary of the Navy. When he and I were together on an issue we were very effective at getting our program through the Secretary of the Navy, Secretary of Defense, and the Congress. Where we disagreed on an issue, we tended to cancel one another out and wasted an awful lot of management time. Admiral ~~Rickover~~ Rickover's concept of truth is that truth is whatever it takes to get his program. He does not hesitate to ~~twist~~ twist the facts, to mis-quote, to take out of context. He believes so fanatically in the rightness of his programs, that he believes the ends justify the means.. As a matter of fact one should make a n interesting parallel ~~xxxx~~ between the way in which Admiral Rickover has operated at his level, and the way at which Kissinger has operated at his level. Each year Admiral Rickover arranges to give testimony, in private, that is he's the only defense witness who doesn't have legislative liaison people from the office of Secretary of Defense, or the Office of the Navy Department there. This is normally before the Mahon House Appropriations Committee, and the Abair House Armed Services Committee.. He may also appear before the Senate, although I don't recall. ~~This~~ This testimony is always quite a bombshell, that ~~is~~ it deals with all his prejudices, attacks on Naval leadership in ~~gn~~ general, attacks on the Naval Academy, attacks on the educational system, and in general represents the gospel by Saint Hymie. It generally takes three or four months before its released by the ~~2~~ Congress, and this always has the effect that when it does come out, Rickover's always able to

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say, well that happened a long time ago when people get their hackles up. Meanwhile it makes a great story for the newspapers each year and so he gets kind of a free ride, and the objects of his scorn and derision get a kind of a free tongue lashing. Over time the whole system's gotten pretty well used to it, and it's more like a national caricature carnival of some kind than it is anything meaningful in public life.

The next vinette, is Admiral ~~James~~ Isaac C. Kidd. This is a tough one, Admiral Kidd was a year of me at the Naval Academy. While he was there, his father was killed on board the battleship Arizona in Pearl Harbor. Young Ike therefore became an object of veneration in his father's name. Early in his career. Whereas given a degree of importance very early, quite beyond his rank, his father's reputation and possibly the early adulation that he was given developed in him an overriding ambition, which appeared to no ethical limits. My first close association with him, and again when I was the ~~Executive~~ Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, Paul Nitze, and he was the Executive Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Dave McDonald. In that role, Ike's relationship to me, although he was senior was one of absolute ~~un~~unctionousness. He appears to maintain that attitude toward all those who are in positions of authority, or in positions to help him. It almost defies the imagination to watch him come in to a room, and speak to his seniors as "you giants" you men of gigantic intellect, you gentlemen who are so much smarter than I am, etc. Yet, the impact of this flattery, seems to have helped more ~~ex~~ than it has hurt him. The thing that began to cause

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me some concern about Admiral Kidd, even at this earlier incarnation when we were both Captains, was the fact that the stories he would tell me about the way in which he came by information or about what the CNO ~~XXXX~~ was doing, were so completely different than the stories one would later learn from those who also had been there andk knew. Over time, I came to the conclusion, that he was a very devious man. But I retained a tremendous admiration for his ability, as a professional man. By the time I was appointed to be the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Kidd was a three-star Admiral in command of the First Fleet, and had already received orders to command the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. This was an important breakthrough by John Chaffey the Secretary of the Navy, and one in which ~~XXXX~~ he overrode the recommendation of Admiral Moorer, because Admiral Kidd was not an aviator, and for many years only aviators had been permitted to command the Mediterranean Sixth Fleet, and the Western Pacific Seventh Fleet, by a Chief of Naval Operation of aviation background. Ike ran the Sixth Fleet in a creditable manner, during my early tenure as Chief of Naval Operations, and I had the opportunity immediately after the ~~XXXX~~ Jordan crisis of September 1970, one concluded he must have outgrown those earlier ~~XXXXXXXX~~ characteristics based on the limited observation I made of him at that time. Later on when it became time to select for four-stars a new Chief of Naval Material, I concluded that Ike was the proper individual, because I wanted someone who was technically competent, who had meticulous attention to details, who had quite a span of management control, and ~~XXXX~~ one who was operationally qualified, this having been a weakness

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in previous Chiefs of Naval Material. I therefore nominated him for the job. Initially, John Chaffey had doubts about ~~his~~ his competence, in the field, but later came around and then I ran into the fact that both Dave Packard and Mel Laird, tended to oppose his nomination for the same reason. I saw each of them privately and got them aboard, in support of the nomination. Ike came to the job, and there was an initial period of three or four ~~mm~~ months when I was convinced that my judgement in this case, in the earlier years had been wrong, and in the later years had been correct. Then there began a period of gradual disabusement. After the initial ~~hmm~~ honeymoon during which he appeared to pay primary attention to getting on top of his job ~~mm~~ in command of the Material establishment. My staff and I began to notice that increasingly he was ~~mm~~ paying more attention to the civilian hierarchy, and less and less attention to his job. This was kept reasonably in check while John Chaffey was still Secretary of the Navy, and while Dave Packard and Mel Laird were still in their offices, because they believed more than some of their successors in sticking to the chain of command. When John Warner became Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Kidd began the practice of almost routine ~~and-~~ running of the system. On each occasion, in the end-run was perceived it was made clear that we knew it ~~mm~~ had been done, but he was so very artful, that very frequently he had an answer that almost explained the circumstances. When Mr. Packard was succeeded ~~x~~ by Mr. Clements, Ike then began to work him directly, increasingly, and to ~~mm~~ end-run John Warner as well. Meanwhile, during the period of the racial unrest, during that famous six-weeks, there was a very

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large body of circumstantial evidence to indicate that Admiral George Anderson was keeping in close contact with Ike Kidd, and that Ike was giving him minute by minute advice from the inside as to how best to proceed while keeping his hands very well covered. People on the Hill have mentioned to me that Admiral Kidd was also using Admiral Rickover who was a born saboteur during this period to him as the man who could straighten the Navy out. At the very least ~~if~~ it is possible to state that unlike most of the other senior officers who stood ~~a~~ tall in support of my policies, ~~and~~ at the time of this crisis, Admiral Kidd did not volunteer to be of any help. That is fact. The rest is circumstantial and surmised. As my tenure came closer and closer to the end, Admiral Kidd increased his efforts to impress civilian authority directly, and measurably, and one began to read all kinds of indications that he would turn back the clock. In one unguarded moment John Warner admitted to me that Ike Kidd had told him that his program would be to do just that, and that that was why he, John Warner, would be for him in the succession sweepstakes. Which I shall dictate later. Admiral Kidd is seventy or eighty ~~plus~~ pounds overweight, and looks very unmilitary in his appearance. He is a prodigious worker. However by the end of my tenure I came to the conclusion that he was not a good manager on the technical side. He lacked the toughness to stand up to ~~the~~ the individual organizations under him, and very frequently I found myself having to be the manager who said no in order to keep Grummond, Litton and Tenaco prudently managed.

The next vinette is Admiral George Anderson. Admiral Anderson



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were visited shortly thereafter when Admiral Anderson's flagship entered port by an officer from his staff who came over to my ship's office to check to make sure that we did in fact have a sailor sent on emergency leave. This lack of trust and basic sense of irritation in the circumstances, I considered noteworthy. When Admiral Anderson had command of the Sixth Fleet, he made it a show force, it was not however in my judgement one that was operationally well-tuned. Nevertheless the combination of his talent and attractiveness led him to be selected as Chief of Naval Operations following the world-reknowned Admiral Burke. Admiral Anderson, shortly after taking ~~office~~ over as Chief of Naval Operations announced to his staff that he was going to "de-Burkize the Navy" and proceeded to go to what those of us from other unions thought were parochialism extremes to insure the primacy of aviators, and aviation in all aspects of the Navy. After the first year in his two-year assignment, (at that time tenures for Service Chiefs ~~was~~ were two-years with ~~the~~ the exception of the Commandant of the Marine Corps), he ~~begin~~ began to come into occasional conflict with Mr. McNamara. I personally observed in the Cuban missile crisis when I was working for Paul Nitze, that Admiral Anderson did not seem able to understand the nuances of the dangerous military-political game that was going on, and highly resented what he considered to be the interference by the White House and the Secretary of Defense, into the deployment of ships. A ~~the~~ famous confrontation occurred during that crisis with Admiral Anderson taking objection to Mr. McNamara's trying to put a specific ship in a specific place, and the two went off in a room together to lock horns. When it

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came time for Admiral Anderson's traditional reappointment, for a second two-year term, Mr. McNamara did not so reappoint him. Admiral Anderson for a few days was quite a hero within military and right-wing circles for having stood up to Mr. McNamara ~~xxx~~ and having been fired. However rather than getting out and taking his case to the people he instead accepted appointment as Ambassador to Portugal, an appointment offered by Mr. Kennedy to induce him to maintain his silence. Admiral Anderson contented himself therefore with a single speech ~~blasting~~ blasting Mr. McNamara, and went off to perform, like a good trained seal in Portugal. When I relieved Tom Moorer~~xx~~ as Chief of Naval Operations, one of the pieces of intelligence that Tom Moorer passed on was that I would find that Admiral George Anderson would serve as a "Dead hand on the tiller." By that Tom meant that George Anderson was constantly looking over his shoulder when he was CNO and ~~xx~~ always trying to second guess what he was doing. I gathered that in Tom's case this monitoring went pretty~~xx~~ much across the board as to what Tom was doing. As soon as the first several Z-grams had been issued under my watch, Admiral Anderson was able to focus his fire and attention on a single area of my administration. He made it a matter of personal concern to seek to overturn~~xx~~ these far-reaching changes, by speaking to everyone who would~~x~~ listen. He would personally organize a great deal of lobby pressure among the~~xx~~ senior retired personnel, urging them to talk to their friends on Capitol Hill. He did a lot of telephoning to Capitol Hill ~~himself~~ himself. I have been told by newsmen that Admiral Anderson was the source of ~~x~~ some of the "informed White House source" stories that I ~~x~~ was to be given other

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jobs before my tenure was over. Admiral Anderson never had the guts to speak to me about his own views. I only knew what he thought because of what I heard from those to whom he had spoken, with the exception to the fact that on two occasions he did tell me that his reading in the White House indicated that my personnel changes were highly unpopular, and that he urged me as a friend to change my ways. I have already recorded separately his efforts to talk to columnist Bill Anderson of the Chicago Tribune. Admiral Anderson did publicly praise my efforts to alert people to the fact that the maritime balance was shifting against us. On three different occasions when he was introducing me to audiences, I think he did this merely because it was the only thing that I was doing with which he could bring himself to agree. On two of these occasions, at the same time he publicly praised the Commandant of the Marine Corps, ~~xx~~ for maintaining such a highly effective and disciplined force. Admiral Anderson is by nature shallow, vain, egotistical. He is a back-biter, and quite two-faced, all in all, very well-suited to be a member of the Nixon White House Staff.

The next ~~xx~~ vinette has to do with Admiral James Holloway Jr. the father of the present Admiral Holloway. Admiral James Holloway was Chief of Naval Personnel and a Vice-Admiral when I first came to ~~Wash~~ Washington for my first tour of duty in the Bureau of Naval ~~Personnel~~ Personnel in 1953. I received an immense education from him with regard to the way to get things done in the Washington milieu. Like most military men, prior to a tour in Washington, I had the view that one merely did the best job he could to produce a

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paper or a program and submit it to his superiors, and let the system take its course. From Admiral Holloway I learned that<sup>is</sup> just the very first unimportant step in Washington, and that one must next seek out all of the various offices and all the various agencies which are in a position to say no to any new scheme, and to do a great amount of work to get them aboard and support of this program. . (end Side B).