

Tape #19 Side ~~x~~ A

Continuing along with Paul Nitze. Paul Nitze instructed me to get the special security clearances required to be his ~~Executive~~ Executive Assistant in the job of Deputy Secretary of Defense. And had been told by McNamara that he would be his Deputy. At this time a ~~spate~~ spate of stories came out backgrounded by Gilpatrick saying that Nitze was too much a mirror image of McNamara, and too similarly cold and analytical, lacking in charisma to be a logical counterweight to McNamara. About the same time Fred Korth, who was Secretary of the Navy began to ~~be~~ come under heavy fire for allegedly misusing the Secretary of the Navy Yacht, Sequoia, for old business associates. (Something that was reputedly a program on the part of Bobby Kennedy to begin to cut up Lyndon Johnson so that he could be dumped from the VP ticket the next time around). It became apparent that Fred ~~be~~ Korth was going to have to be fired under the public hue and cry. Nitze was suddenly called to the White House and was asked by Kennedy to take the job as Secretary of the Navy. He consulted with me about whether he ought to do so, I told him I thought it would be a better job than the Deputy at that time, and it would "be his own command" instead of requiring him to be executive officer under a very powerful skipper. He had several talks with other advisers and with his family, and finally decided to take the job. He held it from 1962 until 1966, and then when it became apparent that Mr. Vance was going to leave to return to a civilian life, again for the third time was one of the candidates to be Deputy Secretary of Defense. Suddenly there began to be a spate of rumors that McNamara was leaning toward John McNoughton. I went to see Paul Nitze and strongly urged him to

Tape #19 Side A

this time make a fight for the Deputy's job. He was reluctant to do so since he had never been willing to lift a finger in his own behalf, but finally did ~~π~~ go to McNamara and tell him that he could not ~~π~~ stay on as Secretary of the Navy if John McNoughton became Deputy, ~~κλσζηθι~~ After some additional wavering, McNamara finally selected Paul Nitze to be his Deputy, and turned out to be a very fruitful association. And Paul Nitze proved to be a very effective manager in a job which gave no time for the kind of thoughtful ~~π~~ and analytical work that he had been used to doing. He continued to serve as Deputy when Clark Clifford came aboard as Secretary of Defense, and finished out ~~κλσζηθι~~ the Lyndon Johnson administration in that job. I was in Saigon by the time he finished. He ~~π~~ sat down the day after and wrote me a long letter of his experiences in the job, (I need to try to find this letter.), which was reflective of the basic optimism and ebulliance that he brought to every job. Shifting back now to my own experience with Paul Nitze. He first ~~κλσζηθι~~ learned about me when he came to the National War College in 1961-62 to give a lecture. The Commandant of the National War College, ~~κλσζηθι~~ Lieutenant General Griswald of the U. S. Air Force nettled Paul Nitze somewhat by talking a great deal about the speech that I had given the day before as part of my annual research project, entitled "The Problem of Secession in the Soviet ~~π~~ Union." Nitze could not get Griswald to discuss with him how he ~~π~~ should handle the prospective discussions since Griswald only wanted to talk about how much he liked my speech. Finally Nitze asked again what my name was, and when he went back to the office, he ~~κλ~~ instructed his exec to see if

Tape #19 Side A

he couldn't <sup>arrange to</sup> ~~get me~~ into that office for duty when I completed my year. I arrived there in August of 1962 after having a great deal of difficulty in persuading my detailer that it was a good nomination. My detailer wanted me to go work on the Joint Staff instead. Soon after I arrived, Paul Nitze assigned me to the job of desk officer in charge of Spain, France and Portugal. Within a month I was able to do a piece of work that he considered extremely useful, and shortly thereafter he elevated me to the job of Director of Arms Control, ~~which~~ which had normally been equated at the three-star or GS-17 level. Although I was only a Navy Captain. In this position he used me not only to deal with problems of the Test Ban Treaty, ~~and~~ and all other arms control issues, but he also consulted with me about general foreign policy problems ~~and~~ crediting me with being an expert on the Soviet Union, which was probably a generous evaluation of my competence at that time. I continued to do a lot a papers for his personal use and saw a great deal of him during the ensuing year, which led to his decision to take me with him to be his Exec when he thought he was going to be the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and then when he did become the Secretary of the Navy. He is a man of brilliant intellect, far superior to any other with whom I have associated, including Kissinger, McNamara, and all the others. He has absolutely no personal hang-ups. He ~~doesn't~~ doesn't mind reversing his opinion when a better ~~is~~ argument for an alternative position can be given. He doesn't hesitate to have anything that he has written to be used by others, and he doesn't hesitate to adapt things that others have written to papers on which he ~~is~~ is working. More than any I have ~~a~~ ever

Tape #19 Side A

known is a sincere seeker of the truth, and he is willing to get there by a series of approximations using his own and others minds to generate these ~~gx~~ truths. He is deeply patriotic and has chosen to devote himself to public service whether in~~m~~ or out of the government, ever since coming to Washington as a young man in the early war-years. He does not enjoy small talk in the normal sense, however he will sit down and converse for intense periods with people of all levels of sophistication, age and background if they appear to have interesting experiences or insights from which he can learn. He has read all the great philosophers, and ~~m~~ can converse at length with them. He has become a ~~gm~~ great admirer of ~~km~~ the mind of Tsuchkin, the seventy year old intellectual on the Soviet SALT delegation, and has done some beautiful memoranda for the record of their conversations. He has ~~m~~ a very talented and charming wife, Phyllis, and four brilliant children, two boys and two girls, and a number of grandchildren to all of whom he is very devoted.

The next personality is Mr. Dean Rusk. I have done a couple of vignettes on incidents ~~wh~~ that took place when I observed him in the meeting of the Committee of Principles, that might be pulled in here. I first got to know about Mr. Dean Rusk when I lived in Chapel Hill North Carolina for two years, next to Dr. James R. Caldwell, a history professor who had been ~~m~~ the closest friend of Dean Rusk when they were together at Davidson College, and who told me about his very poverty stricken early life as the son of an itinerent Georgia preacher, and of how hard Dean Rusk had to work to get the financing to put himself through college. And how Dean Rusk would load his

Tape #19 Side A

old broken down jalopy up with buddies from college who were willing to share expenses x in order to get to and from college; and how they slept in the fields at night en route to and from college. Spec had an almost hero-worship of Dean Rusk for the quality of his mind and for his idealistic character. He judged him to be a man, like Paul Nitze, totally without hang-ups, a man x of simple m tastes and aspirations who had nevertheless because of the ability which had always been recognized by others been pushed along. ~~Rusk had given~~  
~~frankly to Rusk's~~

I came to know Mr. Rusk during the meetings of the Committee of Principles and to hear about him from Paul Nitze who sat in many other meetings with him. Subsequent to the completion of his service as Secretary of State, I have had meetings with Dean Rusk and have exchanged correspondence on one occasion. Based on the sum total of my contact with him, I conclude that Dr. Caldwell is right that he is a man of great character and integrity, and simple tastes, and a man of remarkable ability. I believe that he will have a much better position in history than he has been given in the media after it becomes known to extent to which he followed the dictates he set down for himself as Secretary of State, namely that his job was to advise the President, privately, not making a record for himself, and then when the President with the benefit of that advice had made his first partial or final decisions, to work within the councils of government to get that supported by a consensus. He was a x man who did not seek to make a record for himself, but rather to be the best possible adviser to the President and carrier out of the President's

Tape #19 Side A

policies and he proved that role under both Kennedy and Johnson. From discussions I have had over the years, I believe that he was more highly admired by Mr. Johnson, than he was by Mr. Kennedy. But he is a man who has earned the respect of almost all who have had the chance to truly get to know him.

The next personality is Robert McNamara. My first experience with Mr. McNamara came when I was working for Paul Nitze at the time that Paul was ~~the~~ the Assistant Secretary of Defense. During the Cuban missile crisis, when it came time to ~~send~~ send the initial orders to the fleet through the JCS as to what ships were to be intercepted and in what sequence, Mr. McNamara was in~~the~~ discussion with Paul Nitze and together they sent for me. ~~When~~ When I walked in and having been caught in mid-corridor, did so without a pen, pencil or a ~~piece~~ piece of paper. Mr. McNamara began to rattle off a series of orders to go out. These involved seven or ~~six~~ eight different steps. Finding myself in this dilemma I elected to memorize key ~~words~~ words from each phrase to insure that I did not forget. When he got up about number six, Mr. McNamara perceived that I was not taking notes. In a fit of irritation, he picked up a pencil and paper tossed them at me. I was sufficiently infuriated by this that I did not use them. When he completed his list I left the office proceeded to mine and dictated the required order, and carried it in to Paul Nitze to initial before it was to go back to Mr. McNamara. Paul Nitze studied it thoughtfully for about 5 minutes, and then said Bud, I believe you have gotten everything in , and that is very fortunate, let me report to you that after you left his office Mr. McNamara said, if he misses anything, fire him.

Tape #19 Side A

My next experience with Mr. McNamara came when Castro cut off the water at the Guantanamo Naval Base. I was tasked by him to lead a group ~~gm~~ to go down to Guantanamo and come back with recommendations as to what should be done. The JCS on learning of this insisted that there should be a more senior military officer representing them, and Rear Admiral Chou was so designated. Mr. McNamara countered ~~xx~~ by designating Paul Nitze, the Secretary of the Navy, to be the titular head of the team, and I as his Executive, therefore had the necessary authority, although Admiral Chou was along. We had orders to leave on a Friday evening and to be back Monday morning with our written report. We flew most of the night-worked all day Saturday interrogating a wide spectrum of people, at Guantanamo, made up detailed notes Saturday night-flew back Sunday writing the report en route. We handed the report to the typists on arrival Sunday night and went off to get our first sleep before meeting with Mr. McNamara Monday morning. My report was required to deal with the problem of how to solve the ~~x~~ water shortage, near term and long term, and how to make Guantanamo more self-sufficient and hopefully how to retaliate a bit against Castro. The water part was easy, we recommended that Navy barges bring the water in initially and that a desalinization plant be established as rapidly as possible, and both of these were put into effect. The problem of how to ~~■~~ become otherwise self-sufficient and also to show some modest retaliation, was a little tougher, but we hit upon the following ~~■~~ scheme. Out of about the 2,000 Cubans who were under the employe of the base at that time, there were about 300 who had been hired since Castro came

Tape # 19 Side A

to power and the base felt that unquestionably a large fraction of these were agents. We therefore suggested that they who had very little seniority anyway be let go, and this would cut off some flow of income to the surrounding countryside, and be a measure of retaliation. We then categorized all other personnel in the, who worked on the base but lived on the outside in several categories. Those who had three to ten years of service for example, those who had more than ten years of service. And then in a separate category, some 200 maids who earned about \$20 a month, and who were highly beloved by the individual families in which they served. When he went over the report, Mr. McNamara bought my recommendation on the firing of the 300, but directed also that in addition the maids be fired. I strongly protested pointing out that these maids were, in many cases, were the only source of income to their families, that Castro was only getting \$4,000 a month into his economy from them, and that this would be a hardship on the Naval personnel who probably would never again be able to afford maids, and who on this tour in Guantanamo could have that benefit. Mr. McNamara insisted they be fired. When we left his office, I turned to Paul Nitze and said I simply cannot understand that man, how he can be so ruthless as to fire those maids. Paul Nitze looked at me and smiled, and said, But you don't understand, he's got orders from the President to get rid of at least 500. This was the first lesson to me of the extent to which Mr. McNamara, like Dean Rusk, believed that his job was to take the lumps for his Commander in Chief, just as a military man is inclined to do, and I developed a new respect for him and began to study

Tape #19 Side A

him more carefully. As I saw more of him, ~~through~~ through my association with Paul Nitze, I came to recognize that he was a man ~~of~~ who was by nature warm and sentimental and who was a liberal in the finest sense, but who ~~is~~ had a tough hard job to do and who tended to isolate himself from personal ~~relationships~~ relationships as much as possible in order to make it easier for him to do the hard and tough things that he had to do. He was impatient with those who were slower with him, he did insist on rapid decision - making ~~in~~ ~~relationships~~ sometimes therefore without sufficient analysis and thought he had a tendency to close off the dialogue before there had been a full adversary exchange, but he did not exclude from his consideration differing views, I have to report an episode that happened during the six weeks racial unrest/Hicks Committee era. Mr. McNamara who was by then President of the World Bank, called me to say, Bud I know ~~is~~ you're having a lot of difficulties right now, and I wanted to say to ~~is~~ you that if it will be useful to you, you can quote me publicly as having said to you that I not only strongly support the changes you have made to integrate the Navy, but I ~~personally~~ personally regret that I didn't get more done along ~~those~~ those lines while I was Secretary of Defense. I did not use this information at the time, because I treasured the offer so much, I preferred to report on it in a more thoughtful manner after the fact.

The next personality is McGeorge Bundy. I don't have a lot to report about him, he was one of two brothers both of whom served in the Kennedy-Johnson administration. Mac Bundy became the Special Assistant for National Securities Council Affairs to President Kennedy,

Tape #19 Side A

and stayed on after his assassination. He played a much more open and honest role in that job than did Henry Kissinger. Although he clearly was the last pair of lips ~~whisper~~ whispering in the President's ear, nevertheless he encouraged full and open <sup>discussion</sup> ~~discussion~~ and debate and I never saw any evidence in the many meetings I was sat in on with him nor heard any evidence in listening to others who worked with him that he sought to tailor the nature of the advice in the manner in which Henry Kissinger has done. He was in those days a somewhat egotistical man who had much to be egotistical about in terms of intellectual equipment. Very soft spoken, careful. His crowning achievement was probably the way in which he kept the Executive Committee of the NSC working in such good tandem during the Cuban missile crisis. He has come in for considerable criticism by the liberal group from which he sprang, for his part in the decision to commit large numbers of troops to the war in Southeast Asia. And this is a matter that causes him some appreciable amount of personal concern. On ~~leaving~~ leaving ~~the~~ the administration, he became President of the Ford Foundation where he has sought ~~to~~ to do what he could to bind up ~~the~~ the wounds of the Southeast Asia War. For example, he is one of two who approached me ~~near~~ toward ~~the~~ the end of my tenure to require as to whether I would be willing to do a study on the question of amnesty, and the question of veterans problems emanating from the Southeast Asia ~~war~~ War, his theory being that one could best bind up the wounds by dealing with both sets of problems in ~~a~~ a single study. Parenthetically, although I agreed to do ~~this~~ this study and although it was supported by two of his most influential members of his board, Mr.

Tape #19 Side A

Erwin Miller and Mr. Bob McNamara, all the other members opposed it as too controversial.

The next personality is Mr. Bill Bundy. Mr. Bill Bundy was the general Deputy to Paul Nitze when I came to ISA. He had been a career public servant at CIA before that. He, like his brother, was highly educated, a member of the Eastern establishment, very much an intellectual. I judged him to be less of a prime mover than ~~Mr~~ Mac Bundy, and more inclined to keep in touch with everybody on the government to find ~~me~~ out what they were thinking before he decided what he was thinking. Nevertheless, I give him above average marks as a public servant, although I ~~do~~ think he, like his brother, erred in advocating the commitment of large ground forces to Southeast Asia. Paul Nitze and I were on the other side advocating that our help should..

(end Side A.)

Tape #19 Side B

Paul Nitze and I were on the other side advocating to Mr. McNamara that ground forces ~~we~~ should not be committed, and entire assistance to South Vietnam should be limited to advisory support plus ~~we~~ air and sea support. After he had completed his experience in ISA, Bill Bundy became. . . After Paul Nitze became Secretary of the Navy, Bill Bundy moved up to become the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and then later was drafted by Dean Rusk to be the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, during the last critical Southeast Asia years of the Johnson administration. So he was heavily involved in the ~~the~~ gradual escalation and activity in Southeast Asia, and I think has to get bad-marked for that.

Gerald Ford is the next personality. My experience with Gerald Ford began when I assumed the job of Chief of Naval Operations. I sought out the leadership of the House and Senate each year to brief them in two separate groups on the declining maritime capability of the U. S. Each year, Jerry Ford was ~~was~~ sure to be there, and asked good and thoughtful questions, and invariably offered to provide what support he could in obtaining the President's budgets. \* On several occasions during the 4 years when there were critical votes, I called him and he always committed himself to get into the thick of action at those ~~the~~ times. I found him open, straightforward, thoughtful, and intelligent. When I had been approached by the Ford ~~the~~ Foundation to ask whether ~~was~~ or not I could, I would consider running the amnesty/veterans study, I suggested that when I called on Mr. Ford next, who was by that time the Vice President, that I would sound him out about the amnesty question to get his views as to any political considerations in connection with doing the ~~the~~ study. Early in June I saw

Tape #19 \* Side B

him and outlined the nature of the subject, and asked for his appraisal. He paused a moment and then said, I believe the study should be done, but I think it will be at least 5 years before the Congress will be willing to deal with this matter, or indeed before the people will be ready to consider amnesty. I therefore consider it an act of courage and political far-sightedness on his part that only two months later, shortly after assuming the Presidency, he spoke up in favor of amnesty. Mr. Ford has been meticulous with regard to his personal conduct throughout his public life, survived the greatest scrutiny any public figure has ever been given during the hearings for his confirmation as Vice President. As a result, he is an uncommonly poor man for one who has served in Congress so long, and began to get indications of support for a government provided house when he became Vice President. Soon after he was Vice President, Mr. John Warner, the unctious Secretary of the Navy, urged upon Mr. Ford, without letting anyone else in the Navy know about it, that he <sup>d take</sup> ~~take~~ the House in which I was living the traditional CNO House, which had had such distinguished inhabitants as Leahy Nimitz, King, & Burke, away from the Navy. Encouraged by the fact that the Secretary of the Navy supported it, and I think not knowing at the time that the MCNO would oppose it, Mr. Ford arranged to have a bill introduced simultaneously by the most important figures in the House and the Senate, proposing to take the CNO's House from him. As soon as this was public knowledge, when it came to my attention I took the soundings that confirmed that John Warner had volunteered it. I thereupon ~~for that~~ telephoned Mr. John Marsh in the Vice President's of-

Tape #19 Side B

vice, a friend, and asked him to inform Mr. Ford that I would have to vigorously oppose the loss of the House. Mr. Marsh did ~~it~~ so and came to see me a week or so later, stating that he was convinced that the Vice President wanted the House, he was convinced that the Vice President would not say so publicly ~~that~~ while the issue was being debated by the Congress, and that the Vice President fully understood that I would have to oppose the loss of the House to the Navy. The Senate passed a version that called for the House permanently to become the home of the Vice President. And for the staffing support to be provided by ~~the~~ the Navy. The House passed a version that called for the House to be temporarily the home of the Vice President and for the staffing support to be provided by GSA. At this point in early June I went to see the Vice President and suggested ~~that~~ a compromise in which the Navy provided the staffing support, but the House be statutorily described as a temporary home ~~is~~ for the Vice President. Mr. Ford readily agreed to this compromise, and ~~it~~ that was the form in which the bill finally became law. The interesting point to all ~~that~~ this is that Mr. Ford was open and straightforward with me, and I with him during ~~that~~ this adversary exchange. Had I been dealing with the President, Kissinger or Haig on a similar issue there would have been threats, nasty calls to my superiors and all kinds of paranoid expressions. On the occasion of my retirement ceremony, as we ~~had~~ began to plan for it, I concluded that I would not want to invite the President to be there, (at that time I did not know he would be in Moscow) and therefore telephoned Mr. Marsh to invite the Vice President to be there. He readily agreed to do

Tape #19 Side B

so. By the time the day approached, I was in the dog house so deeply ~~with~~ with the White House that Secretary Schlesinger~~w~~ was directed not to speak at the ceremony, and further was directed not to award the Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Distinguished Service Medal which had already been approved by him for awarding to me at that ceremony. I am not certain of the exchange, but ~~know~~ it is my belief that Mr. Ford involved himself in these matters. Late in the afternoon of Friday the 29th of June, Secretary Schlesinger called Moscow and informed the telephone service to tell General Haig that unless he, Schlesinger, received word to the ~~contrary~~ contrary that evening he was going to go forward with the Medal at the Ceremony the next day. No veto was forthcoming, and the Medal was presented. Indeed, Secretary Schlesinger also, although, not on the schedule, got up and said a few words. Mr. Ford gave a very ~~at~~ laudatory speech which I considered an act of some courage given his knowledge that the White House did not want me in any way to be praised.

The next personality is Mr. George Ball. Mr. George Ball was the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs while I was working for Paul Nitze in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, under the Kennedy-Johnson administration. He was a very able foreign policy man, although I would not put him nearly in the league with Dean Rusk or Paul Nitze, but nevertheless very capable. He did not seem to stick to channels as carefully as he might have, and was in frequent ~~long~~ touch with the Presidents, sometimes without the knowledge of Mr. Rusk. He seemed to me a generally open and thoughtful advocate, and I give him very respectable marks. X

The next personality is Mr. Tom Gates. Tom Gates came to the

Tape #19 Side B

Eisenhower administration initially as an Under Secretary of the Navy. By the time I came to the office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Tom Gates was Secretary of the Navy. I was in his office to give a briefing on Naval personnel matters, soon after I came to the Pentagon. I found him to be an extremely charismatic and inspirational leader who asked very good questions and brought out the best in all of us, and who had the courage to dig into controversial areas. He made it clear to me soon after I came into the office that he considered the Navy's personnel policies to be Neanderthal with regard to officer promotion. In the course of one briefing he made a ~~statement~~ statement which was so significant to the Navy's long-term future that I wrote it down and had it framed and distributed to a number of cognizant ~~off~~ offices. This ~~xxx~~ statement was "It is completely inconceivable to me that the Navy can maintain a viable officer's corps when Commanders are ~~not~~ not selected until their 16th year, and Captains their 21st year of commissioned service." This philosophy made it possible ultimately to get through the reactionary senior circles of the Navy, the "hump" legislation which provided severance pay in addition to retirement pay to a significant number of Captains and ~~xxx~~ Commanders in order to have them retire early, so that promotions of the more junior officers could begin to be speeded up and the Navy could retain high quality people. On the evening of the day I first met Mr. Gates in his office I was standing on ~~xx~~ the steps of the Pentagon waiting for my wife to pick me up, when he came out. As he walked by he said, good evening Bud, and I reported to my wife as I got into the car that I felt 8' tall because after

Tape #19 Side B

only a brief experience, he not only remembered me but had remembered my first name. He had the touch and the ability to make all who were subordinate to him, love him. On another occasion, we, I was in his office briefing him in response to his question as to why in a particular selection year a larger percentage of Naval Academy graduates had been selected ~~than~~ than the percentage of former reserve ~~or~~ or Non-Naval Academy officers. I had gone through all the ~~my~~ records very carefully and had discovered that there were, in that particular year group, significant qualitative differences, although this was not true of other year groups. And I reported this fact to Mr. Gates. He took sudden offense at it, flared up and said, "Goddamit, ~~xxxxxx~~ I was a member of that year group when I was in the Navy, are you trying to tell me that I wasn't as good quality as the Naval Academy graduates?" I looked at him ~~with~~ with a twinkle and said No sir, you undoubtedly would have been one of those selected had you stayed in. My remark touched him in just the right way, and he laughed and forgot the point. Such was his style. Mr. Gates lost a son in a tragic fire during his tenure as Secretary of the Navy, and never completely got over. He took to drinking rather heavily, and has continued it ever since, although has nonetheless continued to provide outstanding public service. When Mr. Gates announced that he was leaving the Eisenhower administration to return to Morgan Stanley as Secretary of the Navy, those of us who knew him well were heartbroken. Suddenly one day the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Donald Quarrells, tragically died of a ~~xxxxxx~~ heart attack, within moments, and almost instantaneously

Tape #19 Side B

around the Navy Department, scores of officers sprang to work to try to get the thought across that Mr. Gates would be the ideal Deputy Secretary of Defense. ~~We~~ ~~called~~ called the press, members of Congress, and key people within the ~~the~~ White House, I ~~never~~ never knew how much impact this little ~~had~~ had, but Mr. Gates was subsequently prevailed upon by Eisenhower, to stay and to move up into that position and finally succeeded to the top slot and became one of our most outstanding Secretaries of Defense. Included among his achievements there was his decision to solve the age-old dispute between the Navy and the Air Force as to how strategic missiles were going to be controlled by favoring neither school of thought, but ~~the~~ setting up instead a Joint Strategic Targeting Staff co-located with ~~the~~ the Strategic Air Command at Omaha which has ~~been~~ very successfully, although not perfectly over the years, bridged the interface between Navy and Air Force strategic weaponry. Mr. Gates was deeply patriotic, hard-working, he ~~had~~ had superb judgement of people and of ~~the~~ complex defense issues. He handled his relationships on the Hill beautifully, and I know of no one who left Washington more beloved than he did. Many of us urged him, when he left the Eisenhower administration to consider running for the Presidency, by way of the governorship of New York, I am myself confident that he could have had the governorship when Scranton got it, and would have ~~been~~ been a very tough Presidential candidate. However, he wanted no part of politics, and adamantly refused to consider running. In his years since he left government service, Mr. Gates has continued to maintain a strong interest in all those of us whom he knew, and

Tape #19 Side B

has been helpfult to us our careers, and more importantly to defense issues whenever called upon.

The ~~next~~ personality is Mr. George Mahon. Congressman Mahon is Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. He ~~has~~ has become a ~~big~~ legend in the Congress after many years of dedicated public service, and is immensely popular. I found him however to be least impressive of the four Chairman of the Committee ~~with~~ with whom I had to deal after Senator Ellender passed away and Senator McClelland took over the Senate Appropriations Committee. I believe the reason ~~for~~ for this is that George Mahon has begun to suffer the infirmities of age and lacks the ~~stamina~~ stamina to get on top of the issues any more himself. He has acquired a staff which I ~~consider~~ consider to be not only the least competent of the 4 key Committee staffs, Armed Services Committees and Appropriations Committees. But also to be the most vindictive in its approach. For example it was ~~in~~ the staff of this Committee that ~~persuaded~~ persuaded Congressman George Mahon to make punitive cuts in the Center for Naval ~~Analysis~~ Analysis because the Center for Naval Analysis had refused for some time to fire a man who marched in a demnstration. Subsequently the man was let go as part of a reduction in force, but the point which the University of Rochester, ~~which~~ which manages the Center for Naval Analysis, and the Center wanted to establish, was that right of ~~the~~ dissent should not be infringed upon. ~~Without~~ Without being willing to admit that this ~~was~~ was the reason in any public, the staff punitively cut the Center for Naval Analysis. Similarly in response to recommendations from Admiral Rickover, this staff cut back on the personnel in several services which were involved in race relations and human relations efforts. ~~There~~

Tape #19 Side B

These were the most important structures we had at a time when the services were having to take people from a race-torn and troubled society and convert them into useful military personnel. But these very chauvinistic members of the Mahon staff were not able to understand the need. George Mahon is a man of charm and graciousness but just simply seems to lack the span of attention ~~in~~ anymore to focus on the details himself, and merely buys the recommendation of the relatively incompetent staff.

The next personality is Mr. Bill Anderson, ~~newspaper~~ newsman and now columnist on the Chicago Tribune. I first knew Mr. Anderson when I was Executive Assistant to Paul Nitze. He became an ardent admirer of Paul Nitze, both for his intellectual capability and for the ~~the~~ way in which he was selling Navy ~~programs~~ programs at a time when the Navy was not the most favored service. After I came to the office of Chief of Naval Operations, Bill ~~Anderson~~ kept himself informed of the changes I was initiating, and ~~when~~ when the ~~controversy~~ controversy got toughest, was almost intuitive in the way in which he produced columns which were useful and supportive. He is astute enough to see through old guard who have made strenuous efforts to get ~~to~~ him, (see for example my memorandum concerning George Anderson's approach to him.)

Next is John Milliken, a member of ~~the~~ Time Magazine. John Milliken was the man who covered the Pentagon for Time Magazine during the first 2½ to 3 years of my tour. He was the one recommended that Time do a cover story on me, he having gotten interested in me as a result of knowing me when I was command of the Naval Forces in Vietnam, and having decided he liked what I was up to as CNO.

Tape #19 Side B

His cover story came in for considerable attention ~~xxxxxx~~ around the country. ~~xx~~ Later, when the famous, when the infamous six weeks set in, John Miliken did some of the best reporting around town of the~~xx~~ true circumstances. Because he knew so many people around the building, he had no difficulty picking up the fact that Admiral Kidd was working with Admiral George Anderson, ~~xx~~ in an effort to un-horse me. And he was one of those who informed me that George Anderson was speaking as a White House source, and ~~xxx~~ that my days were numbered. I think that his article putting the efforts of this old-guard into focus, was one of the most helpful factors in my survival during that struggle.

The next personality is Mr. Joe Alsop. Joe Alsop is one of the most egotistical, absolutely vain individuals I have ever known. He is quite well read, and considers himself an intellectual's intellectual. He has always made it a practice to be on very good terms with Henry Kissinger and Al Haig, and ~~xxxxxx~~ has been one of the primary sources of pro-Haig and pro-Kissinger stories. I knew him because he had been a ~~x~~ friend of Paul Nitze's for many~~x~~ years, back when I was Executive Assistant to Paul Nitze. He contacted me on several occasions during my period as CNO; I always leveled with him to the extent that I could, and he was supportive of the Navy in his columns and believed as deeply as I did in the fact that the maritime ~~x~~ balance was turning ~~again~~ against us. Joe has a habit of tilting in favor of those who are talking to him, and the most interesting column of his that I ever read was the day that both Schlesinger and Kissinger had given him a version of the rift between them, whereupon Joe had

Tape #19 Side B

to write a column that favored both, by giving Henry the right of it in the near-term and to Jim Schlesinger the right of it in the ~~long~~ long-term.

The next personality is Scottie Reston. I knew Scottie Reston again through his friendship with Paul Nitze, his being a 20-year long next ~~door~~ door neighbor of Paul Nitze, whom he liked and respected. I didn't see ~~him~~ nearly as much of Scottie during my tenure as I did Joe Alsop, but again was always able to be completely candid with him and found him generally favorably inclined toward the job I was doing, though not always willing to support the Navy case.

The next personality is Mr. Joe Faller. The former Secretary of Treasury ~~is~~ under Lyndon Johnson. I got to know Mr. Faller through my work as Executive Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. When the Navy had a sudden crash requirement to get small-craft into the coastal patrol off South Vietnam in 1965, I called upon Joe Faller to give us some assistance in acquiring Coast Guard boats. We had a meeting on this and also on an ~~is~~ issue involving turning over Navy ice-breakers to the Coast Guard. This required ~~some~~ ~~some~~ considerable bridging of the normal bureaucracy. I found him to be a delightfully logical and ~~simple~~ sophisticated but ~~down~~ down to earth type who's long of common sense, and who was obviously a dedicated patriot and ~~is~~ public servant.

The Next personality is Mr. Ray Cline. Ray Cline was a career public servant who worked for CIA when I was working with Paul Nitze in ISA and Secretary of the Navy. I got to know him there as a superb intelligence analyst. When I became Chief of Naval Operations he was

Tape #19 Side B

head of the State Department's Intelligence Research Bureau, and where he was doing an equally superb job. When his intelligence judgment. . . (end Side B).