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This is Cline continued. There came a time when Ray Cline's intelligence analyses did not agree with what Henry Kissinger wanted these estimates to be. That is he was looking for intelligence judgements to support his preconceptions and his policy objectives. ~~Ray~~ Rather than permitting the intelligence experts to give their very best analysis. And he began to be increasingly rough in his dealings with Cline. Cline refused to accept Henry's desires to have intelligence tweaked to support Henry's ~~at~~ policies. He also refused to put up with Henry's tyranny, and left the State Department after writing a beautiful letter of resignation, he is now working with the Georgetown Institute of Strategic Studies. He is one of the top intelligence analysts and criminologists in Washington. And again a man o f character and integrity.

The next personality is Mr. Richard Helms. Dick Helms was a long time CIA public servant who was picked to succeed, I think Mr. McCoen. And who initially was in ~~great~~ great favor with the President and Henry Kissinger. He has always seemed to me to be one who strove very hard to make intelligent responses to the requirements of the policy level, but I worried on some occasions he tried a little ~~bit~~ bit too hard to make his conclusions, his professional conclusions, supportive of the prejudices of Nixon and Kissinger. In any event he demonstrated administrative courage in refusing to let Haldeman and Erlichman prostitute CIA during Watergate, and was for that reason ~~they~~ I am sure they brought off his removal by making him the Ambassador to Iran. Dick Helms seeks to avoid controversy, and to maintain cordial terms with all hands. He is a highly competent

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in the intelligence ~~from~~ ~~the~~ field.

Mr. Bill Colby. Bill Colby was the second career CIA servant to become Director of CIA. He did so when Schlesinger was brought to Defense, and Richardson moved to the Attorney Generalship. I first knew Bill Colby when he ran the ~~the~~ Cords Operations in South Vietnam. He was a quiet~~m~~, unassuming, very bright and capable, individual who was a good manager in the Cords Operations. This was the Operation that served as the interface between ~~the~~ General Abrams military command, and the U. S. Embassy with regard to civic action programs, ~~and~~ with ~~regard~~ regard to dealing with Viet Cong agents in the viallages and towns. He had the very controversial Phoenix program, which has had some criticism for being too accessive in the ~~many~~ way in which agents were eliminated. I never saw any evidence myself that Bill Colby was doing anything except taking a lofty ~~approach~~ approach to the problem of identifying Viet Cong and picking them up. And do not believe that he encouraged in any~~w~~ way the so-called assassinations. After Bob Comer who was the Ambassador on the McVey staff left the country, Bill Colbey was General Abrams and Ambassador Bunker's mutual choice to move up and to take that job. He was~~m~~ extremely popular with all the military, because he was able to understand our problems and cooperate fully with us, and won our total cooperation and loyalty.~~m~~ When he became the Director of CIA his same attitude of openness, candor, professionalism, good management, and meticulous attention to his homework seemed to me to take further than Helms or Schlesinger had been able totake the elimination of problems at the interface between CIA and the Pentagon. I give

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~~XXX~~ him very high marks for his Directorship of CIA.

Dr. Arthur Burns. As head of the Federal Reserve Board, Dr. Arthur Burns has been around Washington for a number of years. I'm not competent to judge how good an economist he is, but he does ~~RE~~ come across as a very open, candid and honest man, of administrative courage. I talked to him at one time about my concern for the maritime balance, and after I had given him the facts, he expressed equal concern. He told me, (this was before the President got mired down in Watergate), that he had always found that the President was a good reader and that he, Burns, ~~f~~ had found that when he ~~w~~ couldn't ~~f~~ get papers into the President, through the Haldeman screen, if he gave them to Rosemary Woods they would get to the President. On one or two ~~x~~ occasions we used this route and also ~~x~~ on several occasions had Admiral Means Johnston brief Rosemary Woods on critical matters. She always agreed to see that this information ~~g~~ got to the President. But we ~~RE~~ never got any report back. Dr. Burns is quiet and scholarly, but can be articulate on the subject of his expertise.

This ends the series of Vinettes on personalities. The next paper should be entitled "Summons (First Half-This replaces the destroyed on my being called back to the CNO job.)"

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"Summons, (First Half - This replaces the destroyed tape on my being called back to the CNO job.)"

In May of 1970, I was having breakfast in my headquarters-home at Saigon, when a messenger came over from the communications office. I was in the presence of the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Vice Admiral Red ~~Kinn~~^{Baum}berger, and members of my own staff. The messenger stated that a telephone call had come in from the Secretary of the Navy, the honorable John Chafee. Red Baumberger turned to me and said, "Bud, my guess would be that that is your summons to the top job in the Navy." I offered to wager that it would not be the case, and walked across to the headquarters to the communications office. Mr. Chafee calling at night from Washington to bridge the 12 hour difference in time zones, instructed me that I was to get on the next commercial airplane and return immediately to Washington without telling anybody I was leaving. I pointed out to him that it was simply not feasible for a military commander to leave a wartime theater, without checking out with the theater commander, General Abrams, or the Navy high command, that is Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. I further pointed out that since the Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet had been with me when his message had been delivered, I would have to give him some information as to what the call was all about. Mr. Chafee agreed that I should tell these two and no others. Having informed Admiral Baumberger I drove out to see General Abrams at his headquarters. I told him about the telephone call, and surmised that it would be to inform me as to my next assignment. I had been only 20 months in South Vietnam and

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had expected to stay for, ~~at~~ until the summer of 1971. And was very interested in doing so since I had become intensely dedicated to the success of the Vietnamization program for the Navy, and wanted to see it through ~~it~~ until its final phase was well along. I therefore said to General Abrams, that I would like to be able to quote him as desiring to see me stay on until the summer of 1971. General Abrams thought for a minute and then said, sure, Bud, you can tell them that but first listen to what it is they have to say, you never know when those civilian fellows are in trouble and might need, might find that you're the only man who can do a certain job for them. I agreed that that was good advice, and went off to catch the airplane. My instructions ~~from~~ ^{from} John Chafee had been that I would be met at Dulles airport by a chauffeur, and ~~be~~ driven directly to the home of the Under Secretary of the Navy, John Warner. Where I was to remain incommunicado until Mr. Chafee contacted me. Somewhat mystified by this procedure I flew home by commercial air in civilian clothes, accompanied by another young man in civilian clothes, Lieutenant JG Mel Stephens a wartime riverine commander who had earned the purple heart and the silver star ~~through~~ through his courageous actions while in command of riverine forces. We were met as instructed at Dulles airport and driven to John Warner's home. He met me there and merely reaffirmed John Chafee's instructions that I was to remain incommunicado until Governor Chafee showed up later in the day. Lieutenant Stephens was to be housed at the Marriott Hotel but with similar orders. I sat down to read. ~~About two hours, Governor Chafee showed up, he said to me, you are to see the President in the Senate-~~

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In about two hours, Governor Chafee showed up, and said to me, Bud, you are the one whom Mel Laird and I have nominated to the President, to be Tom Moorer's relief as Chief of Naval Operations, when the President announces that Tom Moorer will relieve General Wheeler as the ~~next~~ next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. This transition will take place next 1 July. He went on to say that I was the ~~one~~ candidate they had settled upon after John Chafee had gone through the interview with me in April, and learned ~~that~~ what my thoughts were about what ~~we~~ was required for the Navy in the future. He said that both ~~a~~ he and Mel Laird had liked my plan for changing the personnel administration of the Navy in order to improve the conditions of life, and in order to accelerate the rate of integration. He stated that they were having a man ~~a~~ in the job who understood the high priority needed in Vietnamization, and who supported the concept. He added that they were also interested in me because of my views on the way to go about modernizing the Navy's ships and aircraft. Finally he said that their desire was to depart from the tradition of the last 3 CNO's as aviators, and to get a non-aviator as CNO, and that they had consciously sought to get someone who was much younger than the norm in order to help bring the Navy into the modern age. He was frank to say that Tom Moorer had preferred Admiral Chick Clarey as his first choice. Chick Clarey was then his Vice Chief of Naval Operations, he was a distinguished Naval officer from the submarine specialty who had been Tom Moorer's deputy as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and who when Tom Moorer had become Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, had commanded under Tom Moorer the Second Fleet, and

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who then finally had been brought to Washington and promoted to the #2 four-star position. He said that Tom Moorer's second choice had been Bush Bringle who was a distinguished Naval aviator, and a long time associate of Tom Moorer's and who was out of the class of '37 of the Naval Academy. (Admiral Clarey had been a member of the class of '34). He stated that Admiral Moorer had put me #3 on his list, but had felt that I was too young to be accepted by the rank and file of the Navy of that time, and I had appreciably less experience than the other two. He strongly urged that I be saved for the top slot until 4 years later. Governor Chafee stated that nevertheless, he and Mel Laird had decided to overrule Admiral Moorer, and asked me whether I would take the job. I said that I agreed with Tom Moorer that the others were more experienced and would have more support on taking over than I would have. I stated that I would have preferred to wait another 4 years, and in that event would have looked forward to completing the Vietnamization ~~process~~ process in Vietnam, and to ^{the} command of a numbered fleet ~~in~~ during the interim. I said that I also deeply believed the need for the changes that I had discussed and would not refuse to take the job if ordered. Governor Chafee indicated that that was his intention, and that I would meet with the President in the Pentagon, privately on Wednesday, and that day or the next the announcement would be made. The point that needs to be made here is that there were a large number eminently acceptable alternative choices to be the Chief of Naval Operations. Civilian authority, as is its right and ~~prerogative~~ prerogative, had interviewed many of us and had learned from each of us what our programs would be. The Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of Defense,

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had decided that among these alternatives they liked my programs. Whether or not they were right can be argued, but it should not be argued that I had pulled the wool over anybody's eyes. I was the alternative chosen and the programs I had ~~said~~ said I would initiate, I ~~proceeded~~ proceeded to initiate. The nature of these dramatic changes demonstrates the way in which civilian authority can have its maximum impact by picking manager dedicated to the policies they have in mind. Mr. Chafee told me that he and John Warner had agreed that I should remain in John Warner's home until the announcement was made public, and that at that point, they and Admiral Moorer had agreed that to symbolize the transition, and to indicate Admiral Moorer's support of the selection, I should then move to Admiral Moorer's home for the rest of my stay in Washington. I agreed with this plan. Governor Chafee left and I spent another day in the Warner home where his very shy, but very hospitable wife did her best to keep me from feeling a prisoner. The . . . I had told Mr. Chafee that and Mr. Warner that it was my intention 15 minutes before the news ~~announcement~~ announcement which would be made at 11:00 on Wednesday, to telephone my 78 year old father and break the news to him before he heard it on the radio. I had always been very close to my father; he was a general practitioner in the field of medicine, in Tulare, California, from the time of completion of his service in World War II, to the time he retired there at the age of 70, he was a highly beloved individual by friends, family and patients. Having retired at the age of 70, he promptly came down with a stomach ulcer, which diagnosed as being the result of the frustrations of inactivity. Shortly thereafter I learned of the fact that the Naval Ordinance

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Test Station in China Lake had been looking for a retired civilian medico to head its industrial medicine department, for two years. I put them in touch with Dad, and within two weeks he was at work there. He remained there almost until his death at the age of 81. John Warner and John Chaffee had ~~agreed~~ agreed that it was proper for me to jump the gun by 15 minutes to let my father know. Wednesday came, I was picked up again by John Warner's chauffeur, and driven to the basement of the Pentagon, where I was spirited up the Secretary of Defense's elevator to his private office. I waited there a few moments in conversation with the Executive Assistant to Mel Laird, Brigadier General Bob Persley, an old friend. Bob Persley had been selected from the Air Force to serve as Air Force officer on duty in the Systems Analysis Division of the office of the Secretary of Defense, when Dr. Intoven was the head of that organization. He was a Rhodes scholar, with a brilliant record and an equally brilliant mind. He served as any military man should, his civilian boss with loyalty and integrity, and was subsequently recognized by Mr. McNamara as the ideal military officer to be his Executive Assistant. He stayed on under the tenure of Mr. Clifford and Mr. Laird had kept him on. Because he ~~was~~ had continued under these gentlemen the practice of total support of their policies and loyalty to them, he had come under severe criticism for advice that was in conflict with his military chief and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. I believe that the ill-favor into which he ~~fell~~ fell with these gentlemen was not merited and that his subsequent decision to retire after having been promoted to 3-stars as Commander to U. S. Forces-Japan, was based on his belief that the Air Force did not intend to make a future to him. This was

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a great loss to the Pentagon. In any event, General Persley congratulated me on my prospective appointment, and gave his view that Mel Laird had been a key factor in the decision to nominate me to be the Chief of Naval Operations. After a few moments, I was summoned to enter the office of the Secretary of Defense, where Mel Laird introduced me to the President.

I will shift now to the next paper which should be entitled: "After the announcement of my promotion."

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"After the Announcement of My Promotion"

I shifted to the quarters of Admiral Moorer as scheduled, and the calls began to flood as soon as ~~xxx~~ the news was well-promulgated. The next morning I called my boss General Abrams, out in Saigon, to let him know the date of my return. In his usual comic fashion ~~and~~ he said O.K., and did not congratulate me on the appointment. I was quite surprised and a little hurt but did not comment on it. The next day I received the following very thoughtful message from him ~~xxx~~ which I shall always cherish:

At the time of the announcement, Admiral Moorer was out of town, when he returned we had a meeting to which he confirmed what John Chafee ~~had~~ had told me namely, that he would have preferred to see me wait 4 more years, and that he thought it was ashame to use up my Naval Service so rapidly by making me Chief of Naval ~~Operations~~ Operations at the age of 49. Nevertheless he expressed himself as over the decision that ~~he~~ [?] made to a total support of it, and offered to make himself available in any way to help me with the transition. Subsequent events gave us the opportunity only for one good talk

the fact that he was in the same building and that I was seeing him ~~xxx~~ three times a week in JCS meetings, we never had the opportunity for continuity.

The next paper should be entitled "Zumwalt's Brief to Laird."

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~~Summary~~
"Zumwalt's Brief to Laird"

When we had learned that Mel Laird was coming to Vietnam, soon after he became Secretary of Defense, my staff had ~~not~~ suggested to General Abrams' staff that we should brief him as a component in the general briefing that General Abrams' staff would use. . . (~~not~~ end Side A - no side B to Tape #20.)