

THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION

Soon after Secretary Schlesinger came aboard, I talked to him about the importance I attached to try to get an announcement out as to whom my successor would be six months before the end of my tour so that there would be the maximum opportunity for the two of us to work together on policies designed to maintain continuity and, in order to have the announcement out before the inevitable jockeying would begin on the part of one or two who would get out of channels. I was particularly anxious to have this done because I recognized that there was one very strong threat to all that I had set in motion and this would have been the nomination of Admiral Isaac Kidd to be my successor. I knew also that he one who would use every channel and every tactic to bring off this nomination. Secretary Schlesinger agreed to try for the six months ' advance. I urged the Secretary of the Navy, John Warner, to work with me on the development of a list of candidates for the Secretary of Defense. John Warner demurred for a couple of months and then suddenly one day just as we were going into see the Secretary of Defense on another matter, he stated that it was his intention to discuss the question of my successor. This, I believe, was done in order to make it difficult for me to put my thoughts together. He raised the question with Jim Schlesinger who promptly asked us who the candidates were. John Warner mentioned just one - Ike Kidd - . I then stated

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that in my view ~~x~~ all four star candidates should be looked at by the Secretary of Defense and there might be some three star officers who also should be looked at. Jim Schlesinger wondered why not more three star officers. Both John Warner and I agreed that the reason for this was that for the last four years the Navy had moved people along more rapidly in order to have a reasonable range of choices within four star ranks and that this was the ~~fixing~~ feature that was new. I made it clear that Admiral Kidd would not be on ~~that~~ my own personal list to be considered and gave the reasons. Jim Schlesinger agreed that he would examine the records of all four star officers and two three star officers whom we had discussed and that he would endeavor to interview those whom he had not already met and gotten to know. The process continued over the weeks hit or miss as is the case when busy people are trying to make thorough and important decisions. Meanwhile, John Warner had Bill Clement give his strong support for Ike Kidd as the logical successor. Both of these gentlemen felt that the Navy personnel system needed to be returned to its pre 1970 style. Both of them were anxious to slow down the rate of integration. Both of them objected to the provision of the equal opportunity for women and to the extent that the Z-Gram had provided it. Both of them felt that Ike Kidd would work with them to accomplish their turn-back objectives. My own personal direction

was facilitated by virtue of the fact that Jim Schlesinger had gotten to know Ike Kidd when he was a student at the Naval War College and Jim was an instructor there and ^{he} concluded that my evaluation of Ike was the proper one. He did insure that he checked his judgment and mine by taking soundings among other personnel in the Navy in whom he had confidence. After some seven or eight meetings on this subject, sometimes between John Warner and Jim Schlesinger, sometimes between me and Jim Schlesinger and sometimes among all three, it became clear to John Warner that Jim Schlesinger was not disposed to nominate Admiral Kidd and this then made it possible for the two of us to agree on a list of three names that would represent our collective choice from whom the final nomination ought to come. These were Admiral Mickey (?) Weisner, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and former Vice Chief of Naval Operations; Admiral Jimmy Holloway, currently Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Worth Bagley who was currently the Commander in Chief of U. S. Naval Forces in Europe, ⁱⁿ London. Each of these candidates would have made a superlative Chief of Naval Operations. Each of them had great strength; their capabilities varied but it would be very difficult for anyone to the final choice among them and Jim Schlesinger found this to be the case. He finally concluded that Jim Holloway had the necessary characteristics

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to consolidate the changes that we had made and to bring the operational competence to the job that he desired and after consultation with Jim Holloway he approved the nomination of Admiral Worth Bagley to be the Vice Chief of Naval Operations in order to back up the distinguished naval aviation background of Admiral Holloway with the most outstanding of the surface warfare officers. In March of 1974, some two months after I had hoped the nomination would go to the White House, Admiral Holloway's nomination did go over there after Jim Schlesinger had cleared himself with Al Haig and Henry Kissinger would support it. It then languished for nearly two months in the President's incoming basket. When I discussed this matter after about four weeks with Al Haig, he indicated that the President was still deliberating, that he had known Admiral Holloway's father and had liked him and, therefore, thought that Admiral Holloway would be a good man but that he was still mulling it over. This long hiatus was exactly the problem I had worried about. In the Pentagon it is impossible to maintain the administrative privacy of matters of this type. Within a very few days, people knew that Admiral Holloway's name had been sent over to the White House. Indeed, Bill Clements sent for Ike Kidd and broke the news to him that Admiral Holloway was nominated and that Admiral Kidd would not be. This then led to a period of intense jockeying

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with the Secretary of the Navy, ^{and} the Secretary of Defense, both being ??? by at least two candidates including Ike Kidd who got their names put forward through other routes to the White House. Jim Schlesinger told me as late as the day before the White House made its final decision that President Nixon was still deliberating as between Jimmy Holloway and Ike Kidd believing that he really wanted someone who would turn the clock back but, apparently, finally concluded that he should support the Secretary of Defense's choice. Thus, by this slender thread, the Navy's programs would survive into a new era.

HOW I CAME BY MY ATTITUDE IN SUPPORT OF INTEGRATION

ZELLERS(?)

When I was an Executive Officer on USS ~~ZELLERS~~ in 1948, and again when I was Commanding Officer of the USS ~~SCHELEX(1)~~ name?? in 1955 to '57, in each tour I had occasion to try to help a ~~KKX~~ Filipino sailor who desired to change his job specialty, called ratings in the Navy, from that of steward to another ~~?????~~. In each case I found that I not only had to write a letter to ~~hexx~~ the Chief of Naval Personnel to get a special exception for a Filipino but, in order to win approval, then had to work the telephone to the Bureau of Naval Personnel to insure that the request was acted on favorably. After completion of my tour in command of ~~???~~, I came to the Bureau on assignment as the officer detailing (writing orders) on Lieutenants. I was briefed on arrival among many other things that there was a very special way in which black officers were washed out of the Navy. I was told that the thing to do was to assign them right after they were commissioned to the Recruiting Service. It was explained that this was an unassailable assignment because we needed black officers to be in the field in black recruiting areas. It was suggested that when they had finished a normal tour of shore duty in the recruiting field, they should be extended for another year. This very lengthy first shore tour as opposed to the normal sea tour for first duty would already put the black officer behind. It was suggested

that then the officers should be assigned to an amphibious or auxiliary ship which, in those days, were considered less professionally challenging and as less note to selection boards than were the assignments to combatant ships and that at the end of this tour the black officers, having had less rewarding assignments and less professionally acceptable assignments than their contemporaries, would be passed over. It was suggested that those few who escaped this screen by promotion could then be similarly hazarded as lieutenant commanders. Naturally, I did not follow this guidance but it demonstrates the extent to which the inequity was carried by certain individuals in the Navy. Notwithstanding this, I came to the job of Chief of Naval Operations somewhat naive about the extent of discrimination. I had by that time observed that the Navy had considerably improved its policy toward detailing of black officers and I made it quite clear that I was dedicated toward elimination of any remaining areas of discrimination. Sometime later, it was brought to my attention that one of the Navy's most outstanding black officers, Lieutenant Commander William Norman, who had served over a decade in the naval service was in the process of leaving the Navy. I sent for this officer and asked him why. Knowing that he had only about ten minutes of my time, he had prepped hardest, tightest set of notes I have ever seen and he proceeded to

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tick off in staccato terms a whole host of ways in which the Navy was not doing well by its black personnel. I had earlier begun the practice of bringing into Washington various groups of people a week at a time to report on problems they saw in the Navy. Reporting directly to me at the end of their week without any opportunity for their recommendations to be screened so that I would have the benefit of their unexpurgated advice. Under the challenge of Comdr. Norman's notes, I determined that we should have a group of black officers and their wives come to Washington and a group of black enlisted men and their wives. This was done in two separate groups. I found myself absolutely astonished at the extent of my own ignorance ^{as to} the subtle ways in which the Navy was discriminating. The lack of black beauty aids and soul foods in the commissaries and exchanges, the subtle forms of discrimination with regard to housing, the contention that housing would be available when telephone calls were made only to discover that housing was not available when blacks showed up in person. All were heartbreaking evidence to me that the Navy, both internally and with regard to its external relationships with civilians communities, was far from a fully integrated organization. One ^{vignette} ~~highlighted~~ ^{from} these meetings ~~xxxxxxxx~~ which drove the point home perhaps more than any other. One very fine flag officer was speaking

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up after the blacks had finished their briefing that the interesting concern he had always felt for his stewarts. In describing them, he said "my boys have always been very happy " the wife of one of the black officers, a very ?? lady, named Esther Fisher, stood up and said "Admiral, let me ask you - how old is that "boy"? The Admiral said "Oh, I guess he's 25 or 26, why?" Mrs. Fisher said "do you see what I mean"? The Admiral didn't.

THE FOLLOW ON TO THE COCKEL TRAILING STORY

I have elsewhere a memorandum from Captain Cockel that describes the fact that he was apparently bugged ~~in~~ and trailed in August 1974 while planning to see Senator Jackson. On 27 August 1974, I talked to Senator Jackson who was on vacation. He reported that he had contacted the FBI at the highest levels to find what was going on with regard to keeping track of people who were having contact with Senator Jackson. He found that the FBI was up in arms at the report. They agreed ~~with~~ ^{with} ~~him~~ that it would be a violation of law. They are investigating the matter and Senator Jackson is prepared, if necessary, to call Haig and Kissinger and under oath to find out if they initiated this tap and trail which he believes they have put upon Captain Cockel. He also stated that he plans to hold hearings beginning in another month or two on the whole question of where SALT is going.

THE PETER RODMAN STORY

A NEW YORK TIMES story appeared in the paper in 1973 that there were reports that Henry Kissinger was having papers removed from his files of a most sensitive nature and carried up to the Rockefeller estate in New York. A friend on Henry's staff I was told the following: At about that time it looked as though Henry was going to be let go by the President. He was increasingly concerned about his tenure. He instructed one of his special assistants, Peter Rodman, to make a number of trips from the White House to New York carrying in his briefcase large numbers of papers that had been checked out of the White House classified files, the purpose of which was to insure that Henry had access to the most sensitive documents in order to do his memoirs. When the NEW YORK TIMES story appeared, there was apparently a great deal of consternation within the NSC staff and instructions went out to return the papers as rapidly as possible. This was a cause of concern and because of the charges being made about leaks in general [?] despite the spy ring, et cetera. There were apparently inquiries made to the White House in connection with this story but Henry managed to fuzz up the circumstances and was not pressed.

JCS SPY RING

After the newspaper stories broke which alleged that there were spying activities carried out by the JCS or by Admiral Moorer, Admiral Moorer reminded the Chiefs in a briefing in the tank (I should have the notes of this) as to what had actually transpired. Back in the days of General Wheeler, there had been set up between Henry Kissinger and General Wheeler a liaison officer to act as a go-between to serve on the NSC staff and on the Chairmen staff to insure that there was full flow of information between both offices and that each was kept informed of the activities of the other. This function was continued under Admiral Moorer when he became Chairman. During Admiral Moorer's day, the first officer to serve in this capacity was Rear/^{Admiral}Rembrandt Robinson, an officer of unique talent who was subsequently killed in a helicopter crash when he was in command of a destroyer flotilla in the Tonquin Gulf. Admiral Rembrandt Robinson not only had tremendous professional competence, He could suck up information like a sponge. He was a man of immense scope who could handle very large amounts of work and responsibility. When he was an action officer in the Office of CNO, it was reported that any time anyone walked down the passageway with a action paper in his hand that Ren Robinson would lean out from his door and take it from him so he could move out with the action and he was noted for his ability to complete, brilliant and crisp

staff work in prodigious amounts. He was an ideal choice for the job of liaison officer. Admiral Moorer reminded the Chiefs that the understanding he had had ~~xxxx~~ concerning this officer was that he was to keep all the paperwork flowing from Henry Kissinger's office. As a result, the Chairman was always informed and prepared to speak up at meetings on military aspects of issues being considered by the NSC staff. It involved an awful large amount of paper and Admiral Moorer never worried about what the source he knew it was Kissinger's intention to keep him fully informed. Admiral Robinson was subsequently relieved by Admiral Wellender(?) who was not in the same league with Admiral Robinson but, nevertheless, a good staff officer, perhaps somewhat less urbane and smooth. We now know that notwithstanding, Henry Kissinger's ^{professed} desire to keep the Chairman fully informed, that there were many things he did not tell the Chairman and, indeed, the Secretary of Defense. Whether Admiral Wellender became aware of ~~xxx~~ this and decided to do something about it or whether he was just being officious will, I guess, never be known but on at least two occasions information came to Admiral Moorer's attention which was apparently not intended to get there. One piece of information was collected by Yeoman Radford from the burned baskets of the Embassy in India when Kissinger was en route to the PRC for his first surreptitious² meeting with Chou en Lai. On another occasion Radford apparently went through the ~~briefcase~~ of Gen. Haig.

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as he was returning from a trip to South Vietnam and filched copies of his trip report. These ~~part~~ pieces of information came over to Admiral Moorer and went in to him along with other vast quantity of paper. His story is that he glanced through the information and recognized that he was ~~at~~ that time in possession of it and didn't pay any attention to the papers beyond that. It is absolutely believable to me, and I believe it to be factual, that this busy man - having to deal with hundreds of papers a day - had no basis for assuming that he had in two cases illicit information and had every reason to assume he was being given access to legitimate information. The business of flow of paper -

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was made more complex by virtue of the fact that Admiral Moorer knew that there were certain papers that he was to see which the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense were not to see. For example, on one occasion at a NSC staff meeting David Packard who was sitting next to Tom Moorer, looked over into Tom Moorer's book made up for the meeting and observed that he had a White House briefing paper in his book. Packard promptly asked when he got back why he didn't have one. The answer, of course, was that Kissinger didn't want him to have one. This meant that at the Staff level thereafter when Admiral Moorer