

Tape 21 - Side B - Part 1

was given papers by his liaison office from the White House they were reproduced with the White House letterhead removed so that if Mr. Packard or Mr. Laird looked into Admiral Moorer's book they would not realize that he had information they did not have. For that reason, any surreptitiousness involved in the delivery of papers would quite likely ^{have seemed} ~~seem~~ to Admiral Moorer designed to maintain this peculiar Presidential cut-out rather than filched information that he wasn't supposed to have. In any event, the circumstance of the filching of papers by Yeoman Radford came to light in the following manner: During the period of the Indian-Subcontinent crisis, Jack Anderson published again, as he had in the past, information directly from Top Secret documents. Admiral Wellender recognized that one of these documents could only have come from his file because it contained within it the misuse of a word in identifying a ship of a destroyer type as a Tartar SAM ~~(S)~~ to describe the missiles on it. Inadvertently, the yeoman had typed up USS TARTAR SAM. Wellender had caught this and had had the memorandum retyped before it left his office so he knew that the memo could have come only from his files to which ^{only} he and Yeoman Radford had access. When he confronted Yeoman Radford on this, Radford denied that he had provided the information to Jack Anderson and circumstantial evidence, in addition to the nature of this memorandum was pretty overwhelming. Radford had had a tour of duty in India where

he had become very fond of the Indians, he had gotten to know Jack Anderson well, when Anderson visited India. When Radford returned to Washington he and his wife being members of the Morman Church had attended church with the Anderson and as I recall had had dinner with the Andersons several times including a night just immediately before the appearance of this memorandum. Moreover Radford was heavily in debt. WHITE"UH Wellender was convinced enough of the guilt of Radford that he reported this fact not only to Admiral Moorer but also to Ge. Haig, who was his immediate superior on the NSC staff. Gen. Haig informed Kissinger and Halderman. Erlichman was instructed to conduct an investigation. This investigation involved putting Yeoman Radford in front of a tape recorder where he was required to answer questions. The same thing was done for Ad. Wellender and as his testimony before the Spennis Committee reveals he felt that he was asked to admit a lot more guilt than any guilt he was involved in. He did admit that he had accepted the two such papers from Radford to which I have referred. Radford, while denying any guilt in regard to leaks to Jack Anderson apparently did state that he had been urged by both Admiral Robert Robinson and Wellender to keep his eyes and ears open and acquire any necessary information. The Erlichman investigation was never shown to Ad. Moorer or to anyone else with whom I have ever come in contact. Meanwhile when Mel Laird

heard about the investigation he apparently initiated one of his own and it was carried out by Jerry Fred Bushart latter of Watergate fame. This investigation also was never shown to anyone although a rough draft of it was found in files by Mr. Martin Hoffman, who succeeded to the responsibility in this area and at one point Jim Schlessinger read through it and had me read a portion with what Wellender had had to say to Bushart. The two investigations apparently designed to determine the nature of the Radford leaks ended up apparently causing a great deal of consternation in the White House because of the paranoid concern by the President and Kissinger that Ad. Moorer, who they thought that he was getting, only that he was getting everything but what they wanted to get only part of the information had apparently in fact become suspicious and was trying to get the information that they were withholding and on the other hand in the case of Mel Laird, he apparently became greatly concerned that the discovery of the fact that there was a methodical pattern of cutting him out, where as information was coming to Ad. Moorer. I have been told by people in the White House that the President was furious, that Ad. Moorer was spying on him, however not withstanding this fact the President had told Ad. Moorer he was going to reappoint him for a third term prior to the time that the newspapers broke the "JCS SPY RING STORY". One gathers that by the time these paradins

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of paranoia had sorted everything out the problem of near lacking suspicions, discontent, frustrations and concern was just too complex to deal with in any straight forward fashion. No action was taken against Ad. Moorer for what they thought to be his spying if in fact they did. Both investigations were kept secret from him. Laird never saw Erlichman's investigation to the best of our knowledge nor did it is known who besides Laird himself saw the Bushart investigation, initiated by Laird. The net action taken was a decision to get #18 Radford out of town. (I have a memorandum for record prepared by my then executive asst. Capt. Burt Sheppard, which demonstrated my part in that business and that needs to be a part of the story. My own evaluation of the JCS spy story is as follows. Throughout the period of my service in the JCS in every action and deed that I observed Ad. Moorer I had the impression that he believed he was being kept fully informed by Kissinger and the President and that he knew that he was expected not to pass certain information to Packard and Laird and that he insisted at that point that any issue got beyond a conceptual or planning or discussion stage and required that action be taken by the JCS that the Sec. of Defense be informed. My impression from my discussions with Henry Kissinger and with other members of his staff is that he and the President wanted Ad. Moorer to feel that he was getting all the information but they did not in fact intend him to get a information.

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And that they had their own little plot within plots that was designed to exclude him. My It is my belief that Mel Laird knew that the White House was trying to exclude him in certain matters and that he was making every effort to keep himself throughly informed through all of his contacts and that he probably in deed did a very good job of tracking what was going on even during those periods when he was cut out. In other words he became a very good practioneer of the art of Kissingerology. My own education from anie. naive into sophistication in this field needs to be brought out in this book. As I have indicated in my discussions elsewhere I was seduced early in my four year watch by Kissinger and had the impression that it was his intention to keep me fully informed. I was visited by Rembrandt Robinson rather frequently while he was still in the liason job and he delivered information to me which was my belief I was intended to have. He consulted with me and I provided advice to him for papers he was preparing for Kissinger and the President. He told me during those early visits that Kissinger was keeping him fully informed and told him to keep himself fully informed and that he, Rembrandt Robinson had arranged for David Young, who was then Kissinger's special asst. (befor he became a plumber) to put one copy of everything that was going across Kissinger's desk into the Robinson box in the routing room. So that we have the picture of Robinson

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feeling he was to keep the chairman and the CNO fully informed. Robinson believing that Haig was supposed to keep Gen. Westmoreland fully informed. Haig distrusting Robinson and Kissinger, Kissinger telling me that he trusted Robinson and that he distrusted Haig Kissinger telling me that I was the only one member of the JCS with whom he could work while stating behind my back that if anything he couldn't stand was an intellectual Ad. Kissinger and the President wanting Ad. Moorer to feel that he was fully informed but not wanting him to be fully informed and Kissinger and the President wanting Laird cut out of the planning phases while getting all the help they thought they needed from the Chairman of the JCS and the JCS. It boggles the mind in retrospect to wonder how rational men thought this system could be made to work. Maybe they weren't rational.

After the spy story broke Jim Schlessinger sent for me on several different occasions to ask questions on what I knew about it. I was able to tell him essentially what I have recorded here. He asked me on one occasion to talk to both Ad. Wellender and Ad. Harry Train who had been the Exec. Asst. to Ad. Moorer both while he had been CNO and during the early part of his tour as Chairman of the JCS. I did so and reported back to Schlessinger my belief that Ad. Train had believed as Ad. Moorer had that all the information that came across his desk had arrived with the legitimate blessings of Kissinger.

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A that he was absolutely clean. I reported back to Schlessinger that in my view Wellender knew that he had acceded the ethical bounds in the case of the two pieces of information previously referred to but that he did at least believe that it was Kissinger's intention to keep Moorer fully informed. I described for Schlessinger my own perception of the Byzantine process that Kissinger and the President were using and how in recent months I had become convinced of the "plot within a plot" system that Kissinger was using and that I believed that Ad. Moorer had not known that he was being used by Kissinger and Nixon at the time these papers sent to him and therefore was himself innocent of any wrongdoing. Jim Schlessinger's attitude toward the thing appeared one of wanting to insure that he knew all the facts but kept himself minimally involved during the period of public debate over this issue one can see how a Presidential appointee in the job of Sec. of Defense would feel that he had to be cautious when the President of the U.S was personally involved in the plot. Schlessinger did make the comment that Ad. Moorer had not used good judgement in connection with the receipt of the two pieces of information. My own view is that even this was a bum rap and that Ad. Moorer simply couldn't not have taken the time to study the legitimacy or illegitimacy of each of the masses of papers he was receiving.

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On February 1974 Rear Ad. Wellender came to see me and told me that he felt that I should know that he was to be called before the Senate Armed Services Committee to testify under oath on the leaked papers and that he would if asked have to state that Capt. Burt Sheppard who was then my executive asst. had asked him at some point after the return of yeoman Radford from the Haig trip about information that Radford had brought back from his trip. I asked Wellender how Burt Sheppard would have known that Radford had brought back such information, he said he didn't know unless Radford himself had told Capt. Sheppard. I told Ad. Wellender that he should testify truthfully, I also told him in response to his question that I did not believe that such information had been passed to me but that I did from time to time see such papers from the NSC staff but that I did not believe I had ever had any info that papers were illicitly acquired. This remains my view because the flow of papers to my desk from the NSC staff was most prolific during the period of Rem Robinson's tour when I still believed that I was getting information because Henry Kissinger wanted me to have it, later during Ad. Wellender's tour and about the time that I became aware of the Machiavellian nature of Kissinger's operation the flow of papers was dramatically curtailed and the ones that I did get were papers that I would have been confident that Kissinger did want to leak through the sieve. There are several memoranda in my files of

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conversations* that I had with Schlissinger while under and Train during the period of the public expose of the "Spy Ring" which can be worked into this story.

The Thermidor

The thermidor of my four year term as CNO came shortly after the half way point in the fall of 1972.

It began with a fight between whites and blacks in Subic Bay on blank date and it culminated in a decision by Pres. Nixon that public opinion need it necessary to reverse his earlier decision to fire me. The story of the blank weeks in between is etched deeply in my mind the story is a vignette of all that is good and bad in our democratic process.

The background factors which led to the crisis are as follows; In the Navy we had been recruiting minority personnel at nearly the national fraction for over two years. This had been to the "old guard" a source of great consternation and was coming under increasing fire. Tensions and resentments existed on some of the larger ships as a result of the large influx of minorities. Navy crews had traditionally consisted of such small numbers of black and other minorities that racial prejudice tended to get defused within the system. Faced with institutional racism or individual racist, these small numbers of minorities personnel tended to let it fester within themselves and too frequently to live with discrimination. As their numbers grew the minorities found more moral support from among their brothers and, synergistically, this lead to increasing reluctance to live with racism and to increasing popular support to do something about it. At the same time, the much larger

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percentage of minority personnel at the bottom of the rank pyramid, as they looked up the ladder and saw the traditional small percentage of minorities at the top, had an even greater perception of institutional racism than would be the case after the national fraction had worked their way up to the top.

A second causal factor was that recruiting of all categories of sailors began to suffer in the Fall of 1971 for the ensuing 9 months. We failed each month to meet our quotas and were forced, in order to have man-power to keep the ships fighting, to lower the mental group quality of the recruits we were taking. By the summer of 1972 ~~were~~ we were taking up to 23% of our recruits from the ~~most~~ lowest of the four mental ~~men~~ group categories -

mental group 4 - as opposed to the 3 to 5 percent which we think is appropriate for the technically complex Naval service and which we were able to recruit after the summer of 72.

This 9 months dip in quantity and quality of recruits was the result of three major factors in my view. - First, domestic turmoil and opposition to the war was at its maximum and prospective recruits felt the scorn of their peers as they considered enlisting. Second, the publicity concerning the all volunteer force had made it widely apparent that the draft was going to expire and young men therefore no longer felt the psychological pressure of the threat that they would be drafted into the Army to cause them to "volunteer" to serve

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in the Navy. Finally, I had been #BIE to slow in the rate of building of high quality re-cruiters in the Navy's recruiting force. We did not have adequate numbers of our most talented officers and enlisted personnel throughout the country extoling the challenges and opportunities of service in the Navy. In contrast, we had already witnessed an increase in the re-enlistment rates among those already in the naval service. On 1 July 1970 sailors in their first enlistment were re-enlisting at the disastorous rate of 105 10%. By 1 July 1971 they were already re-enlisting at the rate of 17% befor the Congress provided increased pay to make the all volunteer force feasible. By 1 July 1972 these re-enlistment rates had surged to 23% and the old timers were re-enlisting at the rate of 91%, the highest figure since the early 60's. Clearly, those who were in the naval service increasingly likes what they saw and were voting "aye" with their career decisions. But this good news had not gotten out to the prospective recruits in civilian life as it was to do later when our high quality re-cruiters enlistee s were put into the re-cruiting force.

A third factor contributing to the drama of the weeks I am describing was the trauma of the changes we were making. We had known that we had to bring personnel administration into the 20th. century quickly to get re-enlistment rates up and to attract high quality recruits. And we knew that dramatic changes in an organization as tradition bound as the U.S. Navy would have a polarization effect. We expected that there would be some who would seek to

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go beyond what the changes authorized. We knew that there would be a group which would resent change or fear it as a departure from learned habits who would have to be dragged "kicking and screaming" into the the 20th. century. We also knew that the large of majority of the personnel in the U.S. Navy would recognize and support the need for change and would, in time, take the other two groups in hand.

The letters coming in from all the old guard and letters to editors confirmed to the public that there were Naval personnel who carried changed hair standards to abberational levels. At its high point this involved about 5% of our people. A statistically significant pool taken before the six week travail told us that the more senior enlisted personnel and officer personnel favored the changes by 75% to 15% with about 10% undecided. On the other hand the more junior catagories of sailors and officers favored about 90% to 5% with about 5% undecided. This 5% to 15% in opposition represented the second or "kicking or screaming" school. These people tended to throw up their hands in horror at the changes. They were inclined in many cases to disaffiliate from responsibility and to let happen what ever might happen. In some cases they went further. There were a few flag officers on active duty who actively worked behing the scenes on the press, on key members of congress, and else where seekin covertly to reverse the course we had selected. This apathetic, or hostile attitude made its negative contribution to events. A fourth factor took place when the

North Vietnamese Vietamees initiated their final major spasm of effort before grappling into a truce, the massive offensive across the DMZ on 30 March 1972. By this time our Navy had been reduced from the 976 ships of 1969 to Blank ships, a Blank percentage reduction. It was out of the question to redeploy ground forces into Vietnam, it was therefore necessary to deal with the crisis by deploying additional B52 to the theatre and by doubling the number of ships in the western Pacific- the largest number ever deployed, from the smallest base number of fleet ships of the entire war. This meant that officers and sailors who had been spending 30 to 50 percent of their time away from home suddenly had to spend 60 to 80% of their time deployed. It meant that turn around times for ships in the Continental U.S. - the time for less, repair, overhaul, and routine maintenance which had been curtailed for the 10 years of the war to unsatisfactory levels, had, for the last year of the war to be reduced to dangerous levels. These factors presented an unbelievably difficult challenge to the wonderful officers and petty officers of the U.S. Navy. That 75 which were in support of the changes and at least high who did not believe

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