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Tape 23 Side A Part I - - I -

While I was working for the Asst. Sec. of the Navy for Personnel under Richard Jackson as the Commander in 1959 I was put through the following experience:

In case I haven't said it in the memorandum up until this point the two jobs involved were command of the one nuclear destroyer, the first the USS Bainbridge and the other was to be the executive officer of the nuclear cruiser LONG BEACH, the Commanding Officer having already been selected by Adm. Rickover to be Capt. Wilkerson, who had commanded the first nuclear submarine. The details concerning the determination as to which of these two jobs I was to go to I dictated in a memorandum on Adm. Ray Peete, which describes that byplay. So let me wind this up by reporting that on returning to my office following the interview I sat down and dictated the whole thing and had a pretty high degree of confidence that it is essentially thought by thought what transpired because during the several times that Adm. Rickover had removed me from his presence to go back to the Tank I having nothing to do nor nothing to read I memorized key words and set up a cross index in my mind so that I could dictate this interview as nearly as possible as it happened. After the dictation was complete my boss Sec. Jackson asked me how the interview went and I showed him the interview. He was interested enough in

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It that he asked it be shown to Sec. Frake, then Sec. of the Navy, he was interested in it enough that he asked that it be shown to Mr. Tom Gates, who was Sec. of Defense. The reaction in each case was about the same they read it and shook their heads sadly.

Rear Admiral Stockdale's Recollection of 2 Grams.

Adm. Jim Stockdale was shot down in North Vietnam as a commander, one of the very first to go into captivity and remained a POW for nearly 8 years. Later he was joined by his close friend and classmate now Adm. Jerry Denson. These two magnificent leaders of men between them kept the morale and team cohesion of the POW in their Prison camp throughout long years of suffering and frequent torture. After the bombing halt was declared by Mr. Johnson there was nearly a period of two years when no new aviation prisoners were received and then with the resumption of bombing new naval aviator prisoners began to enter the camp as has been reported the prisoners had a well worked out system of communications involved tapping the bulkheads between cells and passing messages that way. Jim Stockdale tells me when he finally managed to receive the first message from one of the new naval pilots the word that came through was we have a new CNO by the name of Zumwalt and he is knocking off all the chicken-shit. Jim reports that this was received with considerable pleasure by the

prisoners which is an astonishing thing when one considers what these wonderful men had been through, to think that it would have been received as any kind of news at all. When the Prisoners of War had been returned and President Nixon decided to entertain them and their wives at the White House, my wife and I were seated at one of the tables of eight or ten with Commander and Mrs. Wilbur immediately next to us. Commander Wilbur was the one Naval Officer who was accused of collaboration with the enemy by some of his associates, he subsequently was permitted to retire without formal charges being brought against him by the Sec. of the Navy. Mr. Wilbur's wife was a lovely person whom I had gotten to know in earlier meetings with wives and one who had done a marvelous job in keeping her children and family organized and together while her husband was away. She was obviously very much in love and totally devoted to her husband. During the evening I would estimate that at least 50 POW and their wives came up to speak to those of us at the table, to meet me and my wife and to greet to a great hilarity and bouyancy their ~~own~~ comrades from camp. Not one of them spoke to Commander Wilbur and his wife nor even noted their presence, it was a stark reminder of the circumstances of prison life. On the last day of our presence in Chile, Adm. Montero, the Chilean CNO picked me up at the Ambassador's home where we were staying to take me to Valpariso to visit Naval Facilities there. After we were well under way to Valpariso , Adm. Montero broke the news to me that he had

received the word just prior to picking me up that President Allende would be in Valpariso at his summer palace and would be pleased to receive us for a fifteen minute courtesy call. The normal protocol would have called for the U.S. Ambassador to be with us and it ran through my mind we perhaps ought to turn back to <sup>get him</sup> ?????? but I concluded from the standpoint of time we just wouldn't be able to make it. I did have with me in the car the Dep. Asst. Sec. of Defense for International Sec. Affairs, Mr. Armstead Selldin (check spelling) a former member of congress who had headed the Sub-committee for Latin America for the House Foreign Affairs Committee for a number of years and who was a close associate of Mr. Melvin Laird and considered that that would be an important substitute for the Ambassador as representative of Presidential Authority. On arrival in Valpariso the three of us went to the Palace. Arm Selldin who became a very good personal friend of mine as a result of our service together in the Pentagon was quite strong in agreeing with me that there was no alternative but go through with the courtesy visit notwithstanding the absence of the U.S. Ambassador. The key in my mind was the fact that although my own personal position had been one of regretting the election of President Allende, although I expressed concern about what might develop with regard to his regime I was quite clear that U.S. policy as it was being formulated by the President

called for us to get along with Allende and in my inquires prior to going on the trip and the preliminary briefings that I had had not only from my own staff but from the ISA and the State Dept. Staffs it was quite clear that our policy was to accomadate to Allende's presence. Adm. Moorer, for whom I was taking the trip, Mel Laird I believe that I also say Kissinger befor I left, I have to check to be sure but at no time was I given any information to indicate that the United States was involved in covert activities designed to undo Allende and both Arm Selldin and I were of the view that U.S. policy of that moment was to try to make the best of he bad deal. Arm Selldin and I entered the meeting with Allende feelin however distasteful it might be to us personally U.S. policy dictated getting along with him. Having described the personal feelings I had toward Allende I have to report the meeting was among the most fascinating I had. He was a man of great personal charm and charisma and although he ~~spoke~~ spoke no English and my Spanish was very limited by his the words I could understand, his eyes his gestures and the way in which he used the map I was able to follow almost completely what he was saying even befor his interper~~ter~~ translated. He spoke of his great aspirations for the Chilian people, he described how he had seen many Chilian die for lack of adequate medical care when he was a young man due to the poverty of some elements

of his society and how important it was to correct this. He described his aspirations for Valpariso which he visualized as building into a great state port. Ellende spoke of his desire to get financial assistance from the United States or Japan both Army Selldin and I agreed that it was easy to understand how he had been so successful and we both felt it was very difficult to resist his charm and difficult to believe that he wasn't absolutely sincere in his aspirations for his people. During the course of the conversation as we were getting ready to leave Allende suggested that he knew the nuclear carrier Enterprise was visiting Rio and that he would very much like to have it visit Chile on its way around the Pacific. We both commented to him that we would forward his invitation to our government and see whether or not it could be worked out but pointed out that the ship was on a very tight schedule with regard to its prospective deployment. Our view however when we got together on it after ward was that both Army Selldin and I felt that the visit request ought to be granted and when we got back to the Santiago and consulted with Ambassador Coy we spoke along those lines to him. Ambassador Coy (Check spelling) at that moment agreed with us and said that he would so state in a message to the Sec. of State. Meanwhile Mr. Selldin and I

forwarded the request up through Defense channels recommending approval. The basis for our recommendation was that if it were Government policy to work out our problems with Allende we ought not to reject an invitation extended personally by the Chief of State and rather should honor it. By the time we had returned to Washington, Army Selldin and I were astonished to find we had run into a real hornet's nest of concern that we had forwarded the request. A meeting by the UnderSec. Committee (I'll have to check) had voted something like five to three against it with Kissinger being very concerned Selldin and I had gotten this far into policy with Haig taking the stand we had no business getting so involved and with Mr. Laird coming in for some criticism for having let his two subordinates get so far out of hand. I found myself totally mystified by the reaction which was conveyed to me by Ad. Moorer, Mel Laird and by Dave Packard. I believe also by Sec. of the Navy John Chafee, who also had been chewed out for it. Mel Laird indicated that he was personally sympathetic to the visit, Dave Packard was also Adm. Moorer expressed himself having been willing to support it so it was State and the White House that out voted us. and CIA. At no time were we given the reason, the reason that surfaced only on August 1974, namely that at the very moment we were down there operating under what we thought was U.S. policy there was at the same time a covert

policy to begin the disembowling of Allende and one can see in retrospect how viewed in that light Kissinger would have been upset, that his left hand didn't know what his right hand was doing. I should have been pleased had I been made aware of the covert policy and might have dealt with the invitation somewhat differently. When I learned of this reaction I personally contacted Kissinger, Haig, ~~and~~ Alexis Johnson, Tom Moore, Dave Packard and Mel Laird to try to make sure they understood the milieu the invitation was received and the straight forward nature in which it was handled and to express some mystification that it was considered not to be the right thing to do. At no time did any of these gentlemen pass on any intimation that there was secretly going on the covert operations. Kissinger merely said it was going further toward getting along with Allende ~~and~~ than he was prepared to go at that moment. Haig's reaction was the usual deceitful one that he could understand why I recommended what I had recommended but that Kissinger just couldn't see it that way. I don't remember Alexis Johnson's comment one way or the other. Alexis Johnson was a good friend and I wouldn't have worried about his reaction one way or the other I'll just have to check my files to see if I show anything in it, I doubt if I do. Meanwhile Salsburg the writer not the publisher came out with a newspaper article on which he referred to some

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bubble headed Admiral had done a dangerous liberal thing. I think that the impact of this event was just temporary in nature, I think it was still in the honeymoon period and after a few brief days of gas pains, things returned to ~~XXXXXX~~ normal with the possible exception of Secretary Rogers who never seemed to me quite to have gotten over it in all our subsequent relations.

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Ended around Parts 8-9

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