

Tape #27 Side A

This is daily routine continued. So that I could be ready to act to any public relations crisis that might be set in train by my civilian masters as a result of anything we might have read in the papers. Sometimes the prospective action would be so obvious from reading the paper that it was necessary to telephone ahead from home, or from the car radio telephone to ~~me~~ insure that people were working on the problem. Following the perusal of the morning papers, my wife and I would have a few moments for discussion, between ourselves, or with the children, unless I also had residual papers left over from the evening study. During the ~~first~~ first few ~~x~~ weeks, while I was still learning my job, this became almost a ~~habit~~ habit, and after about the second week, as I was walking toward the door of the quarters, still reading an official paper, my wife Mouza walked up beside me, gave me a kiss on the cheek, and said "we'll see you in four years Daddy." Breakfasts were prepared by my wife and I unless we had official visitors in the home in which event there would be a Navy steward to help. My ~~official~~ official car driven by one of two great Navy petty officers, both of whom Jessie Parker, ~~was~~ a wonderful black chief bos'ns mate, and Homer Murray a first class bos'ns mate, became good friends of mine during the course of this 4 year period. The car, as I said was equipped with radio telephone so~~x~~ that I could be reached in emergencies, or could be directed to other locales as required. On arrival in the office, my custom was to go immediately into a line-up of the members of my immediate staff which included the Vice-Chief of Naval Operations, the #2 officer of the Navy; our Director of Naval Program Planning, who had the position of overall responsibility at the Deputy level within the office of the CNO: mv

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public relations officer; special counsel; the White House fellow; the Master Chief Petty officer of the Navy; my ~~xxxxx~~ executive assistant the office manager; the special assistant for Marine Corps matters; and the Naval aide. The Director of Legislative Affairs, and the Chief of Naval Information were always there as well. On the x second half of my tour, I made it a practice to have the Inspector General of the Navy there as well. In about 15 minutes this group normally reported everything from the key elements of the morning news, to the key actions on Capitol Hill of the day before, and those expected in the immediate future; to dealing with any problems of special crisis that may have occurred during the last evening's hours. (Add to ^{the} ~~xx~~ list of those in attendance up above the Special Assistant for Human Relations). I found this system extremely ~~xxxxx~~ use-ful for getting a quick roundup, before the Secretary of the Navy, or the ~~xxxxxx~~ Secretary of Defense arrived, and was almost always able to be on top of the required information and to have action in train before ~~ix~~ I became interrogated on any specific, immediate problem. This meeting which began at 7:15 was always, almost always completed by 7:30. We then would turn to a meeting of a much smaller group, consisting of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and again the Director of Naval Program Planning, with the Executive Assistant, and the Special Assistant for CEP matters, remaining behind to deal with the issues in greater depth, or to follow up on any matters which were close hold in nature. This meeting was normally completed by 8:00 to 8:15, and was then followed by a quick reading of the message board, and then a morning briefing for me and my 50 to 70 principal assistants on the larger Op Nav staff from 8:30 until 9:00. This briefing consisted of an intelligence and operational wrap-up of the

the ~~ix~~ last 24 hours, or the weekends on Mondays, and a discussion of significant events of the immediate ~~future~~ future. This again was an opportunity to initiate actions, or quick answers at the start of the morning. By 8:45 then the mornings's work was ready to begin with the first hour and a half devoted to just getting on top of the events of the most recent hours, and initiating actions necessary to deal with any problems that had arisen. The remainder of the day ~~would~~ would be spent with a combination of briefings on important Naval matters, visits to Capitol Hill, -to discuss the Navy's programs with members of the House and Senate, telephone calls to, or office calls on members of the civilian hierarchy, such as the Secretary of the Navy, ~~a~~ the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and their Assistant Secretaries of Defense. I used~~w~~ my office for all of that business which could be conducted in it, ~~&~~ using larger briefing rooms only when the audience could not be contained within my office. The office was a large one, about 25 by 40, with a large sit-down desk, a separate stand up desk that I had inherited from my predecessors ~~in~~ ^{and} which I found very convenient to change the pace during a long day. There were two leather covered davenports, and ~~amx~~ smaller chairs in the room. I made it a practice to have a few photographs of Navy ships and my own family's personal pictures on the wall. I used this office, also, as my own private lunchroom. There was a so-called "CNO mess" which ~~had~~ had traditionally been used by the ~~ix~~ Vice-Chief of Naval Operations and the Deputies to get together everyday over lunch to do their business. Previous Chiefs of Navy had frequently used their own office for a two man, or two, three, or four man lunches to get together with those people with whom~~x~~ they needed a little more time than the daily schedule would permit, other-

wise, and for whom a relaxed milieu was judged to be a better environment. I continued this practice and structured it in such a way that I was able to have in for lunch during the course of my 4 years, almost every one of the policy level figures with whom the Navy ~~had~~ ~~did~~ business directly or indirectly, thus during the course of that period, I had 15 or 20~~x~~ different members of the White House staff, and a large fraction~~s~~ of the cabinet, as well as the key figures from within the Pentagon in to lunch. I found this to be an absolutely priceless way to get acquainted with people to whom an office visit, to ~~be~~ get acquainted, ~~would~~ have seemed a trifle awkward, and in almost every case, the warmth established as a result of these lunches, made it possible for a ~~firm~~ friendly relationship to continue so that the flow of information and the exchange of ideas by telephone, or by chance meetings continued. Some of these lunches were of sufficient importance to make it desirable to set them up as reoccurring functions. And ~~in~~ during this 4 year course I met some five or 6 times with the Directors of the OMB, the Secretaries of Defense, the Deputy Secretaries of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of State, or Under Secretaries of State, etc. The typical day in the office, ~~which~~ could be viewed as one divided into 15 ~~x~~ minute segments, that is, a unit of work had to be thought of as a 15 minute period of time devoted to getting an intense briefing on a problem, together with a presentation of alternatives, and the selection of a decision from ~~x~~ among ^{these} ~~the~~ alternatives. This was true of many of the meetings in the office. If subjects were particularly knotty, they sometimes ran an ~~an~~ hour, and occasionally two or three, but I used to think of them as merely 6 or 8 units of work instead of a single unit of work when that happened. Similarly calls on members of Congress

of which I must have made nearly 1200 during my 4 years in office, could generally be accomplished in a 15 minute period of time, although with Chairmen of the 4 principal committees, it sometimes ran a little longer. My work days generally ran until 6:00 or 7:00, with a 12 hour day being the normal situation. 2 or 3 nights a week there would be a requirement to go out socially, to embassies, or to other events in Washington, where one's official position made it very difficult to regret attendance, indeed my office used to keep a weekly record of invitations received and regretted, and the normal week saw the receipt of 5 or 6 invitations for each evening, so that it took a considerable amount of discipline to hold the social obligations down to even 2 or 3 ~~times~~ times a week. Invariably, while we were going out there would be only 10 or 15 minutes to chat with my children, give a quick look and promise the homework, and then to dash off to the event. And invariably after the event, there would be at ~~the~~ least 2 hours of work on a briefcase, in order to be fully on top of all the papers necessary to the discharge of all responsibilities. I have frequently been asked whether it might not have been possible to avoid these long hours by a better delegation, of responsibility, and I have concluded that if a service Chief of Staff does just that work necessary to make him personally ready to deal with his personal responsibilities as a member of the JCS, on then the principal military executive to his service secretary, on to ~~the~~ be able to deal with those hearings on the ~~the~~ Hill which he must ~~be~~ attend, and to do the minimum that ~~has~~ ~~to~~ ~~do~~ with regard to public relations, and keeping on top of the affairs within ~~his~~ his own service, that there is no substitute for the very hard work and long hours that go along with the challenge and reward of having the assignment. At the end of

a typical day, I would turn out the lights at midnight, to be prepared for the start of the ~~mx~~ next day, 6 hours later. The routine that I have described varied somewhat depending on the crescendo of affairs one would find himself devoting more time to Congressional affairs at the time of mark up of the budget, or when the 2 bodies were getting ready to go into conference, and more time on specific crises with which ~~and~~ the Navy and Nation was dealing, when those events occurred, such as the Jordan crisis, the Yom Kippur ~~a~~ war, etc. But the description I have given is pretty representative of the average. This routine saw its principal interruptions when it was possible, as it was 2 or 3 times a year for me to escape from the Washington environment, and to visit the fleet, the U. S. fleet, and the Navies of other nations. These visits were also very hard work, although they ~~did~~ did change the routine. My wife ~~a~~ was almost always with me, and I found that these trips were very wearing on her because of the ~~H~~ heavy load of responsibilities that befalls the wife of a Service Chief. She being expected to participate in coffees, teas, receptions, dinners, to visit hospitals, meet with wives, and all of the myriad other things that these wives do so beautifully when called upon. Perhaps I can ~~illustrate~~ demonstrate most vividly by pointing out that during one, 17 day period, we were in 7 countries of Europe, attended 17 dinners, 17 receptions, 17 lunches, and had official visits inbetween. One did not come back from ~~these~~ these trips feeling rested, or as though ~~it~~ they had had a vacation, but did come back with greatly increased awareness of our allies or of our own Navy men and women overseas. During the course of our 4 year tenure, I tried several times to get away on a leave of 10 days to 2 weeks, but these plans always went astray under the pressure of affairs. ~~I~~ My family and I were able

to get one 7 day vacation in, and several long weekends during the 4 year period, but this was about the size of it. I have often been asked how the pace of life as CNO, compared with other jobs that I have held. I judge it to be the busiest, most intense of my entire 32 years as a Naval officer, I have worked hours that were just as long in previous Washington assignments, but with less adrenalin called upon. Even in war time, one found more time for rest and recreation than is possible in the busy battle of Washington.

The Problem of Quality Work

When I was an action officer in Washington, I found that on each of the 3 tours-one, as a Lt. Commander, one as a Commander, and one as a Captain, I was able at the outset to do very careful, completely thorough staff work. On each occasion I found that after the first 5 or 6 months as I became identified as one of those ~~new~~ many action officers who can do creditable work, I was being given assignments with increasing frequency, and the workload increased. Since it had always been my habit to work from dawn till dusk, there was no increase in working hours, but the quality of work became diluted. And in so far as my own professional satisfaction was concerned, I welcomed the end of each tour in Washington primarily for the opportunity it gave ^{xo} deal with problems in the field on a more thoughtful and thorough, and as a respite from an overload of staff work, which therefore had to be performed with less quality than the author would have desired had there been more hours in the day. In the job of CNO, I found that the problem of getting quality work done was even more difficult because of. . . .

Radio Interview in Newark, New Jersey - WJDM

I: Alright, to summarize when you talk about the modernization of the Navy, what are they the most recent changes?

Z: I'm going to talk about the three objectives that I set for myself

I: (inaudible). . .what you thought about that, and another thing I'd like to ask you too, is what, if any, effect the Presidential/^{recent} action as far as amnesty to those who avoided the military, what effect, if any, did this have on morale within the ranks.

Z: Well, with ~~regard~~ regard to the Naval balance. . .

I: Would k you want to do it ~~in~~ one[?] take. . .what did you view your role as you took over?

Z: Well, as I took over the Navy, it seemed to me that I had three primary objectives, and these will be what I talk about tonight, First was the problem of ~~is~~ achieving an all volunteer Navy, in an era of ~~is~~ an all volunteer force with the draft clearly on the way out. Second was the problem of getting on with modernizing the Navy, its ships and weapons systems, after a decade of war in which we were not able to replace ships adequately. And third was the retention of sufficient power to make it possible to continue to deter the Soviet Union and to wind down the war in Southeast Asia, while accomplishing those first 2 objectives in an era of dwindling defense budgets.

I: I think you did it.

Z: I think we've clearly gotten the all-volunteer Navy, the Navy is one of the 2 services which is making its quotas with regard to numbers of recruits, and getting good quality. With regard to the modernization of the Navy, we gotten it started, but the Congressional cuts have been so serious that we could not defeat the Soviet Union in a

war at sea the odds are. With regard to the retentions of sufficient power, therefore, we haven't done well at all.

I: The ~~ix~~ last point, there was that we may be in (inaudible)

Z: Yes in my studies done when I was CNO ~~xxxx~~ by the Navy staff, made it quite clear to me that the odds are that any conventional war with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union now has the capability to cut our sea lines of communication. And the United States ~~xxxx~~ Navy does not have the capability, the odds are, to keep those sea lines open. (inaudible). . . a very ~~xxxx~~ worrisome situation with the U. S. dependent today for 15% of its oil from the Persian Gulf, and by 1980, 50%, and with 69 out of 72 resources judged critical by the Department of Commerce already coming in on the service of the seas, our economy can be brought to a halt in the event of a conventional break-out of war with the Soviet Union. Now this doesn't suggest that it's going to come, it just suggests that the Soviet Union's ability to be very aggressive with regard to its foreign policy initiatives is increasing, and our ability to insist on our interests, in getting weaker, and weaker.

I: One of the problems is that the job that the two powers would have to do, it's ~~xxxx~~ easier to cut than it is to keep open.

Z: That's correct. The Soviet Union is a land power. It is able to defeat its 2 principal enemies over land lines of communication unless we can reinforce NATO. It is able to support its principal allies the Warsaw Pact, over land lines. It doesn't need the seas for oil and resources the way the U. S. does. We ~~x~~ on the other hand are a world island. And as I have mentioned, are dependent overseas for the things our economy needs, and part of the maritime alliance it must be able to reinforce overseas. Therefore, if we could line both

Navies up in the middle of the ocean, ours might look more impressive, but if you ask, can we do our job, the odds are that we cannot, and the odds are that the Soviet Union can.

I: I think some of the most logical questions asked are first (inaudible) ~~and~~ ...system and second is (inaudible).

Z: The last happened because the Congress had cut the budgets which the Secretary of Defense described as "bare-bones" defense budgets on which to build by 2 billion, 3 billion, 5 billion, 3 and one-half billion, and as many as 5 billion in the last⁵ fiscal years. These kind of cuts have made it impossible for us to reach the power we need.

I: Can anything be done about it?

Z: The only thing that can be done about it in the democratic system is for the people to become sufficiently concerned to communicate that concern to their elected representatives or get (inaudible).

I: (Inaudible)

Z: My own personal view is that the position put forth by President Ford is imminently reasonable. That it does begin the process of binding up the wounds making it possible for those who did not do their duty to work their way back.

(END OF TAPE 27 SIDE A)

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TAPE ~~QIX~~ SIDE B

Questions and Answers - Keene College

Q: (inaudible). . .what was your reaction. . .

Z: Well, first I think that the dispatching of Mr. Nixon, was the best thing that's happened to us in the last two years. And it was a great demonstration of the viability of the democratic process, that he was so clearly about to be impeached that he recognized the inevitable and resigned. My deep regret is that it didn't come much sooner because this country~~x~~ lost giant strides in the period that the government came almost to a halt. Important economic, ~~m~~military, foreign policy, domestic decisions didn't get made. The government broke up into a series of independent dukedoms. And we have paid a price that is almost immeasurable.

Q: Getting back to . . . (inaudible). . .

Z: I, my own personal belief is that if hostilities break out, we ought to maintain neutrality because we lack the capability to go in and expect to deal with any force that might try to interpose itself between us. That's not to ~~a~~ say that resources couldn't be provided

Q: ...(inaudible)...ships at sea...Bain~~id~~idge ...computers...now what I don't understand is why ~~we/know/we/ha~~ even though we know we had superiority in numbers why ~~j~~ are we giving in?

Z: Well, first the, I was not in the Washington at that time and so I can't give first hand what the thinking was. Clearly that was the kind of a decision that only the President could make. I can imagine what some of the constraints were. First, because of those tremendous cuts that I have cited, to handle the requirements ^{for what} ~~there~~ ought to have been a third rate war with taking every bit of ~~ex~~ power we had to spare. And in order to deploy those forces that did go up ~~to~~ temporarily ^{off} ~~to~~ Korea, we had to reduce the ~~war~~ effort in Southeast

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Asia, that's how far our defenses had been allowed to atrophy. And there is no doubt in my mind that the military leadership at that time, would have been very concerned, and would have expressed their concern x to the Presidentx of the United States, about getting involved in another theater given the state of our defenses. The actual mechanics of the decision, I'm not privy to.

Q: Do you foresee, Admiral Holloway changing anyx of your policies. . . (inaudible).

Z: Well, I don't think anyone ever ought to try to look over his successor's shoulder. I had one who was doing that to me, and it got to be very xk irritating, so I'd prefer not to comment, except to say that Admiral Holloway is a superb Naval officer who is keminently qualified for the nax job. He's not bound by any theological conceptions with regard to either being locked into doing nothing, or with regard to being locked into doing a whole lotx -Rather will I think deal pragmatically with the issues as they come. I know that he is completely dedicated because he served as my Vice Chief of Naval Operations for nearly a year to support of the general changes that had been made ;to improve the life for our sailor men and women.

Q: What was your reaction. . .Navy. . .(inaudible).

Z: We went through the following phenomenon. In the fall of 71 as it first began to be x quite clear throughout the country that the draft was going to expire, our numbers began to fall short. And for 9 months we fell short every month in both quality and in quantity. We had reduce our standards to get what we did get. And at one time we were taking about 23% of, what are called mental group 4's, the bottom of the 4 mental groups in a mental profile. By the summer of 72, xk we had turned the xk situation around by a combination of the impact of the changes we were making in the Navy, and by setting high quality standards for our recruits.

making in the Navy, and by getting high high quality recruiters into the recruiting force, and by getting authorization to do advertising. And we've made our numbers, both in quantity and in quality taking only 1 to 3% mental group 4's, and we think we could take as many as 5% nicely, ever since. We're one of the 2 military services that it, the other is the Air Force. The others are all falling short in quality and in quantity. Now I believe that the impact of the ~~k~~ changes, the word that is getting back to the hometowns, from the people ~~who~~ ^{that} have come in, is such that we are going to be able to continue this, provided the economy remains about as competitive with military salaries as it is. It may even improve if the economy continues to go to the dogs, as it is at the present time.

Q: Is it possible to change the concept of Naval warfare. . .superiority. . . (inaudible).

Z: The, there have been changes but they're of relative degree, not major degree, relatively small degree. Nuclear submarines are far more competent than the old diesel submarines in many ways. They can outrun a diesel submarine, they can stay submerged much longer than a diesel submarine. On the other hand, a diesel submarine is ~~a~~ quieter than a nuclear submarine, and the Russians are still building some while overtaking us with regard to the total number of nuclear submarines, as they did in 1973, they're continuing to build diesel subs, because they find them very useful in such places as the East and Mediterranean, where they don't have to go long distances, and can just lie and wait for our carriers, and if they don't get them the first time, they'll get them the second time. Now no matter how versatile the nuclear submarine, it will never be able to deal, ~~or~~ not for a long time, like my lifetime, deal with ~~aircraft~~ aircraft or cruise missiles. It can only ~~not~~ deal with a ~~sub~~ surface ship or another submarine. So you've got to have some capability to ~~deal~~ ^{deal} ~~with~~ ^{with} ~~the~~ ^{the}

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performance in each of those 30 ships, ~~xxx~~ doesn't pay off, like having more performance in 50 parts of the world. Time and time again we've proven this to ourselves. This is why the Soviets have never built a single nuclear propelled surface ship, ~~xxxxxxx~~ ^{combatant} ship, they have built an ice-breaker. But ~~xxx~~ ^{they} have recognized that numbers of ships is where the pay off is, ~~xx~~ that's why they're continuing to build some diesel propelled submarines, as well as a lot of nuclear.

Q: Admiral. . .aircraft carriers. . .to prove a point do you. . .(inaudible).

Z: The Soviets, you remember I said had to come from behind, and they did everything in the classic tradition of Mahan, as we would have done if we had had to come from behind. First they built up a huge submarine fleet, 3 times the size of our own submarine fleet, gradually dropping to 2½ times the size as they then improved it by converting all diesels into some diesels and some nuclear propelled submarines. Second, they began to build many surface ships, and because they didn't have aircraft carriers, they began to put cruise missiles on them and on submarines, and in ~~xxx~~ aircraft so that they would have a pilotless aircraft in effect ^{at} ~~xxx~~, with which to out-range any ship except an aircraft carrier. Third, they began to trail, constant ~~xxxxxx~~ trailing of those aircraft carriers. Wherever we go overseas, there's a Soviet ship in trail, ready to strike first with a conventional warhead against the carrier in the event of war, before the carrier can get its airplanes off. Finally they began the installation of a large number of missiles into their Naval air, and to acquire Naval facilities around Eurasia for airfields, and ports out of which ~~xxx~~ ships and aircraft can operate, and they now have gotten that very high capability to cut our sea lines, and they're now at the point where they're ready for the final step, the aircraft carrier, to give them a capability to project power

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beyond Eurasia, and for example to initiate operations into Africa, south of the Sahara, ~~and~~^{or} into Latin America. They've already launched their first true aircraft carrier, the second one is building, and in your lifetime you're going to see the Soviets with 2 or 3 times as many aircraft carriers as we have.

Q: (inaudible). . .aircraft carriers. What happens. . .(inaudible).

Z: No, one is the Nausbahn, and one is the Leningrad, and they're continuing to ~~exp~~ operate them, and this was their first step into carrier aviation, to learn a little bit of the operating techniques. The next carrier is ~~x~~ still limited in comparison with ours, its only about 40,000 tons, as compared to our 80 to 100,000 ton carrier, and it doesn't have an arresting gear and catapult, which means that it will be limited to helicopters and V_ type aircraft. But it will give them a lot more capability when they get the numbers, you know when they get 20 or 30 of them, they'll be able to do an awful lot with them, and having watched Admiral Gorskov, who had ~~xx~~ been Chief of Naval Operations for 17 or 18 years over there, there's no doubt in my mind that he's already designing the next generation aircraft carrier which will be competitive with ours.

Q: (inaudible). . .sounds real good. . .(inaudible).

Z: No. . .

Q: (inaudible)

Z: It's true that the Russian navy hasn't been tested since the Russo-Japanese War. And all those who were tested in that war ~~were~~ are gone, but it's also true that our people have not been tested with regard to Naval war since World War II. We have been fighting land battles, projecting Naval power against land battles in Korea and in Southeast Asia, ~~xx~~ and that's a very artificial kind of war in comparison to the one we'd