

have ~~not~~ to fight against the Soviet Navy. So that their training is no different from ours. Neither of us have any real wartime training. They do some very ~~impressive~~ impressive fleet exercises. In exercise "Okean" meaning ~~a~~ ~~the~~ ocean, which took place in April of 1970, they demonstrated command and control so good, that they were ~~able~~ able to simultaneously attack 5 simulated carriers in various parts of the world within 90 seconds of one another, while also initiating amphibious operations over a 1500 mile ~~flank~~ flank, and doing anti-submarine operations, and all the rest. So I believe that they are very good. I believe that we do have an experienced advantage on them, because you do get some benefits from the kinds of operational experience that our people have had in the Southeast Asia war, and in Korea. But it isn't linearly convertible.

Q: They seem to be. . . (inaudible). . . isn't there some way that they might be able to convert these ships into more modern ships. . . (inaudible).

Z: You're talking about our ships?

Q: Yes. . . mainly ~~our~~ our destroyers. . . (inaudible).

Z: We've looked at this because it's one of the desperation things you would do if you got involved. And it looks as though it would take on the order of a year to get the ships back in and operating, they're in ~~such~~ such bad condition. They were all World War II, destroyers, or ~~other~~ other types of World War II ships, so that they had 30 or more years of life on them when they were retired. And then when you got ~~them~~ them back in, at the end of that year, you'd still have the problem of installing on them, the cruise missiles that you would need in order for them to be competitive at the present time. You would have had to replace all their communications equipment, their radars and so forth, because many of the radar sets are now out of operation, new radars installed and all that sort of thing. Production lines, for probably more than a year would be involved in just taking care of ships they're already building. You'd have to start additional pro-

duction lines to get them, and I believe that we would have had to negotiate before we would have gotten those ships back and operating.

Q: Inaudible

Z: We've still got four of the old World War II battleships left, they were beautiful ships in their day. We brought one of them back for the Southeast Asia war, but by the time it got commissioned, the ~~strikes~~ north of the DMZ had been knocked off, and it was then pulled back before, and started out of commission before the invasion across the DMZ, when it could have been used usefully. So it was done all wrong. Even so that battleship back in action, had some very marginal capabilities. It's communications equipment was exponentially behind what even a destroyer escort had, It's fire control ~~equipment~~ equipment was somewhat obsolete, and so for firing very massive artillery against these targets it was good, but had it come under air strikes, it really couldn't have protected itself very well. So it was a lot of ship with a lot of vulnerability. We'd looked at other uses for those battleships, and we ~~conclude~~ conclude that they're just so expensive that it's like trying to take Vanderbilt's mansion and turning it into a little bungalow at the beach, you just can't get there from here.

Q: How well are they adapted. . .(inaudible).

Z: These are some of the conventional wisdoms that are used, and it was true a few years ago. The Soviets are in the process now of overtaking us with regard to replenish^{ing} ships, just as they have in all other categories. We think we're still better at replenishing underway than they are because there is an awful lot of seamanship knowledge that is built up ~~up~~ over the years, and that's something we do do all the time. ~~if we observe~~ We know from observing them it takes them longer to replenish for example, but nevertheless they've gotten to be very competent at it, and they're getting the numbers of ships and the capabilities

in their replenishment ships that will give them, they'll be approaching us over the next few years in quality as well as in quantity. Now, it's true that the Soviets are able to get more ship per dollar than we do because they don't have to worry about habitability for their sailors. They're able to jam them in, we think under much more crowded conditions we couldn't enlist sailors, and make them live the way the Soviets do, On the other hand, when that sailor gets back home and walks down the streets, he's the pride and the joy to all Soviet citizens, he loves to wear his uniform with all its medals on it. He's in a highly respected profession. That hasn't been true in recent years for our sailors and soldiers, and therefore, we've got to be able to satisfy some of their feature comforts, if we're going to keep them sufficiently content to stay with us. This does add up to ~~the~~ the requirement for us to spend an x awful lot more money to get the same amount of Naval capability.

Tape #28 Side A

XX We have a couple of officers that had been ~~that had been~~ slated for other commands that were very career enhancing but they all had some operational responsibility ~~as was~~ too. I don't think it's feasible at this time to attribute the (inaudible).

R: But the way we're putting the flex to this things now, what we're looking for is a greater motivation of people, as well as mark a x man excellent, you know. There is no way that we're going to benefit ~~from~~ somebody who always works in the human relations field who's just not had a good operational career, as long as the people who have ~~that~~ ^{good} operational potential are involved, ~~in their~~ and their involvement helps them move up the ladder like in the case of Dreyfus, is an excellent example, then I think we're alright. I don't think you x can, you know, take a look at some people who's operational ~~record~~ ~~is~~ record is...

X: We're going to be in trouble if I don't make Captain.

R: There's no ~~problem~~ ~~with~~ ~~that~~ problem with that.

Y: (inaudible) is getting more of those kinds of people in the past 18 months therefore I would say in the next 3 years. We have more ~~the~~ guys now than I worked with, you know. . .

I: Well, I want to go from that point then to the consideration that I know some of my professional community has that ~~maybe~~ maybe offices are essentially anti-intellectual. And by that I mean, not totally supportive of, you know, higher education, advanced education, all this management stuff that's coming out that gives ~~more~~ skills and more ability. I don't necessarily think that's true, but I'd like to hear you, Admiral Zumwalt as a person who has been in charge of that ~~large~~ organization to see to that. Professional growth opportunities are rewards. Do you see the Navy supporting more of that in the future? You know, go up and take a leap

~~kk~~ for a masters, or get a PhD. or go to Harvard B School, and come back to us with some more information and support.

Z: I do. If when you look back 10 years ago and then compare it to today, 10 years ago a selection board used to almost snicker at someone who was a PhD. Youk know, there must be something wrong with this guy. Now it's looked at with respect. I think what is still wrong with our system is that we still can't try to select everybody having in mind that he ought to be a future CNO, krather than doing as well as we could about insuring that in each year group the selection process gets men who are unique in various fields. We're always going to need more generalists in the Navy, than specialists, but we've got more and more to pick some outstanding specialists in various areas and the system is moving in that direction, bo by policy and by accident.

I: Are you, Admiral, willing to be viewed as a person who can, education can hold up as a leader in applied technology. The reason I'm asking this is that I think the public image that needs to be projected right now is that people like you are ~~recognized~~ recognized by University . I'm sure you've had honorary degree, and would continue to want to get some others if it's going to help to move what I think must be something very deeply important. Do you object to seeing yourself as that kind of symbol of ~~xxx~~^{con}structive change?

Z: No, I don't see how anyone can object to being seen as a symbol of anything constructive.

I: You know, believe it or not, I think there are some people who might see the kindx of things you've done is not so damn constructive.

Z: Yes, that's correct. You know, if I'm seen as a symbol of integration, I'm for it, even though obviously there are people who are against it.

If I'm seen as a symbol of movement toward recognition of the importance of

differences than I'm for it even there'd be some against it.

I: So you're open to being utilized even after you've left your post in that way.

Z: Yes, if I'm seen as a symbol of liberalism and permissiveness than I deny the allegations and confront the allegators.

I: Well your ~~presence~~ prescense here at APA was very encouraging. Because from an applied technology point of view, you see, you ~~had~~ ^{view} this/^{as} important enough to present and to take 2 to 3 hours, that's a big step forward.

Z: I viewed it in that light, based on recommendation of council here.

I: Well, I want to congratulate the councilmen, because that was a very fine idea and a very fine recommendation.

Y: Very frankly it was a boost I needed.

I: One really ~~xxx~~ important statement here at the end, and I guess everybody asks you, if you had it to do all over again, from a leadership point of view, how would you set this thing in gear? What would you do differently?

Z: I think, you know, I've been asked that question before, and the only place that I think that I would try to do something a little differently, is perhaps to have been~~xx~~ even more painstaking than we tried to be with ~~xx~~ regard to briefing the system, including the retired community and the Congress on what we were trying to accomplish. I don't think there was any way to get the job done other than by really wrenching the system, because we really had to go after it, hammer and tongs, to get enough done in 4 years that it couldn't be turned back. As it turns out, because the right leadership had taken over, there's more than 4 years, but we didn't ~~xx~~ know that when we started out to get it done. And so I wouldn't have changed the rate with which we moved, or the shock effect. But I would have tried harder to ~~xx~~ ~~make~~ make sure that everybody understood, why we were doing what we were doing.

I: That is before you actually undertook this change?

Z: That's right.

I: Well if that's the case then, you'll have a chance to take all of your learning into another career ~~in~~^{at} some point in time. Won't you?

Z: I don't know.

I: What are you going to do Admiral Zumwalt?

Z: Well, at the present time I'm in the process of doing a book and I'm giving some lectures around the country.

I: Can people like us afford you? Or do we get a special rate?

Z: You mean this conference?

I: No, I'm talking about if someone wanted you would you be. . .

Z: Yes, I have a lecture agent that runs things. Also I've taken some visiting ~~professorkkxx~~ professorships at 4 universities. Actually I've accepted 3 and am considering a 4th. The 3 that I've accepted are the University of Pennsylvania and Vanderbilt, add Stanford.

I: Schools of management?

Z: At Vanderbilt it's the Management School, at Pennsylvania it's an undergraduate course in the political science department, the role of the Presidency~~x~~-and I'm lecturing there on the role of the President as Commander in Chief. At Stanford I'm being sponsored by both the Political Science and the Hoover Foundation in the field of arms control, for 2 or 3 lectures that I'll give this year.

I: That's really outstanding. Well that means that you'll be able to impact on the academic community, even a little personally. I should think you'd be outstanding in that role.

X: You got some ~~xxx~~ real good feedback this afternoon. That was the longest series of applause that I've heard since. . .

Z: It was exciting, they really laid it on. . .

I: I guess the footnote on this is that when the military division took a look at the program that we submitted on change, and teaming and

they set up their own special action office for drug abuse. And they were at that time meeting with heads of the various services as well as the Department of Defense drug programs to insure that some immediate steps were taken to fight this crisis, both on the part of our people involved in the drug abuse, but also that was necessary to be solved if we were to stay in Vietnam as long as the President felt necessary to the turnover, the responsibility to the South Vietnamese. Bud Krough ~~xxxx~~ ~~xxxx~~ said that his primary job ~~is~~ on the White House staff was crime in the cities, and that kind of thing, but this drug thing had come so fast, and reached such ~~xxx~~ crisis proportions that the President ~~is~~ had asked him to be the head man in trying to resolve this problem as fast as possible. ~~Following~~ Following out of that action ~~is~~ was the Ear Analysis Testing Program, and eventually the requirement for at least 30 days rehabilitation for all personnel who were ~~is~~ considered drug dependent prior to our releasing them to the civilian world. Another thing that was discussed during that lunch was that the new Special Action Office had a lot of capable psychologists and psychiatrists who had had various degrees of experience in the drug abuse business, but there was very little office management or administrative ~~is~~ capability over there, he wondered if the Navy had anybody that might be ~~is~~ able to assist them. Admiral Zumwalt said we'd take that on as a project to see if we could give them a hand. And it was out of that discussion we sent Captain--he may have been a Commander at the time--Jack ~~Lach~~ Richard over to the White House who, according to Jerry Jaffes, the head of Special Action Office, had done a magnificent job to help them in their administration planning and so forth. I remember Bud Krough during that conversation as a man in the staff whose boss had given him a job to do and he was exerting every effort he had into successfully completing that task.

Why I was sent to Vietnam

I was told by Admiral Moorer that I was being sent to Vietnam and pro-

moted to three stars because the job as Commander of the Naval forces in Vietnam was now considered to be much more important and required a 3 star officer there. He made quite a point of the fact I shouldn't be concerned about having been promoted to three stars so young. That there would undoubtedly be those who express concern about it but that it had happened to other people and the thing to do was to go ahead and do the job and not worry about it. When I returned from Vietnam to the CNO's job, Admiral Clarey-who had been Vice CNO at the time I went to Vietnam and continued to so serve for the first 6 months that I was CNO-told me a different story. His account was that Adm Moorer had gotten increasingly concerned about not being able to control the product of our studies in systems analysis. That the output was not supporting the cost effectiveness of the nuclear propelled ships and he also apparently felt that we could have been more decisive in killing the F-111 rather than to have concluded that for the rules we were given, namely the assumption that the F-111B could land and take off of an aircraft carrier, that the Phoenix missile and Aug 9 fire control system were unbeatable by anything then flying. (Indeed this is so much the case that when contractors later came in with competitors, they had to put the Phoenix Aug 9 system into it.) Therefore, Adm Moorer concluded that he wanted me out of the Systems Analysis job. However, it was also apparent to him that with Paul Nitze, then Secretary of the Navy, he was going to have to do so in a way that would not suggest to Paul Nitze that I was being fired. Adm Clarey had, therefore, come up with the idea of upgrading the COMNAVFORV job and convincing Mr Nitze that this was such an important place for me to go that the Navy's best should be put there. It was Adm Clarey's view that Adm Moorer felt that the same fate would befall me that had befallen all others who had gone there--namely that I

would never be heard of again.

Conversations with MGEN George Keegan

Enroute ~~11/11/71~~ to Washington to Cleveland on Tuesday 5 September, I sat across from Gen George Keegan. He made the following points:

- 1) Kissinger is now proposing to Schlesinger that the only thing that we got left to offer the Soviets in order to get them to accept strategic parity is to give them our military technology.
- 2) The recent Soviet visit to US commercial aircraft companies were highly structured intelligence efforts. Keegan has reports that it demonstrates that the Soviets asked each manufacturer for all his documents while promising to buy ten aircraft and, in the final analysis, being--offered 20 million dollars for their design manual which has all of their industrial secrets in it--was ready to sell it until the Air Force got it locked. Meanwhile, it is believed that they did get all other documentation from all commercial companies and then turned off the deal.
- 3) Ralph Metcalf, who runs the Strategic Institute, is letting Adm McCain go. Keegan has been trying to persuade him to get Albert Walstadter. Metcalf feels he needs better Navy input and isn't able to get it. Gen Ira Eker is prominent in this work.
- 4) The new Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Davy Jones, is working extremely close with Schlesinger. They meet almost nightly. Schlesinger and Jones are working closely on a concept to beef up airlift and to handle the maritime gap by making Air Force air adaptable to sea control work. Schlesinger has been after Dave Jones about why the Air Force no longer has a lot of intellectuals. He says he's looking into the Air Force to lead and he's not getting it. Davy Jones, therefore, has instructed his generals to get more intellectual. Schlesinger said to Davy Jones one evening that he couldn't understand why CACK's airlift wasn't under MATS. Within four days Davy Jones put it there. Keegan says that Davy Jones is ecstatic about this relation-

TAPE 28 SIDE B

Admiral Holloway, the father, was Chief of Naval Personnel and when he heard about this record he promptly had me nominated to be Adm Arleigh Burke's administrative aide, relieving Cdr Tom ~~Weschler~~ who was going to sea. I was told when I got to BuPers that I would probably only stay there ~~2/3/4/5/6/7/8~~ for two or three weeks and then go work for Adm Burke. However, two factors conspired to prevent this. One, Mrs Burke had Mrs Weschler bring in the wives of several prospective candidates. At that time Mouza was heavily pregnant with Mouzetta and Mrs Burke apparently felt that she would not be able to participate as fully ~~at~~ (that's a bad word to use about a pregnant woman) as some of the unpregnant wives. Separately, Adm Burke apparently had served with Ray Peet and knew about him. So Ray was detached from command of his destroyer early and brought into that job. Subsequently, I went over to Richard Jackson's office and toward the end of my tenure there ~~was~~ one of the two destroyermen picked by Adm Rickover after a lengthy screening ^{and} interview process for command of the nuclear destroyer Bainbridge, our first one, and Exec of the nuclear cruiser Longbeach. Rickover indicated that he had no preference as to which of the two went where. Ray Peet and I both agreed that we wanted command of the Bainbridge and that neither one of us wanted to be exec of the Longbeach. So I relayed this to Adm Denim who was the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel. The Admiral asked to speak to both of us, asked us if we couldn't work it out. We both agreed we would neither accept the Longbeach job. So he then made the decision that since both records were identical and that since I was senior in the class, I would get the job. We each went back to our offices and within about 30 minutes I received a call from Adm Denim there had been a slight change, that Ray Peet would go to the job instead of ~~me~~. This had been a decision between Adm Burke and Adm Page Smith, Adm Burke strongly favoring

Ray Peet to whom he felt loyal and Adm Page Smith ~~was~~ being violently against me for having worked so hard for the Hump Bill. Ray Peet was in on the decision and Adm Smith then endeavored ^{to persuade} me to take the Longbeach job which I refused to do and insisted on carrying out my original orders to Dewey. It was known at the very beginning that whoever was selected to command the Bainbridge would be selected two years early for Captain because another classmate, Bill Anderson, had taken his submarine, the Nautilus, under the Pole a few months earlier and Pres Eisenhower had wanted to promote him immediately to Captain. ADM Burke had persuaded the President that that could be handled by a selection board, and it wouldn't rape the system as badly. So it was quite clear that CDR Anderson was going to have to be selected for Captain on that board. However, before the board could meet CDR Calvert, another classmate, also took his submarine under the Pole, the Skate. And it was apparent that the board--in order to be fair---would have to be directed to take two submariners. All of us who were ~~at~~ following the thing pretty closely felt that the odds were very high that the board would ^{then} feel that they had to balance it by picking one aviator and one destroyerman. And that whoever got orders to command the Bainbridge would be the guy who was picked. Sure enough that was the way it worked out with Calvert, Anderson, Peet, and an aeronautical engineering duty officer the aviator, ~~X~~ in my class being selected, four of them, two years early. I was one of four selected the ~~g~~following year, one year early. But fate has an interesting way of working these things out. Ray Peet, by getting command of the Bainbridge and getting promoted two years early, was required to spend five years in command of Bainbridge by Adm Rickover. During that same five year period I had a two year command of the Dewey which had everything the Bainbridge had except the nuclear power; it was first of a class. And then a year at the National War College where I was rated

the number one student. And then two years with Paul Nitze, taking a PhD in foreign policy as his Director for Arms Control and his Executive Assistant when he came to be Secretary of the Navy. So that competitively, I pulled ahead of Ray Peet during this period of time and was then selected as one of the first two in my class for admiral, along with Jim Calvert, a year before Ray Peet made it. The rivalry between us continued. Ray Peet was working for the Secretary of the Navy as a two star officer when I was promoted to be CNO and urged Governor Chafetz immediately thereafter to appoint him to three stars. I went along with this as part of the effort to get younger flag officers up and because I considered that Ray Peet had a lot of professional ability, although I did worry about his character. Ray Peet went to command of the First Fleet ~~and / as / head~~ and as he came to the end of that tour I consulted with him about whether or not he was interested in the job as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. He indicated that he was. However, before he got there, Mel Laird asked for nominations to be the military Assistant Deputy in his shop and I nominated Ray Peet for that job, partly because I felt that he would be eminently acceptable to Mel Laird and partly because I felt that I would prefer to have a different type in the DCNO surface warfare job. Ray Peet served under Laird, Richardson, and Schlesinger. By the time I nearing the end of my tenure, Schlesinger became very eager to get a fourth star for Ray Peet. He had told me that Ray had come to see him and had indicated that he had a very lucrative offer on the outside and would not be able to stay on unless he was going to be promoted. I encouraged Sec Schlesinger to let him go ahead and take the outside job. Adm Moorer came out the same way on the thing but Schlesinger did not tell Ray Peet that that was the alternative, but rather let the thing go into limbo. A couple of months later,

Adm Holloway, who had by this time been nominated to be CNO, was asked by Schlesinger if he would promote Ray Peet after he became the CNO. Jimmy Holloway consulted with me and had the same view I had that Ray Peet was not on his list for four stars and he, therefore, demurred. And said he would not like to make that decision to do so. Now the next thing that happened was that the Congress took my quarters which meant that Adm Holloway had to plan to stay in the Vice CNO's house and we therefore needed another set of quarters for the new Vice CNO, Admiral Worth Bagley. Adm Holloway recommended that we take Adm Peet's quarters as the best available and Adm Peet, who had no children at home was asked to moveⁱⁿ to a smaller set. The message was given to him by a three star Admiral Gaddis. Before Adm Gaddis could get through with his request, Adm Peet interrupted him and said forget it that he would never move. When Adm Gaddis~~X~~ reported this to me I instructed him to return and to say he was directed to give the full message to Ray Peet. He did so and explained the whole rationale as to what was going on and that it was Adm Holloway's recommendation, the new CNO. Adm Peet again refused to move. He said he would not do so unless he got a order from Sec Schlesinger. I therefore called Ray Peet and asked him is this was an accurate report. He said no that he would leave if he got a written order from me. I said he would get it within an hour. He then said that he would still have to check with Schlesinger. I therefore dictated a written order for him to inform me within 48 hours that he intended to carry out my order. Meanwhile, Schlesinger sent for me and asked me why I was picking on Ray Peet. I described ~~to~~^{to} him the sequence of events. Schlesinger asked me what my intentions were. I said my intention was to recommend ~~of~~ Ray Peet for a court martial if he didn't comply in writing. Schlesinger gave me the Delphic salute of smiling and saying nothing. The next thing I knew I heard back in writing from Ray Peet saying that

he would leave. So I assume that Schlesinger told him he had better do so. At this point Schlesinger indicated that he was somewhat disenchanted with Ray Peet for the way in which he had operated and, subsequently, it was suggested to Ray Peet that he should take the option of private employment and the Navy was spared having to wrestle with that problem anymore.

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