

but it's a contempt for people that is extremely deep-seated, and of course because of expert cognizance.

? Is this the term called "kitchen conference?"

S. Nixon was Vice President. He went over there and Rickover pulled strings to have himself included in the party. He went over and then he wanted to get into the Leningrad and the Russians would not let him below decks, and so he was on the verge of creating an incident and in a desire not to stir the waters Nixon personally intervened for him and got him admitted so that he could go down and see the propulsion system.

Z. Incidentally, a couple of times before Watergate Kissinger called me to see whether or not there was something we could do about Rickover when Rickover was taking the budgets on, and on both occasions I told him "yes" but that the President would have to be prepared to take on Capitol Hill and could they guarantee to deliver; in both cases he dropped it. So, here was the White House taking the initiative to find out if there wasn't some way the entire cast

? Whether somebody else could do it ... miss the whole point.

S. Apparently, now maybe you can verify this, I was told by one person that towards the end of his period McNamara said if he ever had any more trouble with Rickover he would take him on even if it brought the whole House - the House of

Representatives down. He'd had it. Do you think that's true?

Z. I think that is the formulation that McNamara gave after Johnson said "no, don't fire him." McNamara really but my recollection is that he said "if he gets out of line again we're going to go after him," and I suspect we'll find out from Paul Nitze that he did and that that's why they made the second effort which came a cropper in this meeting you had the dope on that I frankly never heard Nitze tell about, because McNamara was that kind of a guy. Rickover who is also the kind of a guy/would have been very careful at that point. He does put some constraints on himself and knowing that he almost got fired he probably was very careful not to let them get him with his fingers in the cookie jar, certainly until McNamara was gone, you see.

S. I don't know about that. McNamara is a very hard man - I haven't gone to him until I have, I don't want to touch him until I've touched Nitze because he's a difficult person to interview, I've been told by people who've talked to him. I don't want to go to him until I've really got all my ducks in a row to sit down and talk. And that's why (I've talked to a few Congressional people) as soon as you touch a door and his alarms go off, he begins putting up blockades so you never go to the door until you're really ready to make all the points, because

you only get one shot at it and I think that I will be very surprised if Nitze doesn't say the same thing. I mean, you had one shot and once Rickover knew you were trying that avenue he then begins building walls to keep you from ever doing it again. So, either score the first time or you don't make it. And, so there are certain areas I have avoided because I don't want to spoil them until I'm really ready to.

? Who are these captive congressmen principally?

Z Hollifield, has been a big one; Hausmer - both of them are leaving at the end of this congressional year which is good.

? Who was your second one?

S. Hausmer, Craig Hausmer.

Z. Anderson was, Pastore, Jackson understands that Rickover is a problem and he isn't a worshiper and could be gotten you know if it got important enough to him.

? Where are these fellows, Hollifield , the Atomic Energy Committee?

Z. Mel Price is very high on him. He's the Chairman of the Committee.

? Where is Hebert on Rickover?

Z. Hebert, I don't think is enchanted by him but he would basically come out for him in a showdown.

S. It's a mutual amusing, you see.

Z. Z. But Mayheim is very high on him. Mayheim practically uses verbatim what Rickover handed him to attack the Navy, each year.

? What about McClellan:

Z. McClellan, I think is not swept off his feet by Rickover, but he recognizes him as important institution.

? Stennis?

Z. Stennis, I think, is probably ^{slightly} pro-Rickover. Stennis is pretty turned off about both me and Rickover from pressing as hard as we did for the Trident and for the Navy in general.

S. I'm curious with.....was that one area where you and Rickover worked together, I mean you.....

Z. On Trident. That was an example what we could get done when we were together. We really practically took on the Senate. Now there were some awfully strong people on the other side, some pro-defense people on the other side, so it was really a tough one.

S. How in your opinion, what was the - I mean I have my own ... what was the mutual help-relationship between Admiral Kidd and Rickover?

Z. In the early period when Admiral Kidd first came to the job of Chief of Naval Materiel, he was actively seeking Rickover out in getting his help and

there's every evidence to satisfy me, although it wouldn't stand up in court, that they were linked pretty much during this period when I was being taken on so strongly. During the later part of the period, Rickover began to take Kidd on and Kidd, therefore, was hunting for a tent to enter about the time I left.

S. Let me ask you, are we talking about the post-heart attack Rickover period or pre- now because the reason I ask this is that I heard a wonderful story from the ambulance driver who drove Rickover to the Hospital in which he said that Rickover had had some kind of cardio-vascular problem, heart attack whatever it was, stroke - and he was taken downstairs and examined there and they said they couldn't do anything with him - it was beyond their means - so they had an ambulance to take him to the hospital and Kidd rode over with him. And I'm telling you what the driver told me - he said they were sitting back there and Rickover really didn't know if he was going to live or not, there really some question for a while there how serious this was, and so he began telling Kidd how to do this and how to do that, and finally he said - he said bolt upright -
not
"Kidd, you're smart enough to do my job, you're not taking notes." With that he went back down, and it seemed to me that it was about that period - I have the feeling, that's why I ask you - that somehow Rickover decided that Kidd just wasn't a strong enough ally and so he began...

Z. It was about that time that the split began. I couldn't really relate to that episode but that's about the right time. I went out to call on Rickover when he was in the hospital. We all thought he might well die, seeming to me just a symbolic thing that I ought to do, and his approach to me was not inconsistent with .. that story. He said, "Close the door and sit down. There's some things I've got to tell you," and he started rattling off the status of his programs, etc. And I urged him to stay in until he was thoroughly well and he said, "No, there's too many things I've got to get back and do and there's no one else can do them." So that's kind of consistent with what you're saying.

S. But that he was mad at Kidd because he felt that he was not a strong enough reed. That's why I've been very curious, at first they seemed to be aligned and then later on they seemed to just split apart.

? Did he ever have any of the top Admirals in the Navy in his pocket the way he has a couple of pet Congressmen?

Z. Oh, yes. He's got Admirals whose strings he pulls. Until a man has achieved a position where Rickover can no longer get him promoted, he feels like he got to pay more attention to Rick than he does to the C&O. This is true of most of the nuclear submariners. The aviator, once they've had the one aviation command , cause he doesn't have any more influence over him. The

destroyer man has other areas, but the submariner is pretty totally submerged in the Rickover empire.

? I'm talking about the 4-star guys, the senior 3-star guys, can he do much to them?

Z. No, but even there they are very cautious about him because they recognize that he can be a veto on Capitol Hill when it comes time to get...

? Can he sabotage their actual operations by messing around with his folks in the Fleet? Can he make them look bad?

Z. He hasn't tried to do that, because it's just too dangerous, you know, there's too many ways he could get caught. He's very careful. If he had been involved in the cover-up he never would have been caught.

? Let's say he is smarter than Haldeman. That's/^{not}much of a tribute, I'd say.

S. Wouldn't you say though, Admiral, that all but the most courageous Flagg Officers give Rickover a very wide berth because (a) of his veto power and (b) because ..you know you make a balance. How badly do you want to push your programs and what is the cost going to be if you take him on in something, and also because Rickover is there so long and if you see;1 Flagg Officer told me that he considered one of his misjudgments was that he had taken Rickover on something less than the most crucial issue and because of it the man he was

trying to bring along behind him, who he thought were really outstanding officers, that Rickover went back (you see he'll carry generational gentlemen) would go back and zip their careers as a way of getting/.....

? One area he stays out of is the tactical or strategic, the actual operational exercises of the Fleets.

Z. Yes, but he talks to Congress about them as tho he's the great expert.

Now he'll say, "Why don't you insist that the Navy run an ASW exercise. It'll prove how much more cost effective nuclear submarines are?" By the way in which he structures that statement he guarantees subs will look good because he leaves out the cruise missile and the air strike Incidentally, I asked Admiral Moorer's Executive Assistant , how Admiral Moorer had handled his relations with Admiral Rickover and he said Admiral Moorer never called Rickover and whenever Rick called him he'd say, "Yes Rick, Yes Rick, Yes Rick, Yes Rick," and then hang up and never do anything about it. So his style was just to maintain pleasant association but not to move on it and let Rick's momentum get it done, if it could.

? Is this typical of Moorer?

Z. Yes. Moorer was a very cling___operator; my style was to take him on, take Rickover on, if I disagreed. It caused a hell of a lot more friction.

We did get a few more conventional ships on my list.

- SS. I think that in many way the most greivous flaw he has done, he has taken an entire (you may not agree with this, other than the actual naval capabilities) the most greivous flaw to the plate is the personnel problem. I've talked with senior civil service personnel types who were involved over in BuPers for years talking about how Rickover set up certain standards and wouldn't, for instance had a distinctive factor on the man in Kenyon said it was his opinion that one of the propellents was for tension of nuclear officers was largely Rickover and the way he was constantly finagling with their careers and the fact that they lost a lot of junior officers who might otherwise have stayed in because once they had been scrunched through Rickover's wringer, they just didn't stay in the Navy.
- Z. They either were so turned off by it they got out or they had to become conformists and so that meant you were loosing the good guys.
- S. He told me that it was his opinion that one of the reasons, one of the things that really lay behind the \$15,000 continuance pay was Rickover, because they were loosing, to the point you make, that you either got the conformists or you lost the good guys because they couldn't stay in the Navy or they had to transfer out because there's no hope for a diesel submariners. It really has an effect, it's great deleterious over the long run because the whole generation

of Navy planning in terms of submarine has been also dictated by Rickover.

Z. Institutionally, it's exactly the same phenomenon as the way in which the Communist Party operates in a nation which has become communized. You either join the party to get ahead or you are a non-person.

S. That's a good point.

? However, your principal gripe in terms of naval strength is not with the submarine but with the surface program.

Z. Yes. I differ with Arleigh Burke to this extent, I believe .. I do agree it's a shame we can't continue to build some diesel submarines but it was very important to get an all or nearly all nuclear submarine fleet because it gives you a whole order of magnitude different capabilities. Once you got beyond that, this business of an invading now the surface fleet in such massive numbers is killing us.

S. Let me offer as an example because maybe I didn't make my point, his objection was not nuclear submarines, it was they were forced to do it so fast that as he said we came out of the Korean War period and we had ships that were already old then by those standards and instead of getting rid of them and building new ones and building the nuclear ships - cause he said there was no missile, we could have instead of building how many it was, you could build a third that many, and strung out over a long.....

? Were all attack submarines?

Z. The first series were attack submarines. They were important but we could have built them at a slower rate. We have more submarines than we need and less of everything else that we need. So, in that sense I agree with him.

S. He said, once the missile came in then he could understand this. He was

? On the other hand, in terms of capability you have an extremely capable submarine force and a less capable service force.

Z. That's right.

? Is that correct?

Z. That's right. Which means we could better against the submarine threats than we can against the air and sea missile threats, either of which can do us in when it comes to keeping our sea lines open. Steve, can you leave this to us.

S. Yeah. Now, I don't know how much help this'll be, I've got many more of these things. These are just 3 and they're in a specific order and were sent out. These all went out to the Philadelphia Researcher, and all these books, and I have tons of this stuff; some of it you will find useful and some of it you will not find useful, for the simple reason that most of the stuff/- I ^{the clippings}

didn't know that until I accumulated all the clippings - until I spent a year doing it - don't reflect reality.

Z. It's Rickover's own plans?

S. Well, everything in the press is Rickover's plan. That's what you have to realize. Unless yourself or almost anybody else that I ever met in public service, I don't believe an article has ever been written about Rickover - well, I won't say not only - there's one done by a guy named Absoer, Oxsoer or something like that who's now with ABC who used to be with the old New York Post, a fairly straightforward, about the best that's ever been written on Rickover - almost everything he has engineered to go along to support the Rickover image. He has been actively engaged in creating a myth for 26 years that I know of, so that everything you read must be taken within that particular grain of salt. I mean you have to recognize that he has planted it in a sense that he either let it sleek out or he called a reporter up (as he used to do with Charlie Carter of the Baltimore Sun) and leaked it to him.

Z. So Carter? doesn't have to conclude that it's right when he gets the leads.

S. Ah yes, but the Defense Corps Press, the Defense Press Corps, is fairly
----- bunch.

Z. Basically they're horrid.

? They're a pro-quos. You've got a lot of goodies in there.

S. True. Being builled as a myth, you see it made good.....

? Not only that, but I'm sure Rickover pays off you know. If guy prints one of his speeches then he gives him some goodies, too.

Z. He gives them something

S. Oh, yes. The reporters love it because you know Rickover's colorful, the editors love him, he always gives you a quote which can be made into a headline, very very

? He probably passes along other tips, and gossips about other things as a favor.

S. Oh, yes. He'll say to him, "Well, listen Charlie, (Lloyd Norman told me this)

" - he'll call you in for an interview and tell you seriously listen by the way,

secret
I know this/story and I'm glad to give it to you, I always like to help you boys in the press, by the way you might want to look at that Surface Program, because I think you might find something there," and of course he tells them who to call and they go and call up and it's like the Congress thing and they're wired up and they love it because they file good copy for their Editors and that's what they're there for, they don't want to work very hard, and it can be very discouraging work

in the Department of Defense which is hard to get information out of it, and Rickover is a good source and if you print the way he wants you to print it, he keeps feeding it.

Z. Bob, you have anything else you want to ask him.

? Not really.

Z. Steve, this has been fascinating. I hope we've given as good as we've gotten,

S. Well, I would like to do...

Z. I'll try to set up a date with Paul Nitze.

S. Yes, I would like to do if you were willing is as you go along, I'm particularly interested in this Swanson thing because it is a modern classic.

? I have a three-foot high stack of Swanson notes in my drawer at the moment, I haven't really gone into yet.

S. Did you ever contact Julian Bach?

Z. No. I can't remember now what it was about, Steve.

S. He's an agent. I gave his name to Jack Davie, and Steve Menicuse? New York.

Z. Yes.

S. I wondered if you've ever seen him.

Z. No. I went through, I used Ted Sorensen as my guy.

- S. Is he doing ?
- Z. Well, he's a lawyer who specializes in
- S. Literary agent. Literary lawyer.
- ? Does he do mostly literary work.
- Z. No. But that's one of his specialites. He should live for about a decade on what he made on Rose Kennedy.
- S I will leave you this. This does not have, I see, a lot of the interviews although I don't know how much use they will be to you. Treat it with care. It is the only copy of anything. And there are no Xeroxs available. That's my outline with which I sold the book to Grosset at an auction and he bought it. Any other information that you think of, anything else, I would be most appreciative of it.
- ? What do you think you will do. Are you really going to be able to pull it off under all formidable difficulties?
- S. I think so. I'm a very good mole and I'm not quite sure what I'm going to do financially cause I'm going to leave hut..
- ? Still working for the Navy?
- S. Yes, I'm still with Admiral Hall but I'm going to leave in November and....

Z. I thought you were going to go over and join the ..

S. Woodrow Wilson.

Z. Woodrow Wilson.

S. No. They did not give out.. they only gave 6 instead of 24 fellows...this is a very interesting story. The Administration effectively gutted that. In fact, by the way, I just en passant, if you remember when we went over there you mentioned Nitze, him, and someone in the Administration, I was told, turned that off. That they had actually considered asking him about something and somebody over in the White House..

Z. That would be Kissinger.

S. turned it off. What they did was this year instead of awarding the normal 24 scholarships, they awarded only 6, and they are all very senior academic writing things like Italo-American Economic Relations 1845-1873, nice safe...you see the politics of was written at Woodrow Wilson...

Z. This fellow, Billington, called me up and