

Z: Then there is the Joint Force Memorandum (JFM) which is a reflection of the strategic forces that can be procured for the budget level that the Secretary of Defense has authorized for the current and succeeding four years after~~x~~ in theory, looking at JSIOP and deciding that that's just more than he can afford to do. And the JSIO JFM tries to estimate then what capabilities you are going have as a result of these expenditures and to warn about the~~x~~, as we have had to do each of the last several years, about the increasing Soviet strategic capability, ~~and~~ decreasing US capability, and the fact that the Soviets are enroute to getting superiority. Now, for what ever that means, at the same time in theory the arms control efforts which are going on ought to be get~~x~~-ting evaluated in the same context. That is, there are two ways in which can have an impact on the relative strategic balance. One is ~~to~~ the way in which the Russians spend their money and ~~we~~ spend ours to build forces and the other is the way in which we negotiate limits on those arms, and when we finally get--if ever--a completely efficient process, arms control calculations and Joint Force Memoranda ought to sort of go hand in hand, but they don't yet.

R: You've described how the theory works now how closely in practice does it work?

Z: I'd say that it works a very long way in practice from the theory I have outlined. First...

R: For example, at all times during SALT when numbers proposals ^{limiting the} about ^{war-}heads and things like that came up, were you able to react almost immediately and say, "Hey, if we have this many and they have this many, here's what happens"?

Z: There were calculations made throughout the SALT process by the Joint Staff and by ~~the~~ separate teams in the Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency and OSD. They all had to done very crudely because to do a full war game calculation is something that takes months to do to play it out in all its fine grain detail. And therefore many simplifying assumptions are used in these crude quick calculations that are done and they're in my opinion somewhat dangerous. And one of the risks that you take in moving as rapidly as this government has moved from one position to another is that you don't get adequate analysis, therefore, of the significance of the changes in terms of war outcomes.

R: Well, does your intelligence indicate that the Russians have the same war-gaming capability, analytic capability, that you have?

Z: The Soviets are behind us in computers but all that really means in my judgment is that they have somewhat less sophistication and have to use much more manual input and much more manpower with the computers they've got. And traditionally, the Soviets have been willing to take the brute force approach. And I, therefore, would feel quite confident that the Soviets have a competence comparable to ours with regard to the accuracy of their calculations but perhaps slower. So the thing that happens in fact then, is that, I've outlined the theory of how things work, in actual fact a Secretary of Defense each year makes decisions ^{with} ~~as~~ regards to the budget which are ~~by~~ based on recommendations he gets from a money man, the Assistant Secretary of Defense--the Comptroller--which in the final analysis depart from all the analytical ~~work~~ work that has been done by the Secretary's Assistant ~~Secretary~~ Secretary for Systems Analysis and in his final budget calculations he may have some kind of hunch, and indeed this is true ^{of} ~~by~~ the Service Chiefs as well, he may have some kind of hunch as to what this is doing to his military capability based on the anyalsis that he's gone through at a higher ^{as} budget level but he doesn't know exactly what the consequences are ~~and~~ ^{as} he has to make these hasty final budget decisions.

R: Are the war games timed so that the results come out at the proper time for budget consideration?

Z: Yes, there is an annual process that is ponderous but theoretically appropriate that leads to calculations that emerge in time for the JSOP (Joint Strategic Operations Plan). That is the services make their calculations and put them into the Joint Staff where the debate goes on and then conclusions and decisions come out. And the JSOP goes up to the Secretary of Defense and then fiscal guidance is issued which tells everybody go back and start cutting it back.

R: Never mind about fiscal guidance. Suppose just towards the end of this highly elaborate, complicated, war game suddenly 27 new Poles are found over there in some Russian plane. Then what happens to your game?

Z: Because the state of the art isn't yet good enough to keep up with sudden changes that way, you don't have a rapid response....but where the concern caused by that is sufficiently great, you react imperically. That is by doing something in the right direction. For example, the decision to go back to the original schedule with regards to ULMS or Trident which Sen Symington promptly dubbed the accelerated Trident schedule was really in reaction to the fact that our negotiators came back and said the reason we are going to have to have an unsatisfactory outcome in SALT I is that we are not building strategic systems rapidly enough to impress the Soviets.

R: One other thing on this. You were talking about incremental changes, increases and decreases. What order of magnitude are you talking about when you are talking about incremental. I mean obviously one new missile is not going to make any difference but do 5? Do 10? Do 20? What kinds of numbers are involved?

Z: Well, the major decisions that impact on incremental changes are kind of cyclical. For example, when I was the Executive Assistant to

the Secretary of the Navy, who was Paul Nitze, ~~w~~e were in that era where Mr McNamara was taking as a matter of policy that he would no longer increase the numbers of missiles. And was trying to signal the Soviets in his policy articulations, in his speeches, that ~~if~~ they should have no incentive to try to go beyond the number of missiles that we had--1054 land based missiles and 656 sea based missiles. And faced with that kind of major policy decision that were not be increased in numbers, the services began to look for ways to get increasing capability and also there was a desire to find a cheaper way to get this capability and this led to the concept of MIRVing, that is putting numbers of warheads in the missiles. Kind of major calculations were made at that time to demonstrate the dramatic improvement in capability that could be gotten if you could MIRV.

R: Of course MIRVing isn't incremental. If you have a hundred missiles with a hundred warheads and suddenly you end up with a hundred missiles with a thousand warheads that scarcely could be called incremental.

Z: Well, it is in this sense: we, at the time of this MIRVing decision back in 1965 or so, knew based on the design ^{studies} ~~studies~~ could put 14 in each Polaris missile and make it a Posieden. And we knew that there was some number in that vicinity that we probably ought to install. And we could calculate what would be the impact of that increase by tenfold of the number of warheads that we could drop on the Russians. But in each given year, as you proceed to implement that decision, there were small numbers coming on the line and small changes at the market.

R: I suppose you also don't increase throw weight by that?

Z: No, as a matter of fact total megatonnage goes down and throw weight stays the same.

R: OK. Well, that's sort of that part of it. There's a whole other subject now that came up while I was reading the thing. Because I was

reading so much OPDEP stuff, I suppose, I got very impressed by how parochial everybody was. And I began to think of military people^a being in a sense culturally deprived or occupationally, almost incapable of taking a broad view and so forth. And I know that that's overstating the case. What deterrants are there, if any, that prevent the military from being parochial? Not only parochial in the sense that maybe parochial Air Force, parochial Army, but just military parochial?

Z: I guess the first point to make is that as one goes through the files of a series of discussions that for example, operationally deputies might be having on issues, you would tend to get the same flavor of parochialism about their positions on issues that you would get if you listened to a group of labor leaders discussing their problems. They're fighting very hard to accomplish specific objectives within a very narrow environment and they're concentrating on that. Even those same gentlemen, if you took them to another room and said now let's talk about the national problems and what are we going ~~to~~ to do about it, would immediately adopt a different frame of reference and clearly their superiors who are the Service Chiefs do^d and have to because all of the Service Chiefs are as conscious as the Secretary of Defense is of the very serious nature of the strategic problem and the rate at which the Soviets are gaining superiority, for whatever that means. And the need for us to get the very best from our dollar in order to be able to deter the Soviets. In other words, there is very great concern on the part of everyone of the service chiefs that we be able to continue to assure ourselves that we can so damage the Soviet Union in a second strike that they won't strike first. And because of ^ythis you tend to get more rapid agreement on SALT issues than you would for example in a budget discussion.

R: I'm talking also about a certain amount of a general political so-

phistication. I call to mind that one discussions~~d~~ right in the Chiefs where one of the Chiefs was carrying on something furious about a number of books that have been written about atrocities in Vietnam and really acting up something fierce about it. Or another time when somebody said, "do you think it's bad under Nixon, what would it be like if Muskie were President?", and somebody else said, "Oh mh god!" It all sounded a little bit parochial from the point of view of

Z: Well, part of the problem there, Bob, is in the Tank people tend to scratch the places that itch just like a group of journalists would siting over a cup of coffee bitching and then they would turn right around and write theri story differently then they would over that coffee clash. But, and also the particular fellow who was bitching about those books was the theater commander who was being attacked.

R: I guess that's true. I ~~did~~ gathered that. It seems to me an enormous lack of sophistication to thing that, you know, McCarthy may be one thing but to think that a man like Muskie~~d~~ would be a total disaster for the military. What's what I mean about a narrowness of vision. How much of that is there? How much of it did~~d~~ you encounter? How much of it did you suffer from or did~~d~~ you have to fight against because of your situation?

Z: There are levels of sophistication that are as dramatic as can be. As one tends to go up higher in the military and gets forced more and more into civilian and domestic problems, he tends to become more broad gaged. I think in my own case, because I served as a Commander and as a Captâin under civilian Secretaries, I was forced to go through this process much earlier. But two successsive Chiefs of Staff of the Army were as dramatically different in that regard as could be. Westy an th one hand was very narrow gaged. Abe was a very broad gaged guy who did

understand the problems of civilian authority.

R: Did he have any civilian experience much in the Army?

Z: No, I don't think his experience was much different to Westy's in regard to the extent of his exposure. He was just a more balanced and better read man.

R: Well, does naval service or military education in the service impede this kind of broadening?

Z: I would say that in general, the norm is to be impeded. That a man has to ~~be~~ work hard at being broader gauged than his professional environment. But I think, Bob, this is true in many other professions. The requirements associated with getting ahead in a military profession requires ~~you~~ such detailed study and knowledge ~~and~~ your specialty that it's easy in one's spare time to let the other things suffer. And those of us who have kept ourselves broader in perspective are either those who had an interest in other kinds of reading as a hobby or who were just able to do the extra hard work to stay qualified.

R: Well, let's talk about some of the principal players in the SALT I thing. There's Gen Mogue. There's Gen Allison; there's Adm ^{Blouin} ~~Bowen~~ and there's Gardner ~~Tucker~~ ^{Blouin} for four. I guess ~~Bowen~~'s deputy and then Van Owen, right? What kind of guys were they?

Z: Adm Blouin was the Navy OPDEP or operational deputy. His official title was Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Policy. And as such he ~~was~~ was the one who met almost daily with the OPDEPS from the other services. He was a man who had had very broad gauged preparation for this job both operationally and through having worked in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs as a Rear Admiral.

R: Did you inherit him?

Z: He was there when I came to the job and I was delighted to have him

and to keep him. He was a very sage individual and made my transition into the JCS system much smoother than it would have been otherwise because I had had absolutely no experience with that milieu. His deputy at that time...

R: You want to put that anecdote in...?

Z: Yea, Adm Blouin was a classmate and good friend of Adm Moorer with whom he used to play golf and I believe that he filled a useful role in because of his great friendship for Adm Moorer and his loyalty to me as the CNO in helping rapidly to insure that the two of us were working together well in the JCS arena. He was a man who was deficient and indefatigable but who apparently early on felt ~~that~~ some of the pressure of my numerous questions and requests as I took over. One of his staff associates reported to me~~s~~ at an appropriate time that Adm Blouin went back to his desk one day after meeting with me and said~~y~~, "Bud ~~Zumwalt~~ wants to be CINCWORLD and the only problem is we're not staffed for it." The next name mentioned was Gardner Tucker who was an Assistant Secretary of Defense--he was at the level of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis although at that time because of Congressional pressure the office had not yet been restored to the grade of Assistant Secretary of Defense. He was a man who had worked initially for the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and ~~y~~ then shifted~~over~~ to the Systems ~~BA~~ Analysis post. He was a man of technical competence but one who seemed to those of us who worked closely with him really to get lost in the forest for the trees and...

R: What does that job involve doing?

Z: Well, ~~y~~ in ~~theoretical~~ theory, it involves ~~y~~ doing all the analysis to structure force levels in the pre-final budget process for the Secretary of Defense. In actual fact, Gardner Tucker devoted himself almost exclusively to SALT and his ~~deputy~~ deputy~~y~~, John Christie, became the

man who worked on the non-strategic force levels. Tucker...

R: So he presumably was giving both the Secretary and the Chiefs some data base to work with?

Z: Yes, his line responsibility was to the Secretary of Defense but he met from time to time with the Chiefs and briefed them on studies he had done. And as the 1972 minutes of the SALT meetings with the Chiefs will indicate, he frequently rejected the Chiefs recommendation with regard to what we ought to be doing in SALT I because it was not negotiable. In other words, his whole thrust was to get a deal by progressively reducing US positions and moving toward the Soviet positions as I could perceive.

R: To whom was he being loyal in that?

Z: In that he was really being responsive to pressures from Henry Kissinger and seemed to be working as part of the Verification Panel as kind of an autonomous agent.

R: 'Cause there's stuff that appears in the Joint Chiefs stuff that I've read that indicates that Kissinger himself was extremely suspicious of Systems Analysis as a method of finding anything out.

Z: Yea. That was part of what Kissinger was saying to those who wanted to hear that point of view. At the same time he was telling Systems Analysis that the military mind was impossible to deal with and to go right ahead and do what they were doing.

R: In any case there was a certain amount of conflict between the Chiefs and Tucker?

Z: Yes there was. I think that the Chiefs by and large came to consider that Tucker, who was a fine US citizen, was just so eager for an arms control deal that he was taking his eye off what the long term stability arrangements required.

R: Well, where was Laird in the middle of all that kind of conflict?

Wouldn't you think that...

Z: Laird, as I perceived him, tried to keep himself above the daily wrangling on the Verification Panel. He had Dave Packard attending the meeting. Dave Packard seemed to me to pretty closely in tandem with Adm Moorer who representing the Chiefs. So you had the situation where frequently a paper, sort of tentatively agreed on among Gardner Tucker and Kissinger's guy Phil Odean on the NSC Staff, would then be attacked Packard and Moorer in the formal Verification Panel meetings with Kissinger trying to see how far he could push in the direction that would sell to the Soviets without precipitately overruin the Chiefs or the Defense Department.

R: Cockell did make the point that Laird was sort of not interested in getting into the details of this whole SALT business.

Z: That's correct but Laird did keep in close touch with Paul Nitze whom he had personally asked to take the job as his ~~personal~~ representative on SALT and Paul Nitze would meet with him and brief him and talk to him each time he came home. And I personally have the strongest confidence that Laird's decision to go back to the original Trident building schedule was based on Paul Nitze's view that we were in real trouble with regard to the SALT discussion.

R: I suppose probably that goes on in the OPDEPS, the parochial part of all this was something Laird didn't want to get himself tangled up in.

Z: No, he clearly wanted to stay out of that. He clearly had a problem of not trusting Henry Kissinger and not knowing when Henry Kissinger was going to come up on his blind side. And therefore, he didn't consider himself, and properly so, in any way subordinate to Kissinger and he wanted to maintain his line access to the President, Commander-in-Chief, by having Packard participate in meetings, keeping him informed and then Laird saving himself to bring his pressure to bear on the

President.

R: OK. Now who was General Voight?

Z: Gen Voight was at that period the Director of the Joint Staff and he was an Air Force general.

R: Was he a 4-star general?

Z: He is now a 4-star general. He was at the time a 3-star general. He also had had a tour of duty as a 2-star general in ISA in the era of Paul Nitze.

R: His first name was?

Z: Johnnie. He was a Nitze trained man and showed the sophistication that always results from that kind of polish. A very broad gauged guy who subsequently became the Air Force 4-star commander in Vietnam and then inherited the whole theater when the Army forces were withdrawn and is now our Army NATO Commander in Europe. In so far as I could see Johnnie Voight was about as non-parochial as any military man can be in the SALT and strategic discussions.

R: He was an able guy then? He ran the Joint Staff right?

Z: Yes. And he was the team captain of the OPDEPS.

R: And the Navy had no complaint with him at any time?

Z: No. I think the Navy was very satisfied.

R: Well, I noticed that one of the things that bugged him was apparently he was very annoyed that Allison didn't come under his purview.

Z: Yea, the problem was that Gen Wheeler, when he sensed the early SALT efforts were not being well handled by the Joint Staff, felt a need for a special approach to this problem. And he apparently knew Gen Roy Allison personally and felt that he was a kind of sophisticated intellectual guy who could do the job and deal with civilian whiz kids and so forth. And so his position in the hierarchy was that he was a Special Assistant to the Chairman. He didn't come under the JCS as a corporate

body and therefore he didn't come under the Director of the Joint Staff. This left Gen Voight in the ~~of~~ status of a guy who was really sort of the executive officer to the corporate bosses, the JCS, responsible for getting the work done and yet not having any real control over Gen Allison who was involved in a significant fraction of the problems that the Joint Staff was dealing with. So he had properly ~~of~~ a bitch.

R: Actually, a negotiator in that position off with a delegation is not just a Charlie Mc Carthy for the Chairman or the Joint Chiefs. He doesn't ~~say~~ just simply say what he is told to say from back home?

Z: He has lot's of room to talk but very little room to budge from the policy position. In other words...

R: Whose policy position? He's ~~really~~ ^{really} under control of whoever controls ~~the~~ Delegation from the White House to...

Z: It's kind of an interesting point. First, because there is so much difference of view within the various agencies of the government, the Joint Chiefs have always felt more comfortable having their own man on the scene listening to the nuisances and flavor so he can report whether he agrees with the rest of the delegation as to what the actual situation is. And occasionally ~~xxx~~...

R: Within the delegation he can speak for the Chiefs?

Z: That's right. And occasionally, if he doesn't agree with a message being sent back, and whenever he doesn't and occasionally he didn't, he will have the message say that the SALT delegation less the JCS representative have the following view and the JCS representative has the following view. And this was considered an appropriate technique. Similarly the ~~ACDA~~ ACDA representative or Mr Nitze as the Defense representative could take a position differently than ~~the~~ the delegation. But they were all under one overriding constraint and that was that ~~any~~ any

time a NSDM was signed that then represented a Presidential decision which they were all bound to support. It was only as they began to get into areas that went beyond the constraints of the NSDM and to explore new areas that dissent was possible as new policy decisions were being considered.

R: Was Allison a satisfactory representative as far as you and the Chiefs in general were concerned?

Z: I thought that Allison was not a stand out. I think he did a satisfactory job but not an outstanding job. First, I think Allison, unlike Vhight, did get somewhat parochial from time to time trying hard to throw in a flavor that would support Air Force Minuteman when the national decision making probably should have held up less for Minuteman. Second, I didn't think he was quite bright enough to deal with the tricky nuisances that had to be dealt with.

R: How about his Soviet counterpart? Was he...decently with that guy?

Z: So far as I could see, he dealt satisfactorily with his Soviet counterpart. Bill Cockell might have an additional judgment on that. He was closer to reading the daily message traffic. I noticed that in going through the hearings that were held after the SALT deal was signed that Allison was not a particularly good witness. And I recalled in reading it that Sen Jackson had been very disenchanted with him after those hearings.

R: Is he a 3-star general?

Z: He was, yes. He's now retired.

R: Then the only other one is Blouin's successor.

Z: Blouin's successor was the man who had been his deputy, RADM Frank Vannoy who moved up and became a Vice Admiral when Blouin retired. Frank was an old hand at the Joint business having been on the Joint Staff and

had several tours in the Plans and Policy shop. And although he didn't have quite the philosophical depth of Adm Blouin he was a very able and useful deputy.

R: Alright, there's another mysterious reference--mysterious to me--about MARCS. Tell me about MARCS. That's the radar. Apparently there was a difference between Navy and other services about what to do about radars in SALT I negotiations.

Z: And you say it's referred to as MARCS?

R: M-A-R-C-S. Masts something or other radar control system or something.

Z: That term doesn't stand out in my mind at all. It must ^{have been} ~~be~~ something that was used for just a brief period in the dogma because it doesn't stand out in my mind. You'll have to ask ~~about~~ Bill Cockell about it/

R: We don't need, I suppose, to go into the Army wanting change the whole strategy from offense to defense, but that's a little much. You've already explained all these other things, all the SAG&A and SIOPs and all. Then intelligence. I have here various issues, FBS and NCA; I don't know what I meant by it when I put it down. But do you have something to say about it?

Z: You'll find FBS standing out through the whole period of SALT both before and after the May '72 agreement. But the big issue was that the Soviets had very brilliantly developed this as their device for getting around what ~~we~~ they knew we were going to be demanding, parity. And they were claiming because the US had nuclear systems in Europe both in its tactical aircraft and in its aircraft carriers, it could reach Russia, whereas the Soviets tactical weapons in Europe could not reach the United States. That this was an asymmetrical advantage on our part that had to be taken into consideration when discussing central systems.