

R: Cockell has a lot about that on a tape we got already so I'm not concerned about that. However, about National Command Authority, apparently the Navy did differ with the other services...

END OF SIDE A TAPE 41

TAPE 41 SIDE B

Z: I don't recall the basis for the difference. Do you recall what it was?

R: I think the Navy was sort of for it. But again maybe this had been the OPDEP parochial level.

Z: I suggested that we ought to be interested in the NCA after discussions with Paul Nitze when it became evident to me that the only real virtue in an ABM system if you were going to be held down to the numbers that we were talking about was to gain some additional time clearly to overwhelm a Minuteman field that was defended 100 ABMs. All you needed was 101 warheads to come at it. The 101st would get through if all the first 100 were shot down. And yet when you looked at that as 100 missiles protecting Washington and having to wait for 101 that gave you a few additional minutes to evacuate the President and to get a decision made as to what form of retaliation to take.

R: It seems to me there's some study there that said it might give you ten minutes.

Z: I think we ended up considering somewhere between 5 and 10 minutes was the time you might get.

R: And that was a worth while amount of time to work for?

Z: Yeah, when you're talking about those critical final moments in a Presidential decision, it could really make the difference.

R: You couldn't get the President out in 5 minutes, could you?

Z: If you were in a period of strategic crisis, you would probably have a helicopter stationed on the White House lawn.

R: Yeah, I guess he probably could get out in 10 minutes. Was there some parochialism in this too? Was it the Air Force's ~~missiles~~ <sup>interceptors</sup> that we're..... protecting?

Z: No. I don't think that that was a consideration at all. I never

felt that Minuteman was surviveable with or without ABM. ABM just took a few more Soviet missiles to get it.

R: What is the safeguard that was ~~deployed~~ being deployed then?, presumably is now deployed out there in Grand Forks? Is that an area defense thing?

Z: The safeguard is capable of defending an area as extensive as the area in which the Minuteman at Grand Forks are located. It's ~~not~~ a site defense for small areas or an area defense for small sites. In order for it to have provided national coverage you'd have had to had many more than were planned.

R: There seemed to be an argument that I didn't quite understand about two was not enough but four might have been enough. That I don't understand.

Z: I never had any great interest in that. It seemed to me, you know the original scheme was to have 12 sites and that could have given you some respectable thin defense against China or against an accidental strike. But when you got down to four you were talking about just...

R: Well then you were talking about four Minuteman fields weren't you? Well that's what they were talking about?

Z: Yeah, so <sup>it's</sup> ~~the~~ difference between four and two. But again you're talking about a very small additional expense on the offensive side to be able to override it. So that's why I kept ~~being~~ <sup>getting</sup> driven back to the fact that the NCA seemed to be where you seemed to get the most for your money, that 5 or 10 additional minutes to get the President out ~~a~~ and to get decision time.

Meeting with Members of NSC Staff Re: SALT II

1) An NSC meeting will be held at 3 o'clock today 18 October to discuss 4 options: Option A (JCS option)-2000 vehicles each including bombers, no MIRV constraints either throw weights or warheads, no throw weight constraints, a 300 MLBM sub limit. Option B (SECDEF Option)-2000 vehicles but with a ~~6000/4000~~ 6 million megaton throw weight and a 4 million megaton MIRV throw weight. This includes a 250 heavy vehicle sublimit. This heavy vehicle sublimit is to apply either to bombers or SS-9s and follow ons so that it'll take care of both sides. This Option B would require a reduction from the present Soviet throw weight of about 12 million megatons and is the hardest line of the options. In other words, SECDEF is ~~is~~ in a tougher position than the JCS. Option C is a state ACDA variant actually structured by the NSC Staff and consists of 2200 vehicles for the Soviets with a 1050 vehicle MIRV limit and no megatonnage limit as opposed to a 2000 total for the US with a 1300 MIRVed sublimit. This variant is quite similar to the one Henry Kissinger suggested was negotiable with the Soviets after his last trip to Moscow. Option D, which is a new option invented by Kissinger at the last moment, consists of freedom by either side to choose from among the two options in Option C available to the US and the USSR. That is the US could choose a 2200 vehicle limit and a 1050 MIRV sublimit.

In preparation for this NSC meeting, Kissinger gave President Ford a two page paper to read over the weekend which Pres Ford liked so much he asked that it be expanded <sup>and</sup> ~~in~~ a 20-page variant was prepared for him which contained all of the usual Kissinger rationale suggesting that the US must get the best deal it can and can't compete with the Soviets.

At the last NSC meeting last week, Pres Ford sided with Henry Kissinger that the American people, through their elected representatives

that is the Congress, would not be willing to support budgets necessary to compete in the strategic field with the Soviets. This was after Sec. Schlesinger had suggested that one billion dollars additional would do the job but after Bill Clements argued that it would take more. Pres Ford said that in either event he wouldn't get the support from Congress. (This judgment, however, was made without any consideration of laying out the facts either within the executive branch as to what would be required and ~~it/s~~ without any consideration of taking it to the people.)

On the subject on the latest SALT discussions, Kissinger has had to send a message to Alexis Johnson telling him at the outset of the SALT meetings not to talk to the Russians about anything much until he got guidance <sup>and</sup> ~~it/s~~ the NSDM didn't get out for about two weeks after they went back. The NSC meeting today is to get Kissinger ready for his trip to Moscow and there's great concern within the Pentagon that the President will come down in favor of Henry's position which is to accept second best.

At SALT on the subject of FBS the Russians are making it quite clear that they are going to insist on retaining <sup>their</sup> ~~a~~ superiority in central systems as a compensation for the Forward Based Systems which the US has. And the Russians are making it clear that carriers will continue to be considered part of the Forward Based Systems, even if they are removed from the Mediterranean in view of their flexibility. When SALT delegation stopped by way of NATO on their way back home recently, the NATO nations demanded assurances that the United States would not sell out on Forward Base Systems. Alexis Johnson gave them this assurance and finally under repeated pressure committed himself that the United States government would consult with NATO if it contemplated any policy change with regard to FBS. This seems to suggest that Kissinger

is going to be under great pressure given his own desire to give the Russians a deal on carrying forward the superiority of Russian central systems. In that regard, it is the theory of one informed member of SALT that Kissinger has already assured the Russians privately that the central based systems superiority ~~they~~ got in SALT I will be carried forward into any SALT II. And he reminds that the initial NSDM guidance that the delegation was given when they went back for SALT II told them to stay away from interfering with the first 3 articles of SALT I which dealt with the number of ICBMs, SLBMs, and the site or their silo dimensions, suggesting that Kissinger was anxious to avoid any reopening of this issue. However, since this guidance was inconsistent with later parts of the NSDM, the SALT delegation chose to disregard that part of it.

In view of the critical nature of these discussions, I have gotten together with my old friend and we've agreed that I will try to see both Jackson and Rumsfeld to try to get Jackson to call the President and toughen him up and to try to get Rumsfeld to make the President aware of our proper concerns. And then my old friend will follow up when he gets back ~~from~~ to town next week. My old friend's view is that the Russians are so nervous about how well things are going for them that they are trying to give the United States in their negotiations at the present time every item of window-dressing <sup>that they can</sup> without relinquishing any of the advantages that they see coming their way. I stated that my view was that the Russians are probably being fed this view from Henry Kissinger. In either event, the conclusion that the Soviets would be drawing, if this hypothesis is right, is that they better not rile the American public too much but rather slow down the rate at which they score their negotiating victories in order not to drive us not to do something dangerous to their long term interests.

AT the recent VP meeting, Gen Brown was asked to explain his JCS Option ~~pos/ki~~ A position and his explanation was that it's virtue was that it was simple and understandable. (General consensus is that so is surrender.)

Gen Rounéy's view is that the SALT delegation saw the Soviets making every effort to appear flexible in the latest rounds while not being flexible. This is consistent with my old friend's theory.

The general consensus is that Henry will use Option C as his minimum position and Option D as his preferred position and by throwing in a 7 million megaton total throw weight constraint and a 10,000 warhead MIRV constraint will seek ~~to~~ to draw Schlesinger aboard as the only alternative to leaving the government. And that this will then make it possible to talk to the Congress about some reductions having been achieved.

My old friend reports that a recent NSC paper pointed out that no reductions in strategic arms expenditures by the US could be achieved under any foreseeable SALT arrangement. This was apparently unnoticed by the JCS although SECDEF picked it up. It makes the problem one that will even be more difficult to put across to Congress. Old friend and I feel that Jackson has got to maintain a low public profile on these issues ~~right~~ now as he campaigns for the Presidency and that we therefore have to get to somebody like Buckley to see ~~if~~ ~~if~~ ~~if~~ if he can not carry the torch on stiffening up the President.

~~Rice-Zumwalt on SALT~~

### The JFK Story

When we got the word that President Nixon wanted to meet in the 6th Fleet we also got the word that he did not want John F. Kennedy to be the flagship on which the meeting took place. There was considerable shuffling and maneuvering to try to be sure that we had a different flagship on which we met, (I need to research to see what ship we actually finally ended up on.) It was our understanding that the President did not want this very public event to remind people of J. F. Kennedy.

### Back to Rice-Zumwalt on SALT

R: This evidently came up because there was various self-righteous material in the Joint Chief minutes about while we are fiddling around, the Russians in not reaching an agreement, the Russians keep building and building. And the question simply is, weren't we building and MIRVing and doing all this all at the same time. I mean, if it was both ~~sides~~ sides continued to improve their strategic forces during that time is that correct?

Z: Yes the problem as we saw it though is the following one: we saw ourselves headed for a deal where there was going to be a set number of missiles given to the Russians and to ourselves and no constraints on MIRVS.

R: This was after Nixon-Breszhnev, you're talking about?

Z: Yes, after the May 71 announcement. And it was clear that both sides would therefore be able/<sup>to</sup> continue to MIRV and that the Soviets would have a great superiority in total numbers over time because of their ~~throw-weight~~ throw-weight advantage. And therefore the desire on the part of the JCS was to get the deal on numbers set with a date early enough

that it held down the total numbers into which they would have the continuing right to MIRV.

R: I see. Meanwhile however we were going ahead and ~~re~~deploying the safeguard out here in North Dakota. . .and we were doing ~~us~~ various things ourselves. And effectively MIRVing submarines too, right?

Z:

Z: That's right.

R: Now what I wish ~~is~~ you would do now is give a kind of a narrative of the dynamic of ~~our~~ your getting involved in SALT over the first year and a half, you know, some of the things you said about you knew there was a tiger in the jungle and the early business, and also the defects in the JCS system and your inexperience with the JCS system as ~~another~~ contributing factors to their not being as good a military input into SALT in the beginning as they should have been. Just go on about that.

Z: When I began to think about the challenges that I would face after my nomination to be Chief of Naval Operations, one of the things that concerned me ~~is~~ was the knowledge that there was an unseen tiger in the jungle, namely the ~~Strategic Arms Limitation~~ Strategic Arms Limitation TALKs were already getting ready to start and did in fact start before I took over as CNO. I had a very healthy respect for the ~~intricacies~~ intricacies of this because I had been involved in negotiating the Test Ban Treaty when I was Director of Arms Control back in 1962, and as a matter of fact together with Paul Nitze I had done about a 69 page analysis of the complications~~is~~ involved in trying to get what we then used to refer to as a separable first stage disarmament agreement, and I have a copy of that paper which will be coming to you Monday, to show that I had thought through to a pretty fine grain the complexities of the problems why I had a healthy respect for it. I therefore considered that ~~OK~~

one of the things I ought to do in laying out my orientation trip back home, which involved going first through the rimlands of the Western Pacific and then over into the Mediterranean and Europe, a visit to Vienna where the SALT delegation was already ensconced, and an opportunity to get briefed by two of my old ~~friends~~ friends, Paul Nitze, Alexis Johnson was not there yet, on the status of things to that point so that I would be better able to run the Navy's part of the problem. However, soon after sending a message back suggesting that this is one of the things that I would like to do, I received a telephone call from Governor Chafee's office stating that they had heard from Admiral Moorer that this was a bad sign that I was getting ~~a~~ ready to have a meeting with Paul Nitze ~~with~~ before ever taking over in view of the closeness of our previous association. And it was suggested that I not visit him so instead, General Allison flew into Brussels to brief me while I was there, (I'd better check to make sure it was Brussels and not Stuttgart). I say this to demonstrate that I started out with a fairly healthy concern about the complexities of the problem. . .

R: Did you ~~write~~ write a memo about that briefing?

Z: I believe that there is a memorandum of the details of that briefing. I need to get a copy of that paper if it's available. I then came back to the JCS to take the job and to be a member of the JCS, and had the problem that I was somewhat of a novice with regard to the way in which JCS procedures worked. My previous experience had been at a level in the hierarchy when I worked for Paul Nitze as Assistant Secretary of Defense and again when he was Secretary of the Navy, where one could get things done by getting to a ~~single~~ single decision maker and I ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> not ~~initially~~ initially well indoctrinated into the committee solution approach of the JCS. But after a few meetings, it became

clear that this was going to be a very bureaucratic ~~ppf~~ process, and it was going to be very hard to grapple in a clear and precise way as each one of us as individual members of the JCS were capable of doing with the issues as a corporate body.

R: Was this complicated by the fact that your initiation to the JCS was also Moorer's initiation as Chairman?

Z: It was... some of my initial reticent was a result of the fact that Admiral Moorer was there both as a Chairman and as a more experienced naval officer, and former CNO. So I tended...

R: What I meant was did Moorer in his early days, never having been to supervise and run the Joint Staff before, did he find this Joint Staff a tiger whose tail he hadn't quite managed to get a hold of?

Z: No. I think that Adm Moorer was well equipped after 3 years as CNO to step in. He had been acting Chairman a number of times, and he was pretty well up to speed on the SALT issues having grappled with them as CNO. But nevertheless what he could do as a person was different from what he could do as chairman of a committee. And so there was a kind of a floundering process, and it was the early discovery of this and the recognition that it was going to be very hard to get the kind of clear and precise work that I'd been used to doing in the Arms Control field, that led me to conclude that one of the things that the CNO executive panel ought to get busy on was strategic issues in order so I could have a source of information.

R: It is also true isn't it that however important you thought the SALT was you would not have made getting on top of this issue one of your very first priorities in taking over the Navy right?

Z: Yesk this is correct because we all visualized at that time that it was something that would be fairly slow moving as indeed it was. It

really didn't get going with a vengeance until May of 71, nearly a year later. However, the surprising thing at that point was to discover the extent to which there had been discussions going about which the Chief knew nothing, and the extent to which ~~his~~ decisions could be made which committed the Chief after the fact to support Presidential policy before we had gotten ourselves on record with the President.

R: When did you begin to discover that?

Z: Well, it was when the May 1971 announcement came out. In other ~~my~~ words it was apparent that the President was going to be willing to make decisions in the Arms Control Field without having firm knowledge of the JCS positions on those ~~of~~ specific decisions.

R: ..... may it have been put out with very little input from the (inaudible).

Z: That may be accurate. My recollection is, Bob, I'll have to re-search the papers that Option E had really been signed out as a ~~new~~ <sup>??</sup> ~~idea~~ before I took over.

R:

R: Yes, but it's signed out without much consultation with ~~the~~ the Chiefs?

Z: Yes, but coming into a relay race and picking up the baton at the point that I did, either I was not properly briefed or ~~perhaps~~ not properly seized myself with the extent to which this process was taking place. I ~~felt~~ felt both that there was time for me to get read in and get a body of people developed that could advise me, and that the Chiefs were going to be able to get a specific ~~part~~ position into the President on specific issues. ~~My~~ Subject to reviewing the papers and correction, I believe that it was the May '71 ~~new~~ bomb that really accelerated my intensity of focus in the SALT area. That point I need

to review all the papers on to be sure. The very first weekend, or ~~xxx~~ the ~~xxx~~ very first <sup>two</sup> ~~xxx~~ days after I took over on 1 July, on the 4th of July, President Nixon signed NSDM 69 which contained within it Option E, an option known only to the White House, prepared by Henry Kissinger; and option designed not to be acceptable to all agencies in Washington, but rather one which was designed to be negotiable. ~~It~~ provided for no MIRV ban, for no reduction in strategic vehicles, that is 1900 were to be authorized, and provided bombers numbers equal to the number of Soviet bombers, and for 250 SS9's. This was a ~~x xxx~~ rather significant development of a proposal and one which was developed in a manner completely bypassing the JCS.

R: What did it contain with regard to numbers for the military. Did it mean reductions, did it ~~kmean~~ cutting ~~x~~ back ~~xxx~~ plans or. . .?

Z: It meant that the U. S. would keep the ~~x~~ 1,054 ICBM's and the 656 SLBM's but that we could then only keep 190 B-52's instead of the 250 that had been planned as a reduction from the existing 500. And so it had a significant impact on force levels for which the Chiefs had not been consulted. Now, this was of course an option among a series of options, but the fact that it was there ~~x~~ as an option which the White House was planning to put forward to the Russians meant that force level changes had been potentially decided on by the White House without consultation with the Chiefs.

R: Was there a wailing and gnashing of teeth in the JCS over this, or did you all accept it with undue ~~xxxxxxx~~ serenity?

Z: The NSDM was actually dated 9 July, although it had apparently been signed on the 4th of July. ~~xxx~~ In the JCS Admiral Moorer reported that the NSDM had been worked in such a way that the reduction in bombers was required and ~~xxx~~ that no new silos could be constructed.

The latter was considered by the JCS to be specially serious, since it denied us the opportunity of the two-way flow to build large mega-tonnage missiles. But also forced us to give up our superiority in ~~making~~ bomber mega-tonnage. In other words by the reduction in bombers we ~~were~~ were giving up mega-tonnage by the fact that we couldn't have any way to change the silos themselves we ~~were~~ weren't able to pick that mega-tonnage back up in terms of larger silos as the Russians had.

R: . . .one way to mix part of this so that presumably there was one body that thought that the one-way mix which ~~would~~ <sup>drove</sup> the Russians ~~out~~ <sup>out</sup> to sea was an advantage to the U. S. is that right?

Z: That was considered to be an advantage to the U. S. if the Russians took it, but the fact that we froze the Russian large mega-tonnage silos and closed off that route to ourselves was again considered a serious setback.

R: Now put ~~me~~ yourself and your reactions about all this, I mean what were they?

Z: My reaction at the time was one of concern at the theory of the way in which it was done, and. . . (end side B).