

Q. Do you believe the military authority would give him the option not to
or would he be forced ?

Z. I don't think that anyone can answer that other than the Commander in Chief himself. Clearly, the military would give him several choices: one would be to do nothing, one would be a massive spasm in order to assure that all nuclear weapons got off before any were destroyed, and then there would be a series of in-between choices. In the days of Mr. McNamara, when he was Secretary of Defense, we had one data point as to what advice the President was getting and that is Mr. McNamara's advice to the President was if one nuclear burst goes off in the United States, wait for the second one. And by that he meant the awesomeness of the decision to retaliate was so terrible and the consequences of a world destroyed so terrible that one opted first to wait to see if it wasn't a nuclear accident, either self-inflicted or one that arrived from without, rather than to retaliate at that instance. This is something that each President has obviously got to have worked out in his own mind as to the action that he is going to take.

Q. When you spoke in terms of the Cuban Missile Crisis ,
will you elaborate a little bit on the way in which these 2 options came out of
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Z. First, there was an overwhelming consensus within the Executive Committee

that we could not tolerate the sudden secret emplacement in violation of their solemn promises given personally to the President of this doubling of the magazine tonnage that they could bring to bear and the halving of the warning time that they would be able to achieve. That was almost unanimous within all of the civilian authority, including the President himself, who considered that the acceptance of that sudden reversal of strategic balance would have been a deathblow for him politically and a very serious thing for the country. So then the question was how best to prevent it from happening. In the initial discussions the advice he was getting from the then Joint Chiefs of Staff came down fairly heavily in favor of the so-called surgical air strikes, and there were members of the Executive Committee - the civilians sitting in on these meetings - who felt very much the same way. There were others like Mr. Paul Nitze - who will be here - who counselled that one had to think through the consequences of that, not only with regard to the immediate confrontation and the greater risk that that would involve of getting nuclear retaliation from the other side, although at that time it was considered by all hands to be a much lower likelihood because of the tremendous advantage that we had in strategic power at that time, something we no longer have, So as these decisions began to be debated, more and more of the senior members of the Executive Committee began to join that school of thought

advocated by Paul Nitze which was that we ought to look at the question of blockade more seriously. It was much less efficient, much slower moving thing, but it had the advantages of its weaknesses. Once the decision not to make a "clean surgical strike" was made, the Joint Chiefs of Staff's role then became merely the technical one of advising how best to carry out the details of the blockade.

Q.

Z. Almost nothing. One of the common fictions is that they have a lot of parochialism when the country is an extremist. There is parochialism with regard to competition for weapon systems and in the annual budget, etc. But I have never seen a time when I felt - either when I was looking upward at them or when I was one of them - the Joint Chiefs of Staff really were parochial with regard to the gut decisions; for example, as the Soviet have begun to overtake us in the field of strategic power, I have been as strong an advocate of the B-1 strategic bomber and the Army hard-fight anti-ballistic missile research and development as I have the Navy Trident submarine. The strongest advocates of the clean surgical strike were within the Executive Committee itself. Within the ^{real} Chiefs there was no/parochial rivalry there because we would have used Air Force, Navy and Marine airplanes, had it been done.

Q. How would you characterize the relationship between the

. . . . presidency and the Pentagon staff ?

Z. I would describe the relationship as seldom. The former President was one who had an almost paranoid reluctance to have a shirtsleeves kind of a give and take. He wanted all of his domestic material screened through Haldeman and all of his military and foreign policy material screened through Kissinger and he, therefore, made himself captive to those two gentlemen - each of whom were human and fallible and each of whom were quite capable of tweaking the advice, tilting it in their favor rather than giving balanced advice but rather tilting it in favor of views they held. So that the President surrendered his proper role of being the one who had to monitor adversary give and take and truly to understand the flavor of it, the nature of sincerity and intensity behind that when it was given, and instead was - as I suggested - captive to the nuances of two very deft staff personnel. The Joint Chiefs of Staff as a group during my four years had 3 meetings with the President. I had 2 others with him as a result of the Jordan crisis in September 1970, and all other contacts were ceremonial in nature.

Q. Henry Kissinger said there was nothing that could have been done to prevent the Turkish occupation of Cyprus. Is that your ?

A. No. I think that there was a great failure on the part of the foreign policy of the United States in permitting this to come about. We've had two

almost identical precursors over Cyprus between the Turks and the Greeks and in both cases by very deft, early reaction on the part of State in making use of the very strong military powers that the United States has with both the Turks and the Greeks at all levels, we were able to keep them pried apart. The State Department was just looking the other way in this crisis; the problem being that Secretary Kissinger will not delegate and will only deal with those things that he has in mind at the time, and they didn't get his attention early enough.

Q.

Z.

In the Cuban missile blockade....Well, I think the blockade is kind of a classic extreme because there you have two superpowers personally involved; in this later confrontation at the Yom Kippur War only at the very end were they directly involved and it was action against Soviet strategic power that we were taking so the President controlled it right down to the minute details almost how much rudder to put on when changing course. Once one gets involved in actual hostilities, as in the Southeast Asia War, even there the President retained quite a bit of control - Mr. Johnson used to personally select the targets that would be struck - but once those kinds of decisions were made it's not possible for Washington, even the Joint Chiefs of Staff, really to maintain control over the level of detail. You have to delegate some of that to the

field commander.

Q. I would like you to solve one of the questions here which I think is very important . How does the Commander in Chief really get the information he wants in order to see what he wants? We all know that the complexity of all military establishments are enormous. Now, he is the civilian and . Can you give an example of failures of channelling through a limited number of persons . We have also an example of McNamara trying to develop systematic way of making evaluations for the purposes of information. Every President tried to solve or had this problem, can you comment on what these things - preferable structures or preferable arrangements are that the President can manage this critical information?

Z. This, of course, really gets right to the guts of the problem that the President has with regard to using his power as Commander in Chief. We've talked about the extreme - President Nixon - who was antiseptic about it and cut off, therefore, almost all his antenna. Another example is that ^{which} Mr. Johnson used - although he was not candid with Congress, with the majority of Congress, - he did within the Executive Branch encourage debate. And Secretary Rusk was extremely good about insuring that any dissent within the Executive Branch at any senior

level, not only the Joint Chiefs of Staff but Assistant Secretaries of Defense or Assistant Secretaries of State, were brought in if they had a real heartburn about a given issue to see the President so that he had their views. Therefore, Mr. Johnson was a much better informed man in making his mistakes than Mr. Nixon was in making his. Now, every President obviously when he gets through listening to all the inputs still has the problem of making the decision. And Mr. Johnson overriding backdrop within which he was making his decisions was that he was desperately anxious to get on with winning that Southeast Asia War with what he thought was honor, so he could get on with his real love which was the tremendous domestic program for which he had the whole legislative base through the Congress and wasn't able to find the money because of the expenditures in Southeast Asia. So he was driven by this fantastic desire to get it over with but on his terms and then to get on with funding the domestic program. And he didn't take much of the advice that he was getting. I think, therefore, that if you could have had a combination of those two presidents, that is, Mr. Johnson's willingness to be open and accessible within the Executive Branch and Mr. Nixon's better ability to really think these things through, given the input that under that other system would have been broader, you'd have kind of an ideal example of the way in which a president ought to operate.

Q. You said that Mr. Johnson

Z. Well, I think that David Halberston's "Best and the Brightest" is a kind of a good example of how limited in a tintype history can be early on. You can't write history immediately after the fact. It will take 50 to 100 years to have access to everything. Let me give you one example: and try this out on Paul Nitze when he's up here - his name is mentioned once in that book in a very indirect, unimportant way. To read that book you would have the feeling that the key players in the Pentagon were McNamara, Kilpatrick, Vance, McNaughton and Bundy. Two of those, McNaughton and Bundy, were Paul Nitze's subordinate. Paul Nitze was one of the strongest of those, as I, who felt it was a mistake to get involved in Southeast Asia in a major land war. He was not fired, he was kept on and ended up being McNamara's Deputy Secretary of Defense, after we were well involved. He was, I think, pushed a little bit out of the main stream with regard to Southeast Asia. Once he fought hard against the decision to go in but that is a kind of a natural phenomenon that when you are looking for someone to implement policy you tend to go with the man who has demonstrated a strong commitment to it, and he was kept very busy on a whole series of very important things. In other words, I want to make two points: first, there's one example of a guy who was not shunted aside

and second, that the best and the brightest is greatly tilted away from accuracy by not devoting a couple or three chapters to the tremendous work that Paul Nitze did. The single difference is that Paul Nitze didn't dash back and write memoranda for record, McNaughton and Bundy did.

Q. Do you think it would be possible in a situation where Kennedy decided that he didn't want the Cubans joining in the military . . . ?

Z. No. There is absolutely no way that military force can ever be used without the President's personal permission. It's just beyond belief, with one exception, and that is for an individual ship or aircraft to defend itself if it's attacked, but when it comes to making a decision to use military force in any kind of a foreign policy situation, it's just absolutely unbelievable to me that any military man could ever make that decision unless it was an act of utter madness.

Now, the CIA is extremely meticulously controlled by this now highly publicized Committee and any decisions that are going to be criticized - any actions taken by the CIA that are going to be criticized - have got to be charged to the President of the United States and his personal staff including his Special Assistant for National Security matters and his Secretary of State.

Q. . . . ?

Z. Well, I was not a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time. At that time I was Commander of our Naval Forces in South Vietnam so all I know about it is the heresy that I've been given on coming to the job. The reaction was one of utter consternation because by the time the Joint Chiefs of Staff really knew about it and could take action it was already too late to prevent the seizure. The action that could have been taken to prevent the seizure could have been taken in the field and this is one of those cases of self-defense for which there was ample authority. In my judgment, the Commanding Officer failed in his duty and the Admiral in Command of the Naval Forces in Japan, as well as his superior, the over-all military Commander, failed in their responsibility rapidly to react before that ship got boarded and after she was boarded before it got towed back into port. Once she was in port, in my judgment, the decisions that were made were proper because we lacked the military force to do anything more about it, bogged down as we were in Southeast Asia.

Q. fight your way out of this?

Z. I believe that the Navy Regulation is quite clear: It's been a Navy Regulation ever since the Chesapeake surrendered to the Shannon - "Thou shalt not suffer thy ship to be surrendered." His duty was to fight until his ship

had been sunk and merely judicious use of his rudder would have made it impossible for them to board that ship and would have forced them to continue firing until the ship had been sunk while he himself was taking action to sabotage the ship to help it sink.

Q.

Z. First, let me say as of the time I retired on the 30th of June, no such efforts had been made; second, I don't believe any efforts were taken. The White House immediately denied that report; it was an allegation that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger had said, but he has never confirmed it. One has to turn that right around, I think, and say "Shouldn't we be worrying about a Secretary of Defense who is preparing not to carry out the orders of the President." It raises almost as many questions as it answers. I do not believe that Secretary Schlesinger had the slightest concern that any military man would carry out orders received outside of channels and an order, telephone from the White House or a telegram received from the White House would be outside of channels. Any military commander in the field who got an order like that would merely call up his superior, who would call his superior, who would call his superior, until finally there would

be a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who summon the Secretary of Defense, who would undoubtedly call in the Secretary of State and the Cabinet and the leadership from Congress and decide how to handle this unprecedented situation. You know, a very low-level example of this was when Mr. Kennedy had been elected and was not yet President, his brother, Robert Kennedy, telephoned the Commanding Officer of the Destroyer Joseph Kennedy and said "get underway and come to Washington for the inauguration." The Commanding Officer called his boss, who called his boss, who called his boss, and the word came back "do it." But it went through channels.

Q.

Z. Yes, let me speak about the decision-making aspect, and second about those two incidences. With regard to Mr. Johnson's approach, it was informal: it was truly adversary give and take. He did encourage debates. I've sat in on many where Secretary Husk was serving the same function before they went forward to the President and they encouraged every position and debated it. And finally when Mr. Johnson got through making a decision, he would go around the room and say now "do you have anything to say, do you have anything to say," and he'd make each person either say "I support it" or "I still have reservations, and here's why." In the case of Mr. Nixon, meeting like that were for the record. When he had a

National Security Council Meeting, he obviously had been briefed on the issue and who thought what before he ever went in; ~~it~~ was a performance in which he was a stage actor pushing the various levers and he never made a decision at that time. Sometimes actually avoided calling on the one whom he knew thought more strongly, having been briefed ahead of time on it, and then he made his decisions afterwards. And, in my mind one of the great historical dramas will be when and if the tapes are finally all completely declassified and we get a chance to see just how Mr. Nixon was positioned by those two or three who had access to him.

Now, with regard to the difference in views as to the outcomes of those two situations, it is hard for me to be dispassionate on this and not to sound self-serving, but as a Captain in the Navy working for Paul Nitze when the Southeast Asia decisions were being made it was clear to me - possibly because I was working for this very wise guy - that there was just no end to that kind of thing. It was an open-ended commitment. You had no way to seal off the theatre from this tremendous source of power in ~~China~~ and in Russia over land lines of communication. In the Dominican Republic it was perfectly apparent that you could do the job. You could stop every single snip from getting there, so all you had to do was go in and liquidate the thing quickly and you knew you had control. So they were two kinds of classic extremes and to me quite clear. I could never understand how

we let ourselves get a slice at a time, bogged down in that terrible thing in Southeast Asia.

Q. How do you think change in the Ford Administration.

I'll make a question then, how do you ?

Z. I think that Mr. Ford is a much more open person. He has been, unlike Mr. Nixon who is used to getting his information through reading, Mr. Ford is used to getting his through listening as most of those who are creatures of Congress are. He enjoys sitting down with a bunch of people and listening to the give and take, and although he probably wouldn't get quite as high marks academically as Mr. Nixon, I believe that he'll have a much better - he'll be much less a victim of any one staff assistant than Mr. Nixon became. And, so, his mistakes will be mistakes based on misjudgment - if he makes them - but will not be mistakes based on lack of the fact or twisting of the fact. I believe that the change in Secretary Kissinger's role stems from this; I think Secretary Kissinger is not going to be able to control Mr. Ford insights the way he was able to control Mr. Nixon. I believe this is a very necessary and healthy thing for the country.

Q.

No. Traditionally, I think, civilian authority has felt that this was not something about which to consult with the military. On the other hand, the

military man who wants to use his resources and ties, can have some very important impact on policy through those with whom he discusses issues. When I had my very brief meeting with President Nixon as I was smuggled into town from South Vietnam to meet him in the Pentagon the day before the announcement was made that I was to be the next Chief of Naval Operations, I asked him if he had been made aware by Secretary Laird of the views that I had with regard to how badly we were falling behind the Soviets and the need to do something about it. He said he had and that he would welcome getting my inputs but to be aware of the fact that there were an awful lot of people involved in that decision-making process. Well, that was a classic formulation of what he had observed in previous presidents - one he didn't really follow himself. However, I took that - I said I was going to take it as a signal for me to have contact with a lot of people because I knew it would be very difficult to see him, and I did. I tried each week to have in for lunch members of other departments of the government and members of the White House staff in ones, and twos and threes, and we discussed all of these kinds of issues and frequently I would pass to them papers that they could then use to ask additional questions that were important as I thought. So there was ample opportunity for me to take advantage of that kind of one-on-one contact, but no official way. I was never able to get a request honored to meet with the President nor was I ever able officially to deliver a letter to him until toward the end of my term

when I delivered one to him by the process of just not sending it through channels.

Q. Where does the Armed Forces do you pick? The ratio

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Z. That's a fair question. The ratio has increased. It has increased by what I

think is a fair amount for justifiable reasons. First, because the technology of

the services has gotten so much more complex that you now need college level educa-

tion at the lower management levels to do many of the things which in a sailing

Navy, for example, and in the days when we had artillery but no Air Force, could

be done by a high school graduate; second, because having shifted from the status

of the world's second or third power for a period of time to the nation's number

one, have had a requirement for many more joint and international staffs than we

had twenty or twenty-five years ago. And this has led for an addition of numbers

on the part of all the services into NATO, Southeast Asia staff, that kind of thing,

which is kind of a -off to the service functions that we used to have.

We are in the process of trying to cut down the numbers of senior officers,

not because it's the intelligent thing to do - in my judgment the Navy numbers

were adequate and sparse - but because it is so clearly the popular thing to do

that we better do it in order not to take quite as much flak on that while fighting

for some much more important things like how to stand up to a Soviet Navy which has

four times as many ships as we have.

Q. Would it help if the President as Commander in Chief ?

Z. Are you referring to an order outside the military field?

Q. Inside the military field, where the President orders ?

Z. No. We had some examples of the President ordering the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to do certain things in this last four-year period, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs was always meticulous about going up and informing the Secretary of Defense and waiting until he affirmed the order which gave - in a couple of instances - the Secretary of Defense an opportunity to decline of the decision if he didn't agree with it or to decide to go along. In other words, wherever there was an effort to by-pass anyone in the chain, the military following their training and ritual have insisted that it come through channels even when it came from the Commander in Chief.

Q.

Z. Well, I come at the problem in the following way. My view of the use of military force is that it should never be used by anybody unless there is a conviction that the use can lead to a successful conclusion if it has to be used. Therefore, when we send our fleet for example into the Eastern Mediterranean, as we've done in the Yom Kippur War, we ought not to be putting it there unless

we're convinced that if we got into a showdown with the Soviets we could come out
that
on top. Now, my view is/today we would not come out on top. We have reduced our
Navy by 47 per cent in the last 5 years. The Soviet Union has been building at a
fantastic rate replacing their ships; they haven't been increasing the numbers
appreciably but they've been modernizing at a tremendous rate. In order to do
the limited modernization we have done, we've had to give up half of ours. They
have a much easier job than we do; all they've got to do as a land power which
has the ability to defeat its principal enemies - the European nations of NATO
and China over land lines - is to cut our sea lines. What we've got to be able
to do is to keep those sea lines open and to use the seas. That's a much tougher
job and it takes much more naval power. Viewed in that light, the odds are that
we cannot do our job today and the odds are that the Soviets can do theirs.

That brings me then to the point that if I were asked should we go into the
Middle East, I would say "You can't, unless you're prepared to lose a war if the
Soviets stand up to you."

Q.

Z.

What I mean is that, as an example, we couldn't keep the sea lines open
in order to reinforce NATO, we couldn't reinforce our own forces overseas, we
couldn't bring in the oil - 15% of which already comes in from the Middle East -

and by 1980 - 50% comes in from the Middle East - we couldn't bring in the 69 of the 72 materials judged critical by the Department of Commerce which already travel on the surface of the seas, all because our Navy would have been swept from critical areas through which the commercial ships have to come.

Q. . . . change regarding submarines . . . ?

Z. No. The Trident submarine will merely make it possible to loose the war at the non-strategic level. The Soviets will remain deterred from using strategic weapons and will find that quite a comfortable situation like poison gas in World War II, while they deploy their superior conventional power. Now let me go on to say that I don't think they'll even do that, because with their superior strategic capability and their superior conventional capability they won't have to. We're going through a period that is very dangerous right now when there isn't widespread recognition of that fact that we're inferior. In the next year or two there will be widespread recognition of the fact and at that time there will then be a widespread recognition that we must accommodate the Soviet initiative, and the Soviets will be gracious enough about giving us a face-saving way to back down just as we were very gracious about giving them their face-saving way to back down in the Cuban missile crisis.

Q. . . . ?

Q. ?

Z. I consider that it makes it impossible for the military to do its job effectively. The military were mustered up along with a lot of other people, like the Secretary of Defense and the then Secretary of State, and went over and testified falsely to the Congress because we didn't know about the secret deal. And the only way we found out about the secret deal was some eleven months later when the Russians came up to our SALT Delegation in Moscow and started referring to it. And then when the message came back from Moscow and it was quite apparent that Dr. Kissinger could no longer conceal it, he broke it out and circulated it around the Government. In my judgment, he also misled the Congress in the testimony he gave about it after the agreement came out.

Q. of your knowledge now, was this deal a written . . . ?

Z. It was a written protocol which specified the nature of a modern ballistic missile, and because it was done at the Kissinger-Dobrynin level and not checked by any of us technicians it had a tragic, significant error which could have had major significance. It defined the modern ballistic missile as a missile of the type installed on submarines which had been constructed since 1964. What this prohibited the Soviets from doing then was to install on any of their older submarines any of the modern missiles which had been installed on modern

submarines. But all they had to do was build a new modern missile, not ever installed on a modern submarine, and they could put it on any number of old submarines. And they had a new missile - a short range missile of the type they probably were going to do that with - and they had it by significant glitch. When we discovered this, I made quite a thing of it and insisted that we had to re-negotiate and make it clear to the Soviets that it would be unacceptable for them to use that loophole. It took them another several months to even get the thing focused on and when it was finally focused on we had to pay for it in the standard consultative committee by giving up on some other things that we wanted in order to get the Soviets to buy that. So, in other words, we sold those missiles twice.

- Q.?
2. These things take a long time in a democracy: the process is a very slow one. The press, faced with a President who was a crook and firing full-choke at him, had need of a hero; the people I think had need of a hero. Secretary Kissinger became that. More and more he's beginning to be put in context by the Press and we're beginning to find out more and more about some of these things we've been talking about. There is no doubt in my mind that within the next year or two the full Kissinger will be known and this will be one of the

things with which the people will be expected to reckon at next election time.

Q. In February of this year, arms race, nuclear arms . . .

. . . . The second school of thought is that this is wrong because Russia is developing a system that United

States is not impossible because Russia in our ballistic missile

can intercept . . . ? Which one do you favor?

Z. I favor the former, but what we're headed for is the latter. The problem is as follows. This country has not spent the money necessary for us to be able to be confident by 1980 that we can continue to deter the Soviet Union by having a viable second-strike capability. This country, in my judgment, will never strike first. So what we have always had to plan on is that we would absorb the first blow and have sufficient surviving capabilities that we could promise such great damage to the Soviet Union that they would not strike first. Now, what is happening is that the Soviet Union is in the process of deploying now - but first to go back to the SALT I Agreement, they were given a 40% superiority in land-base missiles, if they cared to destroy the 200 that they had to destroy in order to build up to a 33% superiority in sea-base missiles installed in a 40% advantage in hull; they were given a three-fold advantage in throw weight; a four-fold advantage in mega-tonnage - we had a modest advantage in bombers

and we had nearly 100% advantage in warheads (Multiple Independently Retargetable Vehicles MIRV). Our numbers, however, must remain inferior - our missile numbers - during this period. The Soviets are permitted to overtake us in the field of MIRVs and they are in the process of doing so. They are deploying at such a rate that by 1980 they will have 7,000 warheads of 1 megaton or larger in their landbase missiles, facing our 3,000 warheads in our landbase missiles of 1/100th of the destructive capability. Ours are deliberately designed so they cannot destroy a missile in a first strike; the Soviets - they tell us in the SALT discussions - designing theirs so they can destroy us in a first strike. They believe in a war-winning capability, if they can get it.

Now, what we have to fear at the rate at which we are making expenditures now, which means that the Soviets will not sign any SALT II unless we give them permanent superiority. We're not building at a fast enough rate to show the Soviets that we're going to insist on parity with or without a treaty. What the Soviets can aspire to have by 1980 is a capability to wipe out our landbase missiles and our landbase aircraft in a first strike, and to say to us "Now look, the very best you can do is to destroy our cities, some of them in a second strike with your submarines, and we're saving all that we need to destroy all of your cities." In other words, they can disarm us in the first strike and

we still face the prospect of a city exchange. So that's what the Soviets are after and we're not spending money in the strategic program at a rate necessary to impress them that they ought to give us the parity with or without the treaty that will insure that we can have a capability to retaliate with a strike against their targets and save their cities as hostage.

Q. There was a report in magazines in Secretary of State Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, secret agreement through the recent Yom Kippur War that America would not send any military aid to Israel so that Israel would be important to bargaining with the Arabs
. . . . ? How do you think things like this will affect our position with our allies and do you think the will stand for policies like this?

Z. I worry about the consequences of that action. I believe that it is absolutely accurate that Secretary Kissinger's policy was to let Israel bleed to create the kind of reality, as he likes to refer to it, that would permit him to negotiate. I believe he had more confidence in Israel's capability than I had because I knew their logistics were so limited. I was strongly urging that we initiate the airlift at a time when Secretary Kissinger was still telling the Israeli that he had given the orders but Secretary Schlesinger was

refusing to carry them out - an obvious and patently deceptive thing - and, on the other hand, I don't think that the American people are going to give much of a darn in the light in which the thing will be presented to them over time, mainly that we've got to get along with the Arabs in order to get the oil. I frankly worry about the immorality of our foreign policy and feel that our allies have got to feel very nervous if they see us increasingly willing to cast Israel down the drain, about whether or not we're really going to stand up with them in a NATO confrontation, and it's part of the very sophisticated process that the Soviets are bringing off to weaken our alliances to finlanize NATO and to, as they do, assure these people "Look, we're the way to the future; we've got 40% more missiles, we've got more megatonnage; you'd better make your accommodations with Moscow," and it's happening all around the world.

In other words, what we have going on, in my judgment, is what I call "differentiated detente" - the Soviets have one view of it and we have another view of it. Their view of it is they behave where they must behave because the risks are too high, like a conventional war in Europe which might lead to escalation. And they'll misbehave where ever they figure they can get away with it, like by funding the arms for the Syrians and the Egyptians that made it possible for them to do what they could do; having in mind that the Soviets wanted to see

our access to the oil curtailed, the prices increased; having in mind that they are exultant about the tripling and the quadrupling of the oil prices which is leading to the starvation of a billion people in 30 countries which gives them great opportunity to radicalize those regimes; having in mind that their policy has led to the acceleration of inflation in the more prosperous part of the free world which is helping also to destabilize and increase the rate of accommodation with the Soviet Union.

Q.
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Z. Well, this is the kind of question that really makes me very anxious to have these exchanges with as many of your generation as is possible because this is really the kind of crunch question. I fear a return on the part of our people to chauvinism. I mentioned in my principal remarks the fact that in 1954 we were absolutely committed almost to a man that we'd never get bogged down in another war in Asia and just 10 years later we were knocking on the door to get back in, notwithstanding some conflicting advice. People say "we'll never again get ourselves involved:" well, we've just finished in the Yom Kippur War, sending our Fleet into a situation where, in my judgment, it would have been defeated had it been taken on by the Soviets. Now, if oil prices continue to go

out of the traces. For example, the Turks' decision to go into Cyprus has led the Congress now to take what I consider to be a very unwise action to reduce Turkish aid because it quite probably will, if we don't do something about it, move the Turks more nearly into the Soviet camp. For nearly 25 years, the arms that we have invested in Turkey has served to help maintain NATO strength and to preserve them as part of the free world and out of the Soviet box at a time that began back when the Soviets were actively in the process of encroaching on Turkey. And the Truman Doctrine will enunciate it. So, the way I look at it is that those investments in arms gave us 24 years and 9 months of defense and 3 months of negative on the part of Turkish invasion of Cyprus. For the same token, obviously I favor getting countries like Japan to do more. Japan has been spending only about 1 per cent of its gross national product for defense and it's about ready in the next few years to overtake our own GNP. There is just no excuse for their not doing more. Now as they get more military capability - and incidently the reason they haven't is their civilians distrust their military so much as a result of their pre-World War II experience - that if and as they get that capability we have to expect that they will become more independent and there will be times when they will be on opposite sides of an issue from us because they can afford to be more often than they can now. But, at the same time, we

have to gamble on what I think is reasonable gamble that they will more often than not be with and against the Soviets and Chinese, and they'll be on the other side of the equation.

Q. ?

Z. First, I guess every military man who is worth his salt, and I'm including most of us, but excluding people like General George Patton, feel that if we do our jobs right we will save lives because the country will have sufficient military strength that it won't get involved in war. We've gotten involved in these wars in the past when we let our guard down so badly; second, that once wars have broken out because we let our guards down so badly or, as in the case of Southeast Asia, made a mistake in judgment, then it's our job to do it as efficiently as we can to get it over with as quickly as we can.

In my twenty months in command of the Naval Forces in Southeast Asia, I had 37,000 young officers and sailors under my command; I had rap sessions during that period with some 20,000 of them, including several hundred wounded; I was having to order these young men into action - at one time they were taking casualties at the rate of 6% a month as we were at the height of trying to break off the infiltration into the Delta. Included among these young men was my own son who was in command of one of the small boats that we had out there, so every-

time I gave an order I tried to think of it in terms of the risk I was making my own son take and to realize that everybody else's sons were involved too, and I think it is a terrible and prayerful problem and you do a lot of worrying about it and hoping and praying that you will make the most intelligent decisions for your country and for your men.