

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS AT THE SUPERINTENDENT'S GUEST LECTURE,
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SCHOOL, MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA, 5 SEPTEMBER 1974

QUESTION: Admiral, recently the Secretary of Defense sup-
posedly took action to prevent or keep out a military
coup in the United States. Could it have been that there
was this possibility - in our system.

ZUMWALT: I think the statement was unwise. I do not believe
that there is a tenth of a percent probability that the coup
would ever take place in this country. I do not believe that
any need existed to re-ensure. There is not a military man
in this country who would honor a coup order directly received
from the White House, in my judgment, not a military leader
in command of any force of significance. The immediate thing
that anyone would do on receiving an order would be to check
it out with higher military authority and, then, higher
civilian authority, and there is just zero prospect that the
military forces could have been used for or against.

QUESTION: Admiral, your serious words, today,
recent with your interview with PLAYBOY,
saying in no way the single man who's about to retire from
the spotlight. Do you have any intentions, sir, to be willing
to communicate that now that you're retired?

ZUMWALT: Yes, I'd be glad to tell you what I've done. I've
mentioned to a smaller group a little earlier. I'm doing

about four things; one is to try to turn off the mail and close out my files. Admiral Burke tells me that takes about six months. The second is to give lectures around the country in front of private and public groups. The third is that I've agreed to serve as a visiting professor on four campuses, giving lectures all the way from management on the one hand to arms control on the other. And, I'm seeking to write my memoirs, having in mind that I want to deal with the issues, as I had to wrestle with them in the four years that I had this job against the backdrop of personality.

And, then, sometime within the year, decide what I want to do.

QUESTION: A few questions. Number 1 is that I heard an "off the cuff" remark by Admiral Moorer in 1970-- he said that if we mixed it up with the Russians we could expect to beat them, but we'd take a hell of a bloody nose. I would like to know if you think that's still true today or if you shared that opinion? That's the first question. Number 2 is, Admiral Rickover recently made very critical comments about managerial expertise in the Navy is overcoming our technical expertise, and I wonder if you share that opinion?

ZUMWALT: With regard to the first question, I shared Admiral Moorer's view in 1970. With regard to the second question, Admiral Rickover is a very fine nuclear scientist.

QUESTION: Admiral, you made reference a short while ago about the importance of Diego Garcia. Now, recently, I read

in the paper where TASS had come back at President Ford's announcement saying that the Russians have established three ports, or three bases, in that particular area of the Indian Ocean - obviously, in a move to keep us from moving into Diego Garcia. Would you care to expound on that?

ZUMWALT: Yes. President Ford stated, the other day, that the Russians have three bases in the Indian Ocean. He's absolutely accurate. They have in Somalia a communications station which is superior to the one that we have on Diego Garcia. They have a port of Berbera which they built, or improved for Somalians, which they use as a naval port. They have an airfield there, and are in the process of building a much larger airfield that can take any kind of aircraft near Mogadiscio. So that when they get through, they will have facilities, there, greatly superior to what we would hope to have, someday, in Diego Garcia - and will have an indigenous population to provide labor, whereas we do not, in Diego Garcia, an unpopulated coral atoll.

In the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Soviets have access to the old British naval port of Aiden, and an airfield adjacent thereto. And, as part of that same country, the island of Socutra, which has an abandoned airstrip and a naval anchorage - but which has some new buildings in the last few months.

In the country of Iraq, their third holdings, are the port of Um Qasr, which they have improved for the Iraqians,

- and four or five airfields which they have helped the Iraqis build. They are investing billions in helping the Iraqis to equip themselves - and you can be very sure that the Soviets don't give anything away.

In addition, the Soviets have mooring buoys in several different parts of the Indian Ocean. They have access to repair facilities in Singapore, as do we. They have taken five times as long, allegedly, to sweep the ports of Bangladesh, as we would have taken, and are still hanging on.

So, they have a good many fold more capability with regard to infrastructure there, than we would have - if the Congress ever gets around to approving our request. I should say, Admiral Holloway's request.

- QUESTION: Admiral, as you well know, our ship forces are getting pretty exhausted; they're getting old - and yet, we continue with our commitments, and we continue going forward with the same carriers that we've had for a long time. Is there any chance that we are either going to step down from our commitments to repair our ships and get the funds that we need to do that job, or are we going to continue deploying, again and again, with tired ships that are getting tired every day?

ZUMWALT: I think the answer is that we are going to make progress very, very slowly, if at all. As you are all well aware we have gotten away from most of the deployments beyond six months, and I believe that it will be possible for Admiral

Holloway to continue a maximum of six-months deployments.

There has been no relief from the mission requirements to provide two carrier task forces in the Mediterranean and three in the Western Pacific, as our carriers have dwindled from 24 down to 15, and are headed for 12. This is the reason why we were driven to the concept of forward deployment of families, in order to be able to try to ease the load that would get absolutely, unacceptably heavy, as those forces continue to come down.

The Congress has never, in my lifetime, appropriated ample funds for maintenance and operations - and increasingly, in the last five years, has been more niggardly.

About six months ago, we finally decided that there was no possibility that the Congress would ever believe a military man - that we needed more funds in this area. We got some civilian groups in to take a look at our situation, and they came up very convinced that we needed better funding in these areas. Whether or not they will be successful, through their reports and briefings, in turning the Congress around, I'm uncertain.

It's back to the old "Tommy this and Tommy that, and Tommy, don't you fret" era, and will be until the man in the street is more concerned than he is today about the relative military balance.

QUESTION: Admiral, recognizing that habitability is important in addressing, particularly ship construction, again, with

- this that you've just talked about, would we not be better off if we traded some of our habitability in the newer ships for more fighting capability?

ZUMWALT: Viewed in the frame of reference in which you've presented it, yes. But, then, when one goes back to the problem that we face as to whether or not we can really attract enough recruits in an era of no draft to maintain an all volunteer Navy, I'd be very uncomfortable about toughening up our standards of habitability.

The Russians are able to because the military service is a high-prestige profession, and they can get all they want by pressure, if not by motivation.

Under our system, we've got to be able to appeal to today's young man and woman, and we simply are going to have to, I think, expend the money that gives sufficient habitability to keep them and to attract them.

It is not cost effective, in terms of military effectiveness, but when one views the fact that it takes a man as well as a machine, I think it is.

QUESTION: Admiral, I wonder if you'd care to tell us what you consider to be your most vivid accomplishment and greatest failure as Chief of Naval Operations?

ZUMWALT: All right. Let me give you the bad news first. I think my most significant failure is my failure to be able to convince people of the thrust of what I just said, here, today. Not very many people in this country are really con-

cerned about the situation. Yet, I know that President Nixon believed it; I know that each Secretary of Defense believed it.

I guess my greatest accomplishment, as I view it, is to finally move the Navy into an era when we could be truly representative of the country at large, with regard to race and sex. We haven't gotten there, but we're moving rapidly in that direction. And, to bring a 20th century approach to personnel administration. That's not the way that many others would vote.

QUESTION: Admiral, concerning the decision to sell to Iran some of our top systems, like the F-14 and the DD-963, your view...is this decision driven by the economics of just being able to sustain these programs? And I wonder if you see some long-range problems in having a country like Iran have these systems, in that area of the world?

ZUMWALT: You have to recall that the President of the United States articulated the doctrine of total force. What he said was that, if people read it clearly, he said everything that needed to be said. We could no longer hack it ourselves, we had to count on our allies, and we had to count on reserve forces. Now, if we're going to be able to do it with our allies, we've got to be able to have them fighting with us, with sophisticated equipment. The Iranians are prepared for this equipment, they have sufficient technical base although it will stretch them, as it always does when you get new equipment;

they've got sufficient technical know-how to handle it; they have got the money to pay for it; and they will be very effective allies if we have to fight together.

One always embarks on risks when you give something to allies because one can never be sure whether they're really going to with you in a given crisis. I think we have to look at allies in each area of the world as being basically like us - selfish - and likely, therefore, to use that equipment only when they, themselves, feel threatened. But when they do feel threatened, it's going to be for that region, an area in which we have an interest.

QUESTION: Admiral, considering the difference in political structures and methods of appropriating money between ourselves and the Soviet Union, given that the American people do wake up and realize what we need to do, is it realistic to think that we can maintain any superiority that we may have now, or that we can gain any that we used to have, back - or is it more realistic to just consider that we're on a downhill slide, and no way to come back?

ZUMWALT: I believe, from my discussions around the country, that if the American people really believed we were headed for second best, that there would be the most amazing turn-around you can imagine. I do not believe that the man in the street wants to be in that position - he just hasn't been told that we're headed there.

All that we're saying to the Russians with regard to strategic equation is that we insist on essential equivalence.

This nation, with one-half our Gross National Produce must see us, in the conventional forces ...demonstrate, physically, a capability to reinforce and, therefore, to deter. If we permit that to fall behind, then I believe that the Soviet Union will feel encouraged to take greater foreign policy risks than she has taken in the past.

I believe that the minute the Soviets demonstrate evil intent clearly enough that the newspapers of this land are pointing the finger at them, and the man in the street is believing it, that we will see a demand for greater defense budgets.

The American people are a pendulum; in 1954 we swore we would never get involved in another land war in Asia and in 1964 we were back knocking on the door to get in. That's how fast the swings can occur.

My own view of the Russians, is that they would be well advised to worry about the long-term consequences of the chicanery they're practicing. And that is if they really view detente as important for their survival over time, that they'd be far better off to grant essential equivalence in the strategic field and to stop threatening the one area of our conventional superiority in the past.

QUESTION: Admiral, would you care to comment on the all volunteer service, and its future? And if it continues as an all volunteer service, what affect it would have on all of the services' capability to perform their mission?

ZUMWALT: My initial view toward the all volunteer force was very much like Abraham Lincoln's view toward prayer - I found

myself driven there because I had nowhere else to go.

It was quite clear that the American people would no longer tolerate the draft. It was quite clear that the American people were absolutely hostile to the military at that point, as a result of the mistaken belief that the military had gotten them involved in Southeast Asia: Actually, I think the majority of senior leaders were against it, in the way in which it was brought off. But it was clear that if we were going to have any prospect of retaining the kinds of numbers that we needed in that kind of an environment, it had to be on an all volunteer basis.

Now, the theory of the all volunteer force made good, sound economic sense: The theory was that we had been taxing our sailors and soldiers with a hidden tax, and that from an economic standpoint it didn't make any difference if we went ahead and paid them their full worth. But what that economic theory overlooked was political theory: As personnel costs grew from 30% to 56% of the defense budget, the Congress increasingly got hostile toward paying those kinds of costs, and the consequence was that there were personnel reductions that have driven us gradually from 3.6 million down to 2.1 million men and women under arms, while the Soviets have gone almost exactly the reverse in the same period of time, from 2 million to nearly 4 million. The Soviets fraction of their defense budget for personnel, incidentally we reckon as something like 27%. So we have to

spend twice as much just to start off even in manpower, quite apart from all the labor costs involved, and the equipment, and so forth.

It's too early to say whether or not the all volunteer force is going to work. The Air Force and the Navy are getting the right number of recruits and sufficiently high quality. The Army and the Marines have had difficulty, and they're taking very large numbers of the lowest of the four mental groups. This, over time, is going to make them a less ready force. All the services, in my judgment, can handle some, but that's getting to be a pretty high number in the case of two of the services.

The thing that this country ought to be doing, in my judgment, in an era when labor costs have gone up, is to drive within the Defense Department toward more emphasis on the capital intensive services, the Air Force and the Navy; and less emphasis on the labor intensive services, the Army and the Marines. I don't think we've gone quite as far in that direction as we should for present budget levels. Of course, still better would be to get enough money to do it right for each of the services.

QUESTION: Admiral, regarding French President Giscard's pressure on the nations of Europe to rely more heavily upon themselves rather than their "big brother across the sea," the United States, do you feel that this will affect our capability to deal together with problems with our NATO allies?

ZUMWALT: I think we have to look at the NATO allies as being necessary to us, just as we are necessary to them, for those kinds of confrontations that involve NATO, per se and as a non-asset, in bilateral confrontations. That is - the NATO nations have demonstrated time and time again that only one or two of them are going to be with us in crises that are not related to NATO directly.

I would hope that over time the NATO nations would become increasingly concerned about the impact of standing aside in these crises. The Warsaw Pact nations do not stand aside and are there, as ordered, during the crisis. We've got to recognize that when you're dealing with a dictatorial series of satellites, they've got a degree of unity that the free world has got, in some way to learn, to if it's going to survive in an increasingly dangerous world.

QUESTION: Admiral, I know that you've spent a great deal of time and effort trying to get to individual members of Congress and talk with them about the things you feel. A lot of people feel that you've been very successful with this relative to others, and, yet, it's very discouraging to find that you haven't succeeded in convincing them with the compelling arguments you have about the strategic view of the world. Could you comment on why you think you cannot convince these representatives of ours as to what the situation is, and why they won't respond?

ZUMWALT: Yes. Each year I set for myself the objective of talking to every member of the Congress, and most years I got to between 80 and 90 senators and between 350 to 370 of the representatives. The others included people like Proxmire and Aspin. The groups with whom I spoke break down into about three. There are a third who are like President Ford, when he was the minority leader, who understood the problem and indicated that they would support and did support the President's defense budgets. There were a third who turned off the switch as soon as you started transmitting, and didn't care to listen. And then there was a middle third who generally would say words like, "Admiral, we believe you, we're worried, but if we vote for you, we'll lose our seat." And this is what convinces me that until you start telling it to the people, you won't turn those elected representatives around.

Now, the result has been that in the last four years, defense budgets, which the President, himself, has described as "bare bones" budgets from which to build, have been cut by \$2 billion, \$3 billion, \$5 billion and \$ 3 1/2 billion and we're enroute to a \$5 billion cut this year. That cut, each year, has been a compromise between that third that would have supported the President's budgets totally and that third, like Senator McGovern, that would have turned us into an NTH nation.

QUESTION: Admiral, there was an article in the WALL STREET JOURNAL last week that dealt with the oil problem, and I think

it stated in there that oil production in the United States right now is 'around 9 million barrels a day, and that our daily use is somewhere up towards 18 million barrels a day. It seems that the price that we're forced to pay for the imported oil is controlled by the Middle East nations, and that as soon as we adjust to the current level of prices, that we're susceptible to blackmail - a form of blackmail - in them raising the prices again. Do you see any way that that can be...how we can deal with that problem?

ZUMWALT: I think it's a very tough problem. I think that the Soviets are urging the Arab regimes to keep those price raises coming. I think they visualize this as a thermostat that they can control, fine-tuned to keep inflation devouring us faster than we can reorganize to keep ahead of it.

To me the only long-term answer is to launch upon a NASA-type crash program to make ourselves as nearly independent as we can be in the energy field. We have not really learned our lesson from the last crisis, and it's almost business as usual, again, today. We ought, in my judgment, to be doubling the price that we charge our consumer for gasoline today. If I were President, I'd immediately triple the price of gasoline, because we ought to be driving our economy in the direction of becoming oil conservative. We ought to be forcing ourselves to go in more for mass transit, and to do all the other things that have been done exactly wrong as we luxuriated in wasting a mineral resource which is finite.

QUESTION: Admiral, we've seen some opposition to some of your personnel policies in the past few years - do you anticipate any sort of a backlash movement among the older personnel?

ZUMWALT: I've been feeling it for about four years. The polls that we took after the first eight or nine months, which incorporated the large body of the changes, including all of the really controversial ones, indicated that within the Navy at the Chief Petty Officer level, the changes were favored about 75 to 15, with 10% on the fence. So that was roughly five to one. Among Captains and Admirals, it ran about the same, and then as you drop down the pyramid in both the officer and enlisted pyramid you got a higher vote in favor. Now, that meant that we had somewhere between 15 and 25% who were against or uncertain enough to straddle at the upper levels. And we felt the impact of those who wrote letters to Congress and who communicated with the retired community, where I think the vote probably would have been a hundred to one against the changes. This had, as its thermadore, the decision on the part of the House Armed Services Committee to do the Hicks investigation at the time of the racial unrest on the two aircraft carriers.

I, personally, think that that was a very fine thing. It really brought out into the open what the issues were, in a way that could be grappled with on a national basis. Using words like liberalism and permissiveness, the people who were

against, who in a very large fraction of the cases were people who did not want to see us integrate the Navy, were forced to have this issue debated.

An interesting phenomenon I had been facing as one of my principal adversaries on the Hill with regard to homeporting in Greece - a Greek expatriot by the name of Demacropolis, I think his name is, who had been all over every office I ever got to; he'd been there ahead of me, working against us. And in the height of this crisis, this fellow, who is quite an idealist, came up to me and said, "Admiral, I just want you to know that if you're in trouble on those personnel issues, I've got 102 people in the Congress who are ready to write the President."

The newspapers around the land saw the issue objectively, by which I mean they saw it the way I saw it. It was fantastic to see, as this thing was opened up and debated on a national basis, and as the press returns began to come in, the way in which the pressure eased off from Capital Hill.

QUESTION: Admiral, I wonder if you would comment on the significance - or possible strategic significance - of Greece withdrawing from NATO and the possible losses of our bases there?

ZUMWALT: I think it is a catastrophe that the Soviets must be exultant about, if it comes to pass. The Soviet strategy,

each time there's been a Cyprus crisis, has been to try to exploit it by offering help to one side or the other.

Whereas we, as a good NATO partner, tried our very best to get the differences bridged, as evenly as we could.

The Soviets are very anxious to use this opportunity to force us out of Greece, and to win a closer association with either Greece or Turkey, or both. It's the kind of tactic that they are best at, and we have to view it with considerable alarm and hope that our policy-makers are pouring their best effort into making this thing come out right.

QUESTION: Admiral, recently in Chicago, President Ford indicated a desire to consider amnesty for the deserters and draft dodgers, and I was wondering if you're willing to comment on this?

ZUMWALT: I think that his position is a very wise one. I believe that the thought of giving these people a chance to work their way back, not to be treated with the same honor and respect that those who served were treated, but nevertheless to become useful members of the community, again, is an important thing for a society based on the Christian ethic.

The idea of continuing to make them suffer forever is something that we wouldn't do to the common criminal, except in the most heinous of crimes.

Now these people, who'd number somewhere between 25,000 and 40,000, include people that range all the way across the spectrum from true conscientious objectors, and I've talked

to some of them and they're very impressive people in their beliefs - they're prepared, personally, to suffer for their beliefs - all the way over to those who are simply cowards, and bugged out rather than risk their skins.

QUESTION: Admiral, what advice can you give an assembly of young naval officers about careers? Where's the next generation of captains and admirals going to come from - are they going to come from the decks of our ships, the offices in Washington, or the management positions in our technical areas?

ZUMWALT: I believe that what I said when I was CNO still pertains - I always said that I thought that my successor would probably be a generalist but that his successor would be a man who had had a subspecialty.

I believe that the exponential rate at which knowledge is being accumulated has taken us to the time when we can no longer have very many, if any, true generalists. And, to a time in which we're going to have to have each of us sub-specialize and do repetitive tours in weapons systems management or more technical skill areas each time one goes ashore. Future selections for flag rank and for positions of higher responsibility are going to have to take the man who has performed best in skill "A" in competition with the man who has performed best in skill "B" - rather than to try to look at the man who has generalized.

I would make one other point and that is that I would

urge everybody to approach each job as though it's your last. I always found that that was a great luxury - to tell yourself, as you went into a job, you were going to do the very best you could; you were going to call them like you saw them; and if you ended up locking horns to the extent that it hurt you, you could always march off and do something else in another profession.

I think, in general, military officers tend to be a little too conservative about fighting vigorously for their opinions, and until a decision is made, one really ought to go all ahead flank.