

REMARKS BY ADMIRAL E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (RET.), AT THE FORCE PLANNING ISSUES SEMINAR, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA, 6 SEPTEMBER 1974

It's good to be back with you again. I am going to have almost nothing to say for my principal remarks in order to permit as much time as possible for your questions, because I think in a course as technical as you're going through, it's very difficult for me to gage the areas of your primary interest.

I will just recite for you the way in which program planning confronts someone in the position that I held for four years. I, of course, from 1966 to 1968, was the Director of Systems Analysis for the Navy, and had the opportunity to deal with it in a somewhat different manner during those years than in my last four.

The difference in those two jobs is the difference between analysis in the pure sense and judgment, and judgment, in the job of a service chief involves things that are very difficult to categorize in the program planning field. They range all the way from the knowledge that you've got to throw in a vector based on the strength of various lobbies with which one has to deal, internally, within the Navy - the aviation lobby, the surface lobby, the submarine lobby, the nuclear lobby and all the rest.

One has to tack sail because of the problems and prejudices within the office of the Secretary of Defense, and

because of special interests over on the Hill. So, all of these things are constantly throwing biases in to what would, as an action officer or even, to me, as the Director of Systems Analysis, seem to be decisions that are a little hard to understand.

I used to comment, when I was Director of Systems Analysis, I couldn't understand why Admiral Moorer made so many peculiar decisions. After I got to be Chief of Naval Operations, I found myself making those same kinds of peculiar decisions.

One of the biggest problems with which you have to deal, as Chief of Naval Operations, is the problem of how you're going to allocate as between mission areas.

As you know, I've tried to break them down into Overseas Presence, Projection, Sea Control, and the Strategic contribution.

In theory, as one does program planning, the decisions with regard to programs in the strategic area are independent of those in the other areas for the Navy. In actual fact, over the years - even going back into the McNamara era - that isn't the case. And when major strategic expenditures are assigned to the Navy or won by the Navy, it has a rather significant impact on the amount of money that's available in those other mission areas. People say that it doesn't, but it does.

As we got ready, therefore, to have to deal with the

Trident issue, on my watch - and it was clear that that was going to involve very major expenditures - one of the things we had to worry about was what that was going to do our rapidly diminishing capability in the non-strategic area - particularly with regard to Sea Control, where we knew we were in real tough shape.

Again, the decision that had to be made in the area of Trident was not a purely military decision. If I were going to have made that decision just based on military considerations, I believe I would have favored - I know I would have favored - going at a slower rate, in the Trident program, than we have, because we're at greater hazard in the conventional field than we are in the strategic field. The odds are that we're likelier to have to back away from the Russians because of our lack of capability to control seas, today, than because of any conviction on their part that they can bluff us in the strategic field.

We had the additional problem that over the long haul we had to try to achieve essential equivalence. As I indicated in my talk yesterday, it was quite clear that if we were going to have it, we had to be funding at an impressive rate in the strategic field, in order for the Soviets to conclude that we were going to get parity with or without a treaty, and that, therefore, they ought to join us in reducing the amount of monies that we pour into those strategic arms - and that meant funding Trident, which was the thing they seemed

to fear more than anything else, at a greater rate than one would on purely analytical or programmatic reasons.

So, this is an indication of the kind of thing that gets cranked in at the service chief or national level that makes it difficult, sometimes, to understand force level planning which perturbs those things that one would do in a purely analytical sense.

I think I'd like, now, to ask you to fire away with your questions and lets see where that takes us, and I'll see if I have anything to add at the end.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

QUESTION: Sir, a recent article in U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT indicated the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company was very upset with the Navy's contract for nuclear carriers. Basically, their allegations are: (1) They are only earning about 2% on assets involved in the production of Navy ships, (2) That the Navy has had 1,266 changes to the NIMITZ during the time that it has been under construction, (3) That the Navy contract indicated that they would only need about 33.5 million man-days or man-years of work. Now the current projection is about 42 million man-years of work. Based on this, the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company says that they are not interested in continuing to work on Navy ships, and that the Navy is doing a very poor job of contracting for its ships. Could you comment on this and give us the Navy's response to these rough allegations by shipbuilders?

ZUMWALT: I think that they're largely accurate. We're in real trouble with regard to our ship work and, particularly, in the nuclear area. In my judgment, we have a long way to go before we're being factually accurate in what we say about costs of nuclear propulsion. There is a built-in series of biases that lead to underestimating - part of it brochuremanship to get the Congressional budget; part of it is that each person throws in some caution in the direction of his programs. I think it's particularly bad in the nuclear area - in part, because there's been this struggle within the Navy with regard to whether or not we should be going as fast into the nuclear propulsion field as we are.

Newport News went through a period of years when almost the only work to which they had access was the Navy. Labor costs overseas were so much cheaper that the commercial work went elsewhere. The labor curves for both European yards and Japanese yards indicate that they will approach ours in the next two or three years - they're converging at an impressive rate - and they've got a lot of work, and there's a backlog. Because of the backlog and because of the increasing labor costs, commercial work is coming back into this country. Newport News has grabbed a hunk of it, and they're in a position, now, to stop being flagellated and they're getting tougher to deal with.

In my judgment, the people dealing with them are just going to have to be much more precise than they've been in

previous years. I think the net of that, over time, will be to begin to bring out much earlier the true costs of nuclear propulsion, and will facilitate our efforts to maintain a balance between nuclear-propelled ships and conventionally-propelled ships in order to have the numbers that we so badly need.

QUESTION: Admiral, would you give us your views on combining armed services, that we've been hearing talked around? Combined forces? One service?

ZUMWALT: There hasn't been an awful lot of talk about it up until the 30th of June. Has there been talk since then?

I don't think that we're ever going to see, in your careers in the Navy, an effort to do the kind of things the Canadians did. First, the Canadian system has passed its thermidore and is beginning to return to a degree of decentralization - they just found that you can't call an admiral a general and make it work. So, I think there's increasing recognition across the border that they went too far.

Second, the services have very strong lobbies on the Hill. Certainly, as long as Eddie Hebert lives, nobody is going to combine the Navy with the Air Force. It's just too big a job to be undertaken. I think that, rather, we'll see a continuing evolution towards centralization of functions.

There has been talk, for example, about a single medical service, and we fought that very hard because of the need

to maintain the same kind of esprit within the medical systems and service related medical specializations. It's always a very attractive proposition to budget cutters to look at ways in which those kinds of savings can be made.

Similarly, in the training field, there's been talk about having a single training establishment. What we're doing, in the services, to try to both be more efficient and maintain the separateness that we think is critical to a team, is to look very hard, within the services, at where we can aggregate functions. The training commanders of the three services meet frequently and have combined a lot of schools under one service or another, depending upon where it could be done most efficiently. The logistics commanders meet frequently and are looking for areas where they can do procurement in common. The medical services have been much later in getting started, but the surgeons general now are working together in trying to look at areas of commonality.

I think if the services continue to do their homework well and stay ahead of the efforts of the people in the office of the Secretary of Defense to do it by eliminating different uniforms we can maintain both efficiency and separateness.

QUESTION: Admiral, do you feel like the results of the Project 2000 study - they're, I guess, just being published now - will have any impact on the Sea Control Ship project?

ZUMWALT: It's hard for me to know. I wasn't around at the time the Congress made the final decision to take the money

out of this year's budget for the Sea Control Ship. So, I don't know what the current thinking is about whether it's dead forever or just for a while.

Project 200, I thought, was a good controversial study - there was a lot in it to stimulate talk and discussion. I would hope that Project 2000 and lots of other of the issues that have been kicked around will continue to have people look very hard at, what I consider to be our greatest internal problem in the Navy today and that it, excessive amounts of money going into the very high-cost platforms. And, therefore, inadequate numbers of platforms.

If you look at what the Russians have done, their Director of Systems Analysis has done a much better job, perhaps because Admiral Gorshkov doesn't have quite the problem with lobbies. The Soviets have never built a nuclear-propelled surface combatant. Therefore, for that reason more than any other reason - although there are others - they've got 2,054 ships to our 508 - a four-fold advantage in numbers - because they've kept them cheap. The Russians are still building diesel-propelled submarines, and there are some distinct advantages, as you know, to having some. We never picked one up in the most recent crisis in the Mediterranean, and they were there to do their damage.

The U.S. Navy will never build another diesel-propelled submarine - not even if you could prove irrevocably that it was an intelligent thing to do, could you even build one.

QUESTION: Admiral, are you saying that you don't think the NIMITZ class carriers should be nuclear-propelled

we made very smart arguments for that nuclear power

ZUMWALT: No, I'm saying that the justification for the nuclear-propelled NIMITZ, which I strongly advocated, was that it was part of a Hi-Lo Mix, and that costs were getting to be so great for nuclear-propelled carriers that we had to have a balance by getting some flat-tops at sea of a much smaller size, like the Sea Control Ship.

By killing the Sea Control Ship, we've destroyed that argument, and, as now, the Navy seeks to design something that more nearly fits the reverberation from the Congress that was initiated within the Navy - it will be an aircraft carrier which, initially, will be suggested to be conventionally propelled, very small in size, with arresting gear in catapults. And then, Admiral Rickover will insist that it be nuclear-propelled, and then you'll be back to the billion-plus dollar class and the number will come from the 12 towards which we're headed down to six.

QUESTION: Admiral, a few months ago, on this same subject, Congressman Bob Wilson from San Diego came up and spoke to us, and he led us to believe - he said that he was he thought extremely fortunate because he and his colleagues in the Congress, who think the same way he does, were able to show the Navy the error of their ways and convince them to put in

nuclear propulsion in these DLGNs. It seems like this argument has almost gone full circle and I just wondered if you'd comment on some of the - what is the political situation on nuclear propulsion for Navy ships? And who's begging who to have what?

ZUMWALT: You know, there's never been any doubt that nuclear propulsion is more effective than conventional propulsion. And, there's never been any doubt that nuclear propulsion is more costly than conventional propulsion. The issue has always been whether the additional effectiveness is worth the additional cost.

In the case of submarines, you can make a very powerful case for nuclear propulsion. It changes the name of the animal. It's able to divorce itself from the surface of the seas to the limit of human endurance and that drives you toward wanting a very large number of nuclear-propelled submarines. If I had my say, we would still build a few diesel-propelled submarines, as the Russians have, and we could use them in ways that would be highly effective.

With regard to the aircraft carrier, your getting two aircraft carriers instead of three when you make them nuclear propelled, and we're paying the price for that - we've come from 24 down to 15 and we're headed for 12. If we keep on building nothing but nuclear-propelled aircraft carriers, you'll live to see the day when there's a six carrier Navy.

In the case of carriers, nevertheless, I strongly

nuclearizing the three that we're building. I think, after we get a fourth or fifth one, we ought to really take a very hard look at whether or not carriers beyond that - shouldn't every other one be conventionally propelled.

It doesn't bother me - because that issue is close - if they're all nuclear propelled. When you go beyond that, we are killing ourselves by the building of nuclear propelled escorts.

I've done the analysis. I can tell you that in order to meet the task I was given when I was Director of Systems Analysis of justifying some - we had to tilt on every assumption. It just is not cost-effective. We're paying three and four times what we ought to be paying. We can have five Patrol Frigates for the cost of a single DLGN, and those five ASW platforms and those five AAW platforms make so much more contribution to the battle that you just simply cannot justify having nothing but nuclear-propelled escorts.

It would not be so bad if we were building one DLGN per year, but we're going beyond that, now. The next battle will be a stop the building of any G class ship, unless it's nuclear propelled. You're already down at a 500-ship Navy and this is driving you to a 300-ship Navy.

We ought to realize that there are two things that are contributing to the United States Navy's incapability to control and use the seas. One of them is the amount of money that the Soviets are spending, and the other is the fact that

we're spending our money very stupidly.

QUESTION: Admiral, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has proposed a deterrent strategy of control and that up with rather a large budget request and back this up with a rather large budget request for a command data buffer system to do fast, the retargeting, of our ICBM assets. Based on your intimate knowledge of higher echelons of our government, particularly the civilian-military interface, do you think that the decision-making process would support that kind of warfare where you make instant decisions on what you're going to hit or not hit?

ZUMWALT: I give it .0001% probability. It's just the kind of sophisticated talk that goes into deterrence. You wouldn't retarget; you wouldn't have time to retarget. You've all been through those kinds of crises, You know what happens the first time you get a report that there's a ship 100 yards on your starboard beam - you ask the lookout to take another look - you don't believe it.

We've been through periods at the national level where the President has been told their are enemy aircraft on the way, and it wasn't believed. Mr. McNamara's advice to President Kennedy was, if a nuclear missile explodes within the United States, wait until the second one explodes. And, the reason was an intelligent one - it could well have been a nuclear accident.

All of the emphasis is going to be on not doing anything

- until after we've been hit. So I think we've got to assume that whatever our targeting scheme is and whatever survives that first strike, is what will be used. It will be a spasm.

QUESTION: Admiral, you have advocated the invulnerable nature of the carrier in the past. Although I agree that it would take tremendous fire power to sink a carrier it seems that it would take far less to neutralize it by damaging the gear or electronics. I was wondering if you'd comment on that?

ZUMWALT: Sure. What I've always tried to say is that when you look at carrier vulnerability you've got to look at it relative to something. There are three frames of reference that I think one has to consider.

One is a nuclear war. In a nuclear war any ship, any target that gets hit, whether it's Monterey, San Francisco, an airfield ashore or an aircraft carrier - it's going to be destroyed. No fixed facility of any importance will survive. Some moving targets will, so I'd rather be on a aircraft carrier bridge when the missiles start to fly than on any fixed facility.

Shifting to a conventional war. In the war in Southeast Asia, carriers operated in the Gulf of Tonkin for a decade - we never lost an aircraft due to enemy action on a carrier. We lost 400 destroyed on airfields ashore and 4,000 damaged. The Korean War - all the airfield overrun in the first few

weeks the carriers saved the Pusan perimeter and covered the McArthur landing. Now what's wrong with those two comparisons - Southeast Asia and Korean Wars - that the carriers had sanctuary, in part, because of the prestige and, at least, perceived invulnerability. So, go back to World War II for the last was in which they were struck. There the most modern class was now our oldest class, the ESSEX. They were hit by as many as four of the most intelligent cruise missiles we've ever had - the Kamakazi aircraft - and no ESSEX class carrier was ever sunk. All got back into action.

Since then we've built much more redundancy, armour commanding control into the aircraft carriers. The most recent laboratory test was the tragic fire on the ENTERPRISE where the equivalent of seven or eight cruise missiles - U.S. bombs exploded - and the ENTERPRISE could have been back in action in a matter of days; hours really.

You've got to go back to the third frame of reference, finally - cold war. We've dropped from 1100 airfields overseas to 50 - giving them up at an impressive rate, and we've never had to turn a floating airfield over to the other side.

The next way in which I think you have to come at it is - and this is the thing that I think Admiral Rickover so frequently overlooks in plugging submarines to the exclusion of everything else - and that is that there is no way that this country can bring its - the 50% of its oil into the

United States and the 69 of those 72 critical resources into the United States, or troops overseas, or ammunition or bullets - unless we can operate on the surface of the seas, merchant ships. And in order for those merchant ships to operate, you've got to have air-power to protect them. So that you put to sea the most survivable surface ship you've got - the aircraft carrier. If it can't survive, then, we're dead. We simply cannot carry out our commerce and keep our economy operating. So, the expenditures are worth it, and in a relative sense, I think, the aircraft carrier has a high degree of survivability.

QUESTION: Admiral, the Russians the KIEV operation . How do you see them using that? To control the seas, as an ASW weapon, as a strategic purpose, or what?

ZUMWALT: I think they're calling it ASW, partly to mislead us about what their program is and, partly, to facilitate getting it in and out of the Dardanelles, in violation of the Montreaux Convention.

Gorshkov has done a brilliant job of thinking exactly like a classical naval thinker on our side would think. And he's done exactly the right things during his 16-year or 17-year tenure. In coming from behind, first that huge submarine fleet; second, cruise missiles on the submarines - some of them - and on aircraft and on surface ships; expansion of the surface ships; the development of the trailing concept -

- to be able to tag our superior high value ships in a first conventional strike; the acquisition of real estate for naval aircraft around Eurasia; and now he's gone about as far as he can go to get a very high probability of cutting our sea lines. What he next needs - and he certainly didn't need those carriers for this, for the cutting - what he next needs is the ability to project power, and for that he's recognized that he's got to have some air power at sea. I think that the KIEV is going to be the first of a dramatically large series of VSTOL-carrying aircraft carriers, and I'll just bet you that he's already started the design of the next generation aircraft carrier which will be more nearly like what we ought to be building.

QUESTION: Admiral, I wonder if you might talk about any ships or trends in the autonomy of power between OSD and the military departments in the last few years?

ZUMWALT: The shift of power to OSD went on at a dramatic rate from the time that the theoretically confederate Secretary of Defense was created until Mr. McNamara completed his tenure.

I think that, in general, there has been a policy of decentralizing somewhat, since McNamara/Clifford left. Mel Laird and Dave Packard thought in terms of decentralization, and they looked to their line managers more than any Secretary of Defense, in my recollection, to do the job. So they counted on their service chiefs and their service secretaries to really take the delegated authority and run with it, in regard to

weapons acquisition, force level planning, and there was much less monitoring than there had been.

That process kind of brought the curve down for the first three years of Mel Laird's watch, and then the reaction set it and the OSD crowd began to try to pull it back in.

In the last three or four years, the climb has been back, somewhat, toward more centralization - but it hasn't gotten, yet, back to the level of the McNamara era.

QUESTION: Admiral, may we have your rejoinder to the following two pieces of exchanges in the testimony of William Colby, Director of the CIA, in the Senate Subcommittee on Military Construction? Senator Dominick said, "If we should pass the Diego Garcia enlargement, would we by so doing increase the force of the Russian Fleet?"

Mr. Colby: "I think our assessment is that the Soviets would match any increase in our presence in that area.

The second exchange was between Senator Taft and Colby. Taft said, "Mr. Colby, would you consider that enlarging the port and the airfield, as planned, would be such an increase or not.

Mr. Colby said: "I am not all that familiar with the details of the plan, but I do think that the public impression of what we do would probably be almost as important as what we actually do. In other words, the Soviets would believe that if we were to establish a permanent establishment capable

of supporting a regular force in that area, that they would react in some fashion in order to establish a countervailing force.

ZUMWALT: I know Bill Colby well. I was with him in Vietnam and he's a good professional. I'm sure that he believes what he says.

His judgment, in this particular case, unusual for him, is dead wrong.

The Soviets are already there, as President Ford has said in two recent news conferences. They have, in the country of Somalia - going back 15 years - have been in the process of bringing about a series of facilities that are superior to what we will have in Diego Garcia if the Congress funds it.

I might just take a moment to describe the way in which they did it. They started out - the details of this won't be exactly accurate in sequence, but each thing that I say happened, did happen. The Soviets started out with a suggestion to Somalia that they help them with their port of Verbera. They got them in debt. The Somalians were then persuaded to remove the Western oil concessionair and turn it over to the Soviets, as a way of paying off that debt. They were, then, offered heavy equipment. They were, then, offered the training of military advisors in the Soviet Union in order to use that equipment. Soviet merchant ships began to visit with increasing frequency. Verbera was completed. Soviet warships began

to visit with increasing frequency. Somalian-trained - Somali personnel trained in the Soviet Union began to come home. One of them became a general and shot the President and took over. The Soviet penetration accelerated. They now have completed the construction of a communications facility, a naval communications facility - superior to what we have in Diego Garcia. They've got a port in Verbera superior to what we'll have in Diego Garcia. They've got an airfield at Berbera and they're constructing a huge one at Magadiscio , which will take any kind of aircraft - to cover the whole Indian Ocean. And, they've got an indiginous population, which we don't have on the unpopulated coral atoll, to provide the labor force for them.

Turning next to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The Soviets are already using the old British port of Aden, there, and an adjacent airfield. They have access, to, as part of that country, the island of Socatra , which has an airfield on it. They are not using it; they're using the naval anchorage, and there are some buildings going up around that airfield. They've got, in Yeman, a net intra-structure superior to what we have in Diego Garcia, if we get the money.

Turning next to Iraq. They've improved the port of in Iraq for the Iraqis, and the Soviets are using it. They've built four or five airfields for the Iraqis, and the Soviets are using those. So, they've got an intra-structure, there,

superior to Diego Garcia.

The Soviets have made it clear for a decade that their strategic objective is to get the Suez Canal open so that they can take advantage of this impressive inter-structure that they've got down there. The Soviets are there, and I don't know what more reaction they could have to us - reacting to their action.

QUESTION: Admiral, given what you just said concerning the goings on in the Middle East, what do you foresee in the way of Ethiopia, given the movement, and the current semi-coupe going on in Ethiopia? Do you foresee radicalization, as you mentioned yesterday, through the Soviets? Or do you possibly see a Somali expansion - a conventional war in Ethiopia?

ZUMWALT: The Soviets are interested in increasing their holdings. They've got a tremendous digestive capability. They've already approached the new Ethiopian military regime, and said - don't you fellows need some equipment and don't you need some help.

It's just unbelievable to me that our people in Congress are not able to recognize this. I do think that it's too early to predict how Ethiopia will come out - but the Soviets are doing their best to tilt them in their direction.

I should have also mentioned, with regard to Diego Garcia, that there is another thing that Colby has completely overlooked in that testimony, and that is we had one single airfield

available to us that made it possible for us to reinforce the Israelis in the last crisis. All our allies stood aside except the Portuguese. We had to brutalize the Portuguese to force them to give us access to the Azores. The regime has changed, since then, and may well not be with us the next time around. If the Azores is not with us, the only way one can fly airlift into Israel, with sufficient refueling capability to get equipment there, is by way of Diego Garcia. So, it's the backdoor route up the Red Sea to the Middle East.

QUESTION: Can't you use the Spanish bases ?

ZUMWALT: The Spanish bases , we think, would not be available to us.

QUESTION: Admiral, would you give us your comments on the strength, weakness and use of force effectiveness studies like Navy fighter study, NETEC or Phoenix?

ZUMWALT: Yes. I guess they've each been used in a somewhat different way. The Navy fighter study is part of a continuing series of studies that were used first to demonstrate that the F-111B was the most cost-effective airplane that we had - given the assumption that Mr. McNamara gave us, and that was, that we had to assume that it could land and take off of an aircraft carrier. What it demonstrated was that the Phoenix missile aug 9 system could beat anything that you could put in the air. As a result, as soon as we were able to demonstrate that the assumption was fallacious - and four contractors came in with new air frames that could land and take off on an

- aircraft carrier while carrying the Phoenix aug 9 system - we were in a position, in another study, to demonstrate that that was the way to go. The continuing studies since then have made it possible to save the F-14, as people perennially tried to go back to a lower cost fighter.

With regard to the Phoenix study, it's been of use, I think, primarily to help demonstrate what the range of losses, attrition, might be in an war, and has helped add some credibility to the judgmental probabilities that we've been giving to the Secretary of Defense, as to what the outcomes of war would be.

The NETEC study was, I think, the first time that a service has ever, during a crisis, tried to demonstrate what the outcome would be. And, the reason I asked for it on a crash basis was that I wanted to be very sure that the Secretary of Defense and the President knew we were up against very tough odds in the Eastern Mediterranean. We had given that as our judgment. Admiral Moorer had joined us in that judgment. The calculations demonstrated, I think, pretty effectively that we were at real hazard, and served a useful role in getting the Secretary of Defense convinced that our maritime capability has suffered badly.

QUESTION: Admiral, some time ago, Admiral Train came out and gave a presentation to the student body on your net assessment of the U.S. and Soviet Navies as you gave to Congress. The problem is there seem to be some contradictions in the various

approaches used in that study. On the one hand, they sort of counting comparisons which placed high emphasis on the Harpoon missile as the answer to some of our problems, and, yet, in the combat analysis or campaign analysis - he mixed portions - it didn't seem to us that the Harpoon had that much of a role in demonstrating that we could do much better in the, sort of, objectives we have. Could you comment on that?

ZUMWALT: Yes. First, I agree that there were a lot of bean counting parts to that comparison. The reason for it, is that's - you know, we were competing with being counters.

The people in the Congressional committees were saying the United States has built more tonnage than the Soviet Union has built, therefore, the United States will will win. We were trying to demonstrate, in a whole series of ways, if you like to count beans, there were ways to count those beans down. If the Congress would fund us in the out years, we could begin to add those beans back up. Then we tried consciously to go beyond that to the next level of sophistication - to look at comparisons in warfare areas and that kind of thing; and then to the next level of sophistication - the war outcomes - with regard to specific calculations; and, then, to try to sum it all up by saying not even that is sophisticated enough - and you've got to go beyond that to crank judgment in. That's why we give you these probabilities.

That net assessment was just an effort to try to

demonstrate the state of the art isn't very good, but that we had gone a lot farther in trying to push back the frontiers than those who were throwing tonnage at us.

I think it did fulfill a very useful role. The Senate Appropriations Committee stated that they had never seen anything quite as dramatic, and urged that some way be found to get it to the American people - obviously, much too complex in that form. The problem, I think, in some, was that it was the first definitive effort to really lay out everything we knew, and march all the way from the lowest to the highest possible level of sophistication.

QUESTION: Sir, what effect do you think that current international the Soviets from new political and economic alliances will have on our economy and on their economy? And, what effect do you think that will have on future efforts in that field?

ZUMWALT: I hinted at it a little... (lost in tape change) ...and, then, superiority in that field in ways that are not likely to stir up the people. I believe that, having tried for sudden dramatic changes in the conventional field, as they did in the Korean War, they decided that that has low pay-off, and added to our strength because we reacted to it.

I believe that having tried it at the sub-limited level in Southeast Asia, they decided that that was better. But, nevertheless, it also created some problems for them.

I believe they've now found the gimmick that they think is the right tool for the next decade or so, and that is to

break it off in us economically - using their superior strategic power and their superior conventional power to give us no choice, except to backdown and accommodate gracefully, as they do to us what they just did in the Yom Kipper War. They've got, I think, a very fine tuned capability through their Abartof (?) Institute which reads us better than we read ourselves, and through their Soviet Embassy which has emissaries all around the Hill every day, rapping with legislative assistants and senators - to know exactly the degree of concern in this country. If they suddenly saw the people in this country beginning to get concerned that it was Soviet power and policy that had trebled those oil prices, they'd back down and be very cautious for a year or two, until our people were lulled. As long as they remain satisfied, as they are today, that our people do not relate the Soviets to having their hand in the cookie jar, they're going to continue the policy of investing those monies in Iraq and in Libya, encouraging them to keep this wound open, and looking for the orchestra that they're playing to permit them to raise oil prices or create another oil embargo, to stay ahead of our efforts to deal with inflation. I believe that they're in the process of trying to get the same scheme organized with regard to other commodities, and that they have found what they consider to be the ideal tool for so bugging up the economics of the uncommitted and free world that they can begin to radicalize regimes at an impressive rate.

QUESTION: Admiral, several of us saw a taping on the show you did with William F. Buckley on FIRING LINE, which I assume from the conversation, was, at least, more than a couple of weeks old. But it brought up a couple of points I'd like to ask you about. First, it has been widely reported that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and Secretary of State Kissinger have differing views on how we should proceed with SALT, and I'd like to know if you could give us what these two views are, and what you think. Secondly, and perhaps a lot more controversial - you touched on it a little bit with Mr. Buckley - could you give us a view of how you saw things from your level during the last days of the Nixon administration, and how you saw policy being made and how much of that policy was related to, not only his own problems, but problems that you saw.

ZUMWALT: All right. That show was taped in the first week of July.

With regard to your first question, I think that Secretary Kissinger's view is that the American people don't have the will to be anything other than second best, and that his mission is to get the best, second best deal he can get.

I think that Secretary Schlesinger's view - which I share - is that the American people are not willing to accept second best, and that we should hold out for essential equivalence in the strategic field, and if we can't get it, to

begin to make it clear to the American people why we're not getting it. - we haven't made sufficient strategic expenditures.

With regard to the view of that last period under the Nixon administration, it was very much related to the first point because the only real, major issue - everything else in the government having come to a halt for two years, as Watergate began to destroy the administration - was the position with regard to the summit. That, in itself, was Watergate related because the real question in Mr. Nixon's mind, in my judgment, was whether or not he could get a deal that he could wave in front of the American people as such a kudo that it would take the pressure off of him. Therefore, there were fearsome pressures to put together a package that would be acceptable to the Soviets. I, for one, fought tooth and fang against those proposals, and was delighted when the final decision was made that you couldn't call it ice cream when it smelled like spinach.

QUESTION: Admiral, since the F-14 is a rather sophisticated, expensive money machine, would it not be appropriate for us to have also a Hi-Lo Mix or fleet dependent aircraft?

ZUMWALT: To my mind, the fighter aircraft is the best justification for not having a Hi-Lo Mix because it is the cutting edge for your whole capability to maintain the control of the seas through airpower, and it has to operate from extremely

limited deck space - deck space which is going to get still more limited as we continue to try to make the carriers more and more expensive.

Therefore, I have favored, and have fought hard, for keeping the F-14. I would hope that, over time, the Congress will come to recognize that all of these cheaper alternatives that are being designed are really giving us far less, in terms of cost effectiveness, than we'll get from the F-14.

I said yesterday, to one group, that I like to look at the F-14 as a low-cost DLGN. It's a hell of a lot cheaper thing to make - and you know how badly a destroyer man hates to say something like that.

QUESTION: Admiral, you said that we're going to do down to 12 carriers, and it appears that forward basing is going to be almost a necessity. From what I understand, the forward basing in Japan has not been real successful - that they've been unable to get a sufficient number of volunteers to man the carriers that want to go to Japan, live over there. I wonder if you'd comment on this and, perhaps, the future of it?

ZUMWALT: Yes. I guess it's a question of whether the glass is half full or half empty. The dependents who are there and their husbands and fathers are very happy, and the re-enlistment rates are good. It is true that the Bureau has not been able to get 100% volunteers from among the bachelors. I believe that, over time, as the recruiters get more and more focused with regard to the recruiting effort, we're going to

see the capability to fill those ships 100% with volunteers, married and bachelors.

What we're trying very hard to do is to be able to assure a young man in Peoria that if he wants duty in Japan, he can get it, or if he wants duty in Greece, he can get it.

Reenlistment rates with regard to the destroyers that have been homeported in Athens are much higher than the comparative reenlistment rates for destroyers in the Atlantic. The question as to whether or not we can homeport the carrier in Athens rests on this now very great concern about how the Greek government is going to come out after the coupe and after the Cyprus crisis where the Soviets have maneuvered to pry the Turks and the Greeks apart - and to convince the Greeks that we're not supporting them as well as we should have. My own guess would be that we'll not be able to homeport a carrier in Athens for several years, if ever.

QUESTION: Admiral, going back to the discussion you had on the fighters and the limited deck space of the future, as we go to the CV concept, bringing in multi-missions to the carrier, and in regard to the statement that you didn't think that the Hi-Lo Mix in aircraft types would be necessary due to the F-14, do you foresee what many of the low level fighter types in the field would be the degradation of the system by cutting bomb wraps all over fighters, as was the case with the F-4 - do you believe that the F-14 will, in fact, remain a pure fighter and not a air/mud type of thing?

ZUMWALT: I think we'd be very foolish to try to give the F-14 that mission. When I said I favored aircraft being at the high end of the mix, I was talking about F-14. I think we do need to try to reduce unit cost with regard to the other kinds of aircraft. I favor - erring in favor of the A-7s rather than the A-6s, for example. A mix, but more low than high. The F-14, even if we buy it at the optimum rate, is going to come in at \$15 or \$16 million a piece - and that's just too much money for air to mud.

QUESTION: Admiral, when you were telling us about Athens, I didn't see anything about when the Greek problem got pretty severe the Israelis gave us an invitation to bring some of our down there. Would you care to comment on that?

ZUMWALT: I'm not personally aware that they did. You're talking about homeporting in Israel? (Yes, sir.) I'm not personally aware that they did, although I recommended several times we find out whether or not they were interested.

That's obviously a very tough one from a foreign policy standpoint because it would make it even more difficult to maintain the balance that this country is trying to maintain so we can both carry out our commitments to the survivability of Israel, and our promises to the Arabs that we'll be good, if they continue to give us the oil.

QUESTION: Admiral, yesterday you mentioned that at a time when labor costs have soared relative to the many other designs

and our defense dollar, perhaps, should be concentrated more in the capital intensive services - at least some cut. Would you - could you, personally, to one step further and see any problem in the near future for the Air Force justifying its strategic mission - relative to our strategic capabilities in the Navy?

ZUMWALT: I do. If I were Secretary of Defense I'd not be building the B-1 bomber, and I'd be putting additional money into regaining sea control capability on the conventional side. I think the B-1 bomber's principal virtue is the negotiating wampum - but it's a hell of a lot of money. If that's what we were really interested in, in the strategic business, it ought to be going into building twice as many Tridents.

QUESTION: Admiral, yesterday there was a comment about Admiral Moorer's 1970 assessment - that if we took on the Russians in conventional naval warfare, we'd get a bloody nose. Your answer was very terse. Could you elaborate on that and update it to 1974?

ZUMWALT: Yes. When I went through the calculations that had been done after I left the Systems Analysis Division in 1968 and before I took over from Admiral Moorer on 1 July 1970, I decided that as the prospective "Jimmy the Greek" for naval odds making to the President that I thought we had about a 55% probability of success on 1 July 1970. I started saying that and made it clear that with the reductions that we were

going to have to make under postulated budgets, that those odds would continue to come down. When we briefed the President in December of 1970, at that time the program called for the elimination of about 106 ships, as I recall, and I predicted that we would be down to a 35% probability. The President restored some, and we showed 45% a year later, 35% two years later, 30% three years and four years later. We have always showed that we could begin to recover and come back up above the 50% probability by 1980, if the Congress funded the range of ships. As a result of the Congressional reductions that have just been made, in my judgment, we stay at 30% and will not recover.

QUESTION: Admiral, given that if Congress, for some reason, justified those ships, do you believe that with the all volunteer service that we have now, we'd be able to man them?

ZUMWALT: If we maintain a balance of adequate numbers of conventionally-propelled ships, I believe we can. I think we're going to have all kinds of trouble manning the number of nuclear-propelled ships we're headed for. We, in Navy - as well as the Air Force - have been able to meet our quotas, both qualitatively and quantitatively, essentially, since the summer of 1972. The manpower required to go up in those ships from the 508 to the 600 is not a very large number because we're headed for gas turbines if we get the PF. We're doing a lot of automation and the crew sizes will be much smaller than they would be in the ships that have been disestablished.

QUESTION: Admiral, you said before you were vitally concerned with our hardware status, and I've heard some figures bantied about concerning manpower levels in the Navy - something to the effect that they're up 450,000 military and a 324,000 civilians in the naval establishment. Don't you think, in view of our manpower cost, that might be a very high level of support force, and no way to project power?

ZUMWALT: Yes. There's no question but what we have had to cut the fighting forces harder than we've cut the shore establishment. It took nearly six years to get the authority to make the major reductions that were made in - right after the election. Admiral Moorer had tried for three years, and I tried for two and a half years. Right after Mr. Nixon was reelected was the first time we were able to get political support for cutting back the shore establishment. As you'll recall, we wipped out most of Rhode Island and Massachusetts. I wish it could have been Wisconsin. And, in other activities around the country. But even so, the resistance to going far enough was just unbelievable - we had not gone as far as we can go. There are additional consolidations that could be made if you could get political support for doing it. It doesn't bother the average senator or representative a bit to see a beautiful ship go into the grave yard, but it just kills him to see that awesome power of the local fleet post office being eliminated.

QUESTION: Admiral, in the past couple of months in NAVY TIMES there was this article concerning the war recall plan - a war plan for naval reserve forces - a lack thereof. Would you care to comment on that?

ZUMWALT: The naval reserve forces are far from ready. That's true, I think, of all reserve organizations. Our policy, articulated by the President, under the total force concept was that we were going to have to...we could no longer hack it with active duty forces - we were going to have to count on the forces of our allies who are only with us if they're in trouble. And, we're going to have to count on the reserves. Therefore, all the services have been under notice that, unlike the Southeast Asia War where we were not permitted to mobilize, that there was recognition at the national level that in order for us to do a job in a crisis we were going to have to have reserves. It's been unbelievable, to me, to see how hard it has been to try to improve the readiness of those organizations. We have done some things; we've cut back the number of reserve training centers with old equipment and have concentrated on trying to create some readiness centers - smaller in number but of more modern equipment. My young associates, who were with me in Southeast Asia and got out and are in reserve organizations around the country, continue to tell me that we've just got a long way to go. We're still showing them first aide movies and all kinds of out-of-date things.

I left that with Admiral Holloway as one of the things that I considered, together with the shipbuilding problem, as of highest priority to try to deal with in the year ahead. Our contingency plans need overhauling. Our reserves need better training. We should get rid of a tremendous amount of overhead in the senior personnel. A real job needs to be done there.

QUESTION: Admiral, would you comment on the recently concluded conference in _____ on the law of the sea, and what you think we should look for next year on the _____ table?

ZUMWALT: Well, it was very inconclusive. It's regrettable. The people who were at the Geneva Conference back in the late '50s tell me that if the United States, on that occasion, had been prepared to buy a 6-mile territorial sea, that we'd have been able to bring it off, and have eliminated what has come to pass. Since then, there's been this proliferation in claims and, although we have the Russians with us on this and all the other principal maritime nations, that we should not go beyond the 12-mile territorial sea, and if these 200-mile contiguous seas should be limited to environmental and pollution and resource control - they just weren't able to bring it off at that conference.

I believe that we will see the principal maritime nations just refusing to honor any claims insofar as warships are concerned, and I hope that by the time of the next conference, that refusal will bring the smaller nations, who are pushing

these 200-mile contiguous seas, into recognizing that they've got to recognize free passage in them.

QUESTION: Admiral, what are your views on essential equivalence, having been involved with the strategic arms discussions for a long time? Do we have to get into the business of hard target kill capability and matching numbers with the Russians, or can we get away with saying that this is equivalence as we define it and stop at some point?

ZUNWALT: What the Soviets are doing with the 40% superiority of land-based missiles and the 34% superiority of sea-based missiles that they got in SALT I is to tell their allies and ours that they have strategic superiority. As I have traveled around the world, I've found not only service chiefs, not only Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, but ministers of defense saying to me, "Why have you Americans let the Soviets get ahead of you?" They look at those missile numbers as gold at Fort Knox - power - and they tell me that their ministers for foreign affairs and their liberal members of their Parliaments are leaning on their governments to accommodate to the Russians because they see the Russians as the wave of the future with those superior numbers.

So quite apart from the military significance, there's a very important political significance in having the perception of strategic superiority. That's the answer, in my judgment, to Henry Kissinger's plaintiff question - what is strategic superiority? - what do you do with it? You get every-

body to start, leaning toward Moscow, as you get it.

Another answer to what is strategic superiority is that it is the obverse of strategic inferiority, and that's what we've got - and it is generally recognized.

I believe that what we ought to be saying to the Russians is that we are prepared to sign a deal which 10 years from now gives both sides equal numbers, equal megatonnage with freedom to mix, and which arranges for a phased program for getting there. And, that we tell them that the alternative of that is that we will walk away from the whole field of relationships that are being set up, including the trade and the technology which the Soviets are trying so hard to get.

QUESTION: Admiral, in thinking about nuclear versus nuclear powered ships, I was wondering, in war,

ZUMWALT: I believe that the war will be lost much more rapidly for lack of platforms than it will for any propulsion advantages. I believe the analysis is quite clear that there can be no argument on that to any one who has walked through it.

The oil that the United States requires for its defense establishment is 3% of the energy that it uses, and, for the Navy, it's 40% of that. For the Navy, well over half of that has to be used for the airplanes, so that ships are just, kind of, riding along. It does require tankers; it does require

some protection to the tankers, but when you wrap that all up and include the costs of everything, you're paying a fearsome price in loss of combatant capability for the air war and the submarine war to have the advantages of nuclear propulsion in escorts.