

REMARKS BY ADMIRAL E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (RET.), AT THE
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It's a pleasure to be here for my fifth exposure.

I think that we ought to get right at it by just asking
you to fire away with your questions, and see where that
takes us. And, if it looks to me, by the time that we come
to the end, as though there's an area we haven't covered
I'll say something about it.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

QUESTION: Admiral, this past session I just came from -
you indicated that the reenlistment rates in Greece, as a
result of homeporting, were a great deal higher, and the same
in Japan. Although that may be basically true, I think some
of the family problems that are developing are very severe
in Greece, and I wondered if you'd comment on what the Navy's
doing to kind of alleviate that situation?

ZUMWALT: There have been some. There's been some fascinating
examples of where it has proven to be a very beneficial thing
for families. But, it's part of the culture-shock phenomenon
that we're trying so hard to deal with through the inter-
cultural training.

It's exacerbated, I'm sure, by the member of the family
being in and out of port instead of being there constantly,
as is the case when you're on shore duty overseas, so that
makes it tougher.

I think that it's going to require continuing focus on better screening of those who are selected - we had some very bad examples of screening in the first set of people who went over - to eliminate those who just are too likely to not be able to recover from the cultural shock, to prepare those who go, better, over there. And, then, really enlightened leadership on the part of the skippers to see to it that the people and their families are organized in ways that make up for being away from the United States.

We've had some wonderful examples of how to do it - and some very poor examples as to how to do it - and the problem is to pass both sets of examples around.

The alternative is unacceptable. We are not going to be permitted to reduce our forces overseas by very much. If we don't put some families forward, we're going to be going back to very long deployments. And, we know what this does to our reenlistment rates.

QUESTION: Admiral Zumwalt, I'm Tom Wyatt. I guess, I'm not going to ask a question make a statement. Yesterday, I attended your talk and first of all, I want to give you my feeling of sincerity that I received. Second of all, I agree with one aspect of what you're saying and disagree with another, which I find interesting in the sense that I'm very strongly in favor about your race program, your sex program, in the sense that when I look around this room I see how racist and sexist our organization is. I'm really with you

in that part of the program. I disagree with your views on the danger of the world, but I'm looking from a different frame of reference. What I find defeating is that I'm so taken with one side of you and so opposed to the other side?

ZUMWALT: All right. I understand your problem. I don't know whether you've happened to have read the interview that I had in PLAYBOY but I made that point - that people have found me a very difficult target because they've only got a half a bulls eye - whether they're in favor of more defense and less on the personal side or vice versa. And it's kind of interesting that people tend to break down into those schools. I've never been quite sure why - that those who seem to support a more humanistic approach to personnel administration generally also favor doing less in the defense field, and those who favor doing more in the defense field, generally, are in favor of breaking their heads to keep them in line.

QUESTION: I'm really curious to find out why, in your opinion, it seems like we're not able to bridge the gap between the people who see the world as you see it, and the people who see the world as some of your critics, or adversaries, see it. It seems to me that there's a certain data base - there's certain facts available - facts are facts. And we all know that whenever you're going to take a particular course of action, whether it be military, political or economic, and you have enemies, that you never sit around and say, 'Well,

I'm going to plan against what I think the enemy is going to do.' You sit there and you look at his capabilities and you say, what's the worst thing that he can do and then you plan to counter that, so that if he does it, you're prepared. If he does something less, you're prepared for that too. It just doesn't seem to me that we've got a dialogue between the two sides so that we can both look at the data that's there and say, well, look, this is the way that it is and why don't we go ahead and do this because it's the most efficient thing to do? It doesn't seem to me like we do that at all?

ZUMWALT: I've worried an awful lot about that same problem, because I share your view that we ought to be able to get at least a first order agreement on facts, and then a second order agreement on what it is that we disagree about. And, yet, I've come to the conclusion, over the four years that I've had this job, that the problem is more complex than that:

First, because there is a segment of the population who don't want to know the facts. People like Proxmire and Aspin aren't interested in the facts - they're demagogues.

Second, there is, moving from left to center, another group of people who are interested in the facts but who just simply will not buy that in a defense budget, which gets larger in current dollars every year, we aren't doing well, and who just simply don't seem to be able to appreciate that the purchasing power has gone down by 33% since the height of

the war, and by 15% since the year before the war began - and that even that lower base of constant dollars has been eroded in terms of capability that it buys because of the fantastic inflation in personnel costs for the all volunteer force.

You know, by the time you start running through all of these things and you've got all the similar sets of explanations to give on the Soviet side, you have already gone beyond the level of a layman's ability to understand the problem.

Even within the military ranks you can have lots of disagreements about what specific outcomes might be for a given set of assumptions. So, it's just a very, very complex subject.

Therefore, it seems to me that one has to maybe back away from what the immediate situation is. I don't think it's so important for me to be able to prove to you why I believe that the odds are only about 30% that we could control and use the seas, today, if I can convince you of the fact that each year our capability, relative to the Soviets, is on a down-trend. And, I think that is something that any reasonably competent, technically qualified military man can understand.

There isn't any argument about that up through the level of the last President of the United States - that, relatively,

our capabilities are going down. So that if you don't agree with me that it's 35% and think it's 55%, just hang around. You know, if we could just get that much across to the people, we'd begin to make progress - but we aren't.

QUESTION: I'd like to congratulate you for being forthright about the needs, but I attended a national naval reserve conference in Coronado last year in November, and I was aware of the fact that JANE'S SHIPS has indicated that for several years we were doing down in comparison with the Russian fleet. I was also aware of the fact that we had ships on the line that we should have had overhauled, we lost a lot of equipment, and that we need, in all the forces, to rebuild, because we've done nothing except use up resources without replenishing them for years. At the same time we have Proxmire, friends of his, talking about - we need to spend less in the military and more on welfare. We've spent more on welfare than you have on military throughout the four and one-half years. So, it's a little difficult to find out what we're getting for military programs results in the military. What I'm wondering about is, why, at this conference in San Diego, there was no one from the military, nor the Secretary of the Navy, who was there, really laid it on the line in terms of what do we need and what kind of support would we like to get from people who could give us support? These people like the Navy. They would like to be active in the program to support the Navy, but there's nobody

from the Navy, at these conferences telling them what they ought to be doing. I think this is an unfortunate situation.

ZUMWALT: I would share your view. If we had a Secretary of the Navy there, and he didn't lay it on you, he sure wasn't carrying out his mission. That's what he's appointed to do - is to make sure that as much support as possible is organized.

Every naval spokesman that I know, whenever he gets a chance to appear before an audience, tries to lay out the facts as he sees them - I'm just astonished that that didn't happen.

QUESTION: With a down-trend in the total budget and manpower in the Navy, in terms of new weapons systems, how can the sufficiently large pool of manpower be maintained in the Navy to handle the new weapons systems, and still take into consideration training time?

ZUMWALT: I'm not sure it can. The problem is that the Gates Commission, in its study of the all volunteer force, accurately described the economic fact that we had been extracting a hidden tax from our sailors and soldiers by underpaying them, and that in economic terms, you ought to pay them and it wouldn't make any essential difference in so far as the country was concerned.

The problem with that was it didn't look at the political realities. The political realities are that once you stopped extracting that hidden tax and started paying it, and it became a part of the defense budget, defense costs for people

skyrocketed from 30% to about 56% of the defense budget.

Therefore, Congress, directly, by its cuts and, indirectly, by its very strong expressions of concern to the President and the Secretary of Defense, has forced the military strength of this country, under arms, from 3.6 million down to 2.1 million during the last five or six years - a period during which the Soviets have gone almost exactly the reverse, from 2 million to nearly 4 million. They're having to pay, we reckon, only 26 or 27% of their budget for personnel costs.

So, we've paid a fearsome cost in terms of strength for the all volunteer force, and we still are not sure that we're going to be able to make it, even at the levels to which we've been reduced.

The Air Force and the Navy have been making their goals, qualitatively and quantitatively. The Navy had about a nine-month's period of difficulty from the Fall of '71 to the summer of '72. We've now solved that by getting top talent into our recruiting force. The Army and the Marines have fallen short - the Marines by a considerable fraction - and have had to take up around 1/4 of their people from the lowest mental group - mental group IV - which is larger, probably, than they can handle efficiently. I think the Navy could take as many as 5% and we've been running about 3%.

We need to do a lot of things to live with this. First, let me say that both Eddie Hebert and Senator John Stennis tell me that we would have to fail as a Department of Defense for

at least three years by a big margin before there would be any support for universal military suffrage - service.

Second, in addition to all the things we're doing frantically to try to get recruits, we need to do the very best we can to try to economize in personnel by the automation, by the shift to gas turbine propulsion, and all that sort of thing. And, we need to look for every possible area that can be civilianized, in order to get them off the military rolls and be able to hire permanent, rather than rotating, employees.

Nevertheless, given all those things, I believe that we may get by for another year or so in this economic condition we're in, but over the long haul, I'm pessimistic that we can maintain forces like we've got today.

QUESTION: Admiral, in light of what you just said and what you said yesterday on possibly who warrants our capitol

versus personnel . It would seem like we have a greater need for officers with graduate level education in personnel management, human resource management. OSD has recently this coming back to

. I wonder if you have any advice to both students and faculty as to what we can do to get our equivalence

ZUMWALT: The phenomenon that is taking place is that we were able to increase the numbers of people in the billet field and with regard to numbers going into educational programs

during a period when Congress wasn't paying much attention to us. Then, as the conservative members of Congress - the Southern members -- began to get concerned about the Navy's and the other services' dangerous efforts to integrate the military services, they began to look for ways to throttle this effort back.

Some very influential members of the service pointed out to Congress that one way to do it was to reduce the billets and the numbers of people permitted to have this kind of education or to be in these kinds of jobs.

Two years ago we took a fairly healthy cut; this year, I understand, we've not been singled out in this field - I think largely because we made such an effort to get attention brought to the individual members of the staffs of these committees who had done the job - that it was rather a vicious thing.

I believe that, like everything else, these things have a maximum point beyond which they will not go and I believe that we, probably, have survived the real effort to throttle us back.

Meanwhile, any time there is Congressional interest, there are people in OSD who watch it, and the current efforts to hold back what we're doing are based on people in OSD who feel that Congress doesn't want us to be doing these kinds of things. That always takes a while longer to overcome.

I don't think that the very important efforts that the services have going on in the human relations field can ever be stopped, and I believe that, over time, there will be a resumption of momentum with regard to numbers being trained.

QUESTION: Admiral, having executed one of your human relations programs in the fleet for the last few years and over my years of service as an officer, taking a great deal of reward from my budding managerial abilities and leadership abilities - as a mid-student in the management curriculum, here, I suddenly realized that we all could have been killed over those years. I realize that the state of the art of management and that, indeed, the average naval officer doesn't know anything about it. We don't train our junior officers, in my opinion, at the Academy or anywhere else, formally, in what management is all about and where it is in 1974. Do you think there's a need for that? That we should do it with junior middle managers?

ZUMWALT: Certainly there is a need for people to be good managers. I think that the Navy's traditional approach to it has not been all bad. You know, you start on your Midshipman Cruise getting some training as a manager. In your first job as a division officer you're getting some, and so on as you go up.

I think it's also true that you have had to pick it up jack-leg and that more professional training would accelerate the rate at which a man becomes a really efficient manager,

and gets the maximum out of his system and his people. So, I favor the more formal management programs that are available, and wish that we could do more. It's always a question of balance - having in mind, again, that Congress scrutinizes very carefully expenditures in this as in all other educational fields.

QUESTION: Is this what you had in mind with these development courses, the HRDC?

ZUMWALT: Yes, as a way of putting it all together in the field of managing human beings.

QUESTION: I assume that DOD would, of course, like to see the all volunteer concept work. But, yet, when the President said he'd like to withhold our pay for three months, or we lose CHAMPUS benefits, or proficiency pay disappears for or excess leave is not allowed to be sold and various plans to basically reduce retirement benefits - it doesn't seem like DOD is fighting against the people that are trying to do these different things - to encourage the all volunteer force?

ZUMWALT: You've just given my speech. I've testified each year for the last three years that we, the last two years, that we, expect billions to try to achieve the all volunteer force, and now, by piecemeal little cuts here and there, we're being penny-wise and pound-foolish - insulting people out.

An awful lot of people working on that in contact with

the Hill, and I hope that, over time, we can begin to get Congress to understand that when they cut back flight pay, or when they curtail privileges in commissaries and exchanges, and all the rest of these things, that they're doing it to a Department of Defense which is, even now, not making its quality and quantity goals.

QUESTION: Admiral, alike - in the same line - as the military man perceives these cuts in privileges, do you feel there will be some tendency toward unionization of the military? And, if so, should we, as military managers, fight it or try and live with it if it comes?

ZUMWALT: I think that it's awfully tough to consider unionizing the military. What I have always advocated is that anybody who has a beef should never hesitate to sit down and write a letter to his representative or senator, and to get his wives and cousins and children, grandmothers and so forth, to write.

We've got a tremendous amount of leverage if we would use it. Whenever we see those kinds of things being done that affect the whole department as a whole, everybody ought to be rising up through the democratic system and letting the members of the Congress know about it.

I would worry about going into a formal organization. We might try getting the wives to unionize.

QUESTION: Admiral, two items: The emphasis you put on personal services while you were in, I'm sure, will continue. The other one is the one we addressed yesterday - the habit-

ability problem. It seems that even with all this emphasis that we put on personal services, the first place it gets gutted is quality and quantity of manpower in these areas. We keep the technicians who do the things that bring them in, but if we have to make a cut in manpower, the first place we let slide is this very important place of personal services.

The other one is, I've been around quite a while, and I have yet to really hear people from the enlisted side - because I was down there for quite a while - really complain about the living conditions aboard ship that much. If _____ and if we can achieve what you're talking about in cutting back the periods of time that each ship is deployed, then I feel we can make a little more of a trade-off with more weapons

ZUMWALT: Yes. I don't think I have any problem with all of what you said. I agree that we do tend to look at what people call the so-called "fat" - personal services - when cuts come around.

One of the things that both Secretary Chafee and I set out to do, when I took this job four years ago, was to make sure that that was considered high priority instead of low priority. I think we were successful. It's something that has to be watched each year as the budget cuts get put through.

In the past, we just took it out of the sailors hide. We no longer do that.

I share your view that the shorter the deployment the

less insult that derives from crowded conditions, but we have to remember that we're not only in competition with the civilian life, where everybody has a warm bed and a warm beer, but we also are competing with the other services who are able to provide much better space and facilities for their people because they don't have those crowded conditions that we have. So, we've got to have some minimum standard if we're going to continue to compete.

ZUMWALT: Admiral, we've gone more toward subspecialization and specialization within the officer corps and, right now, the warfare spaces are structured so that through the first 10 or 12 years of an officers career he is pretty narrowly defined as to what he has to do to get qualified, get trained, for these billets. We recognize subspecialization as under the Oldham's concept for these other positions. Do you think now is the time to look at the selection process that we use for rank to reflect this specialization within the warfare categories and for at least the ranks of, say, CDR down, have warfare specialists sitting on those boards as opposed to these mixed boards where you're not sure who is doing what to whom?

ZUMWALT: I'm just sure that's bound to come. Already, in flag rank, we specify in the letters to the board we need communications specialists - the Navy's short in them - or we need intelligence specialists. We do try to have a mix

of warfare specialties and technical specialties represented in each selection board.

I believe that we're going to find that process going progressively down the ranks, and I see the day coming when selection boards will be told, we need at least 10% from specialty "A" and at least 8% from specialty "B" - rather than be given a flat overall percentage to select.

QUESTION: Admiral, it seems that the Navy has fallen behind the civilian community in the truth in advertising program. To me it seems that we've been doing this for many years. Representatives desire to visit fleet units were taken aboard an aircraft carrier, were treated as the dignitaries that they are, but they don't see the bottoms rusting out of 27-year old ships; they don't see men down in the compartments. They're treated to the VIP tour. I feel that we're doing the same thing in some of our advertising for the all volunteer force in that we're showing - visit the world, see the world, enjoy the Navy, it's a fantastic place to be. I think it is an excellent profession - one of the best - but I think we should show a little bit of the other side of the coin. And show precisely that it's not all fun and games; it is hard work. I don't feel our advertising does that. I saw the newscast with your presentation to Congress, a portion of the appropriations fight when you were defending some of the cuts that they wanted to make. Apparently, there

isn't a sufficient amount of knowledge in Congress as to what the state of the actual naval forces are. I think rather than the "can do" attitude that we have exemplified in the past several decades, we should look at it, analyze it and see if we can present a more realistic point of view and to bring them back to the ships that show them precisely what we have. On the offensive weapons systems, it seems like you have not really introduced an offensive surface weapon into the Navy in years. We're using point defense missiles - trying to develop them. We're trying to develop a Harpoon missile. It seems like the Navy went all personnel during your administration of the Navy and not enough on offensive weapons systems. I feel, personally, that we should turn the tide a little bit in the other direction so that we do have the capability of hauling our surface ships into various branches to defend the ships, rather than the habitability. I know from my last tour that the sailors running raids up the Vietnamese coast wanted something to throw at the enemy and didn't really care about showers or about the chess board in your living quarters. Do you think the Navy is turning towards more truth in advertising and towards more weapons systems, vice habitability items?

ZUMWALT: I don't think the Navy ever turned away from them. The truth in advertising is a tough one. I'd hate to see us start saying, "Don't join the Navy, it's a lousy world." You've got to get them. I think our recruiters have done a good job of maintaining a balance. We do want people who are attracted

to adventure, - and there's a hell of a lot of adventure in the Navy. I don't think that they're being promised a rose garden. They're shown pictures of compartments aboard ship, and engineering spaces, and all the rest, and I think it's a pretty good job of presenting a balance, reckoning that you still want to get the guy to decide to come in, and not to stay out.

With regard to the idea of having people come to the ships - people do go onboard the old, broken-down destroyers. I used to take them on mine. I used to get out and get them to come. You can get guests approved to be SECNAV guests by just writing a letter, and then, get them onboard. So, each individual skipper has control over that - all he's got to do is have the initiative to get out and scramble.

With regard to getting the Congressmen educated, they've been told the facts each year, and I, personally, have invited the committees to come onboard naval ships so we could rub their noses in the old rust and I can't get them to go. They just are not interested in that kind of a trip - their interest is to get to Europe with their wives and bring loads of shopping back home. There are a few conscientious Congressmen whom you can get, but you can't get the key members of the Appropriations Committee - we've tried very, very hard.

With regard to the questions of point defense, if you read the posture statements for the last four years, you'll find that we've gone after that as a critical weakness, and

you'll find that the Secretary of Defense has cut the Navy's programs back each year and the Congress has cut the Secretary of Defense's programs back each year. We have seen slide into the future, at an impressive rate, our capability to do each of these things, whether it's the close-in weapons system which we suggested was the highest priority program, or whether it's the Harpoon which is the first true cruise missile we will have had some 17 or 18 years after the Soviets get it.

The case has been made, the witnesses have testified fully and in detail - in a democracy, that just doesn't do it.

QUESTION: Admiral, it seems yesterday I took away an impression that the military man is having a hard time selling to Congress - therefore, you'd have to call in civilians. I was wondering, in the recent two months since your retirement with your PLAYBOY article and interview with Mr. Buckley, if you have any feedback on how the American people look towards the military as far as profession and getting our job done?

ZUMWALT: As you travel around the country there is tremendous reservoir of good will toward the military. I found it even during the height of the domestic turmoil over the war.

The poll three or four months ago demonstrated that the military as an institution is now one of the most popular, while the Presidency and the Congress and the Judiciary and everybody else has been sliding back, we've been treading water, and have now forged ahead.

Incidentally, it was fascinating to me to see that within a week after the poll came out Senator Proxmire found something good to say about the military - so he knows on which side his bread is buttered.

I think that the man in the street, by and large, feels that when a military man is out talking about the military balance, he's a salesman trying to sell his product. Until the President, himself, gets up and says it, I don't think the man in the street is going to be concerned, unless the Soviets make one of those inadvertent errors that they have made from time to time of letting us catch them so clearly up to mischief that it can be demonstrated to the man in the street.

QUESTION: Admiral, I have a question and also realize that I missed part of my function in introducing you and that is to remind everybody, it's been published and so forth, that this is an unclassified lecture, unclassified audience and access is controlled or not controlled that way. But my question really has to do with...

ZUMWALT: I thought this audience was

This is unclassified to they

QUESTION: can direct questions to you. My question has to do - sort of related to the last question - that is, do you perceive a skepticism - a national skepticism of each other - not only of high-level people, but of every level? And, if so, what do you perceive as a way of getting after that problem - how do we get ourselves to bleed each other again?

ZUMWALT: I guess this is going into a field of social engineering that I'm no more expert in than anyone else. I think that the fact that President Ford has relieved President Nixon is the giant step forward that was necessary. Mr. Nixon had lost all credibility. I would hope that Mr. Ford would turnover the White House Mafia at the fastest possible rate, to get new blood in, because they're all part of it. Beyond that, I think that the fact that a President of the United States was destroyed for lying and covering up ought to shock the system throughout the country, to make everybody operate with greater constraint than has been the practice for the last decade or two in our political life. I think that maybe, also, our younger generation which has basically always thought of us older folks as not idealistic may have been given a demonstration with regard to our Constitutional and democratic process that will have a very healthy effect on them.

Dave, you had a question?

QUESTION: Yesterday, there was a question involving where the next wave of Navy leadership will come from, and you stated that it might be very difficult for another generalist - we would have to be going to people with subspecialties. That seems to relate to the requirement for education - graduate education - and, yet, not only within the Congress but also within the Navy and not just in the area of human resource management, there is very eroding support for graduate educa-

tion of any kind. In the spectrum of peacetime training and activities, this is even a cost-effective one, I think; it's not expensive. Why is there no support?

ZUMWALT: I think the reason for that is that, within the Congress there is a very large body of opinion that graduate education is a luxury. Sure, it's fine to have it, but you don't need it.

When I fought World War II I didn't need to "be no doctor" - "why do them guys have to be doctors, now?" That's what you're up against in the debate, and it's very hard to get it across.

There are informed people in the Congress who support us very strongly but they're in the minority. We have been taking serious setbacks in the field of education, as a result.

QUESTION: Along the same lines, Admiral, there's been criticism that the Navy and probably the other services, who don't use their people who have received graduate education. I think from the example of that, and I feel that it's very justified criticism. We do not promote our people, we do not give them challenging jobs, so that we keep them in, and they get out when their four-year obligation is up, and this kind of thing. I think the criticism is justified, and I feel that the Navy ought to do much, much more than they're doing now to make better use of the people that complete their education.

ZUMWALT: I share that view. It's a very appropriate point.

The members of Congress do, in the case of every service, have some data to show that we have been less than efficient in the way in which we have assigned out postgraduate educated people. I think that the Navy, for the last two or three years under ADM Bagley's leadership, that the Bureau has been really closing in on this area, and I hope our record is going to look better in the years ahead.

QUESTION: I remember during the KITTY HARK and CONNIE crisis, you criticized much of the leadership in the Navy for lack of commitment, as I perceived it, anyway, in the human goals personal commitment. I'd be interested in whether you see any - since then we've seen a lot of systems of ticket-punching, a whole bunch of other things - I don't perceive any change in personal commitment from where I sit. I'm curious if you have seen any change in personal commitment in the upper levels of the Navy

ZUMWALT: Let me say first that that infamous speech was an interesting problem. The problem, as I thought at the time, was the following one: We had, for nine months, been failing to meet out quotas - this was that period when we were scrambling to get the recruiting force upgraded - we had been having to take, as the Army and Marines are now, for nine months, 25% mental group IV, in order to get any where near the numbers that we needed, and we still weren't making our numbers.

On 30 March 1972, when the North made its massive invasion across the DMZ, we were down to about 560 ships - the smallest number of the entire war - and we had to double the number of ships out there - the largest number of the entire war. So that sailors who had been spending 50 or 50% of their time away from home suddenly were spending 70 to 80% of their time away from home. Turnaround times, which had always been too brief, got briefer. Time on the line got longer. The air sorties were at an all-time high. The gunfire missions at an all-time high. The hours onboard ship at an all time high.

In World War II, we went through two or three periods like this and we had some very bloody fights onboard ship. They were white versus white, because we didn't have blacks to any extent at all.

Here, as soon as they began, they polarized into white versus black on first the HASSAYAMPA and, then, the KITTY HAWK, and that led to the discontent that we saw manifest itself on the CONSTELLATION.

That was a very serious situation in the Navy. There was never any doubt in my mind that we were going to maintain order and discipline. My concern was to be sure that under that pressure of those events, and with most of the conservative members of Congress and 90% of the White House leaning

on me, that I get locked into an absolute firm commitment that there wasn't going to be any backing down on this issue of race.

I would have preferred a different vehicle...
...that was the most immediate .

As an aside, I was instructed to put this speech out, but I would have done it whether I had been or not, because I needed a vehicle to get - what I considered to be the best speech I've ever made - not only out to every man in the fleet but to his family, whether black or white, and to his parents, whether black or white.

So that everybody knew, sure, we were going to solve this problem and we were going to give the discipline to the people who were that they deserved - but we were not going to let that be an excuse to turn the clock back. And let me give you my personal assurance that everybody in town wanted to turn the clock back.

I believe that, in that 24 hours, I did the most important thing I've ever done in my naval career. And I believe that the... (lost in tape change)

With regard to the second question, whether we've made giant progress - I'm confident that we're making slow progress. The mere fact that we have gone from less than 4% - the worst record of any of the services, in minority - to over 8% is getting us close to the national fraction. It

will be many years before these people who have long been denied the opportunity will have worked to the top - and until we're truly representative of the nation at large. But we are doing so and the growing pains to getting there are appreciably less than they were at the height of that crisis.

QUESTION: They would appreciate that answer, I think.

ZUMWALT: Thanks.

QUESTION: Admiral, my specialty is aviation maintenance, and I'm particularly sensitive to the loss of well-trained personnel after a few years service in the Navy. If I may, I'd like to relay a personal experience.

I watched a first class petty officer, an aviation electrician, for the last several years. He is a particularly impressive fellow. He's an ADCOM graduate. He has been given a scholarship for his participation in his church and community activities by the University of Arkansas, that he can take any time he wants. He was an instructor at the, I think they call it - but they don't call it anymore, but that's what it used to be. He's a flight engineer. He had all of these attributes and he called me on the telephone about a week ago to congratulate me on my making promotion, and, at the same time, was telling me that he was getting out of the Navy. The reason he was getting out of the Navy was that he had just passed and had been before the board for chief petty officer. He's passed the exam, now, six times and the man is just as junior - is younger - than I

am, and it looks like it's going to be another year and a half before he can possibly get promoted again. Thirteen years in the Navy, first class petty officer, passed the exam six times, and this seems to be not an unusual case. I'm enlisted, I've seen it, so I know what he's thinking about. I saw this happen. It happened to two or three of our particularly well trained technicians and patrol squadron types

left in the Moffett area. It's reached the point to where promotions are...there doesn't seem to any real consistency as to selection because I've seen people that I knew weren't qualified for selection - some of these people were work promoted. Now, the thing that strikes home, here, is a man that - I didn't have the qualifications that he has and I applied for a warrant commission - and he's having to get out because he can't make E-7. These people are the kind of people we grapple for to get into the Navy, and to get our hands on and to try to keep them; they're the backbone of the Navy, as far as I can see. They're the type of people that you'll want to keep at just about any cost. I feel like there's a deficiency, and I'm in no position to point that deficiency out and say exactly what it is. But, there is a deficiency in our promotion system that would have a man have to get out of the Navy to advance beyond the point that he has reached. I was so concerned, I called a friend of mine who retired from the Navy - in fact, he lives in Texas. He was an E-8 and our best recruiter. I said, "Chief, what can I tell this man?" He said, "Mr. Johnson, after having seen what I have in the last two years, as far as promotion for people like that is concerned - seen the benefits that are gradually dropping off..." He said, "I really don't know what to tell you."

ZUMWALT: The problem you cite is a tragic incident. It's part of the interface that results under any system that can be designed. One can visualize a system in which you seek

to promote people exclusively on the basis of what the command knows their qualities to be - and we used to do that many, many years ago - and that resulted in all kinds of unfairnesses, as between the high-quality man on one ship and a low-quality man on another who had a skipper who was more of a pusher. You can visualize a system which goes exclusively on the results of a mental examination, which tends to penalize those people who are really good performers but don't have quite the mental capability. We've tried to come up with a system that's Navy-wide in its application and which does give credit for service and for outstanding performance and meritorious awards, and that kind of thing - and to, increasingly, at the higher levels, give, also, a board an opportunity, through interviews, to look at the whole man - and that has just been kicked down to one more pay grade. It's a very costly thing in terms of manpower to do. But any system designed is going to have unfairnesses. This is certainly an example of one of them.

If there were some way for the Chief of Naval Personnel to know that that man was the best man in the Navy, and not have that system that brought him to his attention be perverted - you could wire up the system to take care of that kind of man.

I think that, by and large, our Navy system is credited by most objective observers to be a pretty fair one. I would hope that over time we'll get to the point where we can have

interview boards go down to a level that will take care of first class, at least.

QUESTION: I'd like to build on an earlier question on the human goals program - the fact is that the human goals program has, as its first commitment, the officer corps - and yet the traditional promotion criteria in the past, to career success, has emphasized technical and operational competence, what incentives are there for officers, who are partly motivated by self-interest, to excel and commit themselves to the human goals program, or get involved in it in any way?

ZUMWALT: It's a good question, and it remains to be proven, by the Navy, that there will be high pay-off for outstanding performance in this field.

I believe that the boards will recognize it, and I would bet a reasonable amount that next year's selection board will pick someone who has - to the rank of admiral - who has had special work in this field. That's always, kind of, the first sign that alert people up and down the system that there is pay-off for it.

It's too new to claim that we're doing it. But the Navy's got to show that there's pay-off for it or you just won't get the kind of people we need to stay with it.

QUESTION: Admiral, during your administration, you started the Mod Squad - or the younger commanding officer - and, at the same time, we had to stretch out promotions, which, apparently, affected this program. Would you comment on that

program? Is it successful? Is it going to be extended, contracted? Or, where does it stand today?

ZUMWALT: I always felt that the program was successful, based on all the data that came to my attention. There was, I don't think, any real argument against the idea of having some people achieve responsibility one rank early, but there was a lot of discussion and disagreement about whether doing it the Mod Squad way was the right way, or whether you should have billets scattered throughout the force - say, 10 or 15% of the billets scattered throughout the force that were subject to that kind of assignment. That's something that's kind of personal to the taste of the Chief of Naval Personnel and the Chief of Naval Operations, and I don't know how that will work out over time.

But I do think that there's a high degree of evidence that there are an important fraction of people who can take the responsibility early and who, therefore, are eligible for early promotion to other grades so that the Navy can begin to have people competing young for the joint and international assignments which, for so many years, the Air Force and the Army were taking by default because they had people who were in general rank at much younger ages.

The Navy has reduced its average age by a considerable amount - last year, as I'm sure most of you know, a 42-year old for two stars which is the youngest age ever. That gives us an awful lot of flexibility for bringing people along to

compete for one-third of the jobs, plus some.

QUESTION: Admiral, I have two short questions. One, pertaining to enlisted manpower management and one for officers. In the enlisted area, there's been suggestions to have the enlisted men sign up for an indefinite period rather than for a particular enlistment contract number of years, with the right to resign or quit, as is in private industry. I'd like to have your comment on that suggestion?

On the officer level, presently there's no lineal adjustment on the lineal list of officers. Now that we're having a roughly 5 to 15% deep selections and they're split year-groups in officer promotions, you can fall behind relative to the rest of your year-group or classmates, when they split the class. Do you perceive any readjustment in lineal listings within year-groups when promotion time comes around?

ZUMWALT: With regard to the first question, I would hope that we would not go to the indefinite enlistment. It seems to me that one could visualize in a time, for example, like the DMZ crisis - just when you needed sailors the most that you'd lose a pretty big fraction of those about to deploy.

You would also, I think, run into the problem of people leaving a ship which was temporarily unhappy or deployed unhappily - to go reenlist somewhere else. I worry about the system.

With regard to the lineal adjustments, there hasn't been any real clamor for that in any of the discussion sessions

that I have had, and I don't think its ever been raised as an issue to my level. I don't have any idea what the new leadership would think about that, but I have a hunch that it wouldn't get a very high priority.

QUESTION: Admiral, I've done some reading on personnel assessment centers and it appears that they're quite widely used in foreign military; notably, England, Germany, Australia, Israel, and also in U.S. industry; IBM, Sears, AT&T. I wonder if, during your tenure as CNO, there were any proposals for making use of personnel assessment centers to augment our performance appraisal? This kind of falls in line with the other day's comments about our selective .

ZUMWALT: I have only two comments. First, our Personnel Research Center has done some of that kind of thing. Second, it seems to me that, over time, the HRDCs will really fit that role. They'll be doing personnel assessments for the commanding officer. So, I think we're moving in that general direction.

QUESTION: Would you like to comment on the NEOX study and its implementation in the future?

ZUMWALT: Which study is that?

QUESTION: NEOX - enlisted man classification study - this was Admiral Freeman...

ZUMWALT: Yes. I was briefed on that study and I thought it was an extremely well done thing. There was a high degree of support for his recommendations. They were just in the process

of getting ready to be implemented as I left.

I believe that it was a very wise thing to bring a man in who had never had any real personnel experience - in Doc Freeman's case, it had an awful lot of experience with having to deal with the hardware end of our business and he, together with those who were more experienced in personnel, I think, came up with a very fine series of recommendations. I think that's about the level of my confidence to talk about it.

QUESTION: Admiral, when we read and some of these writers, we can't help but draw a comparison between their writings and the Z-Grams. I was wondering if there was, in fact, ?

ZUMWALT: Ah... I guess I should limit myself to saying I don't think I've ever read any of them.