

Questions and answers: (Questions waived) ✓

A: Well, you know, the only thing that I would disagree on is that from where I sat the Air Force had already initiated, long before the Navy, many of the same kinds of changes. Now, obviously, there were some differences in our approach but the Air Force had done a very great deal for it's people, for example, I never went on an Air Force facility where the clubs for both enlisted and officers weren't much superior to anything we had in the Navy. We used to say that the Air Force would acquire enough real estate to build it's clubs and barracks and then ask the Congress for more money for the airfield and it was kind of ^a smart way in which they operated back in those days when money was available and as a result the Air Force has been able to offer a pretty good thing and we had a long way to go to catch up with it. Air Force reenlistment rates and recruiting records are the only ones that are competitive with the Navy so that seems to be indicated. The Army went through a period of adapting ^{to} some of these changes in Europe and then apparently decided that they better not do it on an Army - wide basis, and as a result, I think, of that is one significant reason they are falling short of their rates and quality is well, well below those of the Navy and the Air Force.

Well, I think with regard to amnesty, the offer or the arrangement that President Ford has announced is . . . I believe that the average man who

has fought in war himself was quite bitter, I felt that way, toward those who didn't do their duty. You ask yourself how can a democracy survive if people are able to pick and choose as to whether or not they are going to rally around when it is in trouble and having elected democratically a President and members of Congress to make decisions for you, your options would seem to be to vote them out and serve while required to serve. But nevertheless, those scissions occurred and people did fail to do their duty and now we've entered a period when, like we did after each of the other major wars where we also had to pile out amnesty, it seems to me the time has come to start binding up the wounds. After all we forgive many more serious offenses than those all the time and all that has been offered is an opportunity for these people to work their way back. Seems to me that it is imminently fair. I personally would have preferred that offer to have been made not entangled with the pardon of President Nixon.

A My answer on that has to be a little qualified because the Navy of course would only do it as part of a defense decision and it really would be a Presidential decision. My own position on it would be that if amnesty is going to be offered for those who didn't serve at all that there has to be at some point a way for those who did serve and got out with bad papers to work their way back.

No, I think that if we fail to do that kind of thing, we would see the meaning of detant changed even more rapidly than it will be from the kind of detant that we thought we were getting to the kind of detant the Soviet's hope to have. The Soviet's objective is an objective that I call differentiated detant. By that, they expect to behave in those areas where they know they have to behave because it's too dangerous not to behave like in Central Europe and concentrate there on just weakening the alliance by a series of economic offers and waving their military stick and if they will misbehave in those areas where they are pretty sure they can get away with it such as they did recently in the Middle East. I think the Soviet's see detant at the leadership level as having two forks to it. One is the one that Breshnev has described into his communist leadership, that is if everything goes well, if the United States is gulled as democracies have traditionally been gulled we Communists will be strong enough to really rub their noses in it and back them down a step at a time as I've described. If everything goes wrong and the United States sees through our chicanery and maintaining it's strength we still are moving along into a pretty respectable world as we Communists see it. In other words they've got

very little to loose and an awful lot to win given their dedication to a destabilized world order being remolded in their own image.

A: No, no I didn't. I supported detant. I supported it on the basis that it was much better than the dangers of the confrontation that we were having but that we had to make it clear to the people and the Congress that detant on our terms would only continue if we kept our defenses up. I continue to maintain that case as our defenses shrank and shrank and shrank and I never missed an opportunity even when I was walking through a receiving line to tell it to the President.

A: Secretary Schlesinger and I talked about it a couple of months ago, three or four months ago, I guess, and concluded that eight billion dollars a year would reverse both the strategic race and the maritime balance. That's just about another nine percent of the defense budget and about one percent of the gross national product. So it's for the lack of that kind of a small additional insurance policy that we are going the traditional route of democracy.

Q: Yes, I was asked about politics when I was in office and I always responded with taking a sherman because it seemed to be that in a military position one simply could not flirt at all with politics. I had not really

gotten serious about it since I left on the first of July, deciding that I would first dedicate myself to doing some writing and some speaking and taking a page from my friends in the state department pushed my options ahead for about a year.

Yes, all it takes is for the people to get concerned. I used to each year, in addition to about pressing this story on all those in the Executive Branch. I used to try to brief every member of Congress and on the average I got to about 350 of the 435 representatives and there were about 80 of the 100 Senators each year and they broke down into three general categories. First there was that category, roughly a third, who would say Admiral, we're really with you, we'll vote for you, you can count on us. There was another third who would turn the switch as soon as you walked in and you were just wasting your time. They didn't want to listen. They didn't want to get exposed to another setta insight. Then there was a middle third who generally ended up saying things like we would love to support you, we'd love to vote for the defense budget, but if we do, if we don't vote for major cuts, we're going to loose our seat back home. And it was that middle third that with which the third in favor of defense had to compromise in order to get out of the size I indicated instead

of the much larger cuts that people like Proxmire and Ashman were advocating.

And now when the constituents of that middle third get concerned enough that that middle third sees that they can get away with it they'll be voting for adequate defense budget.

A. I think it takes first a more direct indication of the extent to which the Soviet hand is in the cookie jar than even the recent Yom Kippur crisis because not many people recognize that this was a direct result of a deliberate Soviet foreign policy to so arm and equip the Serians and the Egyptians that they would be able to do this very kind of thing leading to the fouling up of the oil economy. The next slice is either going to have to be more apparent to the people at large or the leadership is going to have to speak up about it more than they were able to do at a time when the President was withering on the vine.

It's very gloomy if Congress continues to make the disastrous cuts in the military assistance budget that they just extracted. South Vietnam is made up of millions of people who cast their lots with us. Based on my twenty months there I can give you my personal assurance that they do not want to be

Communists. They do not want the North to win. They've got their problems, sure, but they're so much better off, and they know it, from their relatives. Many of them have them up north. But there's no doubt in their minds which way they want to go and they showed considerable courage right down to the village level. One village chief after another being assassinated and another one coming forward and they showed courage by fighting in the armed forces and making themselves, therefore liable to prosecution when the Communists take over and they were assured by the leadership of the United States that we would continue to provide financial support to the extent necessary and we have not provided that support.

A: No, there were of course South Vietnamese units that did not fight well. There were also some North Vietnamese units that did not fight well but by and large today they are very well trained outfit with good spirit and moral in the south. The job of the ~~g~~angster is always easier than the job of the policeman. The gangster who steps out from the street front and shoots down the much more heavily armed policeman gets away with it nine times out of ten. It's the very proposition when you are trying to fight guerrilla war. The South Vietnamese were not permitted to create the police in North Vietnam. We wouldn't do that. They ran on right under a very peculiar set of circumstances there the

other fellow was given the opportunity to get wherever he wanted to be and fire the first bullet or make the first assault and then they had to retaliate. So it was a very tough and difficult war and it took a lot of help for them to get on top of it. They are now on top of it and they are handling it at the present time without any help from us except the financial help which has now been removed or badly cut back.

A: I think it's a very good question and it really brings me to the reason why I've tried so hard to appear on every campus in response to every invitation because you're where it's at and you're the ones who are going to change it if it gets changed. What we're up against is a society which is able to be because it is closed and ruthless, much more disciplined than ours. They are devoting in excess of twelve percent of their gross national product. This nation with half our gross national product is spending more than twice as much of a percentage for defense as we are and therefore has over the last several years invested more in capital as we expended a great amount of it in the Southeast Asia war. Do we face the problem as to whether or not we're going to be willing to forgo quite some of our domestic life in order

to do more in the defense field and that's a very tough problem. It's easy to buy it in the abstract but if you are a member of a union your attitude is oh boy, let me get mine, if you're a member of the military I guess your attitude is oh boy, let me get those military pay raises, if you're a member of any particular subset of the society it's very hard to keep your eye on the major competition which is that there is a group of people dedicated in a much more sophisticated fashion than in the days of Stalin, much more careful and rational to the same objective, namely to remake government after government in it's own image. And we're going to have to, as a society think through whether or not we're willing to do the belt tightening necessary to compete with that society or whether as _____ wrote of Athens I know our time has past and it's now time for Sparta to take over.

A: That's a tough one. We didn't arm India. The Russians armed India and they did a better job of it. With regard to the Turks and the Greeks, the problem is that they were both armed as part of the NATO alliance, which was set up to stop the west from running a the rest of Europe after Stalin had over run the eastern half of Europe. It was an extremely successful alliance and the continuing

liability of it has continued to deter the Soviets from action in Europe. Now that involved the risk taking that if you equipped two sets of allies that they would cease to get along and have difficulties and we've had this problem on three or four occasions with the Cyprus issue as between the Turks and the Greeks. In all previous cases, we were able to lean on them and pry them apart. In this case it was not done and I think it was a failure of U.S. foreign policy.

A: Yes, I guess the simplest comment is just to say that Admiral Rickover is a very competent nuclear engineer. He relieved himself of these judgments annually in front of Congressional Committees. He works for the Congress. You know his ADC hat is a hat that is jointly sponsored by the Executive Branch and the ADC. ADC is jointly sponsored by the Executive branch and by the Congress and so he feels very close to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee and to the other committees of Congress and is able to say exactly what he thinks, even though on active service and nobody ever tries to tell him what he ought to be thinking. I totally disagree with his attitude toward the Naval Academy. I think it's neanderthal and I don't consider that he's competent in the field. To the best of my knowledge the only time that I recall that he was down at the Naval Academy was when we ordered him to go down there to make a hall after him, since he graduated.

Well, what we're building is a mix of ships that together can do a job.

The sea control ship, if it ever gets funded, will provide small amounts of air power, seventeen helicopters and v-stall aircraft so that you can have eight or nine such platforms for the cost of one nuclear carrier to go with the many convoys it will have to travel. The patrol Frigate with its cruise missile will be there to help defend it against surface ships or submarines and also to deal with aircraft that may come in. The hydrofoil craft will be there to deal with surplus raiders and more logically in places like the Gulf of Tonkin and the Eastern Mediterranean where it can dart out of a nearby port to make its contribution.

The aircraft carrier is going to have to continue to be the backbone of the fleet for at least another generation.

A: The United States Navy will deploy its first true cruise missile in 1975, some twenty years after the Soviets deployed theirs. They've got a major strategic lead start on us in that field. This was a result, in my judgment, of parochialism and in the navy. The feeling being that aircraft could do it so why build a surface or surface cruise missile.

A: The information that I have is all second hand 'cause I was in Vietnam at the time. It's my understanding that the military, all of the JCS, recommended taking military action and that they were disapproved by civilian authority. The reaction that the military wanted to take, however, was consistent with the theory I gave earlier. That is, they didn't feel they could go in and capture it nor did they think they could afford to leave the power there indefinitely but they were thinking in terms of reprisal type strike.

A: Yeah, that would have been one course of action and I don't know what the specific recommendation was on that but one of the things you'd have to worry about is that the North Koreans would be perfectly capable of keeping some U.S. personnel on the ship just so they'd be killed if we struck it.

A: My personal feeling is that of course the cut that same attitude should have prevailed during the time of the capture. You know, the ship should have been fought to the death. A Navy ship, by custom and tradition and Navy regulation, is never surrendered and had the ship been maneuvered it could have avoided capture long enough to require enough bullets to be pumped into it and to permit enough additional internal damage to be done that there was a very good chance that it would never have been taken to port. However, I understand that Commander Becker will be

coming here for one of these lectures so you'll get a chance to put it to him first hand and I shouldn't try to kibitz his action.

A. The normal life that we have given our ships, other than submarines, is thirty years. We think that the nuclear carriers probably can go a little longer than that. I've been saying that in my judgment the three new nuclear carriers that we have funded will have thirty-five year life and I think that's probably right because we spent a lot more money for all aspects of their engineering plan and it's, therefore, got much more reliability and maintainability. So I'd say the Enterprise has about another twenty years to go.

A. I think that he was right that the primary reason that that final increment of money survived Mr. Ash's budget cut was because of Mr. Ash's interest in the economy and not Mr. Ash's interest in the defense establishment. I think that the money was fortuitously gotten but desperately needed and not adequate in comparison with the threat.

A. Now that Secretary Tolson does not believe that the budget is adequate, it's a little hard to see how he can admit that a primary factor in the decision was made for good to benefit. It's just sure that without having the Secretary's argument that in advocating that it come to defense, he was making a point that since we're in such desperate straits in the defense establishment

put it there even though it may not be the most directly efficient way to bolster the economy it has a very high payoff collateral benefit.

A. No, first Annapolis lost only six or ten in it's so called cheating scandal. It turned out to have been a little bit different from the standard and that is that there was a Quartermaster who felt sorry for some guys who were boning up because they were borderline unsats and he passed them the examination at the last minute and it got to two or three other people. When they got all through with the ~~investigation~~ investigation, I think it was Admiral Mack's conclusion that there were probably less than a dozen involved and I think only about six to ten actually were dismissed. This is the first episode to effect more than one or two at the Naval Academy in a long period of time. The Naval Academy has experienced over the last five years, each year an increasing number of applications. Last year we had five times the number we could take and each year the cut scores have gone up. They're now up a hundred points above what they were when I took the job four years ago. So we're getting very high quality skills emphasizing the whole man. Our attrition, that is those who leave us voluntarily within the first year, is the lowest of the service academies so we think that we're in pretty good shape.

And I would not want to see an investigation of the very high attrition rates at the Air Force Academy, for example, impact on the Naval Academy unless we start to develop a problem here.

A: I guess the only thing I can do to that one is deny the allegation and confront the alligator. I hadn't heard about that. If those are the facts it isn't a very bright thing.

A: I'm trying to do my memoirs of the four years in a way that I hope will be interesting enough to make it read and yet will deal with the issues ~~of~~ ~~as~~ as I encountered them. Obviously, for any book to deal with issues you have to deal with personalities to some extent but I'd like to optimize in favor of issues.

Well, the Soviet policy made a conscious decision way back at the time well before the Jordan purchase in September 1970, that they were going to so equip the Arabs that they would be able to initiate hostilities against the Israelis and the Soviet objective was to so open up the wound in the Middle East that it would lead to such lovely things as they saw them, as oil embargoes, oil price increases, radicalization of Arab regimes and so forth. They weren't able to

foresee exactly the nature of the bleeding of the wound but they knew they were going to create the kind of a wound that could have that kind of an impact on it. Then after the ^{tank} Syrian/army was defeated by the Jordanians in the September 1970 crisis, the Soviets not only persuaded the Syrians to withdraw because they were in trouble but promised to replace their losses and went on to so well equip the Egyptians and the Syrians and to so well train them in the art of strategic surprise that they knew that they would be able to initiate strategic surprise against the Israelis as they did very successfully so they set in training the pressures that would lead to the kind of outcome that it has eventually and they are exaltant with the outcome.

A It goes back to the nuclear lobby. The people in the hill aided and abetted by Admiral Rickover prefer that ships as big as that be nuclear propelled. This takes to do that it's got to be a larger ship than the fleet control ship and then you've got to put a nuclear plant in it and suddenly instead of the one hundred and fifty million dollars, you've got a one billion dollar to one and a half billion dollar ship and so you won't have eight or nine, you'll have one.

Our studies indicate that it would be vacanquanon to provide the