

minimum air power necessary to defend the high value convoys with which it would travel and that without it the patrol Frigate and the destroyers that are going to be trying to protect that convoy will take fearsome losses.

Telephone Conversation with Schlesinger 19 September

12:30 this date I talked to Secretary Schlesinger who had read, of course, the NOVAK Evans Article. I reported to him the background of my conversation with Novak (dictated elsewhere). Schlesinger stated that he had been aware of the fact that Hague^{H.A. 17} was talking him down around town but had not had confirmation that Kissinger was involved prior to my report. He said that Hague was blaming him for the fact that he didn't become Chief of Staff of the Army and that there was some justification in Hague's claim that Schlesinger was behind it. I told Schlesinger that I had heard that he had backed up the Army's position that Hague should not get the Chief of Staff's job and he said that this was accurate. Schlesinger asked me what I was doing. I described what I had been doing. Schlesinger asked me what I thought of the way things were going for the Navy. I told him that I thought the reduction in ships by the Congress was very serious. He said that he agreed and had been toying with the idea of submitting a supplemental budget request to try to get some of the ships back. I told him that I had heard that Admiral Rickover was behind some of the cuts and thought that he had better get Admiral Holloway and Admiral Worth Bagley pushing even harder in support. I suggested that he break out the PFIAB report and reminded

him that Governor Rockefeller was very concerned as a result of that study and suggested that he might use Rockefeller to work on President Ford. He said he thought that was a good idea. Schlesinger then asked me why I didn't arrange to break into print in the Washington Post so that my views on the maritime balance could be read by some of the people ^{IN the Capital} ~~on the Herold~~. I told him I would do so. Admiral Bill Thompson called later and I asked him to report this information to Admiral Holloway and to let me know when it was time to speak up.

20 September Telephone Conversation with Dave Halprin in London

I talked to Dave Halprin^e at 9:30 this date. During the course of personal conversation he mentioned that it would be most revealing if it were possible to get the tapes to show the way in which both Hague and Kissinger had operated in an unethical manner with regard to actions taken, conspiring, telephone, etc. Dave Halprin's view was that David Young probably didn't get called to testify against Kissinger because of a deal made with Fulbright. David Young had information that would have been very damaging to Kissinger. Halprin states that on several occasions when Kissinger was talking to his future bride, Nancy, that Hague would

listen in on the telephone conversations thus not only picking up tender conversation but also listening to Henry when he was at his ~~most~~ ^{most} frank. Halprin does not believe that Hague was able to bug Henry's office but he did listen on all phone calls that he considered were important.

Memorandum for Record 20 September 1974 - Subject Mr. Rusk at the National War College

(1) At the National War College this year, Mr. Rusk in commenting about the method of operations during the Johnson administration with regard to the Southeast Asia War, pointed out that Mr. Johnson always went around the room at each meeting and asked everyone to comment pro or con on each decision and further whenever anyone of importance expressed ~~discontent~~ ^{dissent} Mr. Rusk always saw to it that they had a chance to express their views for the President.

Schlesinger

I just heard back from Jim Schlesinger a couple of minutes ago and the following conversation transpired. I told him that I had been doing some more thinking about his challenge to make the Washington Post and that I wondered if it was still worthwhile doing in view of Stennis' speech on the Senate floor

how much that is but it clearly is not so little that we can afford to deoptimise,

He said
that we all know that we'd be better off to have a range of some nuclear and some non nuclear so that we can have more ships and decrease the level of risk. I said yeah, the trouble with that is that's something you and I believe and know but it's harder to put it across unless you are able to talk about great risks. He said

well you know the thing we ought to do is get all our people talking about the

fact that the ~~PIREP~~ ^{F404P} level was a level that was designed with risk involved and

we didn't get the ~~PIREP~~ ^{F404P} level and therefore we're in not nearly the shape that

we ought to be. *He said as* ~~and that's~~ ^{of types of} the range of the conventional ships that would have

put us up to the ~~PIREP~~ ^{F404P} level. *Partly* and I said well we've got in the building, I under-

stand, incidently I didn't refer to having talked to anybody, Letters from both

Aspin and Proxmire that have to be answered by Holloway or Mittendorf or somebody

in which they are demanding to know what the Navy's view is. They claim that

we're fat. And he said well you know from just a beaurocratic standpoint those

fellows down there have got to be damn sure they don't give away the farm. He

said they've got to choose their adjectives very carefully to make sure that it's

clear that that ~~PIREP~~ ^{F404P} level ^{was a mistake} would off steer and that we certainly are in bad

shape if we are going to be cut below it, and I said well, in other words you wouldn't object to their saying that the ^{PRDP}~~PRDP~~ level was as much risk as the administration felt was prudent and the reductions have now put us at great risk and he said yeah, I agree with that although I wouldn't myself wanted to be quoted on it. And I said you see the problem is that if I get up and say something I don't want to be left in a position where you and Holloway are then forced to get up and talk as you did once before about alarmists and he said you know I don't recall having done that. And I said yeah, about eight months ago you talked about alarmists. He said what I said was I don't want to be an alarmist. He said I was referring to something I had read in the press that was rather startch. Then I laughed and said yeah but you know that was a good word and the press picked it up as you know the press does and they've used it ever since in describing people like me. Yeah and so I said in other words I've got to be comfortable in saying something in support of this that you and Jimmy are going not to be cutting me down and he said well, I'm going to have to get ahold of those fellows and talk to them because we certainly can talk about the risks involved in having been cut below the PRDP level. So I think he said now why haven't they consulted with me? And I said Holloway is

out of town and when I used to be out of town I didn't want people consulting to get my policies changed and that's as far as I took it. ~~Can you live with all~~

~~that? Well~~, ^{em} his assumption, out of ~~the~~ conversation would be that I probably ^{sped up} will, and that ~~he's~~ he's not going to fire back about "alarmists" In other words

I'm going to try to base my probabilities on the ~~PEEP~~ ^{F494P} which I can do by saying

the ~~PEEP~~ ^{F400P} is a program that would have gotten us back up above, ^{the 50% line} and that we didn't

get the ~~PEEP~~ ^{F10P} so we're never going to get there. ~~That's right. That's right.~~

~~these cuts themselves~~ Schlesinger said, that you know the big thing that's changed is you were warning me that we wouldn't get those low cost ships through and I didn't believe you, ~~he said~~ I put the wrong probability on that."

He said "I still can't believe that it's happened to us." "I didn't really realize that the PF's had been lost until just the other day." That's astonishing to me

because I was all over him about twice a week about calling on both the SCS

and the PF ~~but~~.

"Add to Daily Routine CNO"

During visits to naval complexes in the United States and overseas, such as the Norfolk, Virginia, area, the San Diego area, and the Pearl Harbor area, we developed a rather standard method of operation to make ~~the~~ optimum use of the time available and to make it possible to achieve as much in the way of communications as possible. A fairly standard procedure was to meet first with all of the flag officers in the area followed by a meeting with all commanding officers and executive officers of both sea and shore activities in the area.

This meeting was generally followed by one ~~with~~ in a large auditorium with the junior officers in the area and then with a cross section of the chief petty officers and finally a rap session with representative numbers of the enlisted personnel in the area. Sometimes due to size of the area and the number of people it was necessary to have several of the meetings with chiefs and junior officers and with the junior enlisted personnel. During each of these meetings it was my practice to start off by reporting in a manner and in a level appropriate to the group to which I was speaking.—The current scene in Washington, what we were working on, what we considered our major problems to be, what the constraints

on our policies were, what our goals and objectives were, etc. In case of the meetings with flag officers, commanding officers, and executive officers, I generally tried to insure that each had an opportunity to report to me his concerns relative to his particular assignment and then generally threw the floor open both in their cases and in the cases of the larger and more junior groups to questions from the floor. Occasionally questions or recommendations, rather than questions and very occasionally it was possible to provide a solution on the spot. Much more frequently it necessary to assure the questioner that his recommendation would be carefully staffed in Washington and a reply concerning it's merits would be provided. The most significant result of these rap sessions with regard to the lower ranking personnel was the opportunity for all of them to get some insight into the hopes, aspirations of and limitations upon Navy leadership and for me all sessions with whatever level provided valuable insights that made it possible to keep my antenna in tune with the thinking and with the concerns of the men and women. It was my practice to have members of my staff keep accurate notes of the recommendations made and of questions asked that could not be answered on the spot and to provide follow through wherever sensible to the person who had initiated the action while ^{insuring the} ~~concerning~~ the better ideas that had been put forward were well run out and tested by the Naval beurocrecy in Washington.

The Problem of Quality Work in WashingtonHague Catches Z

After the Chiefs had had their annual meeting with President Nixon on the budget and had given him their briefings (the one which was for me, my second)(in August of 1971), Mr. Nixon stated that he would like very much to have George Schultz hear what had been said. This seemed to me to be an important suggestion but after consultation with Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer it appeared as though it was not going to be possible to find a time when Secretary Schultz, then Director of OMB, could get together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the briefing. I, therefore, concluded that it was important enough that I was going to make a separate effort to do so and arranged to make a ~~work~~ call on Secretary ~~for~~ Schultz for purposes of giving him this briefing. At that time his office was located in the Executive Office of the White House and in order to get to it one had to enter the West wing, register with a receptionist and then be admitted to the inner offices. It involved going down a long passageway which proceeded past the offices then occupied by Henry Kissinger and his assistant Brian G. H. Alexander, to get to an elevator to go up to the upper level.

On this particular occasion as I was proceeding down that passageway within the inner sanctum, I encountered General Hague. We exchanged greetings but I did not report, he did not ask me, where I was going. I gave Secretary Schultz the briefing. After it was completed and as I began my departure, Secretary Schultz's secretary reported to me that General Hague had called soon after I entered Secretary Schultz's office and that he had wanted to know why I was there. I She said that she had informed him that I was there to give Secretary Schultz a briefing and that she thought it was on the subject of the Navy budget and asked whether she had been accurate. I confirmed that she had and reported it was the same briefing that I had recently given the President. By the time that I returned to ~~my~~ my office in the Pentagon I had a call from Mr. Laird's military executive to ask me whether it was accurate that I had briefed Secretary Schultz on the briefing I had given to the President. I confirmed that it was, [✓] Reported that I had made this fact known to the Secretary of the Navy and asked what was the reason for the interest. The military executive stated that it was because General Hague had called to complain that the Navy was taking unfair advantage of the Army by giving the briefing and that he was sufficiently concerned that it would probably require that special efforts be made to get Secretary Schultz

to listen to all of the Chiefs give their briefings. I expressed my pleasure at this saying that it seemed to me that that was exactly what the President has suggested and I was pleased if my action had served as a catalyst to bring it off. Subsequently Secretary Schultz and other members of his staff did come to the JCS tank to be briefed and I had the opportunity to repeat my briefing to him for emphasis and to give it to those others who came with him.

The Society Page

One of the things that I could never bring myself to do during my busy four years as Chief of Naval Operations was to read the society page. This proved to be a sometimes significant omission. Toward the end of my tour, in discussions with other high ranking officers, I discovered that reading the society page was quite a professional art and that those who watched the society pages daily were able to stay a step ahead in some cases of those of us who were not doing so. They heard, and I have not checked the accuracy of this, that one could tell who was currently on the inside and who was currently on the outside with the important members of the administration by reading guest lists and who said what to whom at various functions. I have to confess that I do not

regret the omission.

Visits to and from CNO

Some of this appears in the speech that Moyz gave to Greenbrier, is which/in your writeup, Bob. The concept of visiting back and forth between Chiefs of Navy is an old and useful practice. My association with Chiefs of Navy began, of course, as I made my trip back from the relieving of command in Vietnam and proceeded toward the 1 July 1970 take-over from Admiral Moorer. En route home I visited the Navy Chiefs of Japan, Taiwan, Phillipines, Singapore (although there it's just a small coastal police force), Italy, United Kingdom. Then in Sept 1970, a few months after I had taken over, the Navy held it's first international seapower symposium at Newport, Rhode Island, a meeting that had been the brainchild of the President of the Naval War College, Admiral Dick Gilbert, who was known throughout the world for having initiated years earlier the Naval Command Course for foreign officers, ^{That latter course} ~~something~~ that had been developed over the years into ^{one} very meaningful ~~course~~ attended by one representative from each of 30 or 40 free world navies and through this program and through it's graduates with whom Admiral Gilbert had kept in touch, he was personally noted

for being Mr. International Navy, and therefore there was a very high degree of interest in the Seapower Symposium which he organised and to which Admiral Moorer issued the invitation^s and which I, in my official capacity, then sponsored when I took over. At this Seapower Symposium, in addition to the usual professional lectures and the regional seminars,