



One of the things that seemed to please Mr. Vinson the most was when I let him know that it was Mel Laird's suggestion that had led us to come (this is the Vinson visit continued) to see him. It was also clear to me that as a result of our visit, Mr. Vinson was considerably reassured that the Navy was dealing with its problems vigorously and that one source of pressure upon Chairman Eddie Hebert was considerably eased as a result.

Put down an additional sentence to go in the earlier part of the Vinson story. Mr. Vinson made it clear that what had gotten him so riled up and made him call Eddie Hebert about the holding the hearings was the black power salutes on the pier beside the Connie during the period that the 100 plus members of the crew were standing on the pier. He said as he saw that he couldn't help remembering the Constellation as the first ship in our history to score a victory and he resented the comparison.

Also put in a sentence that in the conversation after lunch I ran through for Mr. Vinson how stretched the Navy was as a result of the massive reduction in ship numbers and the need to double the number of deployments after the massive invasion across the DMZ on 30 March 1972. The importance I attached to

taking in more blacks to make the Navy truly ~~more~~ representative of the country.

Also I need to fix it by making clear that another one who vigorously urged me to

go down and see Carl Vinson was former Congressman Armastat Seldon who was at the

Assistant
time Deputy/Secretary of Defense for Internation Security Affairs and is now

Ambassador in New Zealand and was a superb source of strength of advice throughout

this crisis.

The Rest of the Calvert story taking off from Tape 26-B-6

They went on to say that their proposal would be to promote Vice

Admiral Dave Bagley, currently Chief of Naval Personnel, to the job in Naples with

4 stars and it was this proposal which made me take my eye off the ball. Admiral

David Bagley, who had been a friend since prep school days, had been brought into

the job of Chief of Naval Personnel after a tour as the Assistant/^{Chief}of Naval Personnel

for people in which he had been a brilliant success. He had demonstrated there a

breath of vision and a management capability that coupled with a benevolent interest

in the problems of people made him the logical candidate to relieve when his prede-

cessor was sent to another assignment. As Chief of Naval Personnel he had continued

to perform brilliantly. It was clear that he was a key man in the success of the

personnel changes which had brought about integration, reduced racial prejudices, excellerated reenlistment rates, and all of the other good things that were happening.

The opportunity to see him promoted made me less than reflective at that particular moment about the rest of the proposal. I confined myself to the statement to Mr.

Clements "Bill, I agree that there are some members of Congress who are concerned

about my personnel changes but I also think that I have a tremendous amount of

support over there and I'm not concerned about the need to get any help with

Congress but the opportunity to see Dave Bagley move 4 stars is one that I like so

let me ~~talk~~ agree with this tentively subject to being able to get David Bagley and

my Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Mickey ^{Warner} ~~Reasoner~~ on board in support." Mr.

Clements and John Warner agreed and Bill Clements then stated "Now Jim Calvert is

across the hall waiting in the reception room, why don't you go over and talk to

him and work this out?" I considered this to be a very strange breech. First

I had been summoned by the Secretary of the Navy and the Deputy Secretary of Defense

to meet jointly with them on an issue which one would have supposed normally would

be a matter of discussion between the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval

Operations in private first and second Admiral Calvert had been stashed across the

Page 4

hall under the assumption that I would go along irrevocably with the decision or alternatively would have, I ~~am~~ suppose, been ordered to go along. I spoke briefly with Admiral Calvert, expressing some surprise to him that he had begun the process at the level of the Deputy Secretary of Defense instead of, as a good military man, starting with the Chief of Naval Operations. Jim, somewhat sheepishly admitted that it was perhaps the wrong end at which to start but that he had found himself somewhat lost in retirement and desirous of returning to active duty and concluded that Bill Clements, whom he knew, was a good place to start. I reported the tentative understanding that I had to him and stated that I must now talk to Dave Bagley and Mickey ^{Wagner} ~~Reardon~~ and we agreed that we would meet again as soon as I had done so. On returning to my office I summoned these two naval officers. Dave Bagley arrived first and when I explained to him the proposition including the opportunity for promotion, Dave grabbed me by the shoulder and said "Bud, you stupid bastard. You have really taken your eye off the ball. I don't want to be promoted to 4 stars. I want to stay on as Chief of Naval Personnel to complete the work that we are doing. I don't believe that Jim Calvert has been in full support of your policy changes in the personnel field and I believe that this was

a device on the part of John Warner to endeavor to gain control of personnel administration at a lower level since he hasn't been able to get control of it at your level." I pointed out to Dave Bagley that my policies were those in support of the Secretary of Defense's Human Goals Program and that there continued to be support from the Secretary of Defense, now Elliot Richardson, for these goals and that I didn't anticipate that there was any way that either Bill Clements or John Warner could overturn the policy of their bosses provided Jim Calvert and I stood firmly together. Dave agreed with this but suggested that that would be just the problem that Jim would not. About this time Mickey ^{Weiner} Reasoner arrived and without the benefit of having heard Dave Bagley's views he, like the tough little bulldog he is, weighted into me in exactly the same vein. Somewhat sheepishly, I came to the conclusion that I had been had by a very smooth con team and agreed that, based on the information these two officers had given me about the extent to which Jim Calvert had been in league with George Anderson, to try to hold down on my policy of integrating the Naval Academy, I ought not to permit it to go forward. I returned to John Warner to report to him that it was no deal since the caveat

I had made that I would have to get Admirals Bagley and ^{Warner} Reasoner aboard could not be eliminated. John Warner stated that he could not accept that since Bill Clements had taken it out of his hand and/^{he} was not in a position to argue the decision. I therefore informed Bill Clements the same day that the "deal" was off". Bill Clements declined to accept it and stated that he considered it ~~x~~ now a directive. I suggested that there was another difficulty that we had not discussed in our morning meeting and that was the fact that it would take legislation through the Congress to bring Jim Calvert, now a legally retired naval officer, back on to the regular active duty roles since a retired officer recalled to active duty could not by law serve as Chief of Naval Personnel. I suggested that before we got ourselves involved in the kind of disagreement that would have to be resolved by the Secretary of Defense we should go over John Warner and I and find out what the temper of the Congress would be. We did so. *Copied by JZ sum*
low mart.

The Problem of Quality Work (continued from 27-A-7)

In the job of CNO, I found that the problem of getting quality work

was even more difficult because the pressures on the daily schedule were, as

I have suggested, such that one had to think in terms of 15 minutes as a segment of work and this is not conducive to going into a subject matter in a detail and thoughtful way. The real time for reflection on problems came during the weekly meetings in the office of the Secretary of Defense which are required by law, that is the law specifies that there must be an Armed Forces Policy Council consisting of the Secretary of Defense and his deputy, the service secretaries and the service Chiefs of Staff. By custom and tradition this group has been enlarged to include also the Assistant Secretaries of Defense and other principal assistants of the Secretary of Defense and there is some opportunity for some discussion of national issues at these meetings, although never enough. A second opportunity during each week was at the meetings where the Secretary of Defense joined the Joint Chiefs of Staff generally on Monday afternoons. The most effective use of these meetings was that made by Secretary Schlesinger during his tenure. He used them as opportunities to probe, to exchange views, to delve at depth into issues in a way which was clearly designed to plumb a problem to the extent of the knowledge of all of the participants. In the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which occurred as a general rule on Monday, Wednesday and Friday afternoons, there was also some time for

Page 10

discussion and thought on the national issues. But time for a service Chief of Staff to reflect on his problems, ~~in which~~ⁱⁿ my case was typical, was limited to time in the airplane on trips and to the 14 minute morning jog in addition to what little could be accomplished during those 15 minute segments to which I have referred. I have often reflected as to whether or not there is a better way to provide time for the busy decision ~~making~~ maker to work thoughtfully within the government. We have become so interfaced between agencies and within agencies and government has come to be so complex with regard to the relationships between Congress and the Executive Branch and the requirements for busy decision makers to personally touch base with the Congress, the press, and outside bodies of support have so added to the burdens that it's very difficult to see how the situation could be improved. Here again I give Secretary Schlesinger the best marks for finding time to reflect on important issues. Very often when we go to his office in the hopes of a 15 minute discussion and would find that he became so interested in the subject that he would take an hour and a great deal of benefit was received in both directions.

The very best example I have seen of what can be accomplished when

the echelons of government take time to deal with a problem and to push aside

all of the trivia of the daily routine and even the things that in a normal day might seem important occurred during the Cuban missile crisis when I was working for Paul Nitze. Here once the fact was discovered that the Soviets were implacing missiles in Cuba all of the normally busy executives from the President down through the principal cabinet members involved through their principal deputies and assistant secretaries and action officers all pushed aside all the social events except where required for subterfuge to throw the Russians off. ~~all~~ All other meetings were cancelled except those of a most urgent nature and for the entire period of the crisis there was time at the policy level to discuss at great length the policy options and to do the intricate process of analysing possible courses of action, possible counteractions that the Soviets might take and possible counters to their counteractions so that at the very highest levels of government the process of dealing with issues normally accommodated at the action level went forward. Collectively the strategy for dealing with the Soviets was derived. Collectively it was carried out. Out of this consensus it was agreed that the first priority was to get the missiles removed. The second priority the bombers, ¹⁶ ~~isla~~ 28, and there

was on the priority list additional items such as the removal of surfaced air missiles, the removal of Soviet troops, the removal of mig fighters, etc. It was very dramatic to see that once the missiles had been removed and the pressures applied on the Soviets to go along also with the removal of bombers that with the accomplishment of that second priority matter all the busy policy makers went back to their normal daily activity and it was not possible, really, to get the Executive Committee and the National Security Council to focus on the items of lower priority. Although there were certainly policy reasons for not badgering the Soviets any further, I've always felt that the questions as to whether or not they should be pressed further was not really dealt with in the same thoughtful way because of the sheer inevitability of the sinking back into the normal bureaucratic ways.

Subic - The Common Cause

In a telephone conversation with Admiral Clarey on 19 October 1972 after the Kittyhawk incident I made the point that there was one common thread with regard to the episodes on the HMAS Sydney and the Kittyhawk and that is that

both of them occurred in Subic. I asked whether there were any heroic efforts that could be made to straighten out any difficulties in Subic. Admiral Clarey replied that he believed that we at that time faced the prospect of having the carriers on the line permanently until some decision is made that a 96 hour ~~xxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxx~~ notice to return to the line would be acceptable and that with that kind of notice the carriers could then begin to be sent to Yokuska rather than Subic. Admiral Clarey went on to say that he would do everything within his power to get the population as low as possible in Subic because it was overloaded with transient personnel and that he had given orders to have the receiving station straightened up to insure that the transient overload was worked down. He also said that he had sent a team out there headed by Rear Admiral Armstrong with orders to straighten the situation out in Subic and that he would have gone back to Subic himself but that his boss, Admiral ^{Gaylor CincPat} Grewler ~~SINPAK~~, had called a meeting in Hawaii and that he must therefore go back directly after his visit in Japan. Admiral Clarey said that Admiral Armstrong had given him a report indicating that they are getting on top of the situation in Subic. Clarey said that with Marshall in effect in Subic there was no place for the crew to go because of the curfew,

that the base kept the base clubs open until 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning, and that these racial fights had been starting in the clubs - nothing definite but sort of that the same/thing had probably happened. (I need to see if we can get Admiral Clarey's report from Admiral Armstrong in October of 72.) In a telephone conversation with Admiral Clarey on 3 January 1973 at 17:30 I informed Admiral Clarey that my inspector general Vice Admiral Means Johnston hoped to get off some time on the fourth of January on his trip to Subic Bay to conduct an inspection and would come through Pearl to get together with Admiral Clarey or his staff but that some members of his team might go directly to Subic. I added that Johnston would also stop by Okinawa to see if he could learn anything from the Marines. The Commandant had reported to Secretary Warner the success of breaking up of areas out of town but that recent traffic ~~xxx~~ indicated that the Marines still might have difficulty. I asked Admiral Clarey whether that was satisfactory. Admiral Clarey indicated that it was and said that he would be available to see Admiral Johnston. He went on to report that he didn't think that the Commandant was reflecting the true situation concerning Okinawa. He thought they were having "a hell of a time" out there. Clarey mentioned that Commander U.S. Forces Japan

had sent a message within the last two days asking for his component commanders (that is Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) to meet with him to discuss what they could do to improve what is a pretty bad situation in Okinawa. Clarey said that he felt the Marines were not as successful as they were reporting and I agreed with Admiral Clarey and said that that was one reason I wanted Means to look at the problem to provide a base of reference with which to put Subic more in context. Admiral Clarey added that he found that our problems in Subic had increased whenever the Marines came in and that Marine racial incidents have been increasing recently. Admiral Clarey went on to suggest that he was thinking of restoring the requirement for everybody to be in uniform on liberty in Subic. It was his view that some of the blacks were wearing civilian clothing designed to be offensive, that is long coats, big hats, and carrying canes which were being used as offensive instruments. Admiral Clarey asked Admiral Zumwalt if he had received the messages sent in concerning the troubles in ^{the} Subic environment and that he, Admiral Clarey, was seriously considering putting some places in Subic out of bounds. I indicated that I would certainly be guided by Admiral Clarey's views in this respect (I need locate the messages that were sent in from Admiral Clarey about Subic.) In a

1030 14
telephone call of 8 January 1973 Lieutenant Commander Norman of my staff reported

to Commander ^{Imman}~~Enright~~ of my staff by telephone from the Phillipines. ^{BW}~~En~~ Norman

reported that he had arrived at ^{CINCPAC}~~SEVENTH~~ Fleet on the 4th where he got good briefings

and that he had now gotten out to the Phillipines. Bill Norman found that the

receiving station there was the biggest problem. He said the situation was

terrible and he would have a large number of recommendations in this area. He said

that the number two problem is the Marines who come into Subic off the amphibious

ships from Okinawa. He said they bring their Okinawa ways into the Phillipines.

He was of the view that the JCS ought to try to get a greater amount of reaction

time so that the Marines could go back to Okinawa instead of the Phillipines. Third

he found that the conditions were just terribly overcrowded with two carriers and

all other units in there that the shore facilities and personnel just couldn't

keep up. Fourth, he found that the commanding officers weren't insisting that

the appearance of personnel be kept up in some cases. Fifth, he found a lot of

people who were built up in transient status being help by Phillipino law to

remain at the base or because they had medical problems and so forth. He considered

it very important to get this transient load reduced. He reported that Admiral

Johnston and his team had been moving with great energy ever since arrival and

Page 15

concluded by saying that he thought it was an important thing to see the situation in Subic. (I need then to get the report that Admiral Johnston turned in after his return from Subic.) Following the receipt of Admiral Johnston's report and after discussions with Admiral Clerey we came to the following conclusions. One that Rear Admiral John Dick, who was commander of the naval base in Subic under whom all of the individual activity commanding officers fell had not been doing a satisfactory job. There was some evidence that he was drinking very heavily and he had been in very poor physical condition as a result of ~~many~~ of which he had to be hospitalized for a long period of time. His retirement was requested and a very effective flag officer, Admiral Don Shelton, was directed to relieve him. This made a significant improvement in command leadership in the area. It had been apparent on my earlier visit that we had command difficulties at the Naval Air Station, however, fortunately, a very fine commanding officer had just taken over just prior to my visit and I had instructed him privately to make heroic efforts to get on top of that situation. The Inspector General of Inspections indicated that he was doing so.

Tape 31B



Admiral Clarey subsequently concluded that the commander of the Naval Station ought to be replaced by an extremely effective commanding officer who had demonstrated superb performance in keeping on top of problems at the Naval Station in Guam and so on very short notice Captain Whedaman from that activity was flown down to take over at Subic Bay. These command changes, the heroic efforts to reduce the transient load in Subic, the subsequent release of our ships for longer periods away from the line so that they could go to Hong Kong, Japan, or Singapore instead of always having to come to Subic and thereby greatly reducing the load of seagoing sailors in Subic, together with general ^{high} eye level attention from Admiral Clarey and Admiral Holloway rapidly improved the situation at Subic so that it no longer served as a catalyst for racial difficulties.

The Critical Telephone Calls

On 11 November 1972 I arrived at the Pentagon after a four hour flight from China Lake, California, to Andrews Air Force Base and thence by helicopter to the Pentagon at 12:35. Just as I walked in to ~~my~~ my office my Executive Assistant Captain Don Fringle informed me that Henry Kissinger was on the telephone