

Dedication: "To the thousands of Navy men and women who - - - "

Special tribute: To my wife

Preface: Why I decided to do the book

Introduction: A) The basis on which I was hired

B) The Problems I faced

1) AVF and actions needed

2) modernization

3) Vietnamization

4) relative maritime balance and
crisis management changes

5) strategic issues

Part I: AVF and actions needed

Chapter I: U.S. Navy in 1970

A. Deployment history

B. Deferred maintenance

C. Personnel profile

D. Racial situation

1) flashback to my detailing days

2) numbers

3) quality

4) restriction on opportunity

5) subtle restrictions

E. Female situation

same as above

F. Retention data

G. Other criteria

Chapter II: Personnel Initiatives and Early reaction

A. My general philosophy

B. John Chafee support and Mel Laird

C. Categories and reason and timing visualized

D. 1st 6 months

E. 2nd 6 months

F. 3rd 6 months

G. 4th 6 months

H. Miscellaneous

I. The consequences of changes

1) 1971 reenlistment rates

2) the poll

3) the oldtimers and Heine

4) tension buildup

5) the USNA speech

Chapter III: The theorem thermometer

- A) 1972 reenlistment rates, etc.
- B) Chafee leaves; Warner takes over
- C) the situation - (use flag briefing)
- D) the race episodes
- E) the speech
- F) the turmoil
 - 1) Hebert in NOLA
 - 2) George A - Ike - Mullikan article
 - 3) right wing columnists
 - 4) Hicks hearings
 - a) overt
 - b) covert purpose and our counter
 - 5) Kissinger calls to Laird and Z
 - 6) Warner's MO
 - 7) final Navy release - Laird
 - 8) Role of the press
 - 9) Young and McClelland
 - 10) Hicks to Regula

Chapter IV: The role of the press - (enlarged)

- A. The favorable image early
- B. The results during the flop
- C. Stood up to be counted
- D. Impact on people and on Congress

Chapter V: The role of the Congress (7)

- A. Hebert - Time quote
- B. Hicks and 3 personalities
- C. Stennis - out of the trees
- D. Mahon - Rickover - CNA
- E. Liberals - letters - McNamara - Demecropoulis
- F. Conservatives

Chapter VI: The final result

- A. Final enlistment rates - race, women
- B. Recruitment
- C. Sample letters
- D. What it was all about - strategies and failures
- E. USNA 4 men speak - President reaction a la Haig

PART II: Modernization

Chapter VII: The history of the Navies WW II to 1970

A. US

B. USSR

Chapter VIII: The Choices

A. 3 alternatives given the budget levels

B. Analytical base

1) My experience as Director, SA

2) 2 studies FUIB/FRY

3) MFE

4) Endurance Supplement

5) Seabased vs landbased air

6) Project 60

a) Hi - Lo

b) Numbers vs quality

Chapter IX: Impact of nuclear power - Rickover lobby

A. My interview

B. Rickover's NO

1) First meeting in PHN office

2) Clement's EA and reappointment

3) Schlesinger blackmail

4) SSN deal

5) Swanson case

6) SCS vs CV vs CVN

7) DG v DGN

Chapter X: Impact of Congress

A. Committee actions - delay

B. Briefings of members, leadership and reaction

C. Proxmire - Aspen

Chapter XI: Management

A. Dealing with contractors

1) Gruman

2) Litton

3) Jenco

B. Womb to Tomb Contracting

C. Laird/ Packard charge

D. Rickover problem

1) facilities - Pastore

E. 3 unions

F. GAO

Chapter XII: Plan (Project) vs Program (FU 75 approx)

PART III: Vietnamization

Chapter XIII: Prologue - pre September 68 in SVN
(13)

Chapter XIV: September '68 - May '70 - briefing Laird, Ab.
(14)

A. Sealords' campaign

B. Actov

C. Heroes and families

Chapter XV:
(15)

A) May 70 to end

B) POW/MIA and families

PART IV: Maritime Balance and Crisis
Management

Chapter XVI: Selection of Probabilities
(16)

Chapter XVII: The Evolving Trend
(17)

A) Estimate on takeover

B) Jordan crisis

1) describe

2) theoretical outcome

3) meeting with President and Laird

C) What I reported to President - Dec. 70

- 1) summary of brief
- 2) Westy to Laird - Westy to Haig
- 3) Haig to Laird to Z
- 4) K to Z vs K to others

D) What I said to Congress - FY 1971

E) Subsequent Year FY 72

- 1) To President FY 72 - Dec 71
- 2) White House reaction
- 3) To Congress - FY 72
- 4) Laird - "or nuclear escalation"
- 5) subcontinent crisis - escalation in SVN (Mining story)

F. Subsequent year FY 73

- 1) Ship reductions
- 2) Couldn't meet President
- 3) Congress FY 73
- 4) Yom Kipper War Oct 73 and outcome

G. Subsequent year FY 74

- 1) President on Dec 73 - stream of consciousness
- 2) Congress FY 74
- 3) Public
- 4)

Chapter XVIII: Implications for Foreign Policy
(18)

PART V: Strategic Issues

Chapter XIX: Background
(19)

- A) Barrett plan to Missile Crisis
- B) Cuban Missile Crisis - PHN profile
- C) Test Ban
- D) Strategic Paper
- E) Scheme of maneuver

Chapter XX: SALT I
(20)

- A) The dialogue prior to summit
- B) The sell-out at summit
- C) Public rationale
- D) Jackson Resolution

Chapter XXI: SALT II
(21)

A) Subsequent OMB and Congress cuts

1) Jackson triangle

2) shortfall

B) Dialogue before summit

1) at Geneva

2) K to

3) PHN resig

4) Z letter

5) President at NSC

6) no decision

C) What came out

D) The future

Chapter XXII: Foreign Policy Implications
(22)