

Alright Bob. (Admiral Z) Lets see if we can't finish up this chronology which I find extremely helpful in trying to think about the thing. Right. (Ad. Z). We are kind of up to the end of 1972 now. I think it would be helpful if we made up a chart of all of this you know. We can put in the individual pieces and Bob and I can work from that. It might even be a creditable chart. We talked about the DND invasion of 72. We are at the end of 72 now as far as I understand.

I gave it to you that on 1 July 1971 it was down to 45%. By 1 July 1972 it was down to 35% probability and 1 July 1973 it was down to 30%. These are significant

because what (This doesn't only reflect the weakening of the U.S. Navy, it also

reflects the strengthening of the Soviets) That's right. Probably more of the latter

than the former. By this time we are down to 508 ships, I sorry that's 526 ships

as opposed to 570 ships. (452 fewer ships.) That's right. (A lot of those 450 fewer

are obsolete ships, right,) That's right, you give up the worse ones but it takes

platforms, you've got to be in enough places around the world, you see. When

you have given up 47% of your ships, even though they are the oldest ones, you

have given up a hell of a lot of capability. (Your point is that ~~there~~ there was

no replacement, not that you shouldn't of given up the ships, there should have

been some kind of replacement. You will see in some of these speeches, the theory

2

was we could give ip a lot of capability in the near term, begin to invest the money and in the off years begin to pick it up. In actual fact Congressional reductions have denied us the opportunity oof picking it back up and those percentages in my judgement will not come back up. One of the things that will have to be addressed in all this probability is something that keeps coming up in the ~~papers~~ press and I just notice, without knowing anything about it, but this whole agruement about the worst case approach versus perhaps a more rational approach. You know what the, all that stuff if you are going to get into the probability you have got to get into all that. Yes, you see, this is the way in which those who want less defense or those who truely feel we are spending too much , tend to denegrate what I would call an informed judgement. Now let me give you an example of the way this works, Bob. I've got memoranda that demonstrate that Kissinger and the President have agreed with me , we are in this kind of problem. Schlessinger, privately has said to me, he thinks I am probably right about my probability. Publically he had been told by the White House to denegrate that . The problem is that the only time an administration can admit we are in trouble from a defense standpoint is ~~when~~ they are running for election.

3

Wheedy ran on the missile gap. Soon after he was in power, McNamara dismissed it.

And from then on (I have never had it clear yet whether the missile gap was campaign oratory or if there was a ~~missile~~ missile gap) I doubt there was a missile gap. I think

the truth of the matter is Bob, I thought so at the time, that we were superior, we have been superior in since world war II. During this four year period we have

given it up, we have already given it up in the conventional side and we are in the

process of giving it up on the strategic side. (It is very curious, a superficial,

casual observer would think that getting out of that costly Vietnam involvement

would do nothing but strengthen you. Really in the strategic that that was a drain

on the sources and you could understand losing ground to the Soviet Union when you

were messing around over in South East Asia but.) ^{2:} Yea, but the problem is ^{that} that

is a superficial impression and is common place but it leaves out the time part of

the equation. For nearly a decade we were spending, beginning at 10 billion

and before we got through 30 billion dollars a year for bombs, bullets and attrition

aircraft and operating expenses which was an increment that the Soviets were not

having to spend. Now, during that 10 year period, the whole intelligence community

agreed the Soviets came from spending less total dollars than we spend, where to

4

where they are now spending more than we spend for defense, but in addition 20 to 30 billion dollars of ours per year was being wasted and theirs was not, so they gained. What we did was start to hack away at the budget. Each year we have spent a smaller fraction of the gross National Product for defense since 1950 and each year we have spent a small fraction of the Federal Budget for defense since 1950, its come down as a fraction each time. In terms of purchasing power we are at 33% below what we were at the height of the war and we are at about 15% below what we were a year before the war began. We have given our dividends to the domestic budget. We hav'nt used it to build

up and begin to regain our position. (And I suppose there is a marked disparity between the percentage of military budget goes to personnel here and there to.)^{1:} That's a very perceptive point which I should have made. Before the all volunteer force, something like 30% of our budget was going for people now up to 57%. The Russians, we reckon spend about 28% so, we have to spend twice as much to start off even. (Well, the most formidable problem in doing this book is going to be to make all of this real to a reasonably uninformed and casual reader. Make it seem real and important. Let me ask you this. Is it a good technique, from your standpoint, to have maps, charts of the world being put out several different ways that look like. Yes, it were possible to

5

A

do so, they are easy to understand. A lot of readers have trouble with charts
and tables. Even I have trouble with them unless they are fairly graphically
simple. A lot of publishers have trouble with charts and tables too. Charts
and maps, illustrations of any kind cost money. However, that is always ne-
gotiable I ²sure.) You could start with something as simple as this, a map of
the world which shows through arrows that the Soviets support their allies
overland and besiege their enemies overland and the United States with blue
arrows can only come to the assistance of its allies or bring oil in over
the seas. No blue arrows. Then on the next chart³ begin to show the arcs
over which Soviet submarines and aircraft can operate and the places at
which they can cut. Where you can demonstrate that we have got to get all
the way across. You can lay it out in a very clear way. (I think whenever
Jellinec wants to have his summit meeting on this subject, three weeks from
now that maybe we should by then have worked out a kind of a concrete pro-
posal and see if he will buy it because that's really up to them, they
are the ones who have to spend the money to get this done. He is liable to
say to you, well if you pay the artist, sure we will have the charts or some-
thing like that. Have a response prepared to that proposition too. This adds
to the expense. You know say all these books, in that terrible thing of

having one section all in the middle, with eight hundred photographs in it instead of illustrating the text because that the way. Binding in illustrations its a separate process. And it does increase the expense, I have no idea by how much. But the illustrated book, except very fancy editions, is a thing of the past. It is not because artists cost that much but the mechanical process of illustrating a book.)

Now this kind of takes us to 73, lets see, the bombing took place December 73 and we got the truce in about February of 73. That was kind of a watershed point. Did that affect () (Where you responsible for clearing the mines).^{2.} Thats right. We had to begin the mine sweeping , that was the Nayy's job. That's right - which was an important evolution.

(Rice:??That compensated for what interesting operation /.")

that did that was

Z: Yeah, I think so -the force/ the same force that did that was first under this modernization ~~xxxx~~ context - but you can't do everything with inadequate budgets. We had gambled to give up lots of old minesweeping ships - the four we got - Helicopters - that would do the minesweeping, and we gambled right because we just had the helicopters in the force and trained and ready when we got the call to go do the minesweeping. We also had to use some surface ships and then that same force that did the job over

there was used to sweep the Suez Canal later. Then, there began a period of time to improve our readiness. We had for 10 years been fighting a war with ships being turned around too fast, ~~over~~^{over}-operated, ~~over~~^{under/}maintained and we began to try to upgrade and just as we got started on that, the Yom Kipper war broke out in October 1973. And we had to deploy surge forces for that not only ~~into~~ into the eastern Mediterranean but into the Indian Ocean. That interfered with all our improvement - ~~and~~ caused us to spend money again on one-time expenditures.

(R: Well, There realistically never will be a time in the world when such interruptions don't occur, will there?) Z. No, that's true, but it is particularly hard to recover from a 10-year period of over-operating and, therefore, each crisis like this is a setback.

(R: Has the 10 years of operating, does that mean just the equipment was in bad shape and needed overhauling?) Z: There hadn't been time to do the routine maintenance - the car hadn't gone into the garage - ????

Z: Now, the Yom Kipper war was the next big event and then after that it builds up to the wind-up ~~xxx~~ crisis with regard to the Summit that I have described in June of '74 - that threatened to destroy ???. R: Do you

Z: It was a big event - this was the debate to cut the ~~xxxx~~ submarine budget by \$1.2,000,000 and that was a prominent

place in my story because - well, I've already dictated some parts of it here
as part of local color and in that package that I've given you. There was a major
effort to slow down the rate of the Triton - the submarine which is a strategic
submarine that will , and we carried it by two votes - one that
I got personally involved in it and Symington tried to make much of the fact
that ~~is~~ said the Soviets were lobbying on the Hill which I hadn't said but
the newsman asked me if it was ^{true} ~~true~~ that the Soviets were ~~lx~~ lobbying on the Hill
and what I said was "My view is that every Soviet citizen considers himself an
Soviet
employee of the Government and works to support the Government's interests" but
the headlines "Zurwalt says Soviet lobbying" so Symington tried to use that to
shift some votes until Jackson got up and announced that "I don't know what you
fellows are talking about ~~xxx~~ - the Soviets had me under all kinds of pressure
when I was putting the Jackson Resolution through - you know it goes on as well
as I do - forget it fellows". R: You and Jackson have been pretty well
along too, huh? Z: That's right, he is one of the white hats. R: When was
the Triton ? Z: Was it fall of '73 - I'll have to get it for you. Let's
put it down tentatively fall of '73. R: Triton is still on the drawing board
then - it's not being built? Z: The money has been appropriated for the first
submarine - but the construction hasn't started - the first one will come along
in 1978.

R: That's just one prototype that you have money for. Z: that's right,

in this year's budget there's money for two more - the budget hasn't yet been cut out - but it will go through. R: This is one of those things

Z: That the boat plus ^{fact} plus the operating costs are a billion dollars each but when you look at the ~~benefit~~ ^{fact} that everything else can be destroyed in the first strike and the ^{fact} can't, you get an awful lot for your money.

We'll undoubtedly fill in a lot more around that - Bob, one other thing that ^{four one/??} may be of interest to ~~you~~ put down - that those four July 1 points, is that

1 July '70, 10% re-enlistment rate - R: Oh yeah, that is good. Z: It kind of

gives you a picture of how our programs went. R: 10% re-enlistment first tour

is always fairly high - second to none, huh? Z: yeah, although it is ^{at} an all-time

high too. It's 91% now and it was 82% last year. R: Second x '91. Z: Yeah ?

Z: 1 July 1971 - 17%. 1 July '72 - 22% and the same figure for 1 July '73

and on 1 July '74 it was about 29-30% so that's kind of the bottom line that I

throw at my right-wing ? friends. R: How was the mental group for same?

Z: yeah, that's a good point - by 1 July '72, we had started to get very good

quality again - that nine months period from Sept and we've been running 1 to 3%

mental group forward each month since 1 July '72 and meeting our quota essentially.

R: (could not hear what he was saying) How ^{was} asc Marines now? Z: They

?
can afford to have more men deployed but they, I think, about 30% deployed, as I recall, is that right, and are still not meeting their quotas so if you want to over-sympathize on it, the difference between short hair and long hair in uniform is the ability to make your quotas. (laughter and could not make out remarks)

R: The Marines were not helped, for example, by a lot of other things - like with all the drill and stuff back in 15 years down in Parris Island and everything.

Z: (couldn't hear) R: yeah, that fellow. Z: the thing that you have to while

remember that they really didn't run into trouble ~~for~~^{XX}/General Chapman was the Commandant. When Cushman took over, it was ~~another~~ certainly another Nixon

? trap. He was his aide. R: Wasn't he also the Vice Chief of CIA.

who
Z: yeah, ~~he~~^{XX} took orders from the Erlichman - John Halderman - given in disguise,

etc. R: He is one of your Black Hats, huh? Z: yeah, although I really don't have

too much to say about him because.... R: He sat with you on JCS. Z? Yes.

R: Now, let's change the subject for a minute and try and figure out what I

should be doing while you are away. Maybe we don't need expensive tape on

that subject - we can remember that.

R: How much background there has to be - there has to be some - you can't suddenly launching into this - background, there has to be ^{about} the world situation, about history of the Navy's role played in the world, about - all that kind of stuff. I guess I shouldn't really worry you about that - I guess that's one of my problems is how to whittle down and liven up that material so that it is gotten through painlessly but is sufficient to support the arguments that come later. Z: the tough part of it is that it is a book in itself.

R: Oh, obviously, it is a library in itself if you really want to go on with it, I guess but... / Do you think So many bald assertions get made about these particular

issues and laymen and the readers of this book are presumably are going to be blaming you are not writing it for the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the United States. Z: Part of what happens, Bob, is that there is a great deal of confusion between - what are the adversaries' intentions and what are his capabilities and that's kinds of a first point that has to be made.

In every period of detente, Mr. Kissinger himself has said that there has been a period of detente with the Soviets in every decade - in every period of detente you can hear lots of people saying "look, these fellows are friendly - we are not going to fight 'em so why worry". Yet, every time we have entered a period of detente and the other side has started doing some things the question

always has been/
ks "why didn't the free world look to its defenses more". R: Well, people don't
say so much they are friendly - they kind of say it - "if we would be friendly,
they would be friendly". At least, that's the way it has come to me mostly
often. You know, in order to elicit good-will from anybody, you have to
demonstrate good-will. Z: Right, now I think that one thing that does come
across - the common man, you may have to make this argument to them ~~///???~~ ,
the common man who is going to be reading this book, I think you can start
with the fact that we ought not to be clearly inferior - ~~that~~ that that's not
good ~~either~~ even when we are getting along with the Soviets because from time
to time there are going to be difficulties and if we are a nation which has
twice the gross national product of the Soviets, we ought not to accept inferiority.

R: Well, you know that's where - yeah, I know - sure you accept that but that's
where I would begin to run into difficulty because there is this whole mass of
argument that has gone around in my head like a merry-go-round or in one ear
and out the other, as the case may be, about - you know - superiority or not,
or inferiority and what - and if we can only kill them twice and they can kill
us three times kind of stuff, you know - so we are inferior. Z: In the days
before World War II, you could have made exactly the same argument - they've

got poison gas - we've got poison gas - we can each kill each other two or three times - why, therefore, worry about our conventional defenses. What happened was that both sides found themselves mutually deterred from the use of the horror weapon - gas - and we proceeded to fight it out on the basis of conventional arms and besides (1) damn near lost through initial inferiority. Now you have the same situation now - we've come through a quarter of a century where we had clear cut strategic superiority and clear-cut maritime ^{superiority} ~~superiority~~ to make it possible to tie the alliance together. We are now in a period when even the most optimistic will say that the Soviets are able to gain strategic superiority

if they ~~MARV~~ their missiles. They've already got superiority of numbers,

they've already got superiority of ?? R: but how do you define

superiority - I mean you have to define superiority in terms of capability

not of just numbers of things, don't you? What can you do when you get beyond

doing a certain thing - what more can you do - it's ...in other words,

isn't there an effective level - this is in strategic arms, I'm talking about

now - ~~szxxtxthx~~ isn't there a certain level at ~~whizh~~ beyond which there is no

more mission. Q: I think it would be useful for you to read my PLAYBOY

interview in that respect because the point the layman is taken by is the

point that we have over-kill; we can kill each other two, three or four times.

The answer to that is we can't kill the Soviets once for the logical assumptions.

If/ you believe that if nuclear war ever comes - God forbid ever comes - it will only come if the Soviets strike first - we will never strike first. If they strike

first you are going to have to ask yourself - what can we do to them with what

survives - the answer is that we probably can't kill more than about half of

the Russians. R: With what survives. Z: With what survives - now the further

and more worrisome thing is that over time that situation will get worse as the

Soviets accuracies get better and better and the numbers of their warheads get

more and more numerous and what is still worse than that, probably, Bob, is

that since the Soviets are rational people and will probably seek to avoid

strategic nuclear war, they will use that strategic superiority - those number

advantages - for political purposes around the world. They are doing so today.

They are saying to our allies and theirs - and the reason I know this is because

our allies say it to me as I travel around - and our military leaders with whom

I associate, their ministry of defense, their foreign ministers - "why did you

Americans let the Soviets get more missiles". It's like gold in Fort Knox - it's

there and it counts for something in the power equation around the world and it

only that there are all kinds of little buggages and accommodations /

the of NATO, all of these kinds of things that are transpiring are subtle accommodations to what the world perceives as Soviet strategic power.

Now if you couple that with superiority in the maritime field - something that we have got to have in order to ~~xx~~ survive, something they need only for the luxury of winning - you know, you're in real trouble. R: What it sounds to me as if

you're saying is that it is necessary to have a sufficient strategic capability to deter the other side from using strategic weapons. That beyond that what is important is to be on even terms - whatever they may be or better

than even terms - in the conventional ordinary field. Is that roughly among

the things you are saying.: Z: yeah, I would define that as follows: we've

agreed at the national level that all we're asking from the Soviets - this

nation with half of our gross national product - is parity in the strategic

field and that both sides will probably be mutually deterred if we have true

parity. Now, in the conventional field, we have for years acknowledged

Soviet superiority in Eurasia, that is, their capability with armies and

air forces through overrun the contiguous nations has always been superior

to our capability to ~~xxxx~~ defend. R: ? our strategic forces that

deterrent to that presumably, right? A: No, what has kept ~~xxx~~ it as pistols

pointed equally at each others heads is that our maritime superiority has

made it possible for us to reinforce Europe or Asia. Now that you give the Soviets the capability to cut at sea, to go with that superiority of conventional power

in Eurasia then you .? R: ?? I like it better at this point

and I change it around in my opinion about these things from time to time/

I like it better at this point to assume bad intentions as the first argument -

that's not a worse case thing at all. I think that at this point it has been

proven really what Russia's intentions are bad. Z: Breshnev is saying in

his speeches to the Communist leadership what his intentions are. R: ????

expose of the whole thing - that's probably - /????????? not to be

trusted. Z: yeah. R: Therefore, detente is a - what - concept to be

examined rather carefully. Z: Detente, to the Soviets has a different meaning

than it has to us. To us, detente is a effort truly to work out mutual

accommodations and to go from an adversary relationship to one of partnership

over time. R: In order/^{to be able to}to devote ourselves to solving what we see to be

of the acute domestic problems - and what is lacking on the other side is any

interest whatsoever in solving the domestic problems. Z: To them, detente

is a tactic which accelerates the rate at which we assist them in gaining

superiority so that they can be still more aggressive in their

foreign policy and that deter us from interfering with that foreign policy.

R: Also, solidify their own constituency by raising the standard of living and all that sort of stuff but not to promote . . . it's a . . . it's going to be a problem . . . to shorten really. I don't think that anybody wants the book to be a philosophical examination of detente - I don't think that that's in anybody's mind - there has to be some of them, of course but you can't ??? Even if its there , that is not what is going to sell the book. Z. That's right. B. and if it doesn't sell the book , then t e least you say about den nte. Z. On the other hand in order not to be just a Gen. Lamay I've got to both state what I believe namely we need to work toward dente and

then be sophisticated by pointing out that ^{DETENTE} ~~dente~~ on our terms is likely to eventuate if we retain the military capability. Then it is if we let the Russians become clearly superior and twist the meaning of ^{DETENTE} dente to their own definition and we have written several things over the last five or six months about the Soviets appear to be up to . It was classified at the time but I think I can cast around the unclassified. B. Does it touch on the effects of the American domestic and political situation or Soviet retention. Z. Yes, But not very much use. B. Is there anything in that you can talk about whether just having opinions about it. Z. No, but you can sell opinions no matter whose involved. It is becoming recognized that one of the primary things is the government will. B. Well just the whole thing

speculation of whether we would be in the position we are now in as you see it, with respect to detente and the whole SALT thing and so forth. Had there been at that 1972 mandate been in full force and full effect of the situation had the President been in full command of the situation during the last three years.

Z. There is no doubt in my mind that had he been as vigorously in command in the last two years as he was in the two prior, we would have been much better off and we would of had a fairer deal. I don't feel it came much closer having a Soviet system if Erlichman and Halderman were left to do their dirty work around here. B. What you're saying is, given the choice between Nixon in command and Nixon in disgrace, it is better for the country for Nixon to be in disgrace. Z. That's right, we might have won the battle.

Side B.

2. Incidentally Bob, one other person we ought to try and get you to listen to is Paul Nitze. For two reasons. One: In a sense he is Socrates and I'm Plato. And one of the reasons we hit it off so well is that our ~~heart~~*~~patter~~ thought patterns are very similar. I wrote one of his speeches while he was Sec. of Navy and one of the interesting phenomena was that ??????????????

He has a more intimate knowledge concerning the SALT than either Cockrell or I have. He was working 24 hours a day on it over the years. He knows through my spotter system that I have kept him informed about everything we know and a**~~knowledge~~*~~of~~*~~everything~~* we think we have a knowledge of everything except what Kissinger says to Dogarenin and in fact he doesn't even tell the President.

B. And that is probably plenty too. Z. There's one thing I wanted to make a point about. Bob is when you lay out this program of Salt I across the board the four years, the crisis management problem, Jordan and then Jon Kippour across the four years. Particularly when you get to the Yon Kippour War, that there is a fascinating bottom line relationship between Salt and the Yon Kippour crisis. During those negotiations the Russians were walked back to accommodating to a lot more than their power might have lead them to accomodate. In other words they had the superiority in the Middle East. And none of us know but we all have a pretty strong suspicion that Kissinger had promised them that their payments for that would be there kind of SALT II. And what over took it was that the President was in such trouble that when Paul Nitze resigned and I wrote the letter to the President which I was sure would leak, I didn't have to leak it as I was sure the President would ^{think it was} ~~leak~~ ~~leak~~. It was the ~~???~~ thirty four you were counting on to quitting would be very concerned about that kind of deal. So I believe it was pushed ahead and that the loss of the President may have saved this from having to deliver on the commitments that were made on the Middle East. B. Things like that are invaluable. However it is speculative. Z. Clearly and you have to label it as that if you use it, therefore I don't know whether you would use it or not. B. The Russians were clearly worried about something there are speculative arguments against the short term in the middle east

being more important to us. Z. By letting us buy back peace in the Middle East they not only got what ever was permitted in Salt but they had already by that time bought off a trickling of the oil prices which is leading to starvation in certain nations, *populations* of a *billion* which have a population of a billion and which is g bugging up the economy of the rest of the free world. And as a collateral benefit to themselves they reversed their trade inbalance by the extra billion they made. B. What I'm saying is that since that it is hard to believe that in any calculation that it was worth more to us to get a quick fix in the Middle East then it was to have a decent Salt. It is hard to believe that anyone would have traded even on that basis. B. Kissinger may have been a rotten tempered, devious secretive character but you have it would be hard to make a point that he was so intent on designs of immediate image that he would peddle off the country. Z. No, I think it goes back to a broader point, it goes back to the trauma and the insecurity in his youth and the turbulence of that environment which he transmutes to the American populace. What he says, is that the American people will not support the effort necessary to maintain superiority, therefore it is up to me to get the best deal I can before both sides clearly percieve that the shift has place, by the time the American people have discovered what has happened it is too very possible but by that time it will be too late. Now, when you come

ack at him as I have , isn't that the ultimate immorality to make that decision for the American people, instead of going to them about it . His answer is, if we do that then the Russians know that we know we are in trouble and you loose negotiating leverage. So he has sold us out by lack of really believing in the American people , thats the primary, thing the rest of it is secondary. My own view is that it is an honest debatable issue but the odds I think are quite heavy that if the American became convinced that we were really in that kind of predicament they would demand that we do more. The problem is that the President has not gone to them and said it. Only the President cansay it and be believable.

B.(could not hear what he was saying) Z: ??? The program has trouble/
making itself as much of a

militant as I am. R: Well, ????? I just think I'm not going to do that,

however, I think that I will be able to get so that I understand better than I

now do what the issues are and what the arguments on the two sides are and be

able to present ?? part of it clearly and ??? Z: (cannot understand part

of it) let's have you talk to ????? and to Nitze . He probably the wisest

man in our national life today/with regard to the whole structure and in our defense policy and Russians
in our foreign policy/

He is so far ahead of people like Rogers and Kissinger/????? that there's just no
competition

They are writing very similar stuff - Eric

LA

Kohler is now at the group in Miami and you'd find very little

difference ~~xxx~~ between what I've just said and what he is saying. ???, (Dolan?)

before he died, Kennon(?) probably not as far over in that direction as Kohler

but he is fairly close and Nitze ~~wright~~ there with Köhler. R: (could not hear

beginning) ~~g~~ popular apprehension of what ??? It has been very much of a

pendulum ?? (Liza leaves and interruption in tape) Side B - approx Part 3)

Z: It has and Admiral Rau^h is the best one to talk to about what the current numbers are but that was a very significant part of the controversy on ~~which~~ what

the one ship which it is legal to sign in the hospital ship sanctuary and

probably ~~even~~ more controversial than race as far as the oldtimers are concerned .

But it's working beautifully and what this family magazine review of my four

years talks about that in quotes what some of the women ~~think~~ think and it is

pretty accurate, in that regard. R: Nurses are ??? Z: We're

?? finally to put them into anything - we have now opened up all ???

R: couldn't understand Z: Would you believe that the first female chaplain

- military chaplain in history - came in about 18 months ago. (couldn't understand

next bit) I'll throw this in but practically the whole issue is devoted

to it and it's almost exclusively personnel. R: well, that's good.

The strategy is to deal with the four years and flash back wherever we want to -

there's a lovely flashback in the SALT business when we go back to the test ban era which I participated in. R: I do think that's the solution to the problem and then you can be absolutely selective about what history you put in and you're not pretending to make a compendium of the entire history of Naval power. Z: What I had in mind there were some of the kinds of things that you were asking about - you know, the poor man's description of it - not highly complex.

R: Do you have any ? word appropriate to use ???????? (couldn't hear)

Z: I think the point ... R: I think McNamara ruined himself partly by over-reliance on ?? didn't he. Z: That's right. ?? what I think is the genius

of the probabilities course which, incidentally, is something that Nitze used to do

- McNamara didn't - is this: Systems Analysis can take you methodically through a series of calculations - all of which are based on assumptions but it is always

going to have to involve some military/^{judgment}~~segment~~ as to whether or not those assumptions are ???, how likely they are and when you get all through you

come up with very precise calculations that on day X - Force Y means

Force B (??) has so many losses. Now you're going to have to sit back and look

at that and have to, in addition, remind yourself/????? what is the state of my of Navy with regard

to personnel training, regard to readiness of equipment, what is the state

of the Russians, how long since they fought, how long since we fought

- all of these things and then you have to put ??? on it - like Jimmy ^{the Mark} agrees

- I used to say to the President that I was his Jimmy the Greek for naval ^{policy making}

and that I was not only looking for the outcomes of Systems Analysis - I was looking at the results of fleet exercises which is the nearest thing to simulating

war and I was cranking all these other factors and when I said the odds are 55%

I was doing what I am getting ~~am~~ paid for and the infuriation/among that trio at that period

was just unbelievable, I thought I was going to lose my job. B. They wanted a

sure thing. Haig didn't want the Naval outcome to look so pessimistic because he

was afraid it would reduce the Army budget . Kissinger didn't like it because

he felt it weakened his foreign policy. He was willing to gamble that we wouldn't

have a war and go ahead and deploy our power even if the odds were down to 30%.

I say that you shouldn't be taking those kinds of chances. B. Bud I don't believe

some of the things that I hear, that the National Security Advisor to the

President shouldn't want to have a factual appraisal of what the National Security

situation is, seems to me a little strange. That's very strange. That's crazy.

A. To refine it just a bit, if Kissinger were the kind of a man who had the

security of being able to accept he was getting those odds in absolute privacy

if he had been looked at them differently from being out there as a guy he was,

worrying about who else was being told and what the impact of that would be.

Overtime we had to begin to testify those odds in front of congress and

want
doesn't know how to run a democratic system. End of this conversation

PREFACE

On 30 June 1974 I opened the door and walked out of the professional

home... in which I had labored for 35 years - United States Navy. This

retirement was a voluntary one since I had completed the four^{year} statutory

term of the office of the Chief of Naval Operations to which there can be

no reappointment. The Sec. of Defense, The Honorable James R. Schlesinger

had been thoughtful enough to offer a series of alternatives - active duty

positions in order that I might continue in the U.S. Naval Service. I had

declined these , In June 1974 General Alexander Haig had offered me in the

name of the President(Nixon), the post of the Director of Veterans Administration

I had also declined this.

I reflected on the reasons for leaving the Naval Service and the service

of my government for which I had labored all of my professional life . It seems

to me that there was a long story involved, that long story added up to

a single message.

of
center
left
up

The simple message was that not withstanding the challenges and excitement of professional life. After four years leadership of leadership and the National level I thought

This sense of suffiaation did not stem from the normal frustrations associated with the job. It is true we had ~~gotten~~ accomplished less in the field of modernization of the United States Navy than we had set out to do. It

is true we had not gotten across to a suffecient segment of the Congress and the American people the dramatic shift ^{of} power balance between ourselves and

our principal likely advesaries, the Soviet Union , . It is true that we have not completed the intergration of minority personnel and ^{of} women into the U.S.

Navy . With all of these things as with all of these objectives were ones

towards which progress had been made and toward which others while ~~if gone~~ ~~in gone~~ could ~~ka~~ continue to make progress on the knowledge that we have found

our desired goals in these specific objective areas , the provading sense

the nature of the way our government was being run. I was singulararily in the

position to judge the difference between the four years of the Nixon Administration

in which ~~of~~ I served at the National level and those of earlier Administrations.

.....

as special assistant and executive assistant to the Assistant Sec. of the Navy

The Honorable Richard Jackson and for his boss the Honorable Thomas ^{GATES} ~~Greiss~~ (?)

and during the Eisenhower Administration. As a Captain in the U.S. Navy I had

worked for the the Honorable Paul H. Nitze ~~as~~ when he was Assistant Sec. of

Defense for National Security ~~Affair~~ Affairs and he was Director for Arms Control

..... And when Paul Nitze was Secretary of the Navy I was his Administrative

Assistant for two years. In that capacity I also had the opportunity to work

for Mr. Robert MacNamara and Cyrus Vance, the Sec. and the Deputy Sec. of

Defense under the Eisenhower and Johnson Administrations. All the men with whom

I have worked in most previous administrations were strong believers in the

need for absolute civilian control over the military. From them I gained

an even greater awareness than I had in my earlier years of the meticulous

attention that civilian decision makers

From them I learned the philosophical from them I learned the deep

attachment that sound and patriotic men give to the philosophical principle

upon which civilian control is based. From all of these men I observed that

regardless of differences there was a full free flow and exchange of advice, opinion

and information between civilians and military and officials. They did not

.....

of the manner in which the Constitution was designed to make our Government work
that is , that those in authority in the ~~Executive~~ Executive Branch while accepting
full responsibility for decisions and insisting for their rights in the need
to make them would constantly seek the best professional advice from what
ever source it could be obtained. and encouraged the degree of exchange of
views which permit It was in the light of my own
deep ;..... attachment not only to the principle of this relationship but to
the empirical I had observed in my earlier years in the official
way in which it can operate, I had come to Washington to enter the
Chief of Naval Operations on 1 July 1970. As I came to the end of these
four years and looked back , myself sufficiently qualified by the comparison
of the Nixon Administration through those earlier ~~years~~ periods of service.
In the personnel field I have found unwillingness at the highest level to
face up with openness and candor to the extents to which ~~discriminations~~ discriminations
still existed in the U.S. Navy in regard to minority personnel and equal
opportunity for women. In regard to the expressions of major national interest
in military foreign policy , which I , the nature of military
operations in the Pacific area and where all the major aspects of our foreign
policy were found a similar unwillingness to face up

to a basic exchange of views which have lead to

mistakes and those previous errors strike..... In the

early part of my career end of tape. 13 - side B