

PHN ON NIXON

When Mel Laird asked Paul Nitze to be his Defense representative on the SALT  
dele

delegation and Paul Nitze agreed to do so, a visit was scheduled for him to meet

the President. During the course of that discussion, the President said to

Paul Nitze, "I don't trust Rogers, and I don't trust Jerry Smith. Therefore, I

want you to report to me direct any time you feel that it is necessary to do so.

(I need to get more details on this from Paul Nitze.)

RUSK VERSUS FOSTER

In 1962 I used to attend meetings of the Committee of Principals then set up as the policy group dealing with arms control issues. Membership included Mr. Rusk, the Secretary of State; McGeorge Bundy, the Special Assistant for national security matters; Mr. George Ball, the Under Secretary of State; Mr. Bill Foster, the head ACDA; Mr. Adrian Fisher, the Deputy Director, ACDA; the Director of CIA or his Assistant, Mr. Ray Cline; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara or his Deputy, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Paul Nitze. I was present as the Executive Secretary for the Defense. On one occasion, we were discussing the test ban treaty and the need for on-sight inspection. A particular formulation was put forward by CIA ~~Mr. Rusk~~ as a suggestion for the group to consider; Bill Foster, Director, ACDA, spoke up very vehemently against it saying "you can't do that - it's not fair to the Russians". Dean Rusk, with a twinkle in his eye, looked across the table and said "Bill, that's all right with me if the Russians buy it. I'm for us".

RUSK VERSUS BALL

At another meeting of the Committee of Principals, Mr. Rusk painstakingly worked the group towards consensus on a particular issue. At this point, Mr. Ball, who had not been present for the earlier discussion, walked in and said somewhat officiously, "Mr. Secretary, I've just been talking to the President and here is his position which he outlined in some detail." When he got through Mr. Rusk looked across and said somewhat wryly, "George, I, too, have talked to the President just before this meeting and at the moment you walked in I had just finished maneuvering this group gently towards the consensus that we<sup>would</sup> support that position." This broke the tension.

TALENT CUT DOWN BY K

I need to get more details on the background of the firing of Weish (?),  
Secretary Rogers

Secretary Rogers, Mort Halprin, Wayne Smith, Larry Lynn, Gray Gartoff (?),

and the several young executive assistants, beginning with David Young,

David Halprin, Coleman Hicks and Dick Camel (?).

I need to know more about the internal power struggle between Haig and  
Kissinger.

To get  
with these details, I need to talk by telephone to Weiss (?), Sella (?)

Halprin and others.

PERSONALITIES TO WORK IN

I need to research what I can re-create of my associations with the following: Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, Bill Bundy, Bill Foster,

Adrian Cheshire (?), Dick(?) Trawler, Ray(?) Cline, Dick Helms, Bill Colby,

Larry Lynn, Wayne Smith, Note to Adm.Z - noise so bad at this point - unintelligible), Al Haig,

John Ehrlichman, Halderman, Mitchell, Bud Krog (?), John Connelly, Arthur Burns,

Bill Rogers, Mel Laird, Dave Packard, Al Mentoven(??).

Quotes of a Meeting Between Me and K

I believe the American people want the world to do the things necessary to achieve strategic parity to maintain maritime superiority.

I believe we must get the best field we can in our negotiations before the Soviets and the United States both perceive these changes in balance have occurred. When these perceptions are in agreement and both sides know that the United States is inferior, we must have gotten the best deal we can. Americans will not at that time be very happy that I have settled for second, but it will be too late.

Z. Why not take it to the people? They will not accept the decision to become second best owing to this <sup>in</sup> possession of a GNP twice that of the USSR.

K. There's a question of judgment. I judge that we will not get their support and if we seek it and tell the facts as we would have to do we would ~~lose~~ our negotiating leverage with the Soviets.

Z. But isn't that the ultimate immorality in a democracy to make a decision for the people of such importance without consulting with them?

K. Perhaps, but I doubt there are one million who could even

understand the issues.

Z. But even if that presumption is correct, these one million can influence the opinions of the majority of the people. I believe it my duty to take the other course.

K. You should take care lest your words result in a reduction in the Navy budget. There are subtle retributions available.

CEP - A Private SALT Team

Shortly after I became Chief of Naval Operations, I decided it would be useful to establish an advisory board consisting of some active duty Naval personnel and some distinguished civilians of a variety of backgrounds. I was very fortunate in being able to bring together a high quality group of members, some of whom I had worked with on and off over the years and all of whom I knew to be men of great competence. They included among them<sup>the</sup> following: (here get a list of the membership since the beginning from WOK).

The objective of this group was to meet monthly to receive briefings from the Navy on current problems, programs designed to meet them, and to meet with me at the end of these meetings to provide their frank comments on my policies and those of my superiors. I found this practice to be an immensely productive procedure and read with great interest the more detailed reports provided to me at the end of their monthly meetings.

Over the four years an interesting phenomena occurred. As it became increasingly apparent that Dr. Kissinger was trying to carry out a great portion of his policy making without consultation with the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we ~~found~~ <sup>found</sup> this group developing into a collateral function that I might describe as "Kissingerology" somewhat similar to the

phenomenon that is practiced within various parts of the U. S. government in the absence of complete information as to what the Soviet leadership is about - of studying their intentions from those pieces of data that are available. This science is, of course, known as criminology. My "Kissingerologists" aided in their work by virtue of the presence within the group, a Mr. Helmut <sup>?</sup> who was a member of Dr. Kissinger's NSC staff and his actions <sup>of the</sup> on many ~~the~~ Navy issues that were of concern to me and my advisory board. In the earlier years he was able to be rather frank and candid in his views, but in the later years it became more and more apparent that he spoke only what he felt Dr. Kissinger would want him to say and was increasingly reticent about revealing any differences of views between himself and his boss. Nevertheless, his silences were revealing and his contributions, when he was able to make them, were useful. These, together, with a dash of input from those who were in touch within the State Department, frequent inputs from the Defense delegate to SALT talks, Paul Nitze, my own defriefs of meetings with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to pass on such information they were given, made it possible for this various fine group to piece together - much like a jigsaw puzzle - a mosaic of what Dr. Kissinger and the President were about. This, in turn, made it possible

for me to generate papers prepared sometimes by this advisory board and sometimes elsewhere within my staff, official papers of use in the JCS arena or serving as catalyst in regard to the Secretary of Defense. With the special insights gained that from working with this group/made it possible for me to conclude that the time had come toward the end of my tour as the President was preparing to go to the Moscow Summit , badly wounded by Watergate and clearly under some pressure therefore to get the best newsworthy deal he could get, to insist that my views of the matter get to his attention. The mechanism I used was to deliver a letter to the President by the Secretary of Defense, but with an advance copy directly to the President and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whereby preventing what had happened on the previous occasion that I had endeavored to communicate directly with the President, that is, not forwarded by the Secretary of Defense to the President.

THE MAJOR'S PAPER

I need to get from WOK a copy of the Major's paper. If this is not possible, I need to try to get the Major over for an interview.

Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin  
at Secretary Ken Rush's Cocktail Party in 1974 (Bobbie can provide date)

At the subject cocktail party, Ambassador Dobrynin sought me out. He appeared to be more elated and friendlier than he had been on any of our earlier meetings. He asked me for my view of the status of Phase II, SALT negotiations. I told him that I was very concerned at the continuing Soviet failure to understand the American people would never accept strategic inferiority over the long haul. I said that if the Soviet government really believed in detente as a continuing relationship they had to understand that strategic parity must be granted the United States, less the swinging pendulum of public opinion begin to question the very basis of detente as the Soviets achieve strategic superiority. I urged him to consider these views carefully. Ambassador Dobrynin replied that my view was not the view of Dr. Kissinger. He said that it was Dr. Kissinger's view that the American people over time would not make sacrifices necessary to maintain even strategic parity, let alone strategic deficiency (whatever that term might have meant) or strategic superiority.

I reminded him that the Jackson Amendment cast by both parties of Congress in connection with the approval of the SALT I Treaty in agreement had made it clear that the elected representatives of the people would insist on strategic parity in

the next round. Ambassador Dobrynin said, "Frankly, we were elated at the results of SALT I. It gave us the strategic advantage and central systems necessary to offset your forward base systems and it reserved for us the right to match you with regard to warheads in the future." I replied that the agreements which I had supported as simply the best that could be done, given the Soviet building program and our own failure to have built, must be understood by the Soviets to have a very ~~tenuous~~ basis; that is, we had granted them huge superiority in numbers of land-based missiles and in numbers of sea-based missiles, in numbers of strategic submarines and in throw weight while retaining for ourselves only the single advantage of warheads as a result of our merit technology. I pointed out that their numerical advantages were in essence frozen during the five-year period of the interim agreement whereas our advantage was not and they were permitted to deploy and at whatever rate they found feasible. I pointed out that clearly over time the Soviets, with their superiority in both numbers and in throw weight would be capable of bringing into place much larger numbers of <sup>merus?</sup> than we would be able to have, and with this would come not only the perception of Soviet strategic superiority but the reality of it. I told him that this would never be acceptable over a long haul to the American people, that campaigns for presidential elections would be run on the issue of this strategic gap and that this could have a very

de-stabilizing effect if the Soviets are not wise enough to accept true strategic parody.

Ambassador Dobrynin replied, "You must recognize that we consider that the numerical advantages we have been given with regard to missile numbers represent relationships that must be carried forward into the future and that we cannot be prevented from having the <sup>MERV ?</sup> technology and from bringing it into place all of those missiles which we have been granted the right to have. " I asked him if it was his perception that SALT I was designed to be a relationship that would carry forward beyond the five-year period and he said that it was.

EHRlichman TRIP

In the fall of 1972, prior to the election, I received a call from my friend, Herb Cline, the White House Press Director, whom actually was badly maligned by his President<sup>to</sup> whom he had given many years of loyalty, whom I always found certainly did have his head screwed on properly and whose advice seemed to me<sup>to be</sup> not only sound but<sup>to</sup> recognize the proper lengths to which one could go in dealing with the press. In fact, in my judgment that the frustration he may have caused Mr. Nixon would be the result of Mr. Nixon's unwillingness to follow sage advice about how to deal with the press. In any event, Herb Cline asked me whether I would be willing to accompany John Ehrlichman to the Midwest to give an informational briefing to a large number of small town newspaper publishers and editors. Herb Cline proposed that John Ehrlichman speak before this group on domestic issues that he and Herb Cline be the foreign policy spokesmen, and that I be the defense spokesman. I told Herb that I would be willing to do so provided (a) Mel Laird's concurrence<sup>^</sup> were obtained by him, and (b) the event could be structured in such a way that I was not part of a political campaign. Herb agreed to both conditions and brought them about. On (get from WOD) , in , we met with some 200 of the local and regional newspaper publishers and editors. The question

(1)

and answer period went on for several hours and the defense issues were covered widely. The most noteworthy element was that many of the questioners wanted to know the impact of the McGovern budget, which had proposed drastic slashes in the defense money. I was reluctant to attack a specific candidate's budget, but at the same time it seemed to me the people not only had a right to know but, indeed, there was a positive need for the people to know the nature of the issue. I, therefore, elected to use a fictitious defense slash which I made sure was not the same as the amount Senator McGovern was proposing, and suggested that for that cut - which was in the same ballpark as McGovern's figure - it would result in the following from a maritime standpoint. All but one of the many bases on the West Coast should be shut down and all the people let go. Similarly, on the East Coast. Major reductions in ships and aircraft would have to take place. In terms of our capabilities, we should give up any thought of defending our seeline to Japan or Europe and concentrate simply on the defense of Alaska and Hawaii in the Pacific and on the defense of the East Coast and Caribbean area in the Atlantic.

On the way back I had the opportunity to get to know John Ehrlichman. I was impressed at that time that he was a man of intelligence, great loyalty to the President, and I saw no signs of the lack of integrity and inclination to misuse

power with which he became associated in the public eye in later months. He seemed to me to be remarkably frank; for example, he made the point to me on the trip back that I would undoubtedly ride high within the Administration for the views that I was expressing concerning the impact of a theoretical budget cut in the vicinity of the figure that Senator McGovern was using and would be judged a "call it like it is" man. He went on to say, however, that as soon as the election was over - and the only basis for a comparison would be the Nixon defense budget - that my continuing to "call it like it is" as I had in the past would lead to great unpopularity. He said that I can practically assure you that Henry will go for your jugular as soon as the elections are over and his national security budgets become the object of your evaluation again.

In any event I continued to use the impact of the "fictitious" budget in various appearances around the country in response to questions and did find myself temporarily riding high. When the Long Beach newspaper came out with the following response to an answer I had given the WOD (get it from WOD), Secretary of the Navy, John Warner, sent up a copy to Mel Laird. With great concern Mel Laird wrote across it - GREAT - and that ended that source of concern.

I continued to have contact with Ehrlichman from time to time and found him, in so far as my affairs with him were concerned, always to be forthright and helpful. I saw him, for example, in that period when I was working to achieve the appointment of Admiral Horatio Rivera(?) Sp. to be Ambassador to Spain, an appointment which seemed to me to be highly desirable for a number of reasons - Admiral R Naval officer of great distinction and intellect, a representative of the large number of Spanish-American in our country, fluent in the Spanish language and delightfully suited by temperament and even by his diminutive size to be the U. S. representative to Franco's Spain. John Ehrlichman promised me he would get this done and together with help from Mel Laird and Peter Flannagan who were also working on the problem at my request. It did get done.

A month later when the Navy was in the public view as a result of the racial difficulties on board two of its aircraft carriers, and when a major effort had been organized by Admiral George Anderson, working with some other retired Naval officers and a few on active duty to have me dismissed from my post, I had been informed that the position taken by John Ehrlichman that I should be kept on was influential in the President's decision to override John Hadleman's recommendation that I be fired. I would like to think that John Ehrlichman took this position, recognizing that I was on

the right side of an important issue, but it may well be that it was merely his way of rewarding what he considered to have been a useful performance on my part during the political campaign.

If One Could Get the Tapes

If it were possible for us to have access to the tapes of the briefings that Henry Kissinger has given to the President in advance of NST meetings and after them, one could measure adequately the accuracy of my assertions that facts were distorted in JCS's positions, subtly torpedoed by this master Word-snipping??