

DISCUSSION WITH CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR

On the night of 11 September, I had a discussion with the Cypriot Ambassador at Dr. Narva's birthday party. He described the problems he has had in dealing with State and Kissinger during the Cyprus crisis as follows:

Prior to the coupe, he had been warning his contacts in the State Dept. for a number of weeks, the Greeks were going to initiate the coupe and this would lead to the kind of tragedy that has come to pass and that the Greek Colonels were simply incapable of evaluating the Turkish reaction. He said that his contacts in the State Dept. told him they were not able to convince Kissinger that this was a matter of great moment. Subsequently, when the coupe took place the Ambassador feels that Kissinger reacted inadequately and did not make sufficient effort to restrain the Turks in the way in which L.B.J. had been able to do using Cyrus Vance. It is the Ambassador's belief that inadequate demonstration of force plus firm policy level resolve similar to the previous occasion could have had a similar effect.

In any event, the Ambassador has persisted in his efforts to try and see Kissinger since the coupe took place. He finally had a meeting with him scheduled for this past week-end. One hour before the meeting was to have taken place he received a call from Secretary Kissinger's office telling him that

because he had been called out of town on emergency business. The Ambassador subsequently learned that the emergency business was to spend a family weekend with the Rockefellers.

The Ambassador spoke pointly of the fact that here Sec. Kissinger is involved with one of his principals, the turmoil in Greece and has not seen fit to take the time to spend even fifteen or twenty minutes with a man who is expert in the problems.

The Ambassador spoke also about his disappointment in the attitude of President Nixon when he was presenting his credentials to the President on arrival in this country. He said that this is always a big moment for an ambassador when he is being received by the sovereign to present his credentials and that one would expect at the very least there would be an effort made to spend a few minutes chatting about the country and its problems in the broad. He said that instead in his case Mr. Nixon received the credentials from eight or ten ambassadors all at one time and that he found himself shaking hands with the President, who immediately with pressure on his hand pushed him onward and he found himself in his car almost before he knew what was happening to him.

Discussion with Mr. Robert Bruie (Check spelling) Protocol Officer in State Dept.

Mr. Bruie, who is the Asst. Protocol Officer in State (also meet at Dr. Narva's Party) He has served as political advance man for Mr. Nixon in each of his campaigns going back to 1960. In 1964 immediately after Goldwater was nominated Mr. Bruie contacted Mr. Nixon

to see what his plans were. Mr. Nixon said to him that he would like to meet with him but that he was so busy that he suggested that Bruie ride with him to a meeting that Gov. Scranton had called to coordinate Republican strategy right after the Goldwater nomination. Bruie found himself somewhat miffed because when he got on the plane with Mr. Nixon some Italian fellow who was also on the plane all the way up to the conference in the plane Rosemary Wood had the President reading papers and going through them and coming back from the conference Mr. Nixon was in close contact conversation with "some Italian fellow" all the way back to New York. They dropped the Italian fellow off at a hotel and then Mr. Nixon had just 10 or 12 blocks left to talk to Bruie. Mr. Nixon said to Bruie keep your eye on that Italian fellow I think he has a future, his name is Volpe (who later became Gov. of Mass. or Conn. and then Ambassador to Italy after period as Sec. of Transportation in the Nixon Administration.) Bruie went on to say that during that final cab ride Mr. Nixon then said to Bruie that he was going to campaign for Goldwater and ask Bruie to take on the job of being advance man in laying on the schedule. Bruie said that Mr. Nixon elected not to campaign in Montana saying I think I'll leave that fellow Mansfield alone, who is up for reelection. After Bruie had laid out his schedule and Mr. Nixon had approved it they campaigned in thirty six states for Goldwater, Bruie said he and Nixon knew at the time that Goldwater didn't have a chance and planned this series of campaigns as really

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their kickoff for Mr. Nixon's drive on 68. Bruie reported that he called Halderman and Erlichman
 he had been with Nixon on the 60 campaign to express support for the 64 campaign. He said
 that they were both frantically sled off the hook as not wanting to get involved because
 they knew Goldwater didn't have a chance and they didn't want to waste their time. Bruie
 said somewhat wriely that in 1968 after Mr. Nixon was nominated and Bruie was put in charge
 again within 24 hours Halderman showed up and took over, this time sensing victory. Bruie
 views of Halderman, Erlichman and Mitchell coincided with he views I had, which I have dictat
 Bruie farther reported that in the 1960 campaign he had meet a very bright and remarkable
 able young man, whom he reported to Halderman really needed to be watched, pushed and pro-
 moted because of his talent, the man's name was Dwight Chapin. Bruie also shared my views
 that Krough was basically a decent guy.

The following are notes from a meeting with the President of the United States in the

6th. Fleet after the Jordon Crisis:

The President started out by saying the Italians are very concerned about the prospect
 of ~~unilateral~~ unilateral reduction s of strength. There is a race to Moscow be-
 tween the French and the Germans . Brandt's ~~unbalanced~~ unbalanced ~~ripote~~ riposte is the re-
 sult of a lose of confidence in the U.S. ~~commitment~~ commitment. The Federal Republic
 of Germany is the most vigorous nation in Europe, even though they have no NucS and they

therefor need a larger association. The President said there is a larger point, there are number of people in the United States who feel that the United States should reduce its forces, certain numbers of the Senate and so forth. The President said what has all this to do with the 6th. Fleet, we ~~have~~ have to evaluate the situation in the light of U.S. weakness, we didn't have in this crisis the strength we had in 1958. Looking at the situation : 1970 despite the changed situation on land we did have the U.S. 6th. Fleet, its presence gave our initiatives a chance to succeed if it hadn't been for the U.S. Fleet I don't know what we would have done. For those who say that naval power is obsolete just look at the Soviets, not only have they made remarkable developments in nuclear submarines but also in surface craft. It shows that the Soviets know the importance of naval power. What it all comes down to is this. Under Eisenhower, ~~and~~ the Dulles doctrine, was proper and relevant at the time. Until 1963 and 64 there was a clear U.S. advantage we could say to the Soviets that they risked massive retaliation. During the Cuban missile crisis our advantage was enormous. Now we are a period of nuclear stand off. We have an advantage in MIRVS and possibly in ABM'S but they have a tremendous advantage in numbers of missiles and throw weight and it is increasing. In 1973 and 1974 their submarine growth in superiority was enormous also in regard to numbers and equipment. We have a two front situation therefor we don't need the Dulles doctrine. At a time when massive retaliation threat is no longer relevant the question is what to do with ground and naval forces. U.S. diplomacy is in a very difficult

sition, If Soviet sea power approaches the capability of the U.S. Our need for sea power advantage is obvious (I don't mean to down grade Air and Land) but the President and the State Department have a problem of diplomacy. If the enemy moves what do we do? Killing 70 million people doesn't represent a policy, what do we do in the Mediterranean in the event of a death, there would be less stability. My visit is intended to emphasize to the world that the 6th. Fleet is here and how we use it and maintain it. Sec. of State then said, the two questions most frequently asked are; The question of Soviet power in the Med. and how to offset the opening of the Suez Canal and second, are we going to withdraw our troops from NATO. It is not just a question of military power it is also a question of symbolism. They see us reducing in Southeast Asia and Adm. Moorer says the morale on the JFK is very high the President's reactions showed that visibility counts. He placed 79 thousand men on alert in the U.S., Europe. He initiated airlift, deployed 25 ships, 12 thousand marines and navy men to the alerted theater forces in the Med, the U.S. Fleet. In Adm. Moorer's views there were two categories of situations: one is a U.S. unilateral situation in which basing ashore is difficult for example the Turkish bases were not available, Cyprus and U.K. bases not available at the operating level. The Italian and United Kingdom forces did provide information but not their fields and overflight rights, so the 6th. Fleet was very important. Adm. Moore says that when one looks at the 6th. Fleet it is outstanding for projection of capabilities

ashore and its presence strengthens U.S. policy. Looking at the 6th. Fleet in a NATO confrontation you are looking at the possibility of either a nuclear or a non-nuclear war, a world war III type and we are not out of the woods in a continuous situation. Gen. Goodpaster said the President's presence was a psychological plus to every service man and this is a U.S. day and a NATO day. The President of the U.S. said the Soviets are equal to us in missiles and bigger in mega-tonnage but we mustn't talk pessimistically. The President said we are going to have to get bases in the Med. we need to be able to get support from Lebanon and Georgia(?) we need better facilities in Suda Bay, in Sicily and in Malta. I expressed concern about the situation in Malta and the President said lets get going. The President pointed out that the Turks are really for the Arabs and therefore the question of landing rights was very difficult but that State and Defense should explore this. Adm. Zumwalt then briefed the President on the calculations as to outcomes in the event of war in the 6th. Fleet. The calculations that I showed the President demonstrated 16 different cases ranging all the way from the normal Soviet squadron the normal US 6th Fleet to a squadron augmented as it was during the Soviet exercise OKEAN played against the 6th. Fleet as it had been augmented for the hostilities. For the 8 cases which appeared to be most consistent with the real world, that is, the likeliest cases the very best outcome was a stand-off and there were several in which the outcomes were clearly unfavorable to the United States, that is we would

have lost. This briefing was the briefing that lead to the private ~~confer~~ conversation I had with the President which I have dictated else where. On the back of those calculations I have some notes that were made up on the way back from the 6th. Fleet. The ones that are relevant to the 6th. Fleet read as follows: the training officer of the Moroccan Command needs to be a volunteer and a front runner. Tell the Chief of Naval Personnel to nominate one to me. I need a letter to Ad. Wandt concerning him 2. Find out why Adm. Kidds courier letter did not get to me before I left for the 6th. Fleet 3. Rear Ad. Worth Bagley should go back and look at Command and Control, pelectronic warfare, and other actions in Med. readiness to give me a status report. 4. Is DCand O Plans and Policies still sending weekly summaries to Adm. Revera SINC South. 5. Prepare a directive for Kissinger to send to CIA concerning help for the 6th. Fleet in communications and also a memo for Kissinger concerning Malta and Sicily. 6. Check on State (Embassy) communications for the 6th. Fleet. 7. Get us ready for 6th. Fleet Commander to visit the Soviet Fleet 8. Need a plan to shorten over-haul period for carriers. Seventh back up notes with Presidential comment The _____ has approved getting more submarines for Turkey.

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FOLLOWING ARE THE NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE NATO AMBASSADORS ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1970:

Ambassador Tasca reported that the Greeks were impressed by the show of power. The Soviet presence off Greece is a great issue. The Greeks therefore insisted the United States and NATO, because of the above, he estimated there would be a long period of leadership in the UAR and, therefore, ~~it~~ there would be difficulties with the Palestinian issues and more differences. He expressed an interest in U.S. policy supporting the stoppage of marshal law in Greece. The U.S. Ambassador to Israel stated that Golda Meir was not too strong politically. The U. S. Ambassador to Italy said the Italian Government approved of our Mediterranean activities. The U.S. Ambassador to Libya said that _____ was young, impulsive, inexperienced but was trying to be valiant. He said that he believed in the long term he wanted ties with the U.S. He analyzed the hard domestic problems that Libya has. With regard to the Soviet presence in Libya, he said that it had not grown. They had supplied large amounts of arms but no advisors - it was used Soviet equipment - and they were trying to get Egyptian advisors. Libya was avoiding excessive involvement with the Soviets. He estimated there were 4,000 to 5,000 Egyptians in the country. He said Libya was criticizing the UAR for the Soviet presence there. They were distrustful of any foreigners. He said the French were improvir

their influence in Libya. The U.S. Ambassador to Malta said there were going to be elections about 1 March of the following year - not later than April - and he estimated a 50-50 chance that the ~~Comm~~ Conservatives would stay in power and keep [?] Mintoff out. If the economic situation was good, then the Government had a good chance. He described the opposition under Mintoff as a doctrinaire Socialist who saw his future as being aligned with Africa and would, therefore, gradually diminish the UK presence which was already going down. He said the UK was hurt by lack of equipment and ~~inadequate~~ ^{fiscal} inadequate/support of Malta. He was afraid of Soviet presence in the economic fields. He thought the U.S. should provide economic support keeping a low NATO profile. He quoted the government as disappointed at the lack of a NATO economic involvement. He said Italy was not interested in helping. Westinghouse had been there last week to ^{examine setting up} ~~set-up~~ a desalinization(?) plant. He recommended that we go for a NOAA laboratory and provide PL4-80 ~~ass~~ assistance and technical help for the port area with civil engineers. He thought the UN should provide fertilizer, that the astronauts should visit - that would be a great help - and that the United States should supply two patrol craft to assist in preventing smuggling. Both Rogers ??? and the President said they want to win the election - let us know what has to be done. The Ambassador said that Malta

wondered why the U.S. hasn't coughed up anything. They would prefer the UK.

~~The U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus~~ (As a result of the briefing by the Ambassador to Cyprus, the Navy ended up providing a civil engineer to do a port survey and did provide the two patrol aircraft craft to assist in preventing smuggling.) The U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus - He referred to the embroilment of Turkey and Greece and feared that war would result if there was any flare-up on Cyprus. He pointed out that we had to stop it two times in the 60's and '64 and '69. He reported that their objective was to have no additional crisis. Concerning Soviet and U. S. relationships over Cyprus, he said there were two important things - one was the geography which made it very useful to the Soviets if they could gain a presence and, second, the neutrality of Cyprus which made it possible for Soviet influence to grow. 41% of the voters are Communists. The Communists support Mikarios who is anti-NATO and anti-U.S. ^{We} They need more efficient ways to counter this; we need more visible U.S. military presence - this helps. It is important to have communications, reconnaissance, et cetera. He described Mikarios as subtle, stubborn, scheming and movable. The President, if he sees Mikarios, ought to express appreciation for his support, emphasizing that he helped us by his restraint and to hint that if he would move our way he would find a ready response. The Ambassador pointed out that the U.S. holds Turkey in

check with regard to Cyprus. The Ambassador to Turkey gave a routine brief. The U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia said that with regard to the Mid-East Conflct, Bourgebia felt that he had to take an active role and he called for a Cairo conference. Now he was exposed as a scapegoat because Nasser's death had hurt. Tunisia hopes that we can keep the cease fire they identify with Europe; consider the U.S. their most important ally. He talks about the problem of succession. The U. S. Ambassador from Morocco said the only U.S. military presence is U.S.; that this is the most pro-U.S. Arab country in the Mediterranean; they had no love for Nasser but they feel insecure now and they would like to see the United States establish contacts with the insurgent Palestinians and the deZionization of Isareyl in order to get stability. He said they had too many people and not enough education. In recent weeks there was a plan to restore parliamentary rule. The President said spoke to the Ambassadors in generalities but made a couple of them have important points. First, that the achievement of strategic parity by the Soviets means that the game in the future will have to be played low, polite, and that we've got to get more allies like Jordan and Morocco. In referring to the Lebanon crisis, the President said it is obvious that we couldn't go in there again. The U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon

pointed out that the President's message had been very helpful. The ^{Lebanese} ~~Lebanese~~ saw that Jordan could have ben Lebanon. They were concerned that the Jordan [?] might come in. There was some confidence now that they could handle it. Nasser's death was a blow. The internal situation was good. The U.S. Ambassador to Algeria said the Algerian government is moving toward us but a long way to go. The President asked regarding Algeria a number of questions.

BRIEFING OF LAIRD IN VIETNAM

I was told earlier about how Julian Ewell gave me the opportunity to brief Mel Laird during half of the 30-minute period allotted to him in Dong Tam in the 4th Corps Delta when he was Commanding General of the U.S. 9th Division.

I will comment first on the briefing expertise as Bob requested.

I have had the good fortune as I came along to have the opportunity to develop competence in the field of public speaking and verbal self-expression.

In high school I was on a county championship debating team. At the Naval Academy I had the good fortune to win the gold watch in my second and third years in the quarterdeck public speaking contest that was held there annually. As I returned to Washington as a Lieutenant Commander for my first true staff duty in the Bureau of Naval Personnel - 10 years after graduation - I found myself called upon to use this talent in connection with presentation of ideas and concepts for the following reason: It readily became apparent that papers submitted up through the system had a tortuous progress under our bureaucratic system where if one could get the principal decision makers together in a room to listen to a presentation on a given issue, one was most likelier to get an early decision and one in the presence of enough people that the bureaucracy would then permit the idea or concept to see the light of day. Yet, if one were

to be able to continue the practice after a single ~~xxx~~ idea or concept, it became clear that there was going to have to be sufficient interest on the part of those decision makers who were senior to get them to turn out. Very early in my tour in the Bureau of Naval Personnel, I became interested in the fact that there was a way to make a major improvement in amount of shore duty opportunity for sailors and the critical seagoing ratings. I recall one case, for example, that a radar man who in 1951 had a ratio of sea duty to shore duty of 13 to 1 which meant that the ~~rating-overall~~ man in that rating overall could expect on the average to spend 26 years at sea to get one 2-year of shore duty and, for this reason, re-enlistment rates were critically low. In my job as Officer in Charge of the Shore Duty Section Complements and Allowances Branch of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, it became apparent to me rather early that this was really a requirement shop and that by writing all of the allowances for the shore establishment we were really creating the requirement for certain numbers of men in each of the ratings in the shore. This led me then to investigate the nature of the jobs assigned throughout the entire shore establishment and it became apparent that there were some 8 or 9,000 jobs which were assigned to

ratings which had ample shore duty that really were of a general administrative nature and which could be assigned to any other rating. In other words, if a Petty Officer was required but not a Petty Officer of any particular technical background. This led me to see that if I could change these jobs from the ratings to which they were assigned, such as yeomen or storekeeper, to a rating where they were one of those ratings which had a very heavy preponderance to sea duty such as radar men, boiler men, machinist mates, I could do a lot to improve the ratio of sea duty to shore duty. This required a lot of support from other parts of the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the problem was how to gain support quickly and effectively.

I, therefore, put together a presentation which on a flip tablet on which, instead of placing a lot of printed material, I drew cartoon-like "stick men" to demonstrate most of my points together with necessary smiles and frowns, et cetera. The concept was quickly approved and the interest around the Bureau in this technique was such that I found that I was able to assemble my seniors for important subsequent briefings on other subjects to gain their support. I had had a net A Naval career being largely one of operational duty or written performance, I did not use the technique - feel called upon to develop the presentation technique.

for another decade until I was attending the National War College in 1961 and '62, where it was the verbal presentation of my National War College thesis on the Problems of Succession in the USSR which brought me to the attention of the President of the National War College and, subsequently, through him to Paul Nitze, which I have recorded elsewhere. Again, the presentation technique that I follow for nearly a decade, until I went to South Vietnam in 1970.

END OF TAPE 5 - SIDE B