

*JWS*

The 15-minute briefing for Secretary Laird at \_\_\_\_\_ consisted of two parts.

The first dealt with the changing concept in riverine operations and the second with our ACTOV which stands for Accelerated Turnover to Vietnam. With regard to the riverine operations, I described the manner in which the initial application of Naval power against the logistic system of the North Vietnamese and Vietcong had kept the infiltration by sea in trawlers almost completely and had forced the Communist to develop over many months and with thousands of man hours the Ho Chi Min trail overland and this, together, with what they were able to bring into Sihanoukville and across the sanctuary of Cambodia to the borders of South Vietnam represented their principal logistics lines. This application of sea power had been accomplished by the use of major air and surface elements of the US Seventh Fleet supplemented from 1966 to 1970 with nearly a 100 swift boats PCS with about 200 PBR's - River Patrol Boats - and with about 100 amphibious boats which had been armored. The swift boats were used for an inshore coastal patrol to help prevent the infiltration by small craft and to provide a Coast Guard type function. The PBR's were used to patrol the major branches of the Mekong River in the Delta and the armored boats had been married to the US Ninth Division to form the mobile riverine flotilla which had been of such tremendous support to the cities of the

Delta to prevent their being overrun during TET in which they conducted riverine amphibious operations throughout those earlier years. However, by the time I arrived in South Vietnam ~~xxxx~~ in September of 1968, it was clear that infiltration by sea was almost non-existent. The major rivers were now so ~~xxxx~~ clearly ~~xxxx~~ <sup>Government of Vietnam</sup> under the control of the Vietnamese along the shore and so full of government controlled commerce that the Vietcong were not able to use them as arteries and the days of the mobile riverine flotilla also had come pretty much to an end as the 9th Division was amply stocked with helicopters and the action had moved inland and away from the rivers in a major way although some riverine operations did continue. I described to Secretary Laird the manner in which we had therefore used boats from the three categories I have described to initiate a new operation called SEA LORDS (one of these many acrostics which we military love to use which stood for Southeast Asia lake-ocean-river-delta-strategy, an operation which we had put under my Deputy, Rear Admiral House, whom we promptly dubbed First Sea Lords. This operation was designed to provide patrol along the Cambodian border all the way from the Gulf of Tonkin to Tanien(spelling?) in the Third Corps. As fate would have it, rivers and canals extended throughout that entire distance

of several hundred kilometers, within a very short distance of the border and although these bodies of water were very narrow and boats had not operated at night along them, we concluded that if we were going to make a major contribution to the cessation of infiltration across Cambodia that they were going to have to operate there and so, suddenly, over a period of a few weeks operating bases sprang up along ~~the~~ several hundred ~~x~~ kilometers of rivers and canals initially quite ~~extreme~~ austere with the officers and sailors subsisting in their boats and living on K rations and over time being upgraded to where the men were able to get a shower and have a warm meal and a bunk at night. These operations were characterized by decentralization to the level of the individual river division and, in some cases, to the level of the individual boat skipper. At each level our tremendous young officers and men made contact with their Army and Air Force counterparts in the area to tie together the reconnaissance, and intelligence, /surveillance capabilities of all assets in the area not only US but UVN. They had to adopt their tactics to the terrain and local situation in each area and each were different. Very rapidly a tremendous contribution was being made ~~to~~ cutting back the ~~x~~ infiltration from Cambodia in the giant sling-shot section of the operation ~~along~~, for example, which was carried out in the

two rivers on either side of the Parrot's Beach of Cambodia, which extends into South Vietnam, Van Chote and Van Chodong Rivers (check spelling) some four thousand tons of supplies were taken from the Viet Cong in the ensuing months. Having completed the description of the operational side I shifted to our plan for turning over equipment to the Vietnamese Navy. I reported to Sec. Laird that on arrival in Vietnam in September 1968 I had given my staff my belief that if Mr. Humphrey were elected we had one year and if Mr. Nixon were elected that we had three years to complete the turn-over of equipment to the Vietnamese before we would be required to have all forces out of the country. I required therefore for my staff that we produce a one year plan which could be modified if Mr. Nixon were elected, to the longer, more sensible approach. By the time of the arrival of Sec. Laird ~~we~~ we were of course operating on the three year plan. Even the three year plan required a dramatic series of accomplishments. It would be necessary for us to ~~expand~~ expand the Vietnamese Navy from one of about 17,500 men to over 40,000 men and to train them all in skills ranging all the way from operation of boats and underway maintenance to shore level maintenance, public works, store keeping, supply and accounting and all the rest. During that period for example we trained nearly the equivalent of a division of men, 9,000 in technical support, skills. This plan also called

for the turn-over of about 30 sea going vessels and about 1,000 small craft during the three year period. It required the construction of about 40 facilities ashore ranging all the way from really small operating bases to major repair and supply facilities and all this had to be accomplished while continuing to fight the war and while planning to remove the 37,000 U.S. Officers and sailors who had been carrying the brunt of the brown water fighting and naval support of the marines. The plan was at the stage of initial implementation by the time of Sec. Laird's arrival so that my briefing presented the entire concept for the three year scheme and also described the interesting initial stages which involved the acquisition of the building in Saigon into which we were pouring hundreds of young Vietnamese recruits and beginning to teach them sufficient pidgin English that they could understand fire, cease fire, port, starboard, beach get underway etc. sufficiently that these young recruits could then begin to be phased in to U.S. Naval craft and facilities and we were in the process of sending the first man to each of a series of U.S. craft, so that the first U.S. sailor could be replaced and start home. Sec. Laird indicated to me a few months later that the naval turn-over plan had been a key element in his thought process and leading him to advocate the Vietnamization program to President Nixon. (Also Bob there should be some stuff of Chic Rough's tapes that will be useful).

Chaffee Interview

In the spring of 1970 ( I need to research the date) I was requested to depart && South Vietnam and report to Washington for a meeting with the Sec. of the Navy in connection with my next assignment. This The trip back was a time for intense speculation concerning what might be in store. I had by this time had nearly a year and a half in Command of the Naval Forces in Vietnam, the changed scope of the river-ing operations had been fully completed and was successful with the boat blockade of the Cambodian border along the rivers and canals operating effeciently. The Maise Actof (Unable to understand) program ( our varients of the Vietnamization) was in full swing and although it would not be completed for another two years, thê\* it was apparent that the program was matching the plan and that viguorous prosecution of the plan would bring it off on time. Nevertheless I was very anxious to stay through the completion of the first phase of the operation which would have been completed with the turn-over of all the operational boats and craft and by which time the details of the construction of the base facilites and the training of the personnel to support them would be well along fleshed out. And so in part my trip back was filled with the trepidations that I would not be permittted to finish the amount of work I was anxious to complete in South Vietnam. On the other hand, it had been Reported that Vice

Admiral I. C. Kidd who was in command of the First Fleet was to be ordered as commander of the 6th. Fleet and this had raised my aspirations in another direction. Years ago when the Navy began its post WWII phase of peace time deployments in support of U.S. commitments for numbered fleets were created. There was the 1st. Fleet on the West Coast of the U.S. 7th. Fleet in the Western Pacific. That should read there was the First Fleet in the Eastern Pacific and the 7th. Fleet in the western Pacific. There was the 2d. Fleet in the Western Atlantic making occasional sorties into the Eastern Atlantic and the U.S. 6th. Fleet operating in the Medaterranean, under the command of Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, who is located in London and who is a subordinate to the Army General who is Commander in Chief, Europe. The two overseas numbered fleets - the 7th Fleet in the Western Pacific and the 6th Fleet in the Mediterrean - were considered to be the real pluss. In the earlier years these fleets had rotated from command of Naval officers who were aviators to Naval officers who had come up through command of surface ships. Then, following the departure of Admiral Burke from the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy had a succession of three Naval aviators as Chief of Naval Operations - Admiral George Anderson, Admiral David MacDonald and Admiral Tom Moorer. For a

period of nine years, these overseas numbered fleets had been allocated to the command exclusively of Naval aviators. This was a matter of great controversy Naval aviators thinking that it was eminently correct that fleets whose principal striking force <sup>were</sup> aircraft carriers should be commanded by Naval aviators and those of us who were of the non-aviation background feeling equally strongly that one couldn't aspire to do the job of commanding a fleet without the background in the field of anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare which comes from years of experience that Naval aviators are unlikely to have had as they spend the first half of their careers in ~~flights~~ flying seats. Clearly, the proper compromise solution was to have a rotational program in which aviators were followed by non-aviators in all four of the fleets so that during the course of a ~~year~~ three or four year period a range of insights could be brought to the training and operational improvement of the fleets, and so with the report that Admiral Ike Kidd, who was a non-aviator, was going to be assigned to the command of a traditional aviator's fleet - the U.S. 5th Fleet - at the insistence of Gov. Chafee, our Secretary of the Navy, high hopes arose that I would be given the opportunity to command the other overseas fleet - the U.S. 7th Fleet - as the

first non-aviator to have her in over a decade. This issue appeared to be a hot one at the present moment. As a matter of fact, Admiral Johnny Hyland, who had been Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet and was a Naval aviator, had given a very controversial speech on such and such a date in which he had carried the parochial aviator's position to an extreme -

## QUOTE HERE THE OFFENSIVE PARAGRAPHS

And so, as I entered Secretary Chafee's office on \_\_\_\_\_ date, I was very literally filled with some regret at the prospect that I might be required to leave my fascinating wartime command - Command of the Naval Forces, Vietnam - where ~~with~~ the action was and where wonderfully courageous young officers and men were performing unbelievable feats and, partially filled with the hope that I might be the second of the non-aviation Admirals to achieve command of an overseas fleet and knowing that a movement to command the U.S. Seventh Fleet would give me a continuing chance to operate where the action was and partially filled with concern that I might be required to do some less challenging assignment.

Secretary Chafee began the interview by telling me that he was in the process of interviewing a sizable number of flag officers in connection with future assignments, and did not specify the nature of these assignments. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

My hopes concerning the 7th Fleet were raised when Secretary Chafee started out by

asking me my attitude toward the tradition of Naval aviators only commanding the overseas fleets. I told him that I thought that it was a classic excess of parochialism and that there was simply no excuse for the practice and that, in my judgment, it clearly ought to be required that the all four of the numbered fleets rotate back and forth alternatively between Naval aviators and nonNaval aviators in order to provide overtime ~~arrange~~ arrange of insights with which to produce optimum training performance and feedback into the research and development and, indeed, the entire material community. Secretary Chafee then asked me to describe the problems of the Navy as I saw them and how I thought they ought to be dealt with. I told him I thought that we had four major interrelated problems. The first of these was that we had to be able to deal with the forthcoming challenge of an all volunteer Navy during an era of an all volunteer force and that I did not believe that the ~~existing~~ ~~current~~ ~~training~~ ~~at~~ ~~the~~ ~~present~~ ~~times~~ ~~were~~ current practices in the field of personnel administration would work once draft pressure ceased to provide "volunteers" for the Navy as an escape from the Army draft. I suggested that a whole new approach to personnel administration was going to be necessary in order to do two things - first, to let the re-enlistment rates up - these re-enlistment rates of those sailors already on active duty being at ~~an~~ an alltime low - and checking to change the image of the Navy sufficiently that we could begin to attract adequate numbers of high quality recruits from the outside.

End of Tape 6's Side A

I told him that the second major problem that the Navy had was to begin in a major way the modernization of ships and weapons systems. I described a way in which the Navy had become obsolescent over the quarter of a century since the ending of World War II and the dramatic and impressive growth of the Soviet Navy which, coming from behind at the end of World War II, had optimized in a series of dramatic stages so that it now represented a very serious threat to the United States' capability to use the seas in war and, therefore, represent a real threat to the deterrent impact of the United States Navy. I stated that the problem of modernization was one which, in my judgment, was going to require dramatic belt tightening ~~for~~<sup>by</sup> the United States Navy as it gave up a significant amount of current capability (old ships and aircraft) in order to begin the process of making investments in new weapons systems that would come along much later and that I visualized that a significant reduction in U.S. Naval capability during the new year was going to be required in order to regain an acceptable \_\_\_\_\_? of a capability in the out<sup>?</sup> years. I suggested that the third major problem with which the United States Navy would have to deal would be the problem of modernization of its strategic forces because of the dramatic growth in Soviet strategic capabilities, because the United States Navy had the most ~~invulnerable~~<sup>invulnerable</sup> ~~invulnerable~~ of the tread<sup>?</sup> as strategic forces, and because that component the Polarius/Posiden

submarine missiles system was would be approaching obsolescence with the oldest boat reaching the twenty year life for which it had been constructed in 1980. I pointed out that the second and third problems were quite interrelated, that is, that the more spent for the Navy's contribution to the nation's strategic second strike capability the less we would have to spend at the level of budgets that seemed to be feasible to modernize the non-strategic part of our Navy. I added as my fourth major problem the problem of retaining sufficient power to deter the Soviet Union and to complete the fadeout of our operations in South Vietnam while making the expenditures necessary to achieve an all volunteer Navy (increase personnel cost) and while making the increasing investments in modernizing both the non-strategic and strategic navies and I suggested that a very real part of the job of the Navy leadership for the years immediately ahead would be to provide accurate annual judgments as to just how deteriorated Naval capability had continue to point out annually how much Naval capabilities had deteriorated in comparison to the adversary, as the expenditure patterns were reshaped to achieve an all volunteer Navy and modernization. Governor Chafee asked frequent questions throughout this discussion but the points I have outlined represent the principal thrust of the case that I made for the Navy's objectives for the future.

Governor Chafee did ask me a number of questions about my attitude in the field personnel, and the largest part of our interview dealt with this field which was not surprising since I had heard from many others of his very deep interest in the problem of personnel. This interview was a delightful experience.

Governor Chafee has a charming personality, and it was a good opportunity to get to know him although when I left the interview I didn't know any more than when I went in about what my future job might be. Inevitably, as time went on to the mysterious network within which operates within any bureaucracy there began to be rumors and reports but these were conflicting in nature.

ASPIRATIONS

When Governor Chafee had completed his comments and stated that it was his intention that I be nominated to be the Chief of Naval Operations ( as dictated in the Summons) my heart leaped and my mind raced. I, as I suppose anyone would at a time like that. Passing through my mind at a traumatic rate were ~~the~~ a series of thoughts and emotions. There was the thrill of achievement that there would be a capstone, reward and challenge to a professional career. There is a traumatic sense of how lucky I had been so often to be in the right place at the right time, to be observed by superiors who were able to ~~take advantage of their~~ <sup>do something</sup> about their perception. There were immediately thoughts of opportunities to carry out ideas and programs that had been stored away in the memory bank throughout the years. The feeling of excitement at the opportunity to pull together a team of people with whom to associate in great work. There was at the same time a feeling of regret that I would have to leave a brave comrades to complete our work in South Vietnam, and that the team that had been assembled out there would have to be left for the moment behind. There was an instant reflection on how proud my family would be, my wife, my children, my father and my sister and brother. I have to confess there was a feeling of pride that I ~~would be able to~~ <sup>would be able to</sup> justify the news would justify the confidence that a series of

of people I revered had put in me over the years and there was also a feeling of concern as to ~~whether~~ whether or not I would be equal to the challenge. And then it was time for me to answer and I said ( return to the dictation).

#### THE TRIP HOME

I was relieved in Saigon on 15 May, 1970 by Vice Admiral Jerry King. With my wife and my eldest son Lt.J.G. Elmo R. Zumwalt III , who was in command of a PCF 32, a swift boat and my two daughters in attendance. My farewell remarks which were brief so best the emotions I felt they are quoted here. General Abrams awarded me the Distinguished Service Medal for my performance in the command of U.S. Naval Forces in Vietnam, a tribute to the performance of 37,000 courageous men who were in that force. My family and I made a trip home which provided me the opportunity to visit the Chiefs of Navy, the Defense Chiefs and Defense Ministers of Japan, Taiwan, Singapore. We also visited the U.S. Navy and Marine facilities in ~~Okina~~ Okinawa. In Singapore I had the opportunity also to meet Prime Minister Lee Kon U (Check spelling) who gave me the most professional briefing of the military-political situation in Asia I have ever heard. He is a most impressive figure, Oxford educated, English speaking as well as Chinese, a brilliant man who understands both the need for charismatic leadership and for professional technical management of the city-state over which he presides. I had the great opportunity to

visit with Prime Minister Lee Kon U again when he visited the United States at a luncheon hosted by Vice President Agnew and we resumed the role of tutor and student in regard to Asian affairs. I was able to visit the Commander of the 7th. Fleet, Vice Admiral Morris F. Weisner and his Flag Ship and also the Commander of the U.S. 6th. Fleet, Admiral Richardson during this circuitous trip home. Perhaps the high point of the swing was the opportunity to stop visit with Admiral Horatio Revera and his wife Hazel at their <sup>H</sup>eadquarters and residence in Naples, Italy. Adm. Revera, a distinguished U.S. Naval officer of Puerto Rican origin had become the highest ranking Spanish-American in the Armed Forces and after service as Vice Chief of Naval Operations had been appointed by the President to be SINC South that is Commander and Chief of the Southern Forces of NATO, in this capacity he not only had to plan for the employment of the U.S. 6th. Fleet which would fall to his command in war time but also with the NATO commander of the various allied forces in Turkey, Greece and Italy of all services. He had a tremendous grasp of the entire southern tier and enlarged my horizons by the quality of his knowledge and briefing to me. I made a mental note at this point that one so superbly qualified as Rivets Revera must be employed in an Ambassadorial role upon his retirement from thr Navy. and undertook some two years later to be the prime

mover in setting in train the efforts which lead to his appointment as Ambassador to Spain. My visits with the Officers and men of the 6th. Fleet served to reinforce the convictions I had developed while serving in command of the Naval Forces in Vietnam with regard to the critical need for changes in our approach to personnel administration in the Navy to reverse the worriesome trend with regard to re-enlistment rates and in order to be able to attract adequate numbers as draft pressure would come to be eased. We completed our trip home with a visit to Headquarters of Deputy Commander in Chief Europe, General and Mrs. David Burtrenal (Check spelling) at Stuttgart. David Burtrenal was the most impressive Air Force General I have ever known and was clearly superbly well qualified for the job he held as General Andrew Goodpaster's deputy in Europe. We visited London, England as the final stop where owing to the tragic terminal illness of Michael Lefanu, the present First Sea Lord I had lunch with his deputy Admiral Echart Ashmore (check spelling)

Notes from and Executive Session JCS about 26 April 1971

Admiral Morrer reported to the Chiefs that at 15:33 either Saturday or Sunday before the Monday meeting he got a call from the President directing that Lt. Calley be removed from the stockade. The call came directly from the President to Admiral

Moorer. Ad. Moorer called Laird to tell him and then he called General Westmoreland and couldn't get him so he called Sec. Ressor, then he called Henry Kissinger and urged him to have the President stay out of the action and not be identified with it. Laird called the White House about it. Zigler read a press statement concerning the action, Admiral Moorer went back to say that the 3rd. Army is the reviewing level there being 11:00 press conference he still questioned why the President had gotten himself personally involved. He said that John Mitchell had advised the President to stay out of it.

NAVY CLIQUES and Hinal (CHECK)

All bureaucratic organizations have their cliques, some of them are so precisely organized that they can almost be called unions. The Navy comprises three unions in so far as the Line Officer community is concerned. The first of these is the union on Naval Aviators, the second is the Union of Submariners this used to be part diesel and part nuclear but now with the phasing out of our diesel submarines it is almost completely monolithic in its nuclear composition. The third Union is the surface Officer Union, comprised of those officers who have served only on destroyers, or amphibious type ships. This union is increasingly generating a subset of officers who are qualified in nuclear propulsion for those increasing number of ships, which are surface combatant nuclear

propelled ships. When it comes time for the Quadrenial change of command in the Navy there has been a tendency among the members of each union to agree among the senior leadership on those one or two leaders who seem likeliest to qualify for the high command and there is always a considerable amount of pulling and hauling in a Bureaucratic way to try to put forward the favorites of each particular union. The Naval Aviation Union had won the sweepstakes three consecutive times after the last great surface warfare Admiral 31 knot Burke completed his six year tenure as Chief of Naval Operations. He was succeeded by Ad. George Anderson who in turn was succeeded by Ad. David L. McDonald who in turn was succeeded by a third distinguished aviator Adm. Tom Moorer. In at least the last two cases it seemed to me there was no reasonable competition for the job in comparasion with the distinguished naval officers who were chosen. As it came time for General Wheller to retire and increasingly there was a conviction within the Naval community that Adm. Tom Moorer would become the Chairman of the JCS, each of the warfare communities again had their favorite or two. In the case of the submarine community, it was clearly Adm. Chick Cleary, in the case of the aviation community it was clearly Adm. Bush Bringle. End of Tape