

~~11-4-74~~

9-1-70

#1 Laird always was very concerned about any White House acquisition of DOD data if it didn't go through him -- probably already knew about K's practices.

#2 Ought to cite this fact in the background account of Jordan buildup.

#3 This grim picture is the same as I saw in my probabilities -- need to quote CJCS by date and situation here.

#4 Pertinent re later USG concern, when Syria invaded Jordan, as part of scheme to radicalize the Jordan regime, and put more pressure on Israel.

#5 Z quote on situation is useful re deteriorating capabilities. My "agreement" with mobilization meant that we would be better off, not that Navy could do the job safely.

#6 JCS had not been permitted to select the timing of the truce. K chose midnight. After dark the UAR and USSR rushed SAM's into the canal area where they weren't supposed to be.

#7 My point here was that we all agreed we couldn't handle a Mid-East crisis with present capability. Therefore, in this real life situation, we should say so and ask for more. Other Chiefs felt we would just infuriate the SECDEF, K, and President.

#8 Note that President felt that even he couldn't get the people alarmed enough to turn the situation around. This tracks with what he said privately to me, one month later, in the 6th Fleet.