

ADDENDUM TO JCS NOTES 8/10/70

Admiral Moorer's objection to the concept of the use of the carrier in the dual role was one of the few splits we had between us on substantive issues. My position was that we had no choice but to combine the ASW and attack roles because of the catastrophic reduction in carrier numbers from 24 to 15, and ultimately headed for 12. Over time, SEC DEF came to support my views and Admiral Moorer in the long run accepted them and we are in the process of making every CVA into a CV, which means that every former attack carrier will be capable of both attack and ASW warfare as the S-3 aircraft are phased into it.

ADDENDUM TO JCS Item 3/26/70

Middle East Task Group

As is revealed by this document, NSC generally tried to create a balance with regard to the equipment being given to Israel, that is, to give her neither too much nor too little, but as mentioned earlier always without extracting any concessions.

Tape Side B
Part 3

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 8/26/70

The radar proposals which General Allison criticizes as too complex in this minute and periodically, is a great credit to the perspicacity of Paul H. Nitze who almost single-handedly fought for radar constraints spelled out in sufficient detail that the Soviets would not easily be able to cheat on ABM upgrading. He persevered and the Soviets ultimately came aboard on the matter.

With regard to the discussion of the SIOP paper, on page 4, after the July 29, 1970, briefing with JCS, I had urged both Admiral Moorer and Mel Laird to get the President and Henry Kissinger briefed on the outcomes of the strategic exchange and this action being discussed on page 4 is the result in part of my .

The analyses being discussed here was the beginning of a long evaluation within the Government, known as N NSPAT, which ultimately led to a new approach to strategic targeting.

With regard to page 5, key point seems to me to be that excessive secrecy hurt our strategic planning badly. That is, the time had long since passed when the excessive secrecy within the Executive Branch was as

important as the need for everybody to know who had any interest just how badly the strategic balance had shifted against us.

Also on page 5, the lack of any reasonable options was evidence of very poor national planning.

My point in suggesting a point paper as^a/better approach to a very sensitive subject was that this would give the chairman the opportunity really to level with SEC DEF on the poor relationship of JSTPS to the JCS.