

Tape Side A
Part 9

ADDENDUM TO JCS ITEM 9/2/70

The U. S. policy of not having a policy is most apparent here
trying to give Israel just enough but not too much in keeping the
cox going.

ADDENDUM TO THE JCS 9/2/70
on NSSM 84

The underlined disregard of the flanks and of the LO is
typical of almost all work done with regard to the NATO-Maritime balance,
and our lack of capability to support either the flanks or the LO
is what makes the Navy so concerned as to the probabilities.

ADDENDUM TO JCS ITEM 9/9/70

Middle East

This describes how the Jordan crisis started and has another very
real life indication of how completely consistent the views of the
majority of the Chiefs were with regard to inability to hack the situation
had we had to go to war in the Middle East. Again, only I continued to
articulate this position outside of the tanks proper, unless Admiral Moorer
did it without reporting to us.

ADDENDUM TO THE 9/17/70 - Meeting at 1000

The worrisome thing about this meeting is that notwithstanding the discussions of the day before, that is, the discussions of the 11th of September, with the State Department representatives in which all the Chiefs, with the exception of the Army, were quite negative as to our capabilities in the Middle East. The President was still considering intervention as of the 17th. Another worrisome thing is that after an interval of five days when the _____ Meeting had to be called early in the morning of the 17th, there was no thought-through plan of action at the national level - all talk and no planning.

It is important to note that the action taken to reinforce the Sixth Fleet, that is, the high speed sailing of Le____ and the sending of Third Carrier Task Force , were not finally decided upon until it became clear that the situation in Jordan was beginning to improve. That is, after dancing all around we made the decision to deploy after it became apparent that we probably wouldn't have to use these forces. In this sense it was

a prudent decision not to call the Russian's bluff before we had the game won, but it emphasis how weak we were.

Tape Side B
Part 2

ADDENDUM TO JCS ITEM 23 September 1970 - 1000
Re: Item 5

The key issue here was the Sixth Fleet was so naked we badly needed UK help, yet because of the political differences we couldn't get ourselves committed to UK help and thus given a veto. This is a key example of how the Nixon doctrine missed the bus.