

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 10/12/70

The item here indicates the triangular nature of negotiations on arms control with the USSR being one point of the triangle, and the Branch Executive/and Congress of the United States being two other corners of the triangle. It makes our problem much tougher.

ADDENDUM TO JCS ITEM 10/14/70
NSC Meeting

The Sherman Treaty being discussed here was one which (I believe) was dragged out until it became useful at the time of the decision to mine Haiphong as one of the ways of keeping the Russians in line.

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 10/26/70

Here, again, the radar issue stands out as one in which Allison is wrong and Nitze was right.

The last three lines urging that the SALT Delegation do a little listening instead of talking deals with a key concern that the JCS had about Kissinger who was moving towards the Soviets almost faster than they had the opportunity to reject our position.

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 11/4/70

This is the third of ten JCS Meetings in the first 18 months I was in office which served to give me great concern about the strategic balance as a result of the examination of outcomes of strategic exchanges. The first two were 7/29/70 and 8/26/70, and the others besides the one of this present date were on 3/10/71, 5/21/71, 8/4/71, 8/7/71, 10/13/71, 12/9/71, and 12/23/71. These ten meetings, plus those that followed prior to the signing of SALT I might well be subject to separate treatment.

Note that in this meeting as in the one on July 29, 1970, I was the one that pressed for civilian authority to get briefed on a very dangerous situation.

ADDENDUM TO JCS NOTE 11/6/70

The long and acrimonious debate between General Chasson and General Stillwell about the Secretary of the Army's letter to SEC DEF, recommending an increase in the rate of Army redeployments from South Vietnam and the retention of a Marine Corps brigade in Vietnam, represented a particularly low blow by the Army. General Chapman, way back when I was Commander of the Naval Forces in Vietnam, on a visit there in response to my request for guidance as to whether the Marines ought to be programmed out early or late, had told me that he intended to consult with General Abrams and support exactly General Abrams' wishes in this. Subsequently, both he and General Abrams had told me that it was their desire to move the Marines out first and the Army out last and all our planning had proceeded on this basis. It was, therefore, a very unethical thing for the Army to turn around and try to redo the situation for budgetary advantage over the Marines after the Commandant had tried so hard to work with General Abrams on it. Also, the whole debate on this particular day is in response to a worthy decision by Dave Packard to consult with the JCS on budget matters that had force level connotations, and the paragraph which quotes my views on

this demonstrates that I was in general support of the phenomenon.