

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 1/18/71

Jerry Smith is for negotiations for the sake of negotiations.

The discussion of mutual assured destruction as late as this date is a surprising move, a beginning to move toward other options. This meeting demonstrates the first high level interest in hard sight.

With regard to the last paragraph on the first page, I agree with Dave Packard.

With regard to the last sentence of the first paragraph of the second page, Kissinger is all sweet reason as he gets ready to tilt further to the USSR position, while pretending to be hard.

With regard to the ICBM paragraph, Helms tended to say what the President and Kissinger wanted said at these briefings, that is, he tilted the intelligence slant somewhat. Also, Smith newell almost killed us in the negotiations. Fortunately, the President didn't buy his attitude.

ADDENDUM TO THE JCS MEM CON 25 January '71 - 1300

This is the third mention of hard sight after I came aboard and these minutes represent the first time I can recall that the question of SALT got into the budget dialogue. Since SALT had been a highly theoretical concept heretofore, it was now beginning to impact on our budget decisions and this also came to hurt us as Congress looked for ways to cut the budget betting on the COM in SALT, whereas the Soviets continued to build.

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 1/27/71

Here, again, we're practicing unilateral disarmament, talking about changes in the budget before we have a negotiation. The subsequent discussion on 1 March 1971 shows that Allison was wrong in his judgment that the JCS supported Option ECHO.

I asked for Secretary Nitze to come in and brief the JCS because I felt that Allison was not giving us accurate information.