

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 3/3/71

The discussion of the time added to decision making by defense of the NCA is an important one worth developing and the last two sentences of the page are important in revealing that over a year before the deal was signed, it seems likely that we were unilaterally being forced to live with high options while the Soviets continue to build.

ADDENDUM TO THE DEBRIEF OF EXECUTIVE SESSION  
of the JCS MEETING 8 March 1971

Note that the Chiefs agreed that we had reached a position in which the SALT negotiators are desirous of negotiating for negotiating sake. This is what the Soviets wait for and they close in quickly for the kill when they see it coming.

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 3/10/71

Page 2 - Laird's proposal to toughen up to negotiations is the result of his great respect for Paul Nitze who was actively urging him to do so.

Secretary Rogers comment at the bottom of that page is a typical Rogers inanity.

With regard to Page 3, the President's view by this date was apparently the best we could get was parity, whereas six months earlier after the Jordan crisis he had told me that he would try for superiority. His philosophy expressed in the second paragraph shows how he came to gamble on SALT I. He was assuming that they would find a mutuality of interests with us.

With regard to what the President said about a declaration of vital interests being tantamount to a declaration of emergency and most difficult to do from a political point of view, this is germane also to Soviet cheating.

ADDENDUM TO 12 March 1971 MEMORANDUM  
FOR THE RECORD

Item 4 is a delightful evidence of parochialism.

With regard to General Voight's comments that the Soviets would not object if the U. S. went to hard siding and would not try to match it, it is already apparent that that judgment was wrong.