

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 5/12/71

The great apparent breakthrough of the Soviet being willing to link a strategic offensive system to the ABM proposal has to be viewed in the light of the caveat they gave that they would not eliminate replacement or modernization of ICBM's currently on hand. It is now clear that the Soviets at that time were really ready to go all out with regard to the replacement and modernization, for new strategic systems.

Allison is still going after complicated radar constraints at this meeting.

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 5/17/71

The U. S. demonstrates too great an eagerness. This is the kind of signal the Soviets look for.

With regard to Mr. Nitze's comments at the bottom of page 1, this "extreme approach" was really a great opportunity missed. The Soviets very great concern about ABM could very probably have gotten us constrained on their new large ICBM's if we had been tough. Instead, these particular notes demonstrated that much too great a sense of eagerness on our part which eroded our opportunity.

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 5/21/71

The whole close nature of the announcement without even the SALT delegation knowing it to be made is a prime example of the way in which secrecy was carried to an excess and in harmful ways.

Note the deceitfulness in the last two sentences of that page.

With regard to page 2, it's unbelievable that we were not familiar with any attempt to limit the new construction of Soviet ICBM's and that we were letting them race off. Also, it is obvious that we paid heavily for the linking of the offensive and defensive forces.

Notice in paragraph 2 of page 2 that the President is asking after his decision how the Chiefs would feel about it.

Also Congress did cut our budget about 5 billion dollars that year as I had forecasted.

Senator Allender was always a great fool about his concerning the Russians. They really took him in as a result of his several visits there.

Can we use what the JCS said about Proxaire here?

Notice that the JCS discuss Soviet lobbying on Capital Hill and other places on page 2.

ADDENDUM TO JCS MINUTES 5/21/71
Re: Mauritius

I had an interesting affair with Mauritius throughout my four years as C&O because of its obvious strategic importance and the need to try to keep it from falling into the Soviet orbit. I worked with Senator Russell Long to insure that the sugar quota for Mauritius was increased, as it was, in order to provide a gesture of U. S. friendship by giving Mauritius, whose major industry is sugar cane, greater access to the U. S. market. This became known to the Mauritians and they were grateful. Later, their foreign minister, (I think he was) had to have heart surgery and I arranged for the U. S. Naval Hospital at Bethesda to provide this care. This individual^{was}/already very pro-U.S. and his gratitude as a result of the care he was given strengthened our ties to him. In 1973, when the sugar quotas were being reconsidered (although subsequently all sugar quotas were dropped), the Mauritians sought my assistance to intervene with Congress in their behalf. I also talked to Congressman Poage about the sugar quota as a result of the 5/21/71 meeting of the JCS.