

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
18 June 1971 - 1000

Note the Congressional constraints on negotiation in the first paragraph.

With regard to the concern that the Chairman, the C&O and the Chief of Staff, Air Force, expressed that anything in the way of an interim agreement having to do with the offensive systems are likely to become a permanent agreement, Paul H. Nitze now believes (November 1974) that Kissinger actually promised the Soviets that they could carry the advantages they got in the interim agreement forward into a permanent agreement. This would be his way of buying ^{on FBS} them/without Congress and the rest of the administration knowing about it.

ADDENDUM TO JCS MINUTES 6/21/71
Re: Iceland and Malta

The situation with regard to both Iceland and Malta, as discussed in these meetings, were matters of concern to me and remained so throughout my four years as will be evident from successive notes through the period. There is a story to be put together about all that I did in connection with Iceland, including the final visit that I made up there in the Spring of 1974, to talk to large numbers of the leaders including about a third of the member of the Althing (Parliament) which Ambassador Irving considered was instrumental in helping us nail down the renewed negotiation for the Base which finally got completed in October of 1974.

Similarly with regard to Malta, I played quite an activist role throughout the period of Mintof's blackmailing of the UK and NATO Governments, even to the extent of contacting both Admiral Johannson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Norway, and Admiral Maaf, the Chief of Staff of the Navy in Holland, to get their support to turn their Governments around with regard to their attitude toward Malta.

The significant thing with regard to both Iceland and Malta was that here, as in so many other places, the Russians were hard at work trying to

help unravel the NATO alliance by seeking through political pressure to force the U. S. out of its base in Iceland and the UK out of its base in Malta as first steps, if necessary decades, in the long process by which they would bring about access to those bases for the USSR.

Tape Side B
Part 9-10

ADDENDUM TO JOF HEPPING 6/30/71

With regard to the items which the Chairman stressed in the next to last paragraph on page 2, we never got what the JCS views were in the final negotiations with the Soviets. We didn't get freedom to match the Soviets in MLEM's and we didn't get freedom to mix.

With regard to page 3, note that Dr. Kissinger surfaces a study on a major item in front of the President with no previous staffing within the Executive Branch. This leads to dangerous conclusions when it hasn't been dealt with in an adversary way.

With regard to Stillwell's conversation with Nitze at dinner,