

Tape # - Side A - Section 1  
(2)

ADDENDUM TO THE 1/7/72 EXECUTIVE SESSION

It took from July 29, 1970 until this date, 18 months later, for the system to work around from the concern that was sewed 18 months earlier to a directive to really study in a formal way the national strategic target attack policy.

Item No. 2 is almost a classic example of the sloppy thinking that led us to grant strategic superiority to the Soviets - quoting as an example.

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ADDENDUM TO THE MEETING WITH THE McCLOY COMMITTEE

FRIDAY, 7 JANUARY 1972

This paper demonstrates several points: <sup>one</sup> the extreme priority which the "Arms Control Community" (?) puts on limiting AVN and the fact that they were against the hard site proposal stems from this preoccupation.

Two, the general acceptability of SRBM's and therefore have accelerated ULMS because of the high survivability of that system.

Three, the Arms Control Community including some of those present who used to be very much mutual assured destruction advocates are now beginning to accept the need for a higher target <sup>kill</sup> capability given the insipient Russian superiority.

Tape # Side A Part 1  
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ADDENDUM TO THE JCS MINUTES OF 1/14/72

The insistence of the Soviets that the inclusion of SLBM's would involve the forward base system was a theme running through this period on negotiations and one which, in retrospect, it is apparent that Kissinger solved by giving the Soviets superiority in central systems without saying that it was for compensation for the FDS. The description of the talker prepared for Laird's breakfast by Tucker is again an example of the way in which the arms controllers tend to try to work against our own country unilaterally in the interests of mankind without paying adequate attention to what the implications of this are as the Soviets gain superiority that is inevitable under such proposals. For example, the arbitrary writing off of 209 soft systems is done on the basis that the U.S. could destroy them in the first strike. Of course, we would never strike first and if the soft systems are fired first, they are just as useful as the hard system. Their willingness to wait three years until it comes apparent to the U.S. that the Soviets are developing a formidable first strike is completely naive and we are giving the Soviets a tremendous head start and the

ADDENDUM TO THE JCS MEETING OF 1/14/72 - Continued

definition of a formidable first strike is something that is just as accurate as the SS9 that has six instead of three warheads would make it almost impossible to conclude that we should go forward with a very formidable Soviet threat that didn't meet that definition.

ADDENDUM TO JCS MINUTES 1/19/72

The problem of implementing the President's decision on accuracy and improvements has always been a tough one. After the August 1971 JCS Meeting with the President, rather during it, the President instructed all the Chiefs to get cracking with accuracy improvements in their strategic systems. Both General Ryan and I came back full of determination to do so. Within a matter of days we were called off by Dave Packard and nothing went forward for many months until a new Secretary of Defense, Jim Schlesinger, came in and changed the policy. The political problem involved was that there was significant school on Capital Hill that felt that we should limit ourselves to mutual assured destruction and there was destabilizing for the United States to try to get hard target kill capability. This political problem was acerbated by the fact that Mr. Laird had assured Senator Brooke in a famous letter that he would not get (the Defense Department would not get) a hard target kill capability. Hence, this political viewpoint in Congress

and this assurance from the Secretary of Defense were obstacles as it became more and more apparent around town that the Soviets were proceeding to get their own hard target kill capability and that we would be left with no way to retaliate against a disarming first strike except to hit their cities which would be no recourse at all.

ADDENDUM to 1/21/72 JCS MINUTES

The last paragraph indicates that even this late the Navy is still nervous about hard sight defense. Retrospectively, I regret that I was so slow in getting aboard on this.

ADDENDUM TO JCS MINUTES 1/28/72

By this time I am not opposing the HSD (Hard Sight Defense Option).

In addition to Admiral Moorer's point about the psychological edge in diplomatic confidence, our studies of course indicated that we didn't have the weapons to destroy all the Russians once in a second strike.