

ADDENDUM TO THE JCS MINUTES OF 3 March 1972

Need to get a clear copy of this set of minutes but the key issue here was the length of time of the interim offensive agreement, with the rest of the Chiefs holding out for a shorter period of time and my preferring a five-year period of time. I compromised with the Chiefs on a shorter period of time with the SLEM's to be included and insisted on a longer period of time if the SLEM's were not to be included, because it would have permitted the Soviets at the end of the shorter period of time to have maximum leverage on us with a major SLEM construction program on our own Trident program not yet able to produce.

Note that in the first paragraph of the second page, in conflict with what I said earlier, I am still opposing hard sight defense as of this date.

With regard to the last paragraph of page two, this technique of holding up positions that the JCS requested be sent to the President was used throughout the four years by everyone of the Secretaries of Defense. In this case and some others the information was transmitted but not the official document which let the NSC Staff get a position back over,

or they desired to, as in the case of the comprehensive test ban treaty, which reaffirmed a decision and, therefore, made it particularly inappropriate for the official JCS advice to come across the river. In this way the NSC staff could maintain the position that they had never been informed of the JCS views.

ADDENDUM TO JCS NOTES 3/10/72

The Navy CNOM here was kicked off by me personally to try to solve the basic organizational problem. It had caused us by this time nearly two years of delay in getting on with a sound and analytical approach to national strategic targeting policy, as evidenced by the arguments over strategic reserve. With the Commander of the JSTPS (that is, the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff) being the same man as the Commander of SAC and, therefore, always an Air Force General, and with the key billets on JSTPS being Air Force officers double hatted to the SAC Staff, there was no way that the Three Star Navy Deputy would be able to really get objectivity put into the system. It was clear to me that only by moving the JSTPS to Washington where it could be ripped apart from SAC's parochialism could we ever begin to solve the problem on a national basis. Unfortunately, the Chairman, Admiral Moorer, was not anxious to take on this issue, given all his other problems, and we never were able to get it resolved.

The Chiefs' action on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was our

effort to continue to provide advice to the President which we considered he badly needed, despite the re-affirmation that had been made of his decision to go for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - a re-affirmation that was made before the President was permitted officially to receive a previous JCS position.

Tape Side A  
Part 6

ADDENDUM TO JCS ITEM 3/13/72

The briefing on post-nuclear attacks' study is graphic demonstration of how far we are from a "over kill - killing the Soviets many times over" situation for one realistic set of assumptions, and this is a point that needs to be made.

ADDENDUM TO JCS MINUTES 3/29/72

This particular NSDM, referred to under the SALT discussion, <sup>the</sup> is/one that been a long way - I think, practically all the way - toward overruling Option ECHO which had survived since August of the previous year, and this new decision laid the base for the deal that came to pass in May of '72. It makes it quite clear that General Ryan and Admiral Moorer shared my view that we had accepted inferiority and that we would have a very tough time peddling this deal to the Congress.