

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 5/31/- 6/1/72

Notice that the Chiefs' preoccupation with the safeguard and concern for the requirement for additional programs, all indicate a feeling of reaction to a tremendous strategic defeat - not euphoria over a strategic balance.

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 6/12/72

The essential point out of this long discussion by the JCS is that all of us were quite concerned that the General Purpose Forces needed to get some further impudence if any money was to be picked up from the strategic program since we were entering a era when the Soviets would have strategic superiority and the importance of our general purpose forces would, therefore, grow.

Further notes that on the last page I am specifically concerned about the impact of SALT on the Soviet general force capability because to the extent they are limited from building beyond 62 strategic submarines, they will be able to build more attack submarines and this will be a bigger threat to our sealines of communication.

ADDENDUM TO THE JCS ITEM 6/14/72  
and Monday June 19, 1972

In both cases the strong reluctance of the CINCPAC Command to remove carrier from the Mediterranean is typical of the situation with regard to NATO where all of the southern flanks, , and indeed those in the center and Army commanders, feel that anytime we go from 2 carrier task forces down to one the political and military situation in the Mediterranean is weakened quite badly. The Italian authorities have gone so far as to say the complete removal of the Sixth Fleet would cause the Italian Government to fall promptly.

As indicated in the items for 6/21/72, the Navy has always believed that we should be flexible about removing a carrier from time to time from the Sixth Fleet, although we too would worry about doing it permanently.

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 6/19/72

The action taken by Mel Laird in getting up before Congress before he had OMB and Presidential support to put forward/strategic additional programs in time to get into the budget of Hebert's Armed Services Committee was an act of courage and political acumen that helped us a great deal with regard to strategic programs, and one of the most courageous acts of any Cabinet member on my watch.

Note that here nearly three weeks after the signing, we're still confused as to what the official interpretations are and still learning things about it like the exclusion of the G-class submarines.

My comments about the persuasive nature of the statements of Dr. Kissinger and the President indicating what the situation would have been in five years if we hadn't gotten the agreement, and if the Soviets had proceeded at the pace at which they would have been going, were given in the light of discussions as to make the best case with which to support

a Presidential decision, and should not be interpreted as meaning that I believed that we had gotten a good deal. In actual fact, I think it is a very neat point as to whether or not the agreement slowed the Soviets down very much, if at all.

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 6/21/72

Notice that Kissinger thinks out on linkage at this point, although he had assured both Admiral Moorer and me privately that there was a linkage. Fortunately, the President has taken the attitude that there is a linkage although he wasn't quite as clear and precise as Laird. Laird continues to take a very courageous, hard line.

With regard to the last paragraph, the Soviets never admitted in any way the total number of ICBM's that would constitute their ceiling, which leaves me to believe that they have already visualized given that strange attitude toward that they wanted a loophole in order to be able to cheat.