

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 7/7/72

Assurance Paper Follow on

The interesting aspect of this long and parochial discussion is that after very high-level and national-level development of assurances, the Chiefs began to quibble a little bit about the specific kinds of hardware that would be necessary for the assurances. However, more important than that is the fact that the concern that everybody felt not to have general purpose for its program done in by this budget re-optimization as a result of SALT, demonstrated that not only were we in trouble strategically but that everybody recognized that we were in trouble with regard to conventional forces as well.

ADDENDUM TO 12 July 1972 OP DEPT MEETING

The last paragraph of the last page on Assurances demonstrates the great concern that I had for the much greater importance of maintaining our conventional capability for recovering it in the light of the disastrous agreement that had been made on SALT.

Tape Side A
Part 9

ADDENDUM TO 7/14/72 MEETING

The Army and Navy fall off in support of accuracy showed that
virtue triumphs over parochialism.

ADDENDUM TO JCS MEETING 7/14/72

The concern expressed by the individual members of the JCS as opposed to the Chairman about how the Senate Armed Services Committee would react were proved to be accurate. Senator Jackson considered that the testimony by the individual members of the JCS less Zumwalt, who was not there at the time and testified later, was very bad and equivocated and dodged all around the issues and was not informed. In actual fact, the Chiefs were in a tough predicament being loyalists and not wanting to get across the breakers with the President, but also having the problem of a difference between the President and the Secretary of Defense.

I stuck to the position to which I adhered throughout my tenure that I was not going to pussyfoot with the Congress and I gave my views as accurately as I could which were that the deal only made sense if it were recognized as just the best we could get, and that we had better be funding strategic programs at the rate submitted by

the President if we were going to get a better deal in round two.

I believe that this whole problem and the testimony as it was given is a matter that is worth expanding upon because it goes right to the heart of the joint responsibilities of the Executive Branch and the Congressional Branch, and the requirement upon the Chiefs to give their best military advice to the Congress. The fact of the matter is that all of us had to waffle (?) it a little bit and some more than others.

There's a lot of fascinating material on this in the Hearings that took place.

ADDENDUM FOR THE JCS MEETING 19 July 1972

This is a watershed meeting for a number of reasons: (1) It demonstrates that it took two full years to get to the point of getting a civilian recommendation endorsing the concept of a strategic reserve, and that there were still another 18 months or so to go until the actual targeting resulting from that decision would be implemented, or nearly three and a half years to accomplish an important turn around in strategic policy, (2) the comments of _____ reveal the hazards of bringing a group of civilians (study groups) in who are not in the line of responsibility, as was Laird and the President, because Johnny Foster was pushing his own party line independent of what the President and the Secretary of Defense had said they wanted, as was Dr. Tucker. In other words, neither one of them looked at it from the standpoint of the civilian policy but rather from the standpoint of their own prejudices.

With regard to the paragraph on GPS programs, this demonstrates the way in which I was constantly trying to relate our maritime advantage to

the overall national problem. By that I mean that the point we had been making throughout my watch of the lack of U. S. maritime capabilities to perform its mission in the confrontation with the Soviet Union needed to be made again at this watershed point when we were accepting a SALT arrangement which would lead to strategic inferiority, and we needed constantly to recommend programs however slight the chances were that they would be accepted.

With regard to the paragraph on relative advantage, the only important point to note is that the NSC was requesting the Chief to define "relative advantage" after many years in which the Chiefs and JSTPS had in _____ and tasked with the responsibility of handling SIOP planning in such a way that the exchange outcome resulted in "relative advantage" for the U. S.

With regard to the JCS Meetings on page 4 out of 5, the first thing to note is that the forecasts about the rough time in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee were accurate and, second, SIOP briefing again

provides unfavorable results but the ABM's are fairly easy to over-
power at the levels that are authorized. It could be a different matter
if the Soviets do massive cheating.