

15/1.11-24 Lists the weather information inquiries made in preparation for the China project: 1) requesting the OSI hindcast study; 2) speaking with Royal Observatory in Hong Kong and Meteo in Guangzhou. States the OSI hindcast study was requested in 1980. States they spoke with the Royal Observatory in 1979 and with Meteo in October of 1982.

negy - JKW

16/1.14 - 117 States his contact in 1979 with the Royal Observatory was HIS first familiarity with typhoon seasons, stating he first received information from them in June or July of 1979. States he knew when the typhoon season was for the South China Sea as early as mid-1979.

neg - JKW, LK

20 States he knew before the typhoon season of 1983 that the Arco drilling concession was in an area susceptible to typhoons.

neg 1/17 - JKW

23/1.12-19 States Arco discussed with Global Marine where the rig would be used and what weather conditions it would face, and Global, "who was the operator and the experts, raised no objections".

negy - LK, JKW, LK

Arco Sea CA

24 Reiterates that Global Marine was told the JAVA SEA would be going to China and operating in the South China Sea and Global raised no objections.

do

26/1.23 - 128/1.19 States there was some discussion as to whether or not the JAVA SEA would be utilized in the South China Sea during typhoon season. States these discussions were in the Los Angeles office, and that he would guess the people involved would be: Fei, Prindible, Cook and Ritter. States he recalls seeing a letter with respect to these discussion. States Dr. Evans was also in on the discussion.

negy - LK, JKW, J

28/1.24 129/1.16 States Dr. Evans was given the task of seeing if the vessel could work in the South China Sea on a year round basis, and what downtime could be expected if it did. States he saw Dr. Evans' report prior to the JAVA SEA arriving in China. States he recalls the gist of Dr. Evans report was that IF it was used on a year-round basis than greater downtime could be expected which would correlate to the typhoon season.

negy - Dept of State, JKW, J

29/1.17-25 States he recalls Dr. Evans' statement that the "JAVA SEA should not be considered for year-round use, states at that time Arco was thinking of using it in the South China Sea part of the time and then someplace else part of the time.

negy - LK, JKW, J

31 States DR. EVANS' report would have been forwarded to the Arco China offices in either Zianjiang or Hong Kong by Fei.

negy - LK

32-133 States he also recalls a letter from Mr. Ritter which summarized Dr. Evans' comments about the loss of excess time during certain times of the year due to weather conditions.

negy

34/1.20 136/1.13 States he did a downtime analysis himself, coming to the conclusion that a considerable amount of time would be lost during the year due to weather - which would primarily coorelate with the typhoon season, but that there was some weather-related downtime outside of the typhoon season. States most of the downtime would occur between July and December.

negy - JKW, LK

37

Defines "downtime" as the time when progress on the drilling of the well is ~~not~~ not proceeding. It includes time lost for weather, securing the rig and making the preparations to get back to a drilling mode.

safety
submers
38/1.18 -
141

States the reason you have downtime is that there is a possibility of it being unsafe to pursue drilling activities.

States Dr. Evans did not address the issue of safety, but was an analysis of the time that Arco could expect ~~the~~ the drilling rig not to be drilling.

do
42

States his ~~any~~ analysis was strictly on economics.

do
43/1.1-7

States it was to see how much downtime Arco could expect and because of that, to see how long it would take Arco to do the work.

43/1.15 -
144/1.5

States his analysis was to compare the downtime expected of the JAVA SEA to that of other types of drilling vessels in the South China Sea, and mentions the SANTA FE 135 and the OCKER H# H3, both semisubmersibles.

44

States the 2 semisubmersibles would probably have been available for use in the South China Sea in 1983.

47

negly

States the typhoon plan was a guide, and that if the certain things contained within the plan were carried out, then some lives could be saved. States the reason the typhoon plan was developed in the first place was to make preparations in the event of a typhoon, so that people would know what actions to make.

from negly - called
48/1.9
149/1.11

States the typhoon plan was Arco China procedure and that it was part of his job to see that it was followed ~~xxxxxxx~~.

50

negly

States he was on the rig on 10/20/83, and that Mr. Lawrence was on the rig on that date also. States on that date he knew Brockman was going to Hong Kong and that Mr. Lawrence was to be in charge.

52

negly

Agrees that Lawrence's duties, among other things, was to know what was going on at the rig as it pertained to safety.

53

negly

States he understood the captain of the rig to be a Global Marine employee, and that he reported to and was supervised by Lawrence, in Brockman's absence.

54-155

negly procedure
to prevent

States had Mr. Lawrence felt the weather conditions were unsafe, that he had the authority to stop the operations. States that Lawrence could discuss the evacuation with the captain, but that he couldn't envision under any condition a circumstance when the captain would order an evacuation if the captain did not agree with the evacuation himself.

55/1.15-17
negy - p/m

States Lawrence could INSTRUCT the captain to evacuate the personnel, but the captain would not have to follow the instructions.

55/1.21 -
61/1. 17
negy - p/m

Discussion of whether Lawrence, acting in Brockman's absence, would have the authority to relieve the captain. Finally does admit that someone in Global's employ at Brockman's level or higher does have the authority to relieve any one of the Global employee's in the China project, including the captain.

62-163

Discussion of Chu Exhibit 3, and states Brockman had the authority to request that the captain be replaced.

66

States he assumed Lawrence would do all those duties which were required on a day-to-day basis.

67
negy - LR

States Fry would screen all the weather reports and that he would bring those reports he believed were significant to the witness' attention. States he assumes the first one Fry brought to his attention was that of 10/22/83, the one that came in the morning.

68

States 10/22/83 was the first day back in the office for him.

6168/1.12 -
169
negy

States parts of Phase I of the Typhoon Plan would be implemented if the Meteo weather report reported a Typhoon within 1200 miles, and parts of phase II would be implemented when the Meteo services reported a typhoon within 1000 miles.

70

States Fry would begin tracking the storm on a map when a tropical depression was identified, that this was also the custom on the JAVA SEA.

71

States there must have been other people in the helicopter with him when he came back from the rig on 10/21/83 as this was a regular crew change day.

72
negy - p/m

States that as far as he knows everyone coming ashore on that day was relieved by someone ~~not~~ coming to the rig (i.e., no evacuation took place).

73
negy - GM, ARW

States when he left the rig on 10/21 that there was not a list of nonessential personnel made, and that there was no typhoon procedure thought about.

75
negy - Skypud

States the typhoon plan was a GUIDE listing certain available options, that it wouldn't be absolutely followed. States the findings listed on the Meteo Services weather reports would "focus the decision makers' attention" on the pertinent phases of the typhoon plan.

77

Discussion of his ~~fix~~ definition of the use of the word "near" by Meteo Services.

79
negy

States they knew Guangzhou was more accurate than Hong Kong weather reporting, but that still Guangzhou could not predict the exact path of the typhoon. Guangzhou's predictions of the typhoon path could not relied upon 100 percent.