

REFLECTIONS ON FIRST PHASES OF SALT

Using JCS Notes and Other Forms of Assistance

July 10, 1970

My best recollection is that I was concerned that Option E had been signed by the President without any input from the JCS or SEC DEF. This concern was not based so much on the substance of the issue with which at that time I was not too familiar, but rather with the strong conviction carried over from the 1962-1963 period which I had served as Director of Arms Control in the Office of Secretary of Defense, that it was mandatory to have JCS support in order for successful and responsible arms control agreement to be achieved.

July 13, 1970

After being briefed by Admiral Moorer on NSDM 69, that it had been worded in such a way that a reduction in bombers was required and that no new silos could be constructed and the seriousness of the latter, since it denied the U.S. the opportunity of the two-way flow to build the large megatonnage missiles which the Soviets already had, while at the same time forcing the U. S. to give up its superiority in bomber megatonnage - I recall making a mental note to myself that I had to get the C&O Executive panel cranked up and to increase the rate at which I would personally make myself familiar with these matters, together with the members of the CEP.