

RICE AND ZUMWALT ON SALT

R. Well, the first thing I think you ought to talk about is just how the Chiefs come to whatever conclusions they come to about the kinds of weapons, weapons systems and forced levels and everything are necessary, how they reach whatever decisions they reach about the proper level of arms limitation of the proper quid pro quos, what are the techniques that are used to arrive at, what is the data base that is used?

Z. I I guess the first point to make is that you are always working not from zero but from what you have and what the other side has and you're looking at incremental changes, estimating what kinds of improvements the other side will make, and calculating then what kinds of improvements you ought to make, and looking at various cost levels to get it down into a cost area that's feasible.

R. So intelligence about the other side is ?

Z. Yes it is, and Albert Wolfsetter's studies have indicated, our intelligence hasn't always been that good with regard to our estimate of the Soviets and in general with regard both to the strategic development and with regard to Soviet Maritime developments we have tended to under-estimate, not to over-estimate.

R. Well, why don't you talk a little about one of the recurrent things about intelligence; the problem of capability vis-a-vis the intention, you know intention does have some significance, doesn't it, or an estimate of

intention.

2. With regard to calculating what the enemy's forces are going to be in a year or two or three or four or five, intentions have something to do with it; that is, if they intend to improve their capability they are going to and we always have tended to credit the Soviets with the desire to improve their total capability - and they have - and we usually haven't credited them with doing quite as much as they're going to do. The more common use of the term "intention" is what are the Soviets going to do with the capabilities that they've got and with regard to that, a military man continually finds himself warning his civilian superiors not to be misled by what present intentions may seem to be. They can turn around just as rapidly as, for example, in September and October of 1962, the Soviets assuring the United States at every level and convincing the United States at every level they were not going to install missiles in Cuba while they were, in fact, in the process of doing so. Those who worried about the capability of the Soviets to do it and who looked at their long-term aspirations did feel that the Soviets were probably going to do it. Two of those were Paul Nitze and Mr. McCone, head of the CIA at the time. So, the problem then is to worry about what the Soviets can do with their capability if their intentions suddenly become very hostile.

R. I would like to get this one down more refined, really. Is it the business of the Chiefs only to worry about capabilities and let the politicians, the White House, the State Department, whoever, worry about intentions, in the ...?

Z. No. I think probably the problem is that when one lets himself get driven into a discussion of intentions versus capabilities, it tends to become too simplistic a treatment. Clearly, the Chiefs must worry about the political ramifications of military capability just as the people in the State Department must worry about the military implications of foreign policy and both sides have constantly to be concerned about the inner face and the real sophisticated viewpoint, I think, has to be what is the long-term objective of potential adversaries and how do they propose to get there with a combination of power and policy, and do significant changes in the power balance lead to significant changes in policy and are they likely to, just because the power differential is there. To bring it then relevant and close to home at the present time, there are kind of two schools of thought about detente. One is that school in this country which suggests that because the Soviets are giving us the perception that they want to get along we can afford to reduce our military capabilities and our military expenditures, and the other school is that that believes that this is part of the Soviet tactic to get us to reduce our defenses so that they can change

their foreign policy approach to be more aggressive and to be the one that takes greater risks, and we will lack the capability to deter those foreign policy initiatives when they come to pass. Should I go back, Bob, and talk about the way in which the Joint Chiefs work on this problem or do you have some more questions in this area first?

R. Well, I'm still a little confused about it. Maybe it's simpler than I think it is. The Chiefs are almost in a position, it seems to me, of saying, "Here is what the Soviet Union has and in order to meet them, in order to have the decent chance of being able to handle them, we have to have so and so." One constraint on this is, of course, a budgetary economic constraint which everybody has to live with. That I understand perfectly well. I still don't see where, if any place, the whole idea of intention comes in or should come in, even.

Z. Let me take another crack at it, this way. The Chiefs clearly, as a body, have had the view that a country - the United States - which has twice the Gross National Product of the Soviet Union can afford to spend more dollars per year than the Soviet Union for defense; second, they have had the view - and the intelligence community now backs this up - that over time we have been driven to a situation in which we are spending less dollars than this country

with half our Gross National Product; third, we have the view that they - the Soviet Union - are and proclaim to be, an offensive alliance, which had as its objective undoing the free-world way of life, whereas the free world, and the United States is the primary underpinning of that, is and proclaims to be a defensive alliance, dedicated to the preservation of world order and stability, and that the difference in the policy objectives of these two alliances suggests that the United States ought to have more military capability, and our Gross National Product suggests that we have the capability to have it and, therefore, there is continual talk about the consequences of letting your capability retrogress until it's inferior in the face of this offensive alliance. Now, obviously, as the balance begins to change, you can't put micrometers on it and state exactly at what point the Soviets are going to make the policy decision that they can be more aggressive on day 10 than they were on day 1, but over time their military will be urging their leaders to take advantage of their superiority and their leaders dedicated to an aggressive field ....

R. What's your data base for saying their military will be urging their leaders to take advantage, when your military is not urging our leaders to take pre-emptive action of any kinds, is it?

- Z. No. If one reads what their military leaders write they believe the dogma of their Communist Party just as we believe the dogma of our Democratic leadership. We military in this country, believe that the objectives of the United States and our allies should be that of a defensive alliance dedicated to the existing world order, and the Soviet military believe that the Soviet Union is the forerunner of the way to the future and they ought to be taking advantage of their capability and their writings proclaim it. And the ominous thing is, over time, over the last four or five years, one sees a subtle shift in the flavor of their writings from one of pessimism about their current capabilities to one of great optimism about their current capabilities.
- R. Of course, we have had some pre-emptive worriers in our time, Curtis LeMay and people like that.
- Z. That's right. Ours, however, tend to be the aberration, the exception to the rule, whereas on the Soviet side they are, I think, the general rule.
- R. O.K. That's probably as far as we go right now but I ...
- Z. Just one other point in that regard, Bob, and that is that the Soviet military play a much more significant role in the political process than U. S. military. The Soviet military are a major \_\_\_\_\_ that has to be courted by a prospective Soviet leader as he is struggling to get ahead in each interregnum after a leader dies or is ousted and, in the case of both Khrushchev when he

took over and Breshnev as he was taking over, it was clear that they had to make their alliances with the military in order to get the power.

R. Yes, they have longer tenure, too.

Z. That's right.

R. They are more permanent part of the apparatus. Well, once you have decided to your own satisfaction what the resources of the potential enemy are, how do you figure out what you need to offset..?

Z. This takes me back to a description of the process that you go through which I have described as a departure marginally or incrementally from where you are and, second, as one of the series of reiterated insights. Let me discuss first the strategic field.

R. Keep to the strategic field now, because we're talking about SALT.

Z. In the strategic field, several times during the year the Joint Chiefs are briefed on outcomes of war games that have been played in which the United States uses the reasonable functions for the kind of targeting strikes that would be initiated in wartime, and this is called a SIOP (Single Integrated Option Plan, I'm not quite positive of that acrostic) and played against it is the RIOP (Russian Integrated Option Plan) and the outcomes are analyzed. We look at ....

- R. How does that...is it possible to describe so that a dope like me can understand it. How such a game gets played?
- Z. You know, one makes a series of assumptions..
- R. Give some examples of assumptions.
- Z. We have a certain scheme laid down by the Joint Strategic Targeting Plan out at Omaha under the Commander of the Joint Strategic Targeting System, who is doubled hatted as the Commander of SAC, and who has a Navy Deputy and an integrated JSTPS Staff, comes up with a constantly improved plan as we get new weapons and more warheads, etc., for how we would integrate all of our weapons into a strike against the Soviet Union, and ....
- R. This means that you would go for x-ity, x-factory, x-weapons sights, x-strategic area, specific places that you would try to hit.
- Z. That's right. And there are then, based on lots of study and analysis, assumptions as to how many of the minutemen would get off if you were involved in a second strike; and how many Tarus or Poseidon missiles would be at sea to get off and how many of those would be within range, because some would be transiting to the area; how many SAC bombers would get off; and these are played in the relevant surviving numbers against the key targets that you choose to meet whatever the particular plan called for.

R. Then there's the problem of getting through defenses, too.

Z. That's right. There's then the plan of how many will get through the terminal defenses, the bombers - some of them would not get through - if the Russians haven't cheated, most of the missiles would get through, etc., and then, you know, assumptions are made as to how much damage is caused by these warheads exploding on the target, and it's all totalled up to ascertain what is the total amount of urban industrial damage. You look at a percentage of population killed, the percentage of industry destroyed, you look at how many military targets are destroyed, etc. on both sides and one tries to make a judgment:

(a) as to who wins, if any word like that can be used about something as disastrous as the millions of people dead on both sides, etc., and

(b) does the United States still have the capability to create a level of killed and damaged that could be judged to be a deterrent to the Soviet for making its first strike. Now, in addition, you also look from time to time during the year at studies of the relative capabilities of both sides to recover from these strikes which involve an analysis of the civil defense preparations that they are making versus

the zero efforts on our side; the dispersal of industries, etc.; the dispersal of population and the differences therein which make a difference in the rate at which one can recover, etc.; and you try to make some judgment as to how fast each side could recover from this damage...

R. What does recover mean exactly? Start the factories producing again?

That kind of thing?

Z. My recollection is that it gives you a number of years by which a given society would return to the level of production that existed before the strike occurred, and exactly the specific standard that is used.

R. And when you have done that, then what do you do? Well, <sup>if</sup> we had 27 more missiles we would be able to be in a much better position, that sort of analysis?

Z. Yes, there is each year a JSOP, which means Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, in which the Services - as kind of a committee and, therefore, somewhat inefficiently - .....

R. That's where they wrangle most....with that one....

Z. That's right. Try to come up with what is the level of weaponry that would make a significant change in the outcome, and then there is a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, called JSCAP, which calculates what your capabilities actually are in the light of all these calculations.