

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

On a few occasions in my lifetime, I have had too much to drink. The last one occurred on the night of October 20, 1962. Mike Ricinak, my First Executive Officer, with whom beginning in 1959, I had commissioned and "shaken down" the "world's first guided missile frigate," U.S.S. Dewey, and his wife, Rose, had had a reunion of the Dewey Ward Room Officers and their ladies. The sea stories and the reminiscences had re-kindled the excitement of our service together and the party continued until 3 a.m. At 7 a.m. on Sunday, October 21, 1962, my telephone rang. Mouza answered it and passed it to me. It was Mrs. Margaret Martin, the private secretary to my boss, Paul Nitze, relaying instructions from Mr. Nitze. I was to come to the office at once, on an urgent matter. By 9 a.m. I found myself entering Paul Nitze's office accompanied by several others who had also been summoned. These included Henry Rowan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, a brilliant economist and political scientist; Colonel Tom Wolf, U.S. Air Force, Director of the Soviet Affairs Division, already a noted criminologist; Professor William Kaufman, a consultant for MIT; Daniel Ellsberg, a Rand consultant; and one or two others. Paul Nitze, and his principal Deputy, Bill Bundy, who was the older brother of McGeorge Bundy, the Special

Assistant to the President for National Security Matters, broke the shocking news that Soviet nuclear missiles capable of reaching the United States had been installed in Cuba in violation of the most solemn assurances that they would not be placed there. Paul Nitze traced the story as it was then known.

He reminded us that he had become personally concerned that the Soviets were secretly installing these missiles in Cuba in early August of that year after listening to an intelligence briefing given by a U.S. Navy Captain who was an analyst in the Defense Intelligence Agency. This Captain had reported the arrival in Cuba, between July 26 and August 8, of eight Soviet block ships. Others were arriving after that date. Those that had arrived carried large quantities of transportation, electronic and construction equipment - communications and radar. Other analysts in CIA and DIA had concluded that the equipment was to provide improved coastal and air defenses and possibly surface-to-air missiles, but both Paul Nitze and John McCone, Director of CIA, tended to support the conclusion that the only reasonable hypothesis to be drawn from the shipment of such matters was that the Russians were preparing to introduce offensive missiles.

Paul Nitze recalled the concern he had reported when U-2 reconnaissance

confirmed the first surface-to-air missile (SAM) installed on 29 August in Cuba, considering that to be a harbinger of a descent net to protect offensive missile installations. He had, therefore, strongly urged that the U. S. Government make clear to the Russians that offensive missiles would not be permitted in Cuba, and that after President Kennedy had issued 4 September warning to the Soviets they had again on 11 September disclaimed any hostile intent.

"There is no need, for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other country, for instance Cuba,"

is what the Soviets