

29 November

1. Also K. stresses that he felt that MIRV's and ABM's were inevitably linked in SALT and that we must freeze MIRV's if we could freeze ABM's.
2. K. spoke again about his pleasure that he was able to overturn the bureaucracy to keep SALT going, last August. I suggested that one could always be succesful in negotiating with the Russians if willing to move to their position. He smiled and said, "Only three-quarters of the way." I urged that we take longer to debate the Soviets on each position and not move too fast. K. said, "That's easy for you to say, you don't have to run for re-election."
3. K. is convinced that Soviet intransigence at Helsinki is a result of splits in the Presidium. I gave him my Soviet succession thesis and pointed out that Breshnev is too clearly in command for this to be a likely prospect. I came out that the Soviets are waiting for us to move to them.